

EUROPE AND
THE EAST



NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS

COLLEGE OF THE PACIFIC



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VOLUME TWO

EUROPE AND THE EAST

BY

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"If a man take no thought about what is distant,
he will find sorrow near."

Confucian Analects, XV, XI.



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THIS WORK
IS AFFECTIONATELY AND RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED
TO MY BROTHER
ALBERT WADSWORTH HARRIS

PREFACE

As originally planned, this work was to have been a study of the relations of Western powers with Eastern states and of Asiatic politics and development during a definite historical period, that is, from 1850 to 1910. The World War and its aftermath, including the awakening of the whole Orient and the beginning of new and important developments in Asia, has necessitated bringing the text up to date. In narrating events connected with the movements in the different sections of the great field covered here, an attempt has been made to tell, as far as possible, a complete story. But in some instances — particularly in the case of Persia and of China, where affairs are still in a state of transition — this could not be done. Nevertheless, in spite of drawbacks, it has been deemed worth while to relate the story of European expansion and intervention in Asia and the Pacific Ocean in one concise and readable volume, so that the entire movement may be seen in its proper perspective, and so that the main facts will be available to students of international politics and to intelligent readers who desire to understand present-day movements and conditions in the East.

The difficulties involved in handling the enormous mass of material relating to Asiatic political and commercial activities through a period of eighty years and in dealing properly with the multitudinous historical events of the present time and year have not been underestimated. The task of elimination has been greater than that of composition; and the liability to error in matters both of fact and of judgment has been higher than is usual in historical writing. Yet if the story has been accurately and justly told, if he who runs

may see and comprehend, and if some assistance has been given in enabling Occidentals to understand the East and in bringing the Occident and the Orient into closer association and coöperation in the noble labor of creating the great civilization of the future, this work will not have been in vain.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dr. Benjamin B. Wallace for reading the entire manuscript and for many valuable suggestions, to Professor E. T. Williams for a critical review of the chapters dealing with the Far East, and to his colleague, Professor Kenneth W. Colegrove, for assistance in the collection of material for the chapters on India and Japan.

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EUROPE AND THE EAST



CHAPTER I

WORLD POLITICS IN THE EAST

THE relations of Europe and Asia, although more or less continuous for several centuries, have assumed the proportions of a real and intimate intercourse only in recent times. The actual transformation of Asia, with its isolation, its superstition, its inertia, and its indifference to the life, the trade, and the politics of the outside world, into a continent of modern communities, dates from that day in January, eighty years ago, when the British frigates bombarded the Bogue forts, and opened a door in China to international trade. Since then, Asiatic states have become members of the family of nations, exchanged ambassadors with all their sister communities, and participated in the great political, economic, commercial, educational, and even religious movements of the times; while the little stream of trade which was borne by caravans and sailing vessels to the distant East has swelled into a tremendous current flowing continuously over land and sea. And the locomotive, the ocean greyhound, the telegraph, the telephone, and the wireless have brought Europe and Asia into such close touch that they have to-day more than a speaking acquaintance.

Meanwhile, the best — and alas! the worst — elements of European Christian civilization were being carried to the Orient, and an ill-advised attempt to Europeanize Asiatic peoples and countries was inaugurated. This movement,

however, outside of the private enterprise of Christian individuals and institutions, was far from being philanthropic and disinterested, even in its inception. From the days when Marco Polo, Vasco da Gama, and their confrères crossed the deserts of Asia and ploughed the Indian and Pacific Oceans in search of adventure and profit, it had been largely a selfish and commercial affair. And, for upwards of three centuries, intercourse between the West and the East had been left to the uncontrolled initiative or caprice of the individual trader, or of commercial corporations such as the British and Dutch East India Companies. The traders were, in the main, well-intentioned; and the action and ambition of many an agent and leader were thoroughly honorable and disinterested. A few, such as Sir Stamford Raffles at Singapore, the Count of Lally-Tollendal in India, and Lord Napier at Canton, sacrificed their careers, ambitions, and even lives, to promote the interests of their home countries and to establish honorable relations with the natives of Eastern lands. But too often the trading companies and their representatives proved as soulless and as unscrupulous as some of our modern corporations; and the methods and means employed to promote their interests aroused the suspicion and enmity of Orientals. And the unthinking, brutal acts of half-drunken European sailors and soldiers, when ashore or on duty in Eastern lands, and the deceitful, illegal proceedings of European merchants, who showed frequently a haughty disdain of all things Oriental and an open disrespect for those things held sacred by the natives of the East, created a hostility to Westerners in many quarters which has survived to the present day.

Such a legacy was not a happy one for the European governments, when they began to take over the supervision

and control of foreign intercourse in the East, along toward the middle of the nineteenth century. Nor were the circumstances attending this movement auspicious in other particulars. The Peking Government and the Chinese provincial officials opposed strenuously all attempts of the British to open official trade relations with China; and the so-called "Opium War" resulted. In India, the administration of the British East India Company was nearly overthrown by the Sepoy Rebellion before the English Government took over the direction of affairs. And, in the Near East, when intervention by foreign powers in Turkish affairs was first proposed, a conflict of interests led Great Britain and France to take sides with the Ottoman Empire against Russia in that stupid conflict known as the Crimean War.

Even after the European governments had assumed direct control of their own colonial activities, and of the forward movement in Africa and the East, little improvement was noticeable for many years in the conduct of relations between European and Asiatic states. For, with the growth of Western states in wealth and power, national ambition and avarice soon eclipsed all sense of justice and honor. An unscrupulous competition for commercial privileges, trade monopolies, markets, and economic concessions ensued, in which diplomatic intrigues, intimidation, bribery, and force were universally employed, on the basis that the end justifies the means. And all the European powers of the first class, and some other states, joined in a movement to preëempt for themselves important strategic places and trade centers, to mark out certain districts as "spheres of influence," and to seize territory, with the purpose of providing for their future commercial and industrial needs, and of promoting their expansion into

world empires. Such activities marked the progress of Great Britain in India and its vicinity, of Russia in Turkestan and Manchuria, of Germany in Shantung, of France in Indo-China, and of Japan in Korea and Manchuria. And this stupendous race for world trade and national expansion gave rise to the infamous Imperialism, and later, to its saner and broader-minded relative — the New Internationalism; while, out of this whirlpool of international conflict and competition, there arose a world intercourse and a world politics, as we have them to-day.

The enlargement of intercourse between the West and the East took place in four great divisions of the East, although there has been of necessity some overlapping of activities here and there. These four regions may be concisely designated by the terms: Near East, Middle East, Far East, and Oceanica or the Pacific Islands. It is with the first three of these, in the main, that the present volume proposes to deal. By the Near East, we mean those portions of Europe and Asia which touch upon the five great waterways — the trunk-lines of traffic lying at the back door of Europe — namely: the eastern Mediterranean and the Dardanelles, the Black Sea and the Bosphorus, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and the Persian Gulf. In this region, the Ottoman Empire in Asia has been the storm center, with the outlying districts of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Arabia, and Egypt playing important side rôles and contributing considerably to the general trend of events. From the days of Napoleon, who wrote to the French Directory in 1797, "To destroy England, we must take possession of Egypt," to the age of William II with his "Drang nach Osten," there has been a constant struggle "to have and to hold" the route to the East and the trade of the Near East.

In the Middle East, India has held the center of the stage

with its dependencies such as Baluchistan, Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, the Shan, and Malay States. For the protection of the trade and the interests of this great state, the British have extended their influence into Oman, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Siam. The so-called will of Peter the Great admonished the Russians to "bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world, and that he who can exclusively control it is the dictator of Europe." This entrancing vision has been an obsession of European statesmen for two centuries, and still leads some of them on like a deceitful will-o'-the-wisp.

The Far East has always had a peculiar fascination for Occidentals, who looked with longing toward its dream life of ease and luxury, and with envy upon its wealth of trade in the spices, teas, and silks, and upon its fabled, unlimited natural resources. There the competition of European states centered upon that marvelous but sluggish heart of Oriental life — the Chinese Empire — where ere long it came into conflict with the activities of the only organized and progressive Eastern state — Japan. But the influences at work permeated also the great districts of Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Indo-China, with incursions into Korea, Formosa, the Philippine Islands, and Oceanica.

When one glances at the map of Asia, one is astonished at the extent and variety of the vast region into which European powers have carried their activities in recent times. And the story of these adventures, though at times unpleasant reading for Westerners, is as marvelous and romantic as a tale of mediæval days. The success of the movement is unquestioned if one counts the results simply

in dollars and cents. For the trade of Europe and the Americas has profited in countless ways. But, when viewed in all its aspects and manifold activities, one must admit that, thus far, this world-embracing enterprise has been a complete failure, in spite of so many individual efforts brilliant in themselves and of certain isolated successes here and there. At some points the movement has broken down completely. At others, cross-currents have set in, which impede seriously all developments; while in many places insuperable difficulties have arisen to block all progress indefinitely. The reason for this unfortunate and discouraging situation is now apparent. It is a threefold one, namely: a failure to understand the real problem at issue, and to appreciate the grave difficulties of the task; an unwillingness to assume the responsibilities necessary to ensure its successful solution; and a selfish nationalism preventing coöperation among the states and forces involved in the work.

What then *is* the problem of Asia? It is no longer a mere matter of trade. It is a question of international life affecting the existence and happiness of countless millions of people in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. In brief, the issue is: how to establish a just, honorable, and mutually beneficial relationship between the East on the one hand and Europe and the Americas on the other. Such a relationship must not subvert Oriental genius or institutions, nor impede the development of civilization, nor bear a taint of that unscrupulous political force which would rule, or control, or Europeanize Asia for profit. It must secure not merely the successful introduction of the "European leaven" (to borrow an expression from Captain Mahan) into Asiatic civilizations, so that conditions in all Oriental countries will be improved and the proper development promoted, but it must establish a mutual exchange of ideas,

principles, methods, and institutions, which shall foster unceasingly the welfare and prosperity of all concerned. This means that there must be an "open door," both in the West and in the East, to all the best products of modern thought, education, government, commerce, religious and social ideals, inventive and creative genius, whether emanating from the Orient or from the Occident. And it is imperative that the national and international life and development of the future should be intellectual and spiritual, as well as scientific and material.

The tremendous task, however, of getting the West and East into tune, on the successful solution of which the future of the whole world depends, has only just begun. The political communities of the five great continents have been engaged, thus far, upon selfish schemes of national development, or expansion, with seldom a thought of things beyond the horizon of their own needs and ambitions. There has been little or no regard shown for the wishes or welfare of other states, or for those of foreign nationalities. It has been a race for the strong and "the devil take the hindmost"; and no intelligent effort has been made, except by individuals here and there, to study scientifically and sympathetically the great problem of world intercourse. But the world moves on. The era of commercial adventure and imperialistic drama has passed. A world war has aroused Europe and the Americas at last from their lethargy of self-content, shown them the danger of delay, and demonstrated beyond question the necessity for international confidence, coöperation, and control to ensure the proper development of national and international life and intercourse.

The difficulties which have prevented thus far the solution of the problem of Asia are numerous and great, but

they are not insuperable. The first to be overcome is a sort of racial antipathy which exists not only between Orientals and Occidentals, but also between nationalities all over the world. This had its origin in certain natural and fundamental differences in personal appearance, mentality, language, customs, religion, and point of view — all of which made for separation, seclusion, and suspicion. Everything foreign has been looked upon as something questionable and inferior; yet human beings are much the same in every land. "It depends upon who is speaking, who is queer," Bishop Oldham once remarked. The old world is still strangely provincial, each section and each nation feeling that it is in some, if not in all, ways superior to all the rest. Inhabitants of Eastern countries have called Europeans "barbarians," "infidels," and "unclean wretches"; and Westerners have returned the compliment by referring to Orientals as "heathen," "fanatics," and "poor benighted Hindoos," while the Russians nicknamed the Japanese "monkeys" before the Russo-Japanese War. Even in our own enlightened republic, there are used such derisive and ridiculous names as "Dagos," "Polacks," "Chinks," for the foreign-born residents, or "hyphenated citizens," of this country. This is merely the result of ignorance and selfish prejudice born of a certain unthinking national pride and self-sufficiency shared by all peoples. But, fortunately, it is rapidly vanishing with the growth of knowledge, accompanied by increased facilities for travel and by the development of international intercourse.

No state has the right to judge others by its own standards. Nor can it longer hold itself aloof from the world with security, or assume a position of superiority or independence with impunity. Nor is it safe in presuming that its methods of life, of thought and of government, are the

best for all peoples under all circumstances, or even for itself in ten, twenty, or fifty years from now. Some Occidentals who have lived longest among Orientals and know them best, claim that there exists a feeling of separateness — a wall of exclusion — between the two racial divisions, beyond which a Westerner never gets. There has been some truth in this assertion in the past; but it is safe to say that this barrier is now disappearing. The honest, efficient, and brotherly work of the agents of the Y.M.C.A. and the untiring, unselfish efforts of many a noble soul in the medical and educational institutions of the European and American missions in Eastern lands have opened in recent days a way to the hearts of Oriental peoples which the key of confidence will always open. But the removal of all the barriers of distrust and suspicion as rapidly as possible, and the establishment of universal confidence and respect based upon equality of treatment and on national integrity, are imperative — yes, absolutely essential — to the successful creation of world-wide coöperation and intercourse.

A second difficulty has arisen from the lack of space in Asia and the existence of certain "backward nations," combined with the complications growing out of the ill-advised attempt of some ambitious states to colonize, or control for the purposes of their own imperialistic expansion, certain territories in Asia. It is summed up in the problem of how to secure an efficient administration for backward peoples and adequate protection for the life and property of foreign subjects, without depriving Asiatic communities of their natural initiative, their national self-respect, and their independence. The days of the great migrations, such as those of the Mongols under Jenghis Khan and Kublai Khan, are past. There is no longer any vacant place where any nation great or small can find a

new home. Nor is the great continent of Asia and its extensive seaboard a legitimate field any more for foreign colonization and imperial expansion. For the conditions there are very different from those which existed in the Americas and in the greater part of Africa, when European colonists penetrated those continents, only partially populated by half-civilized Indian tribes and negro peoples. The inhabitants of Eastern lands for the most part are intelligent beings with highly developed civilizations of their own; and the occupation of their territory would mean the enslavement of one nation by another. This has been true ever since the successors of Nurhaschu conquered China in the seventeenth century. That there is need for improvement in government, in methods of economic production and distribution, and in conservation both of property and of human life, no one can deny. But cannot this be said of every state in the family of nations? We must recognize the fact, however, that, while Oriental countries may need the assistance of Occidental states to reorganize on a modern basis and to develop their national institutions and life, such aid must come through the natural channels of friendly coöperation, rather than through any scheme of imperial expansion or the imposition of foreign control over any Eastern people. And, wherever conditions are so complicated and unstable as to justify foreign interference such as is found in India, Korea and the Philippine Islands today, governmental control should be exercised only with the consent and in the interest of the community concerned. It should be understood, moreover, that the situation is only temporary and that an honest effort will be made to prepare the people to take over the administration of their own affairs as soon as conditions will permit.

A third obstacle to the establishment of cordial and co-

operative relations between the East and the West has been — and still is — the intense commercial and economic rivalry existing between the great powers both in Europe and in Asia. In the western hemisphere, it has been a source of unending trouble and one of the leading causes of the Great War. In the eastern hemisphere, it has already taken on alarming proportions, for it was the chief factor in bringing on the Russo-Japanese War and it has been one of the primal causes of the failure to solve the Chinese problem. It remains to-day the source of many difficulties and international quarrels that keep both the Near and the Far East in a constant state of unrest; and, unless something definite is done promptly to place the commercial relations of nations upon a just and sound basis, it will lead again inevitably to conflict. The natural desire of all governments to promote the economic and political life of their own people and to protect their own trade interests, is so powerful that it frequently obscures the view of well-intentioned statesmen, warps their judgment, and proves a serious impediment to the progress of the ship of state. It has become an axiom of modern political life, however, that the prosperity of the individual state is closely wrapped up in the welfare of the whole family of nations. And there is no good reason why each and every member of this family should not make a serious effort to coöperate with the others, and to dovetail its own interests and activities into those of the whole community so that conflicts may be avoided, the rights of each safeguarded, and the welfare of all promoted. Till this is done, economic and commercial rivalry between states will remain a menace to all life and progress — national and international — and a serious obstacle in the way of any solution of the problem of Asia.

Combined with these difficulties, there has been a com-

plete lack of coöperation between all parties and forces engaged in the opening and development of the East. In the past, the Slav has been arrayed against the Japanese, the Briton against the Frenchman, the Teuton against the Chinese, and the United States against the World. They all stood for different ideals, principles, and policies. The Slav struggled for land expansion and seaports; the Briton for sea supremacy and ports of entry; the Japanese and the Teuton for economic and colonial expansion; and the United States for the "open door" for all. The future of the Orient depends upon the ability of all these forces to unite, and upon the general principles adopted for their joint conduct and coöperation. The old idea of foisting agreements on one another — whether Easterner or Westerner — and of procuring concessions, privileges or special rights through force of arms, intrigue, or diplomatic pressure, is out of date. It has never worked justly and satisfactorily; and it never will. Real progress and ideal international coöperation in the future will come only through the channels of mutual confidence and respect, and of reciprocity among equals.

Another impediment to the progress of the new internationalism in the East has been the unwillingness of Western powers to assume any responsibility for the movement. No state at the present considers itself at all responsible for the present situation in the Orient; and none have thought it incumbent upon them to assume the burden and expense of attempting to set things right. A few, more through accident and the pressure of circumstances than through design, have rendered material aid in improving conditions in certain regions; but the majority have had little desire to promote anything outside the sphere of their so-called special interests. And, with the

exception of the United States, Great Britain, and in later years France, few powers have shown any inclination to give real assistance to Orientals from a sense of international duty or brotherliness. Yet, if the nations of the West to whom the world looks for leadership are to undertake the reorganization of international intercourse and to succeed in solving the problem of Asia, they must assume the responsibilities of such a work and, by coöperation with Eastern states, put the movement on a sound and rational basis.

Fortunately, the enforced and coöperative action of the allied nations and the United States during the Great War, leading as it did to the establishment of the Supreme War and Peace Councils and the creation of a League of Nations for the purpose of restoring order and maintaining peace throughout the world, was a great step in the formation of a new international policy. The inauguration of a system of mandates, whereby certain of the great powers have been given mandatory powers over dependent peoples, has assured small communities with limited resources and incompetent governments of the protection and assistance necessary to enable them to develop into self-supporting, autonomous states. And another and an equally important advance was made at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. Here, under the initiative and leadership of the United States, the situation in the vast region of the Far East and the Pacific was discussed by all the nations (except Soviet Russia) having possessions or interests in the Pacific, and an accord reached through which four states — Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States — will assume a certain responsibility for conditions in the Pacific world. And a method was provided, through international coöperation, concil-

iation, and conferences, whereby conflicts may be avoided, difficulties straightened out, equal opportunity for all nations assured, and the general peace of the Far East and the Pacific preserved.

Thus, an international conscience has come into being and the brotherhood of nations is becoming a reality. World confidence, good-will, and well-being are being restored; and the responsibility for world peace, security, and progress has been laid so firmly upon the shoulders of all the powers — both great and small — that it will be impossible henceforth for them to ignore the duties and obligations of this new world life. "It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in," wrote President Wilson in his message of January 8, 1918, "and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by other peoples. All the states of the world are, in effect, partners in this interest; and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others, it will not be done to us." These fundamental principles of world partnership and international justice apply alike to Europe, Asia, and the Americas. But it took a terrible world war to convince the statesmen of Europe and America that they must assume the responsibility of enforcing these principles and of maintaining international equality, intercourse, and progress.

To understand the real situation in the Orient and how the application of these newly accepted principles is to be worked out in Asia, one must study the history of its past — more particularly the story of the rapidly moving drama of the last sixty years beginning with the old Ottoman Empire and proceeding eastward from one region to an-

other, till one reaches the "Land of the Rising Sun," and comes into intimate touch with the great problems of the most wonderful seaboard in the world. But every student of Asiatic politics and every statesman whose activities have the slightest connection with Asiatic affairs must realize that henceforth he is dealing with a new East. The old days of European dominance and aggression, and of Oriental pacifism and stagnation are gone. The peoples of the East are coming into their own, and are not to be denied their place in the family and the councils of the nations. Since 1904, a remarkable transformation has been going on throughout the Orient. The first impetus to this movement was given by the Russo-Japanese War and the second, and greater, by the Great War in Europe. The Japanese victories over an European foe — heretofore considered invincible — aroused among Orientals an Asiatic consciousness and an intense desire for independence such as never before had been dreamed of in the East. Patriotism was born and democracy had its birth at this time, not only in Turkey, Persia, and India, but also in China and Japan.

"After Mukden and Tsushima," wrote Georges Leygues, "all the Far Eastern peoples were conscious of the inward awakening of a sentiment previously unknown to them — the sentiment of racial solidarity and common interest as against the Western conquerors. Japan appeared to them to be, as it were, the deliverer of Asia. When we closely examine the movement, we find — in the Iranian region, Persia, Afghanistan, Kashgaria — a general ferment, aspirations after independence still formless but quite perceptible, a marked decline of Russian influence, and a spirit of defiance and hostility toward foreigners."¹

¹ Preface to *L'Inde contemporaine*, page 17.

In India, claims E. Piriou in *L'Inde contemporaine*, "a national tendency which is upsetting old separatist prejudice, is breaking down the hierarchy of the caste system and consolidating races, sects, villages, and provinces in a common activity. The birth of patriotism in India is the most important fact and the newest since Brahmanism was founded." And, "A Turkish consul of long experience in Western Asia told me," wrote the Reverend C. F. Andrews, "that in the interior you could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the news. Asia was moved from end to end, and the sleep of centuries was finally broken. It was a time when it was 'good to be alive,' for a new chapter was being written in the book of the world's history."

After the announcement of the Allies in 1914 that they were waging war to preserve democracy and with the publication of the doctrines of President Wilson concerning self-determination, independence, and self-government of small and dependent states, this movement became a definite and vital force in every Oriental country. It soon assumed such national proportions that the governments of Eastern states were compelled to recognize it; and its influence in the councils of state and in the national life was everywhere apparent. The inauguration of the "Home Rule Movement" in India, the development of patriotism in China through the aggressions of Japan and the agitation over the Shantung question, the "Independence Movement" in Korea, and the rise of a new party in Japan demanding universal suffrage and democratic government, were simply manifestations of its general operation. It had its roots in the hearts of the people; and its origin lay in the universal desire of the masses for political justice. And it is a vital force which is going to transform the whole life

and thought of the East, and to exert a tremendous influence upon its future development and history.

The change which is coming in the East is apparent to every one familiar with conditions in the Orient who has visited Japan, China, or India within the past two or three years. It is seen also in the bazaars and streets of Cairo, Damascus, Bagdad, and Constantinople, for the people of Egypt, of Syria, and of Mesopotamia are demanding local autonomy, better government, and better social and economic conditions. The old days are passing away. A new era is dawning. "The East used to be nothing more than a glittering dust. At an infinite distance of time, certain masses of humanity, which the prejudices of race, of religion, and of sect prevented from understanding and uniting themselves, were in a state of confused agitation. But mark how the misunderstandings are vanishing, how hatreds are abating, how minds are becoming enlightened with a gleam of sudden light. Men who knew only the village or the mountain where they were born and died, catch a glimpse in the widening horizon, of other countries where live countless men like themselves having, if not the same language, the same faith and the same origin, or at least the same destiny. The thrill of their collective life has, for the first time, revealed to them their tie of brotherhood and their strength. Races, listless and dumb for centuries past, are coming out of their long sleep and awakening to life. Nations which knew not themselves are gaining self-consciousness. Millions of human beings who lived with faces bent on the ground under foreign masters, are lifting themselves erect and dreaming of a different future. The masses of India are stirring to their depths, Islam is organizing itself, and flinging itself into the current of life as a whole. Everywhere there is, as it were, a Renaissance,

more consummate and more widespread than that of the sixteenth century, which aroused the whole world and renewed its youth.”¹

Yet this renaissance of the East is to be consummated only through and by Orientals. Western aid and methods may be used. Occidental civilization may contribute much or little to the movement. But its ultimate success depends entirely upon the determination and capacity of the Easterner. The day when the European could modernize the East — if it ever existed — has passed. The hour of the Oriental has struck. His future lies in his own hands; and he longs to take over the direction of his own reformation. “The day is coming,” writes one of the most discriminating observers of religious movements in the East, “when the spiritual needs of the Chinese people will find their satisfaction in a wide-spreading acceptance of Christianity. But that acceptance will come only after the civilization which Christianity breeds has been thoroughly vindicated, the missionary has withdrawn, and the Christian Church in China has become an organization of and by, as well as for, the Chinese. So long as foreign influence is apparent, the masses of Chinese will hold off. Even that advisory relation which we are told will follow the present, will prove a sufficient handicap to discourage any sweeping movement towards Christianity. But when Christian civilization has been so thoroughly vindicated that the Chinese can assume, with assurance and unassisted, the propagation of the religion that lies at its foundation, a marvelous ingathering within the acknowledged Christian fold is sure to occur. But it will be a Chinese Christian under Chinese direction, with Chinese support, who goes out to set his religion above all others in China. Before

¹ Georges Leygues in Preface to *L'Inde contemporaine*, by E. Piriou, 1909.

the end of this century, he should be fairly launched upon his task.”¹

As it is with the Christian religion in China, so it is in the whole field of social, scientific, and political activities, not only in China, but also in every country in Asia. The real renaissance of the East will not take place until it is possible for the individual nations to take over the work of regeneration within their respective domains. The Japanese — already emancipated from European leading-strings — is making marvelous strides along the pathway of national progress, albeit (as is always the case with the young and inexperienced) not all of his efforts have been attended with the happiest results. Nevertheless, they have been his own acts, his own blunders, and his own failures. And the Chinese, the Indian, the Persian, the Arab, and the Turk each wants the same opportunity — even though he falls into difficulties and dangers by the way — to achieve his own political and economic destiny through, and by, and for himself. “What, then, is the specific program of economic Pan-Islamism?” writes Lothrop Stoddard. “It is easily stated: the wealth of Islam for Moslems. The profits of trade and industry for Moslems instead of Christian hands. The eviction of Western capital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking of Europe’s grip on Islam’s natural resources by the termination of concessions in lands, mines, forests, railways, custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islam is to-day drained away to foreign shores.” Therefore, the great problem of the hour has become: how to assist Orientals to acquire the information, training, and experience necessary to enable them to work out their own regeneration with intelligence and discretion, and to contribute their share to

¹ Paul Hutchinson in the *Atlantic Monthly* (January, 1921), pages 124–25.

the welfare and peace of the world. "Asia enters the current of international life," writes M. Grousset, "but she enters there with her art, her soul, and her past. What will be her contribution in the elaboration of the civilization of the future?"

Yet, on the one hand, the West must remember that the East is losing its respect for, as well as its fear of, the West. And that the East not only no longer feels any sense of inferiority, but also has come, with good reason, to doubt the sincerity, the good-will, and even the word of the European. Nothing illustrates this situation better than the way in which Great Britain, whose reputation for fair dealing and integrity had won for it an enviable position and influence in the Near and Middle East, has forfeited this position completely since the close of the Great War. "We have always looked up to the British," recently exclaimed a leading Arab editor of Palestine. "Before the War, if we made a statement and said, 'That is the British truth,' our hearers knew that it was so. If a cloth-merchant said, 'This cloth is of British quality,' he meant that it was the best cloth to be bought. Now we are learning that the British word means no more than the word of any other people."¹ It is, therefore, imperative that the West by word and deed, by honest effort and honorable dealings, win back the lost confidence of the East.

On the other hand, the East must recognize clearly that self-determination alone is not the great panacea for all the political ills of Asia. It is merely the first step in the work of stabilizing conditions throughout the entire East, and in the creation of sound political institutions in all the

¹ Quoted by Elizabeth Titzel in "The Too Much Promised Land," *Asia* (April, 1923), page 299.

Asiatic states. If it is not applied honestly and with discretion, it is likely to react upon the body politic with disastrous results. Before doing away with existing institutions, or throwing away the props afforded by Western states, it is imperative that one has ready a practical and efficient program with which to replace them. Moreover, Orientals must apply with great discretion the knowledge, ideas, and experience gleaned from Occidental literature, learning, and training. Western systems and institutions, excellent as they may be in themselves, are not necessarily suitable to Eastern needs and conditions. At best, it is difficult to graft new methods and usages upon the ancient organizations and conservative practices of the East. And it is still a question whether it is possible to utilize successfully the best features of European civilization in the reconstruction of Oriental life and civilizations. "The fundamental issue is," wrote Sir Valentine Chirol, "whether the Orient can be brought to adapt itself to that democratic type of human society which the most progressive nations of the Occident have gradually evolved as affording the largest opportunities for individual and collective freedom combined with the restraining sense of individual and collective responsibility."¹

And, although Asia sees plainly the present weakness of Europe and the financial and economic paralysis that has overtaken it since the Great War, the Eastern leaders will be wise if they do not reject precipitately the assistance of European states — no matter how eager they may be to take advantage of existing conditions in order to rid their countries of European domination. For the problems which confront them are not to be solved through the isolated, spasmodic efforts of weak, semi-organized communities, but through the medium of international coöper-

¹ *The Occident and the Orient*, page 207.

ation and the friendly exchange of ideas, methods, and resources. "We have no longer a choice between different methods of colonization," wrote M. de Lanessan of the French colonial policy in Indo-China; but his words apply equally well to the relations of European states with Asiatic nations and with dependent peoples everywhere. "The only one which will conform to the true interests of our colonial peoples and to the future even of our colonies is that which will gain the most surely for us the sympathies of the native populations, and that which I have defined these many years already as: the association of interests, of intelligence, and of races."

What the world needs, then, is an association of states and of interests, and an intelligent plan for immediate action. "We can no longer content ourselves with investigation, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry," exclaimed Mr. Hughes in his opening address at the Washington Conference. "The world awaits a practical program which shall at once be put into execution."

CHAPTER II

THE NEAR-EASTERN QUESTION

1. FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Allah a lam (God knows best)

THE "Eastern Question," or, as it should more properly be called, the "Near-Eastern Question," has been one of the most vexatious problems of European diplomats, ever since the signing of the first treaty between European powers and the Ottoman Turks, at Carlowitz, in 1699. Reputations have been made and lost by it. Three of the great military conflicts of the nineteenth century — the Russo-Turkish contest of 1828-29, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1877-78 — were caused by one or another phase of this problem. And the first two decades of the twentieth century have seen four wars — one the greatest of all conflicts — arise over one or more issues of the same question.

It is unnecessary to recount here the long story of the various efforts of European powers to adjust Balkan difficulties and to settle the vital questions which arose from time to time from the presence of Turkey in Europe and in Asia. It is sufficient to recall that through a hundred years — from the Greek Revolution to the Great War — all the attempts of the European "Concert," the Balkan states, the Ottoman sultans, and the "Young Turk" statesmen to solve the problem of the Near East have signally failed. Two difficulties, apparently insurmountable, have always stood in the way: the self-interest of the individual states preventing both individual initiative and general coöperation, and the inability of statesmen to grasp

the salient points of the whole question and to apply any drastic remedies.

Disraeli was fond of saying that only two persons really understood the Near-Eastern Question — one, a learned German professor, lately deceased, and the other, himself — and that he had forgotten it. If the truth were told, Lord Beaconsfield never thoroughly comprehended the full significance of the problem or studied it with that clear-sighted vision, impartial judgment, and unselfish devotion to the common good, necessary to achieve a permanent solution of such an international situation. If he had done so, the British Government would not have been credited with a half triumph in 1878, and the question remained practically unchanged till 1923. Unfortunately, he viewed the situation through British spectacles; and, as has been the case with most European statesmen who have taken a hand in Near-Eastern politics, he had the interests of his own country more at heart than the welfare of Turkey or the peoples under its yoke. "The Turkish question only interests Europe," said Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, "through its effect upon the relations of the great powers among themselves." And this has, unfortunately, remained true from his day to ours.

The Near-Eastern Question, however, is not merely "the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe," as Dr. Miller, Mr. Marriott, and other learned authorities have claimed. Nor is it simply the control of the strategic Bagdad Railway in Asia Minor, of which the late Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., wrote: "The control of this highway is the key to the East — the Near and the Farther East as well. Such has been its rôle in the past — such is its significance to-day." It is, rather, a combination of great international issues which are vital to the welfare of the

peoples of two continents, and which embrace within the radius of their action southeastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Asia Minor, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, and India. As evidence of this, one has but to recall the fact that, after the Ottoman Empire had been deprived of practically all of its territorial possessions in Europe at the end of the Balkan wars in 1913, the Near-Eastern Question still remained unsolved. The main issues involved had only been concentrated across the Bosphorus in Asiatic Turkey.

What, then, *is* the problem of the Near East? It is a whole knot of problems rolled into one. But it may be defined briefly as the internationalization of all trade routes and the establishment of an interstate *modus vivendi* in the Near East, which will protect and conserve the commercial, financial, and political rights and interests of all the nations of that region, and which will ensure a permanent peace from Belgrade to the Persian Gulf and from Egypt to the Caspian Sea.

Ever since the days of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, Europe has been seeking a short route to the East. At first, all efforts were concentrated on the opening of a water highway; but direct connection was not established till the Suez Canal was opened to traffic in 1869. More through accident than through design, the general control of this ocean pathway fell into the hands of Great Britain by her ownership or control over territories and ports of call along the way, such as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt (with the right of protection over the Suez Canal), Aden, Oman, and the ports of India, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula as far as Singapore. And, although the British exercised this supervision uniformly with justice to all, they could not relinquish it, since it soon afforded their merchant and naval marines certain commercial and stra-

tegic advantages of the highest importance, and since this water route became the chief connecting link between the mother country and its possessions and protectorates in the Near East, the Middle East, the Far East, and Oceanica.

The idea of a land route to the East did not suggest itself to the minds of European statesmen till toward the end of the nineteenth century. But, after the opening of direct communication with Constantinople over the route of the "Oriental Express" via Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, and Adrianople and the construction of the Haidar Pasha-Konia line in Asia Minor (1888-96), came the conception of a great transcontinental railway from Paris and Berlin to the Persian Gulf. This remarkable undertaking is now not far from completion; and, in time, through trains will run from Calais, Paris, and Berlin to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Moreover, in a few years, it is quite possible that Europe may be connected with India by the linking up of the Russian and Caucasus railways with lines crossing Persia and Baluchistan. There will, then, be both water and land routes to the East, of which the latter, in the matter of rapid shipment, will have the advantage by a number of days. This transportation problem is essentially a commercial and an economic question; but, unfortunately, in recent years, it assumed an overwhelming political significance in the eyes of European statesmen. For they conceived the idea that the control of the land route would carry with it the supremacy of trade in the Near East, the lion's share of the economic resources of Asiatic Turkey, and the domination of the commerce of the Persian Gulf, India, and the Far East — a prospect sufficiently alluring to warrant the sacrifice of human life and property on a large scale in order to attain it.

Intimately connected with this problem of intercontinental communication was the question of the control of

the Straits which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. For centuries, the Turks maintained a mischievous, mediæval system of supervision over the traffic through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Under the pretense of affording protection to Constantinople, they fortified these famous waterways and exacted clearance papers and tolls of every vessel — no matter what its nationality or destination — that passed through them. And they continued this practice long after international law had declared the Black, Ægean, and Mediterranean Seas a part of the open sea and thereby made the connecting waters free to the ships of all nations. But, before the Great War opened, the situation had become intolerable owing to the endless delays and vexatious regulations to which all commerce passing through the Straits was subjected, and which proved a real hardship in the case of Russia, Roumania, and Bulgaria, whose ships had no other outlet.

Moreover, ever since those turbulent days when the Turkish army fought its way to the very gates of Vienna in an attempt to conquer Europe — only to be driven back by the valor of John Sobiesky and his gallant allies — the Ottoman Empire has remained a constant source of trouble, an impediment to all progress, and a menace to the peace of Europe and the Near East. This was not simply because the Turks controlled one of the great commercial centers of the world and their territorial possessions included the lands and waters connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa, but because they held under their yoke, as subject peoples, a number of Christian and Moslem nations, and because the weakness and corruption of their government made their country the prey, in recent times, not only of their own rulers and nationals, but also of their powerful, ambitious, and envious European neighbors. And a conflict

of forces ensued which persisted throughout the past century, and is still operative.

Great powers contended for economic, commercial, and political interests; and small states struggled for local autonomy or independence. Turkish political factions fought for supremacy; and religious organizations — Christian and Moslem — strove for recognition and rights. To understand the full significance of this situation and its terrible legacy to the Europe and the Near East of to-day, it is necessary to recall to mind the character of the old Ottoman régime, the result of the national struggles toward autonomy, and the policies pursued by European states.

The Turk is an Asiatic and a Mongol — an alien both to Europe and to Asia Minor. He came as a conqueror into the Near East; and, between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, he established a splendid empire, extending from Belgrade to Bagdad and from the borders of Persia to Morocco. In the “invincible Janissaries” he possessed a military machine of great power and efficiency; and, in the early years, his rulers were men of action and intelligence, who exercised their absolute power with discretion and justice. Religious toleration was practiced; and, while the other races in the Empire were treated as subject peoples and servants by the Turks and paid tribute in children, in kind or supplies, or in labor, their lot was not a hard one. No taxes or military service were required of them. Personal freedom was unrestricted. And the formation of national communities, as religious corporations under the headship of Patriarchs residing at Constantinople, was encouraged.

Unfortunately, after the Ottoman sultans ceased to be warriors and settled down to the more prosaic task of ruling the peoples of the Near East, they failed to develop any form of constructive statesmanship. On the contrary,

they neglected the organization of the Empire and the development of its natural resources, while they evaded successfully every movement for reform whether it came from their own subjects or from foreign powers. Few possessed the training necessary to administer the affairs of state intelligently, or the inclination to promote the interests and welfare of their subjects; while the efforts of well-intentioned and able rulers and statesmen were nullified by the intrigues and corrupt practices of the majority of the sultans, who coupled a natural indolence and craftiness with an inexhaustible avarice for power and pleasure, and who became adepts in the art of deception and procrastination. And, although they maintained themselves in power by a combination of brute force and insidious intrigue, they produced a political régime unparalleled in history for its corruption, its ruthlessness, and its inefficiency, which concentrated all power in the hands of a few in Constantinople, and made itself cordially hated and distrusted throughout the Empire and Europe.

None ever surpassed Sultan Abdul Hamid in this mediæval form of government. He began his reign by sending into exile in 1877 the able and enlightened Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha, and by discarding Midhat's new constitution. Thereafter, Sultan Hamid never permitted anything to stand in the way of the complete supremacy of his sovereign will, being a strong believer in the efficacy of monarchical government. None knew better than he how to achieve his own purposes by playing upon the peculiar sentimentalities and feelings of the different co-religionists and nationalities within the Ottoman realm. And he set off the European states against one another so cleverly, and kept the jealousies of the Balkan principalities and of the subject peoples in Asia Minor so constantly inflamed, that he was able to head off all reforms and to

postpone any serious change in the *status quo* of the Empire till his enforced abdication on April 27, 1909.

Nor was this all. Not content with obstructing every form of foreign interference devised to improve the wretched state of internal affairs within the Empire, Abdul Hamid put down, with a remorseless hand, not only every local movement for administrative or economic reform, but also every proposal for reconstruction or autonomous rule in the provinces of the Empire. The natural and laudable aspirations of Arabs, Armenians, and Syrians were crushed in the bud, while nothing was done in the way of administrative reform or public improvements to pacify their ambitions or quiet their complaints. He went even further; and, following the example set in European Turkey by his predecessors, he persecuted all Christian Armenians and Greeks with fire and sword until the question of protection for the subject Christian peoples of Asiatic Turkey became a paramount issue that the leading European powers could no longer ignore.

Unfortunately, the party of "Union and Progress" which followed him in power pursued much the same policy. While claiming that their program included the unity of all the peoples of the Empire in a constitutional reform administration, their real motto was "Turkey for the Turks." And they tried, not only to transform all the other races into Turks and Moslems, but also to head off promptly every move for local autonomy. This short-sighted policy, combined with the failure to inaugurate any substantial reforms either in the central administration or in the government of the provinces, gave a new impetus to the decentralization that had already begun in Asiatic Turkey. And the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, already in full swing owing to the loss of almost all of its European and African possessions, was

greatly augmented by the creation of a new national issue: autonomy or independence for Armenian Turkey, for Mesopotamia, for Syria, for the Hedjaz and other Arab communities.

Meanwhile, five Balkan communities, now known as Greece, Servia, Roumania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, which had thrown off the Ottoman yoke between 1829 and 1878, arose from dependent nationalities to independent, self-sustaining states. This successful evolution, though in part the result of the diplomatic and military action of European powers — particularly of Russia, who gave lavishly of her blood and treasure in 1829 and 1877 to secure the freedom of the Greeks and Bulgarians — was due mainly to factors operating outside the sphere of activity of European statesmen. Chief among these was the existence within each of these communities of one homogeneous group of people bound together by common ties of blood, language, and custom, who constituted ninety per cent, or over, of the population of the region occupied by each racial group. Other and hardly less important factors were the rise of gifted native leaders such as Colonel Couza in Roumania, Stambulov in Bulgaria, Pachich in Servia, Venizelos in Greece, and Prince Nicholas in Montenegro, the introduction of religious toleration which brought an end to the strife between the numerous religious sects of the Balkans, and the transfer of the lands of the excluded Turks to the peasant farmers of each of the new states.

The growth of these Balkan communities into self-sustaining states was not viewed with favor by any of the great European powers. Great Britain was fearful lest some, or all, of these young nations should fall under the domination of some Continental power that would use its influence to undermine the Ottoman Empire and to secure

control of the Straits. Her traditional policy — maintained consistently for a century — was to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire at all costs, so that no European state should acquire control of Constantinople and Asia Minor and be in a position to threaten her connection with India and the Orient. In addition, she had her own commercial interests to look after, as well as the duty of affording protection to British subjects and merchants having trade rights and concessions within the Ottoman Empire. And the English statesmen were so successful in resisting the efforts of interested powers to secure the ascendancy in Turkey, that they retained the rôle of “traditional friend and adviser” of the Porte down to 1885. After that year, in which the British Government winked at the seizure of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria, the Germans gradually acquired a great influence in the Ottoman councils of state, until they supplanted the British completely.

The defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 not only deprived the former of her leadership in German affairs, but also thrust her outside of the Teutonic family circle. As a compensation for these misfortunes, Franz Joseph embarked upon a policy of expansion in southeastern Europe. Bismarck deliberately encouraged him in this new ambition, and, in 1878, secured for the Austrian crown the sop of the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina — then Turkish provinces. And, throughout the long sixty-eight years’ reign of this ill-fated Hapsburg Emperor, the Austrian Government exhausted every means — as well as all of the resources of the Empire — in a vain attempt to secure the political domination of the Balkan peninsula. They obtained control of communications between Vienna and Constantinople and from Belgrade to Salonika, secured a large share of the trade of southeastern Europe,

exercised a paramount influence in the economic development of the Balkan states, and, step by step, prepared the way for the extension of the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy to Salonika and the Ægean Sea.

Unfortunately, their methods were too often open to question, and their acts savored too much of national selfishness and the big stick to win the confidence of their neighbors. Their diplomacy was discounted in the courts of Europe because of its close connection with political misdeeds and sordid intrigues. For no crime seemed too great, or intrigue too base, if it advanced the interests of the Hapsburg monarchy. And they committed the grave error of browbeating and throttling little Servia, economically, with a view to forcing her to enter the Austro-Hungarian family; while they made the unpardonable blunder of pursuing a policy of repression toward the Slavic races within the Austrian Empire and the Balkan peninsula. In addition, their lack of respect for the rights of other states and their double-dealing in matters affecting the problem of Turkey in Europe, contributed in a large measure to the defeat of all attempts to solve the Balkan and Macedonian questions before the Great War. Indeed, their own errors and misdeeds reacted on their own heads. For the Austrian statesmen not only failed to advance materially the vital interests of their country, but they aroused the suspicion and enmity both of Russia and of the Balkan states. And their mistaken policy of force and intrigue kept Europe on the verge of conflict for years, only to throw it into the greatest of all wars in 1914, which ended with the fall of the Hapsburgs and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Russia, too, played an important rôle in the drama of the Near East. From the days of Peter the Great, the chief ambition of her rulers and statesmen was the secur-

ing of a southern outlet for their country with ice-free ports. And they looked with covetous eyes upon the beautiful Bosphorus and the gleaming minarets of Constantinople. After Catherine II had secured a foothold on the Black Sea, the Muscovite rulers from 1812 on gradually extended their empire around that great inland lake at the expense of the Sublime Porte. Stopped in their advance through southeastern Europe by the creation of the Balkan states and the opposition of the leading European states, the Czars succeeded in reaching the back door of the Ottoman Empire by their occupation of the Caucasus (1840-59) and the acquisition of the Turkish seaboard and the chief ports at the eastern end of the Black Sea by the treaties of 1829, 1856, and 1878. But it was not till 1850, when Nicholas I referred to the Sultan as "the sick man of Europe" and proposed to Great Britain a partition of his domains, that Europe awoke to the danger of the situation. And, from that time to 1914, the ingenuity of European statesmen was taxed to the limit in the arduous task of keeping the sick man alive and of holding off the Russian bear.

Moreover, the situation was further complicated by developments in the Balkan circles where Russian and Austrian intrigues kept the region in a constant state of unrest. For Russia not only intrigued for political control in the capitals of the Balkan states to advance her own interests, but she supported Servia and Montenegro in their resistance to Austrian domination and expansion. Yet it must always be remembered to her credit that the Balkan states owe their independence largely to Russia, who gave her blood and money without stint for them, that she maintained consistently for over a half-century a policy embracing the exclusion of the Turks from Europe and the protection of Christians, and that there were times

— notably during Mr. Isvolsky's term of office as Minister of Foreign Affairs — when, if the Austrian statesmen had met them halfway in an honest effort to adjust matters, the vexatious "Balkan Question" might have been solved through an *approchement* of Russia, Austria, and Great Britain.

Thus a half-century passed with all the important phases of the Near-Eastern Question still unsolved. Remarkable developments in Asia Minor, however, were transpiring, which transformed completely the situation within the Ottoman Empire, and had a far-reaching effect upon the political situation, not only in the Near East, but also in Africa, in Asia, and in Central Europe. To understand these movements, one must go back to the year 1888, when Alfred Kaulla, for the Deutsche Bank of Berlin and the Württembergische Vereinsbank of Stuttgart, received a concession to build the Ismidt-Angora railway line across Anatolia. This was a purely commercial venture in its inception, with the plan of running a line eventually to Bagdad via Angora, Sivas, and Diarbekir. The Turkish Government was induced to guarantee the sum of 125,000 francs per mile; and stock was offered to citizens of other European countries, though German interests retained the majority control. During the next decade this line was constructed to Angora. But Russia objected to its being run through her "sphere of influence" in northeastern Asia Minor; and the section to Sivas and Diarbekir was never built. Instead, a line was run from Karahissar to Konia; and the heart of Anatolia was thus opened to railway traffic.

After the visit of Kaiser William II to Constantinople in 1900, the promotion of German interests in Turkey-in-Asia advanced more rapidly. The persistent efforts of Herr von Bieberstein, German Ambassador to the Sublime

Porte, were crowned with success at length, by the granting of a concession for a Konia-Bagdad railway to Gwinner and Company (the Deutsche Bank group) on March 5, 1903; and a new international organization known as the "Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad" was formed, which was received with enthusiasm in Germany. This new project included the construction of a main line through the heart of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Bagdad, with extensions to Basra on the Shatt-el-Arab, Koweit on the Persian Gulf, Khanykin on the Persian frontier, and Aleppo in northern Syria, which would bring the total mileage to twenty-seven hundred and fifty.

Unfortunately, in spite of the efforts of the managing directors and the diplomatic protests of Great Britain, Russia, and France, who advocated international control, this undertaking was speedily transformed into a national enterprise through the efforts of the German Imperial Government. The German financiers were induced to retain the appointment of eighteen out of twenty-six directors; the scheme was popularized by a wide advertisement throughout the Empire; and large sums from German sources, such as the Deutsche Bank, which put in some \$80,000,000, were invested in the project.

The Bagdad railway enterprise, however, was only a part of an ambitious program of German economic expansion in the Near East now conceived in the interests of the Fatherland by the Kaiser and his advisers. And their activities quickly set in motion a spirited race for economic and commercial concessions in Turkey-in-Asia. German interests in that region were already extensive. In addition to the control over the Anatolian and Bagdad railways running through the heart of the country, German nationals possessed many valuable concessions for public works in Anatolia — the richest section of the Empire.

Germany, moreover, had her churches, hospitals, schools, and public buildings extending in a long line from the cathedral on Mount Zion to her magnificent embassy on the heights of Pera, opposite Constantinople. And she stood ever ready to rush to the aid of the German trader or missionary. Together with Austria-Hungary, she possessed a far-reaching interest in the economic development of the Turkish Empire and in procuring from it large quantities of raw material — not found at home — for her industries. In this connection it will be remembered that Germany was seeking compensation in Asia Minor for her failure to secure valuable colonies in Africa and other parts of the world, such as Great Britain and France had obtained.

The creation of a commercial and economic corridor extending from Berlin to Constantinople, and from the Golden Horn to the Persian Gulf, would bring the German Empire into direct and intimate touch with the Near and Middle East and free German commerce from the irritating conditions prevailing in the Baltic and the English Channel. For it was well known that the fact that ninety-five per cent of German sea-borne trade passed through the Straits of Dover under the nose of the British fleet had caused great uneasiness in official circles in Berlin. In addition, the presence of German authority in Asia Minor would secure for the German Government certain important strategic advantages that would enable it, not only to threaten the British position in Egypt and in India, but also to further its own economic and imperialistic ambitions.

The hold of the other leading European states — Russia, France, and Great Britain — upon certain portions of the Ottoman dominions was equally remarkable. Russia had a predominant interest commercially in the trade

of the Black Sea and the Straits, in the lands bordering on these waterways, and in the northeastern section of Asia Minor where she had a special religious and ethnic connection with the Armenians. A large portion of the old kingdom of Armenia lay within her own domains; and many of the Armenian residents of Turkey had become Russian subjects for the sake of protection. Then, too, the great Czar of Moscow was the recognized head and protector of all Greek (and other not Roman Catholic or Protestant) Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Russian Government possessed a great hold in Palestine, Syria, and other sections, through the innumerable Russian Jews who looked to it always for protection, the thousands of Russian pilgrims who found their way every year to Asia Minor, and the numerous Russian and Greek churches, monasteries, hospitals, shrines, and public buildings scattered all the way from Constantinople to Jerusalem.

France controlled the Beirut-Damascus railway system, fourteen hundred miles in length, was trying to get possession of the Hedjaz railway to connect with Mecca, and had secured a concession to build the Samsun-Sivas road, ten hundred and fifty kilometers long, in northern Anatolia with branches into Armenia and Kurdistan. She held valuable economic rights in Syria, including the construction of harbors for several of the chief ports, which she wished to see marked out as a special sphere for her own commercial activities. The French Republic, moreover, was the historic protector of all the Roman Catholics in Palestine and Syria and of the religious tribes of Lebanon, and gave official assistance to all the various Catholic orders that, like the Franciscans, had erected monasteries, schools, and public buildings of all kinds on Turkish soil.

Great Britain enjoyed the greatest popularity among the

peoples of Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Turkey proper at that time. This was due chiefly to her reputation for honesty and fair-dealing and the excellence of her methods in education and training. Then it was well known that the British Government did not officially support British schools and churches, and had no definite program of territorial expansion. Yet even this country had its own strategic and commercial interests to guard in Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf. Her subjects owned the Smyrna-Aidin railway, enjoyed special navigation rights on the rivers of Mesopotamia, and controlled various other economic concessions in Asia Minor. And in November, 1913, a British corporation was given the control of the imperial naval works at Constantinople with complete powers of reconstruction and development.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, this striking competition of European powers in the Near East became a source of uneasiness and concern to European statesmen, and threatened to lead to an international conflict. England, France, and Russia impeded the advance of the Germans at every step, for they resented this Teutonic invasion of a region where they had been going their own way unmolested, commercially speaking, for a century at least. Nevertheless, the activities of the German nation went steadily on till they had secured the lion's share of Turkey-in-Asia — economically speaking. Unfortunately, their advance agents aroused considerable suspicion and enmity by resorting to underhand methods in their eagerness to outdo their competitors. And a good deal of diplomatic sparring resulted which filled the chancelleries of Europe with bitterness and unrest.

Fortunately, good sense prevailed in the end; and in the summer of 1912, Great Britain, which had been ac-

cused of acting like a dog in the manger in Turkey-in-Asia, suddenly withdrew her request for participation in the Gulf section of the Bagdad railway, and offered to make a friendly treaty with Turkey. In February, 1913, Hakki Pasha arrived in London to negotiate the agreement, which was duly signed on May 30th of the same year. The respective interests and rights of Great Britain and the Porte in Arabia, in Mesopotamia, and on the Persian Gulf were defined in this new protocol. And, in exchange for fixing the terminus of the Bagdad railway at Basra, the abolition of differential treatment in the assignment of railway contracts in Asiatic Turkey and of irrigation contracts in Mesopotamia, a legalization of the British religious and educational institutions in Turkey, and the settlement of certain difficulties concerning the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia, the administration of Basra and the Aden and Turko-Persian frontiers, and the adjustment of British oil concessions and pecuniary claims, the Ottoman Government was to receive a handsome increase in its revenues by a substantial raising of consumption taxes, and to establish municipal control over its customs dues. In this way, the British sphere of influence and economic rights in Turkey-in-Asia were duly recognized and defined.

On February 15, 1914, France and Germany reached an understanding by which the French secured recognition of their special sphere of influence in Syria and eastern Anatolia, in return for a reciprocal recognition of the German sphere along the Anatolian and Bagdad railways. In June, 1914, Great Britain and Germany reached a similar agreement concerning their respective spheres of influence in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. These treaties were accompanied by diplomatic conversations and corresponding conventions between Great Britain and Russia,

Germany and Russia, and France and Russia, all of which were initialed before the end of the same month. Meanwhile, France, through the offer of a substantial loan, obtained from the Porte an agreement, similar to the Anglo-Turkish accord of the previous May, recognizing the French special interests in Turkey-in-Asia. And all that remained to complete the commercial and economic partition of the Ottoman Empire was the signing of Turko-German and Turko-Russian conventions to legalize the German and Russian spheres of influence, when this diplomatic maneuvering was brought to a sudden and inglorious end by the breaking out of the Great War.

Unfortunately, at that moment the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire were in a deplorable state. The reform movement had failed ignominiously; and the so-called constitutional government was a farce. The party of "Union and Progress," which held the reins of state, was no longer representative of the nation at large, or controlled by wise and patriotic leaders. For it was in the grip of a group of unscrupulous and ambitious "Young Turks" to whom personal aggrandisement and power were of more consequence than the welfare of the Turkish state. Corruption and inefficiency characterized the administration — local as well as central; and the whole country was exhausted through the imposition of crushing taxes, the systematic oppression of the peasantry, and the costs of fruitless wars. In addition, the public debt had taken on enormous proportions owing to the extravagance of the sultans, the wastefulness and graft of public officials, and the expenses of recent military adventures; the coffers of the state were empty, while Ottoman statesmen were kept constantly on the jump to keep the pot boiling — a task which required consummate juggling and an inexhaustible resourcefulness, but which, at best, could only prolong

the life of the state during a brief interval. For the Ottoman Empire was doomed. And nothing short of a tremendous political upheaval inspired by a great struggle for its very existence could arouse the country from its lethargy and produce the able and devoted leaders needed to save it.

But the Great War did not produce these conditions. On the contrary, Turkey was drawn into this conflict unwillingly through a trick engineered by a group of pro-German politicians led by Enver Bey — then Minister of War. Finding that the majority of the Ottoman Cabinet and governmental leaders were not to be moved from their stand in favor of a strict neutrality, this group, backed by the German Ambassador and his Government, used their influence to get the Turkish men-of-war sent into the Black Sea one night under sealed orders and carrying German naval officers on board. When opened at midnight, these orders proved to be instructions to make a surprise attack in the early morning on Odessa and the Russian ships at harbor there, since (as was claimed) Russia was planning secretly to declare war at once upon the Ottoman Empire.

In this way the fate of the old Turkish Empire was sealed. It is true, however, that, at first, the fortunes of war seemed to favor the Sublime Porte, while its valiant troops were successfully defending the Dardanelles at Gallipoli, taking prisoner a small British army at Kut in Mesopotamia, and stopping the Russian advance in Armenia. But in the end the Turkish collapse was complete. She lost Egypt forever in 1915. In 1917-18, Mesopotamia — for two hundred miles north of Bagdad — was conquered by the second British expedition under General Maude, and Syria and Palestine were occupied by the victorious British and Arabian forces under General

Allenby and Emir Feisal, while most of the Ottoman armies were either captured or dispersed. And, finally, when the Bulgarian defense broke down in the fall of 1918 under the onslaught of the Allied forces and that country sued for peace, Turkey speedily followed suit.

In Constantinople the "old crowd" was immediately forced out of office, and their place was taken by a patriotic but pro-British régime which dispatched a special delegation to Paris to plead the Turkish cause at the Peace Conference. Thus the old Ottoman Empire, once so feared and powerful, passed away; and the fate of the Turkish nation and of the peoples long subject to its yoke hung in the balance. Old Europe, with its selfishness, its sordid ambitions, its short-sightedness, and its fatal procrastination, was compelled perforce to face the issue at last. For, not only had no progress been made toward the solution of the Near-Eastern Question, but, on the contrary, Near-Eastern affairs had been permitted to drift into a situation both terrible for its own peoples and dangerous for Europe. Turkey-in-Asia had become a land of stagnation, of famine, and of disease, whose inhabitants were reduced to penury and wretchedness. The young nations of that region, flushed with the first successes of the movement for independence, were slowly and helplessly falling by the wayside; and Europe had become enmeshed in a dangerous commercial and economic rivalry that was fast leading it to destruction.

"Watchman! What of the night?" Were the European statesmen ready for the emergency so close at hand? Had they a plan of reconstruction for the day when the Turkish Empire should be dissolved? Were they prepared to maintain peace and sustain the fledgling states within Turkey-in-Asia, and to undertake with an open mind the solution of the Near-Eastern Question bris-

ting with difficulties? Far from it. They were not even asking themselves these questions. For Europe, weakened and impoverished by a bitter and prolonged conflict, shaken by national hatreds and jealousies, hampered by international controversies and disputes, and overburdened by the labors of reconstruction and rehabilitation, was totally unfit and unprepared to administer the appalling legacy so suddenly thrust into its keeping by the hand of destiny.

CHAPTER III

THE NEAR-EASTERN QUESTION

2. THE LEGACY


ACCORDING to a Syrian tradition, when the hero Adonis was wounded on Mount Lebanon, his blood flowed into the river now bearing his name and changed its color to a rich red hue. And, to-day, the river Adonis still flows red through the land of Lebanon and, at its mouth, turns crimson a wide expanse of the Mediterranean Sea. This is symbolic of the history of the Near East. For, in all the region formerly known as Turkey-in-Asia, there has been a constant stream of human blood flowing, through one cause or other, from ancient and mediæval times when one conquest after another passed over it, leaving a trail of anguish and death, down to the terrible slaughterings of Armenians, Greeks, and Turks in our own day.

It has been a land of oppression and persecution, of misrule and massacre, of conflict and war. It is a country endowed by nature with vast resources, great economic possibilities, and an unrivaled geographical situation; but its inhabitants have never reaped the full benefits, either of their labor or of the riches of their land. And it is the home of several ancient and virile peoples who, in spite of hardships, difficulties, and persecutions, have preserved through the centuries their national tongues, creeds, and traditions. Yet, one of these nations — the Ottoman Turks — although not superior to the others either in intelligence or native ability, has held the rest in subjection as conquered races for five centuries. And, unfortunately, the Turkish rulers, by their selfishness, bigotry, and polit-

ical incapacity, retarded the development of the whole country, and effectively blocked all progress and reform, so that Turkey-in-Asia remains to this day one of the backward regions of the world.

Nevertheless, oppression and misrule did not quench the national aspirations of the subject races. They only grew apace with the decline of the Ottoman power, till the rights of small peoples and the question of local autonomy became paramount political issues. The *laissez-faire* policy of the Turkish sultans did not mend matters. It only precipitated the conflict of races and the fall of the Empire. Meanwhile, throughout the Ottoman domains a chronic state of restlessness and confusion prevailed which bristled with difficulties. And, in the neighboring countries, the situation became more and more complicated and disturbed through the intervention of foreign powers and the growth of national consciousness and socialistic tendencies, till, by the end of the Great War, all of the Near and Middle East was in the midst of a great political upheaval. "During the last twenty-five years," declared Lord Curzon on October 12, 1920, "Central Asia has ceased to be a land of mystery, and has become a land of acute political problems."

Turkey-in-Asia was one of the most remarkable geographical combinations the world has ever seen. It occupied some 600,000 square miles of territory — slightly more than the area of Alaska — in a highly strategic position at the junction of three continents, and containing a cosmopolitan population of 20,000,000 souls. It embraced the great isthmian peninsula — known as Asia Minor — which connects Europe and Asia, and the vast region lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. It dominated the waterways connecting the Mediterranean with the Black Sea and with the Indian



Ocean; and it controlled the intercontinental routes from Europe to the Middle East over the old caravan trails and the pathway of future railways. For administrative purposes this great country was divided by the Turks into vilayets (provinces) and sanjaks (districts); but it had been partitioned by nature into a number of distinct regions which had been settled in the early days by peoples differing in lineage, language, and creed, and which have become known to us as Anatolia, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia.

Of these districts, Anatolia, with an area of 200,000 square miles — four fifths the size of Texas — was territorially the largest, the richest agriculturally, and, with its 10,000,000 inhabitants of whom eighty-five per cent were Moslem Turks, the most populous. The northern portion included the rugged mountain region with great fir forests reaching from Trebizond and Samsun to Sivas and Angora, Kastamuni with its low coasts about the ports of Eregli and Sinope and with a background of the Ala Mountains, Brussa — including the city of the same name which was the first capital of the Empire — with its fertile valleys, and Bigha — the home of ancient Troy, but now a barren district skirting the Dardanelles and the Ægean Sea. The middle section embraced the Haimaneh plateau and the great salt desert in which lie Tuz Lake and the white-walled city of Konia and where the Germans reclaimed 100,000 acres in 1912, and Smyrna with its rich and varied hinterland. And the southern part contained Adalia, crossed by numerous mountain ranges of the Taurus group, and Adana — including Cilicia — composed of mountainous districts, arid plains with prosperous cities, and productive coastal plains. But of this great province, Cilicia alone, lying between the Taurus range and the sea, was a distinctly Christian community whose native

leaders participated in the administration of their own community.

To the east of Anatolia lay the vilayets of Armenia and Kurdistan embracing an area of some 72,000 square miles — about the size of North Dakota — of rugged mountains and arid plateaus, interspersed with arable steppes and fertile valleys. This region, divided by the Turks into the districts of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, and Diarbekir, had a population of approximately 2,500,000 marauding Moslem Kurds and industrious Christian Armenians. The former, who possessed a sense of tribal unity as strong as that of the Persians or Turks, dwelt originally in the Zagros Mountains which separate the Persian plateau from the Mesopotamian basin. About one half of them settled down finally in fixed villages and communities, while the other half — nomadic shepherds of the armed, warlike variety — continued to move up and down the Zagros slopes and into the highlands of Turkish Armenia, seeking pasturage for their flocks and herds, preying on their neighbors. They pushed gradually westward, separating the Persians from the Armenians and the Arabs of Mesopotamia from the Turks, until they had occupied a large part of the region reaching from the Persian border above Bagdad to the vicinity of Aleppo. The Kurds were subject nominally either to Persia or Turkey; but many tribes maintained a sort of semi-independent existence. And some, such as the Kurds of Dersim — an isolated, mountainous country north of Kharput — who were completely independent from 1881 to 1908, defied the Ottoman authorities for long periods at a time.

After the Great War, Great Britain restricted her activities to southern Kurdistan, and directed her energies to the preservation of peace and order on the Kurdistan—

Mosul frontier. Her statesmen preferred to leave the government of the country in the hands of the local chieftains, who were left free from outside interference, but kept under a moderate supervision. In September, 1922, the British withdrew their officials and forces to the Erbil-Kirkuk-Kifu line, and appointed Saiyid Taha governor at Rowanduz over the extreme southern region in April, 1923. This was in complete accord with their general policy to provide a defensible frontier for the province of Mosul regarded by the British and Arabs as an integral part of Iraq. Meanwhile, the Turks, since 1921, have asserted a claim, not only to all of Kurdistan, but also to Mosul, and have promulgated a definite plan for the reabsorption of all of Armenian Turkey and Kurdistan in the new Turkish state. This led to a lively dispute with England over frontier lines at the Lausanne Conference, which became so vigorous that the problem of the Kurdistan-Mosul boundary had to be taken out of the Conference, and referred to later discussion and arbitration by the League of Nations.

However, the Turks are certain to involve themselves in great difficulties if they attempt to enforce a direct Turkish rule upon the Kurds. And, if they include southern Kurdistan in their operations, they will soon be too busy to give a thought to Mosul. For "the position of the average Kurdish Agha is incompatible with our own or any other government," wrote Colonel Nalder after the events of 1919. "Like a feudal baron of the middle ages, he keeps a body of armed retainers, and tyrannizes over the cultivators at his will. . . . Such men cannot but view the advent of any form of settled government with concern." The majority of the tribes in northern Kurdistan, and some in southern Kurdistan, prefer independence. Others, particularly in the south, desire home rule or autonomy under Turkey or Iraq. The Turks will be

wise if they adopt some form of local autonomy for Turkestan, instead of annexation, and if they permit this perplexing question to solve itself. This may be done by placing northern Turkestan under Ottoman suzerainty, and by permitting southern Kurdistan to remain under the supervision of Iraq, for some years, till the situation has calmed down and the Kurds are ready to decide their own future for themselves.

"The Armenians," wrote Ludovic de Contenson in the *Réformes en Turquie d'Asie*, "are a race industrious, tenacious, persevering, apt in the study and practice of the sciences as it is devoted to the works of literature and of the imagination, and excelling in trading and banking." A large proportion of them, however, were engaged in agricultural and pastoral pursuits; and, originally, they inhabited the great plateau between the Anti-Taurus, the Armenian Taurus, and the Zagros ranges — a mournful and unfriendly land; the steppes and highlands of the Upper Murad district, and the mountains about Lake Van — the cradle of the Armenian folk. And they shared with the Kurds the pastoral lands of the Bingol Dagħ and the undulating plateaus and valleys leading down to the lowlands of Mesopotamia. Their history and traditions date back to the days of the ancient kingdom of Armenia, which was partitioned between Persia and Turkey; and they have clung through the centuries to their customs, their language, and the Christian religion, in spite of their baneful geographical location, their unruly neighbors, and the persecutions of their overlords.

In the course of time, however, owing to the natural movement of peoples seeking better homes and to the encroachment of Turks from Anatolia and of Kurds from the southeastern highlands, the Armenian people of Turkey-in-Asia were widely scattered. The majority re-

mained in the five provinces above mentioned; but large numbers migrated to Trebizond and its environs, to Sivas, and to the district often designated as "Little Armenia," which includes the towns of Urfa, Aleppo, Aintab, and the lower part of Cilicia. And when the ruthless pillaging of their villages increased with terrifying frequency toward the end of the nineteenth century — only to be followed by the widespread persecutions inaugurated by Abdul Hamid in the first decade of the twentieth century — many thousands of Armenians were impelled to move over the border into the Russian Caucasus. Therefore, it had become, by 1914, an exceedingly difficult matter to determine just what portion of Turkey-in-Asia was Armenian, since no district possessed a predominant Armenian population, and in only a few towns were the Armenians in the majority — particularly after the massacres of 1916–17. In the eight vilayets and sanjaks referred to above — including Trebizond and Sivas — the population before the Great War was approximately 5,000,000, about forty per cent of whom were Turks, thirty per cent Kurds, twenty per cent Armenians, and eight per cent Greeks, or some sixty-two per cent Moslem to thirty-eight per cent Christian. And in the six districts of the so-called Turkish Armenia (including all of Erzerum and parts of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas), the Armenian peoples constituted only about forty-eight per cent of the inhabitants — not in any case a percentage sufficiently large to constitute a working unit on which to found a state or on which to base a successful revolt against Turkey, as was the case in Roumania and Servia.

Nevertheless, there were in Turkey-in-Asia, Persia, and the Caucasus some 3,000,000 Armenians — a race whose ability to rule themselves successfully and whose right to

enjoy their own national life and independence no one, except the Turk, denied. Just what portion of Asiatic Turkey and of the Caucasus should be assigned to them for a national home was open to question. But it was a problem of paramount importance, not only to the Near East, but to Europe as well, that this Christian nation be preserved and enabled to work out its own destiny in peace and security. And there was absolutely no excuse for the failure of the Allied Powers, at the close of the War, to assign to the new Armenian state territory sufficient to enable it to organize on a self-sustaining basis, and for their refusal to furnish the military and financial support necessary to enable it to hold its own in the face of implacable enemies and tremendous difficulties. Consequently, in the course of the most outrageous episode of modern history, the Armenian state fell a prey to the intrigues and attacks of Soviet Russia and the Kemalists.¹

In the other sections of the old Ottoman Empire, although there were some uncertainties here and there as to the proper racial boundaries, national lines were clearly drawn by racial, religious, linguistic, and geographical distinctions. Mesopotamia, or Iraq — a vast region of 143,250 square miles of territory (about the size of Montana) — is a land of arable steppes, arid plains, and the alluvial valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It consists to-day of the three Turkish vilayets of Mosul, Bagdad, and Basra, whose total population in 1920 was recorded as 2,849,282; and its natural resources, while not remarkable, include promising petroleum wells and the fertile plains between the Tigris and Euphrates, which with proper irrigation will yield large crops of wheat, barley, cotton, dates, and ground nuts. It is unique in that it contains few cities or towns of any importance, and that

¹ See Chapter V, *post.*

about four fifths of the inhabitants are tribesmen or nomads of the deserts and plains. The population is usually classified under four groups: towns-folk, village-folk, settled and semi-domesticated tribesmen, and nomadic tribesmen. And, with the exception of some Kurdish tribes in the Mosul district and a few Jews and Christians, the whole nation is Arabic, of whom approximately ninety-two per cent are Moslems — divided between the two chief Mohammedan sects: the Shiah with 1,494,000 followers and the Sunni with 1,146,600. In addition, there is a strong feeling of national unity based on common traditions, customs, language, and religion, which dates back to the tribal unity that existed four centuries ago in the days of the Arab Caliphate.

Under the Ottoman sultans, Mosul was treated as an integral part of the Turkish Empire, while Bagdad and Basra were ruled as subject provinces. Nevertheless, throughout their long period of domination the Turks never succeeded in producing an efficient administration in any part of the country; and, except in the towns where a numerous Turkish constabulary was maintained, they experienced great difficulty in preserving order. And, while taxing the people heavily, they did little to improve internal conditions, or to create public works or institutions. On the other hand, the Arabs, who are quick to see and to make the most of any situation to their own advantage, soon recognized the weakness, the incapacity, and the corruption of the Ottoman régime. In time, they became conscious of their own superiority — both mental and physical — to their rulers and oppressors, and defied them on every hand. Many local chieftains succeeded in retaining a semi-independence by the payment of annual tribute, while others never recognized the Turkish suzerainty in any form. Always lovers of independence

and claiming the freedom of the deserts as their own, these Arab tribesmen cherished their traditions of national unity, and at length became obsessed with a desire for local self-government and independence. And, for a number of years preceding the Great War, the country was in a restless state, while life and property were constantly in danger.

Syria connects Anatolia with the Hedjaz — the sacred land of the Moslems. It is a country of strange contrasts in mountains, plains, and deserts. Its long coastline with only a few insignificant harbors is backed by mountains and high plains extending from the Kurd ranges to Mount Lebanon, but cut by river valleys forming gateways to the sea. And, behind these, there is a second hinterland of steppes, oases, deserts, and arid plateaus reaching from the Aleppo plains, past the oasis of Damascus which supports the city of the same name and eighty villages with their orchards and gardens, to the high Hauran plateau, and then down to the rugged Sinai peninsula. Under the Ottoman Empire, it embraced Lebanon and Palestine which belong to Syria ethnically and economically; and its area was approximately 114,500 square miles (a little more than that of Arizona). And it seems to have been arranged by nature as a home for some nation, by reason of its strategic position, its seaports, its native resources, and its natural frontiers on all sides — the sea, the Taurus Mountains, and the deserts of Palmyra and Syria.

Unfortunately, Syria has been a land of migrations, conquests, and wars; and many nations have contributed to its history and development. To-day, its cosmopolitan population of over 2,700,000 inhabitants includes Arabs, Syrians who have a large influx of Arab blood and use the Arabic language, Turks, Maronites, Kurds, Alawiye, Druses,

Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Chaldeans, Yezidies, Amaries, and Latins. Twenty-nine different religions have found followers among these peoples, a little more than one half of whom are Moslems, about one third Christians, and one sixth members of other sects. This great complexity of races, languages, and creeds has been the chief obstacle to any form of national unity, and was utilized skillfully by the Turkish rulers for centuries in maintaining their control over the region.

However, in 1861-64, the Ottomans were compelled through the intervention of the French to grant local autonomy to Lebanon, the new government consisting of a Christian governor-general and a medjliss, or central council, in which the six communities of Lebanon were equally represented. In spite of foreign protection, however, the Turks encroached on this autonomy little by little till it was circumscribed and contaminated by the vices of the Ottoman administration. Without seaports, important towns, and sufficient territory for cultivation, the country languished till the powers forced on Turkey a new protocol in 1912, which gave to Lebanon two ports, courts of its own, financial reforms, and a gendarmerie of its own under foreign officers. This little land of Maronites and Druses is mountainous, small, and poor. Its area is only 1190 square miles (slightly greater than that of Rhode Island); but about it has arisen a vital religious and political problem. Its inhabitants are ninety per cent non-Moslem — about seventy-five per cent Christian Maronites and fifteen per cent Druses; and they have appealed to Europe for protection against the Turk, and for local autonomy. Since the powers have adopted the principle of protection for the subject minorities, and since France has given protection to the Christians of Lebanon and Syria and founded schools and hospitals in both regions,

Europe is committed to the movement for a solution of this problem.

Palestine — known as the Sanjak of Jerusalem and comprising an area of 9000 square miles (about the size of New Hampshire) under the mandate — belongs ethnically and geographically with Syria. Its population of 757,182 in 1922 is as cosmopolitan as that of Syria. There are Arabs, Bedouins, Syrians, Maronites, Jews, Armenians, Latins, and others, of whom the Moslems constituted about seventy-three per cent, the Christians about ten per cent, and the Jews eleven per cent. The country has considerable agricultural wealth, and is capable of maintaining a much larger population. Little had been done under the Turks, however, to improve the situation or to introduce modern methods of production. So, now, the great need of the country is economic and agricultural development. To this end a movement has already been set on foot; but its success is dependent on the ability of the new administration to secure capital and labor. The Jewish people are able and anxious to furnish both. For the Jews, by reason of their intimate association with the country and its history for over two thousand years, their sacred traditions, and the actual possession of important cities and lands, lay claim to a paramount position in the country. Yet, to-day, the Arabs form the larger portion of the inhabitants and own a greater part of the territorial wealth. So there has arisen here, for the statesmen of to-day to reckon with, not one problem, but two — a Jewish and an Arab one — albeit the latter is one which concerns Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, as well as Palestine.

The Arabian peninsula, lying between the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf and containing the holy cities of Islam, remained, down to the Great War,

almost an unknown land to Occidentals. Only a few Westerners in disguise had penetrated western Arabia, which extends thirteen hundred miles along the Red Sea and includes the Hedjaz, Asir, and Yemen. Thanks to the energetic work of Lieutenant (now Colonel) T. E. Lawrence and his able assistants during the period of coöperation between the Hedjaz and Great Britain against Turkey — 1916 to 1917 — and to the expeditions of Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby¹ through the heart of Arabia while he was serving as resident adviser at Riyadh to Abd el-Aziz es-Saud,² Emir of Nejd and El Hasa, we are now in possession of the salient facts concerning the Hedjaz and the central part of this great peninsula. It is a huge plateau six thousand feet or more above the surrounding waters, in the north rising up in a series of rocky terraces from coral reefs, white cliffs, and strips of desert plain, and in the south (or tropical region) lying behind a wall of mountains whose steep slopes have been terraced for gardens, orchards, fields, and vineyards. Its area is approximately one million square miles — about one third the size of continental United States; and its population is estimated to be between five and six million. It is an excellent Bedouin land consisting of immense areas of steppes and deserts interspersed with oases, crossed from north to south by mountain ridges varying from four to six thousand feet in height, of which the two of the Jebel Tuwaik are the chief, and shut off at the north and south by the wide deserts of El Hamed (Stony Plain) and Robabel-Khali — “the abode of emptiness.” Some portions are quite uninhabitable; but even in these sections there are regions which furnish good grazing at certain seasons.

¹ Philby, H. St. J. B.: *The Heart of Arabia*. 2 vols. Constable. London, 1922.

² Usually called by his family name, “Ibn Saud.”

The Bedouin inhabitants are all Arabic and nearly all Moslem. The greater number are roving pastoral tribesmen, but many have formed settled communities in the oases and where there is sufficient arable land to sustain life. But all pay allegiance to local chieftains, most of whom have in the past recognized the religious and political headship of the Ottoman sultans. Nevertheless, there has been no political unity thus far in Arabia. The jealousies and ambitions of local leaders, the differences between Sunni, Shiah, Wahabi, Senoussi, and other religious sects, the isolation of the different communities, and the intrigues of the Turk to maintain decentralization, have proved strong enough to prevent it. Yet, before the Great War, of the eight distinct Mohammedan communities or states — the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Jebel Shammar, Nejd and El Hasa, Koweit, Oman, and Aden — only four — the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, and Koweit — recognized the suzerainty of the Porte. Jebel Shammar and Nejd maintained a precarious independence in the center of Arabia. Koweit on the Persian Gulf enjoyed complete local autonomy — thanks to the friendship of the British. The Sultan of Oman on the Gulf of Oman, and the chiefs of the hinterland behind the city of Aden and of the coast of the Indian Ocean from Aden to Oman, were independent, being subsidized and protected by Great Britain.

The Hedjaz, with an estimated area of 100,000 square miles and a population approaching 750,000, is the chief principality of western Arabia. It embraces a barren, hilly region extending southward from the Sinai peninsula along the Red Sea to a point beyond Jiddah — the port for Mecca. It derives its importance from the fact that it contains the famous religious centers of the Moslem world — Mecca and Medina — and controls the strategic oasis of Taif — the gateway to the food areas of the south and

to the oases of the central principalities. It was formerly a Turkish vilayet; but, after Turkey entered the Great War, Emir Hussein ibn Ali, Grand Sherif of Mecca and Hereditary Keeper of the Holy Places, led a revolt against the Ottomans in 1916, capturing successfully the Turkish garrisons in the port cities, at Mecca, and at Taif. With the aid of the British he soon acquired control of all the Hedjaz and assumed the title of king in November, 1916. And his military forces led by his son — Emir Feisal — overran Transjordan and assisted the British in their conquest of Palestine and Syria.

King Hussein, by reason of his peculiar office, his lineal descent from the Prophet of Islam, his paramount influence as the head of the Sunnite sect of Moslems, and his leadership in the so-called Pan-Arabian movement to free all Mohammedan states from foreign domination, was able immediately to assume a predominant rôle in Arabian affairs. With the appointment of his son Abdullah to the Emirate of Transjordan and the election of his son Feisal as King of Mesopotamia his position seemed secure — especially since he was subsidized and supported by the British Government. But his political career was short-lived. He lost the backing of Great Britain by declining to sign the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty because it recognized the British mandatory régime in Palestine.¹ And he made the fatal mistake of assuming the title of Caliph in March, 1923, upon the request of the Moslems of Iraq and Transjordan after the deposition of Abdul Mejid by the Turkish National Assembly, without securing the approval of Mohammedans generally through the calling of a representative Moslem assembly.

¹ "I lost the throne," Hussein proclaimed publicly, "because I declined to sign the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty. I tried to cancel the Balfour Declaration, but was unsuccessful. However, I would rather see Ibn Saud master of Arabia than a foreign power dominating the Arabs."

The Wahabi especially resented this assumption of religious authority by the King of the Hedjaz; and their great leader, Emir Ibn Saud of Nejd, mobilized his forces and seized Taif in September, 1924. To save Mecca from invasion and preserve the position and power of his family, Hussein promptly renounced the caliphate and abdicated his kingship. Nevertheless, Mecca was entered by the Wahabi forces on October 15th, and Ali, the son of Hussein, who was proclaimed King in his stead, was forced to retreat to the seaport of Jiddah, although he renounced all claim to the caliphate. He retains but a small portion of the Hedjaz to-day, while Ibn Saud dominates the situation and has summoned a Moslem assembly to decide the question of the emirate of Mecca or the Hedjaz, and the problem of the caliphate. And the Emir of Nejd, who took forceful possession of Shammar in 1921, is destined to play henceforth a leading rôle both in the politics of Arabia and in the religious circles of the Moslem world.

The principality of Asir, or Idrisi, occupies an extensive region south of the Hedjaz on the Red Sea, and has a population of about 1,000,000. Its ruler is Emir Mohammed ibn Ali el-Idrisi whose capital is at Sabiyah and whose family have enjoyed the headship for many years — except in the highlands where the power lies chiefly in the hands of the Aidh family of the Beni Mughaid tribe.

Just south of Asir lies the small Imanate of Yemen with 75,000 square miles of territory and an estimated population of 1,000,000. Its capital is at Sana; and, although it has two seaports at Mocha and Hodeida, a large part of its trade passes through the city of Aden. It is one of the oldest of the principalities; and its ruler, Yahya Mohammed Hamid-ed-Din (a descendant of Hus-

sein — the younger son of the Caliph Ali and Fatima — the daughter of Mohammed), is a claimant for the Moslem leadership. He is unfriendly to the Hedjaz and is often at war with the Idrisi Emir.

In the center of Arabia are located the two Emirates of Nejd and El Hasa, and Jebel Shammar. The former has been under the control of the Sheiks of Riyadh since its foundation in 1745 by Mohammed-ibn-Saud of Dariyah. It is the home of Wahabism — a rigid and ascetic form of Mohammedanism — created by the revival headed by Abd-el-Wahib in the seventeenth century. Its followers consider themselves the only true Mohammedans, since they follow the teachings of the Prophet in their original purity of form; and, in addition to the usual Moslem restrictions concerning spirituous liquors and marriage, the use of tobacco, silk garments, and rosaries is prohibited. Its leaders, pursuing the same line of thought as that of other leading sects — such as the Senoussi — and of Mohammed himself, have preserved the home of this creed in an isolated spot difficult of access and free from all foreign influences, both political and social. The present Emir of Nejd, "Ibn Saud," is an able statesman, who succeeded in taking El Hasa away from the Turks in 1913, and extending his control to the Persian Gulf. He has been friendly with Great Britain, from whom he received an annual subsidy¹ till recently. But, unfortunately, he insists on maintaining an unfriendly attitude toward his neighbors — Shammar and the Hedjaz — with whom he is frequently in conflict.² The Emir of Jebel Shammar — since May, 1920 — is Abdullah-ibn-Mitab. He resides at Hail, and rules over a country purely Bedouin in character and said

¹ Ceased in March, 1924. The British Resident — H. St. John Philby — was earlier transferred to Transjordan.

² He forced the abdication of Hussein on October 4, 1924. See page 60.

to contain a population of 200,000. Since 1921, however, the Emir Abdullah has been compelled to recognize the overlordship of Ibn Saud.

In the decade preceding the Great War, secret organizations were formed and general movements were set on foot in all sections of Turkey-in-Asia to secure local freedom and autonomy. Although temporarily checked by the revolution of 1908-09, these revolutionary activities were soon again under full headway, owing to the failure of the Committee of Union and Progress to fulfill its widely heralded promises of good government and of provision for the rights and interests of the subject races. Each popular movement was thrown back on its own resources. Among the Armenians, there arose the Armenian National Committee, which, headed by the generous, broad-minded Borghos Nubar Pasha, and with headquarters in Cairo (later in Paris), strove in a business-like way to care for the oppressed Armenians, to promote national unity, and to secure a national home for its people. In Syria, in addition to the Arab Brothers, the Lebanon Union, the Society of Decentralization, and other organizations, there was the Syrian National Committee, which was headed by the gifted statesman, George Samné, and which represented the aspirations of the Syrian race. These people desired their own united and free state, official recognition of the Arabic language, selection of all local officials and judges from the native inhabitants, and a minority representation for Arabs, Maronites, Jews, and other nationalities. The Syrian National Committee was wise enough to see, however, that it could not hope for these reforms from the Turks. Nor could the Syrians carry them out unaided. So they hoped to obtain the aid of foreign experts and the assistance of some great power. If the United States would not accept a mandate for Syria, their next preference was for France.

Another movement — more far-reaching in its effects — was the so-called Arab renaissance which began about 1904. There was a genuine Arab awakening and strong desire for national freedom and for the unity of all Arab peoples in an Arab state with officials of their own choosing. Their movement was supported by two strong, but secret, revolutionary societies which were well led; and it spread through Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. It looked forward to the restoration of the ancient Arab kingdom of the Abbassides and Omeyyades; and it was closely associated with the Ashraf supremacy — rule of the direct descendants of Caliph Ali and Fatima. As the chief claimant of this line, the Emir Hussein¹ of the Hedjaz and his sons soon became leaders in the movement whose immediate program was the independence and union of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan with the Hedjaz and the other states of Arabia. Sentiments of national unity and freedom spread throughout the Arab world, while the different Arab communities sought means of freeing themselves from the domination of the Turks. When the principles of self-determination of peoples and the rights of small nations were enunciated by President Wilson, “a smile went through the desert,” as the Arabs said, and a new impulse was given to the Arab movement. And when the fourteen points were proclaimed as a basis for peace in January, 1918, and the mandatory plan was adopted at the Peace Congress, the Arabs thought the Allies had adopted a scheme by means of which they, and all the peoples of the Near East, might realize their hopes of independence and self-rule.

Unfortunately, Europe, occupied with various important and selfish plans of her own, failed to take these movements seriously. She knew that the political institutions

¹ King from November, 1916, to October, 1924.

of the Arab communities were still in the experimental stage, and that the creation of a great Arab confederation, or empire, could only follow the successful organization of the different regions into independent self-governing states. Indeed, European statesmen were not yet convinced that the Arabs possessed the constructive ability necessary to carry out such a stupendous task, in the face of the acrimonious dissensions of the various Moslem sects and of the opposition of leaders whose personal ambitions were of more importance than Arab national unity. Nor were the European authorities more certain that the Arabs could be trusted to work out their own destinies without foreign supervision, and without danger to their neighbors, than they were that the Turks could do so. To quote a well-informed though slightly biased authority — George Samné: "We have always advanced the opinion, now confirmed by the facts, that the Emir Feisal and his father had as a unique political object the reconstruction of the ancient Arab empire. They have never been friends — neither of Great Britain, nor of France, nor of the United States — and they never will be. They are only fanatical Moslems and Bedouin — antagonistic to the customs of civilized countries — who have utilized the mistakes of Europe to realize their own ambitions." To say the least, it is indeed a serious problem how the advanced Arab communities are to be joined up with the backward regions. For it is certainly out of the question to think of placing the civilized and learned Arab alumni of American, French, German, and British schools and colleges in Syria and Palestine under, or even to make them partners at the present time of, the "wild, uncultured Hedjaz Bedouin."

In addition to these movements toward local autonomy and freedom among the subject races of the old Ottoman

Empire, the interests of certain other nations had to be taken into account in any solution of the Near-Eastern Question. These were the Italians, the Greeks, and the Turks themselves. Italy had special trade interests and concessions in southwestern Asia Minor — particularly in the vicinity of Adalia — and a lucrative commerce with the Turkish Empire. And she was anxious not only to protect these interests, but also to have a goodly share in the economic and commercial development of Asia Minor. Greece, whose nationals had been for years pushing into the coastal regions of Turkey-in-Asia and securing a tremendous hold on the financial and commercial business of many of its chief towns and cities, wished to protect her subjects and to promote her growing trade with Turkey. In addition, national ambitions — fed by political agitation and military successes — had grown by leaps and bounds in recent years until they were dreaming of a re-creation of the old Greek Empire with its capital at Constantinople, and of making the Ægean Sea a Grecian lake. Their successes in the war with Turkey (October 17, 1912, to May 30, 1913) and with Bulgaria (June 30, to August 10, 1913) had increased the national territory from 25,014 square miles to 41,933 square miles, and brought into the kingdom an additional population of over 1,100,000, a large proportion of whom were Greeks.

As a reward for its services to the Allies in the Great War, M. Venizelos had been given definite assurances that Greece would receive Thrace — including Adrianople — down to the Chatalja line, together with the greater part of the province of Aiden with its seaport Smyrna. If this plan had been carried out, as it was ultimately outlined in the Treaties of San Remo and Sèvres, Greater Greece would have embraced an area considerably larger than 41,000 square miles and nearly

all the islands of the Ægean Sea, with a population of approximately 6,000,000 Greeks. No wonder Greek statesmen were ready to fight the Turks rather than relinquish one iota of these claims; and the subsequent losses and expenses incurred by the Greek Government in an effort to overthrow the Kemalist régime made them all the more reluctant to give up any of these "rights" in Asia Minor.

Nevertheless, some consideration had to be given to the rights and interests of the Ottoman peoples. Surely, the 10,000,000 Turks, living in southeastern Europe and in Turkey-in-Asia, were as much entitled to a national home and an independent existence as were the Armenians, the Syrians, the Arabs, the Jews, and the Greeks. It is true that the old Imperial Government had broken down completely, and that the country was bankrupt, and its leaders were universally condemned as unfit to rule either the subject nations or their own people, and were discredited at home and in Europe. Yet the bankruptcy of Turkey was a part of the general financial and economic breakdown through the Near East — intimately connected with the deplorable situation in Europe at the close of the Great War; and the problem of the reconstruction of the Turkish state was of vital importance to the peace and progress both of the Near East and of Europe.

Moreover, there were the Pan-Islam and the Pan-Turanian movements to complicate the situation — the former designed to unite all Moslems in a move to free Asia from European domination and to establish independent Mohammedan states, and the latter to bring together all the Turkish, Mongol, and Tartar peoples of Asia. And, joining hands soon with these, was a new Ottoman national uprising in Anatolia, which appealed to all Islam for aid, and hoped for a unification of the

3,000,000 Turks and Tartars of the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Persia with those in Turkey-in-Asia.

Unfortunately, at this critical moment, European statesmen failed to visualize the situation in the Near East from a broad, non-partisan, far-seeing point of view. On the contrary, no serious or scientific study was made of the many-sided Near-Eastern Question. And no intelligent plan was evolved whereby the interests of all the peoples concerned might be safeguarded, and a permanent peace established in the Near and Middle East. The policy of Great Britain and France — the self-appointed directors of Near-Eastern affairs following the signing of the armistice with Turkey — was simply a short-sighted scheme to partition the Ottoman Empire in a way to promote: first, their own interests; and second, the protection of the subject peoples, in so far as it was possible to do so, with a minimum of expense and effort on their part.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEAR-EASTERN QUESTION

3. PARTITION AND RECONSTRUCTION

They said to the cows, "When you die, we will wrap you in fine linen sheets." But the cows replied, "We shall be very happy if we can keep our own hides."

Arab legend

EARLY in the Great War, it became evident that a partition of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable. References to such a contingency appeared in the Franco-British Treaty, the Sazonov Agreement, and the Anglo-Italian Convention of 1914, in the London Pact of April 25th and the Anglo-Hedjaz Treaty of October, 1915, and in the Saxonby-Paleologue Convention between France and Russia in 1916. But the first official step in the partition of Turkey-in-Asia was taken when Great Britain and France signed the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement of May, 1916. This provided for the formation of an Arab state, or a confederation of Arab states under an Arab ruler, in a region embracing Syria, northern Arabia, and northern Mesopotamia. The northern portion of this great territory, where the French and British were to enjoy a priority in financial and commercial privileges, including Syria and the Mosul district in Iraq, was to be put under the protection of France. The southern part, embracing northern Arabia and the Samara or central division of Mesopotamia, was to be under British supervision; while Palestine was to be given an international administration. In addition, France was to administer directly Syria and Cilicia, and Great Britain Bagdad and Basra. On the 30th of September in the same year, a series of diplomatic "conversations"

on this subject began between Paris and London, to which Rome was admitted, beginning with the meeting of Lloyd George, Ribot, and Sonnino on a railway train at St. Jean de Maurienne in April, 1917. The results were ultimately formulated, on August 20th of the same year, in a new set of agreements containing the main provisions of the Franco-British pact with two important changes: i.e., a mandate to Italy over Smyrna, Adalia, and southern Asia Minor up to Konia and the Taurus Mountains, and the placing of southern Mesopotamia — up to Bagdad — under an international administration.

From that time on, there ensued through a period of nearly six years a most amazing and complicated combination of political activities, diplomatic maneuvers, and backdoor intrigues. In Europe, diplomatic "conversations," conferences of ministers, and international conventions on the problems of the Near East followed one another as rapidly as the business of reconstructing the affairs of a demoralized Europe would permit. Meanwhile, in every section of Turkey-in-Asia, movements and counter-movements were set on foot. Intrigue followed intrigue; and plot met with counterplot. Every nation — great and small — strove to work out its own destiny and ambitions irrespective of the rights and interests of the others; and national selfishness and greed sowed broadcast the seeds of hatred and suspicion. Great Britain sought to further her own interests by taking all the sheiks of Arabia into her pay, by securing protectorates over Mesopotamia and Palestine, by settling the Turkish problem to her own satisfaction through insidious intrigues among the different groups, and the use of the Greek forces as a pawn. France and Italy thought to find a way out of their difficulties and to promote their interests through secret treaties with the Turks. The Angora Government, striving for the freedom

and unity of the new Ottoman state, went over into the camp of Soviet Russia and cultivated the friendship of the small states of Central Asia. Each national group of the old Turkey-in-Asia struggled for national autonomy or independence. And Greece took advantage of the situation to make a bid for territory and empire in Asia Minor.

The whole situation is easily understood when one brings to mind clearly the main issues involved in the solution of the so-called "Turkish Question." Of these, in the eyes of European statesmen, there were four: the economic partition of Turkey-in-Asia; the establishment of a new Ottoman state including the question of boundaries and the problem of the Straits and the capitulations; the reorganization and government of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine under the mandates; and the protection of the former "subject peoples" such as the Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Maronites, and Jews.

Unfortunately, however, the great powers made the settlement of the last three dependent on the prior solution of the first. And three long years — 1917 to 1920 — were wasted by Great Britain and France in a secret diplomatic discussion to determine their respective spheres of influence in Asia Minor. Both were anxious to obtain control of the oil wells of Mosul and the other natural resources of northern Mesopotamia, while France for commercial and sentimental reasons desired a protectorate over Syria, and Great Britain from strategic motives wished to create a defensible northern frontier in Mosul for the new state of Iraq, and to use Palestine as a protection for her route to India and her interests in Egypt.

In spite of a prolonged and spirited correspondence and numerous conferences in London and Paris, no real progress toward an understanding was made till February 15, 1919. On that date, the French accepted the British

point of view in principle; and, on March 20th of the same year, a general agreement was fixed up in Lloyd George's apartment in London, whereby Mesopotamia (with Mosul) and Palestine were included in the British sphere of influence, and Syria, with Lebanon and Cilicia, in the French. The details of this compromise, however, which included the participation of France in the exploitation of the oil and other natural products of northern Mesopotamia and the relegation of the problem of the Bagdad railway to the future action of the Supreme Council of the Allies, were worked out and embodied in three secret conventions in the following year. In the first of these, signed at San Remo on April 25, 1920, Great Britain and France agreed to pool their petroleum interests in Roumania, Galicia, Asia Minor, the territories of the old Russian Empire, French colonies, and British crown colonies, on a basis of "cordial coöperation and reciprocity." In Roumania and the Russian lands, they were to coöperate in securing concessions for their nationals, who were to share equally in all rights obtained. In Mesopotamia, France was to receive twenty-five per cent of the net output of oil, any native government or interests twenty per cent, and Great Britain fifty-five per cent; while the English Government was to use its influence to secure for the French twenty-five per cent of the oil taken out by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.¹

This economic "Entente" was strengthened further by the secret Tripartite Agreement of August 18, 1920, following the Sèvres Treaty, between France, Italy, and Great Britain. After stating their desire to avoid international rivalries and to aid Turkey in "the reorganiza-

¹ For foreign holdings in oil see the *Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Foreign Ownership in the Petroleum Industry*, February 12, 1923. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1923.

tion of justice, the finances, the gendarmerie and the police, the protection of religious, racial, and linguistic minorities, and in the economic development of the country," the signatory powers agreed upon an equality of participation on all international commissions created to carry out these reforms, an export and import reciprocity in their respective spheres of interest, and joint diplomatic action in maintaining their respective positions and rights. The areas were defined, in which the special interests of Italy in southern Anatolia (including the coal basin of Declara) and of France "in Cilicia and the west border of Kurdistan bordering on Syria up to Jeziret-ibn-Omar" were recognized. The position of Great Britain was not mentioned; but her interests were taken care of in Article VI, which provided that "Mandatory powers for territories detached from the Turkish Empire should enjoy the same rights and privileges as the powers whose special interests are recognized and defined in Article V." And it was provided further that "the Anatolian railway, the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana railway, and that part of the Bagdad railway lying in Turkish territory" should be unified and worked by a joint company whose capital is to be "furnished equally by British, French, and Italian financial groups."

In order to clarify the issues still further, Great Britain and France signed another secret compact on December 23, 1920, which defined the future boundaries — to be established within three months by a special commission — between the regions placed under British and French mandates. The chief object of this agreement was to make sure that the railway from Nisibin to Damascus, and from Damascus to Lake Tiberias via the valley of the Yarmuk, would lie within the French sphere, while the line would be so drawn that Great Britain might construct,

within the territorial limits of her own mandates, a railway and a pipe line from Bagdad by way of the oasis of Tadmore and the valley of the Yarmuk direct to Lake Tiberias, from which a connection could be made through to the harbor of Haifa. However, pending the construction of the new road, France was to share that section of the present railway between Nasib and Lake Tiberias jointly with England and to permit the latter to build a pipe line along the existing track. In view of these concessions, Great Britain agreed not to sell or alienate the island of Cyprus without the previous consent of France, and to maintain for France the provisions of the San Remo Convention concerning oil, the output of which would be facilitated by the railways and pipe lines mentioned in this accord.

Meanwhile, as the Allied powers haggled over their so-called rights and interests, affairs in the Near East drifted into a most complicated and dangerous situation; while inexcusable blunders committed by the powers, in an attempt to enforce their own short-sighted program, rendered the solution of the great problems at issue well-nigh impossible. In the first place, before inaugurating any intelligent plan for reconstruction in Turkey-in-Asia, or even suggesting a feasible one to the various peoples concerned, the British forces of occupation and administration were suddenly removed from Asia Minor. Syria and Cilicia were turned over to France at the close of 1919; and the British armies in Mesopotamia and Palestine were reduced to a minimum early in 1920. Yet the presence of the English troops and governors in whom the native peoples had placed trust and confidence, the complete breakdown of the old Turkish governmental system, and the expectant attitude of the various racial groups — submissive and ready to coöperate in the establishment of their own autonomous states — had made the moment

propitious for the introduction of a new régime throughout the Near East.

In the second place, the Allied statesmen induced the Supreme Council of the Allies to assign mandates to France over Syria and Lebanon, and to Great Britain over Mesopotamia (including Mosul) and Palestine, at San Remo on April 25, 1920. Two years passed by ere the approval of the League of Nations for these mandates was forthcoming. Yet England and France, without waiting for this official sanction, or consulting the wishes of the peoples concerned, assumed the administration of these countries with little or no recourse to local officials or institutions. Consequently, the movement proved unpopular; and the difficulties of reorganization were multiplied.

In the third place, the Allies forced upon the helpless Turkish authorities the ill-fated Treaty of Sèvres on August 20, 1920, and insisted on its acceptance by all parties concerned long after it became impossible to execute it or wise to use it as a basis of reconstruction in the Near East. This convention provided for the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the trade of the world, the recognition of Armenia as a free and independent state whose boundaries should be determined by the President of the United States, the establishment of local autonomy in Kurdistan, the creation of Mesopotamia and Syria as independent communities, but under the control of the mandatory powers till they should be able to rule themselves, the setting-up of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, the preservation of the independence of the Hedjaz and other Arab states, and the ultimate erection of a new Turkish state whose territorial limits were to be restricted to an area considerably less than that of the old province of Anatolia. But, with the exception of the Straits, which, with the adjacent territory, were placed under the adminis-

tration of a special commission, no plan was formulated to ensure the execution of this excellent program. The authors of the Sèvres Treaty failed to realize, not only that the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire was only the first step in any move for reconstruction in the Near East, but also that no reorganization could succeed that did not provide forces and means sufficient to preserve peace and order in Turkey-in-Asia, and to aid the new Turkey — as well as all the other young states of that region — in the speedy organization of efficient and self-sustaining administrations.

In addition, the European treaty-makers, by their clumsy tactics, aroused the ill-will and animosity of all the national units concerned. Neither the Turkish representatives, nor the Greek, nor those of any of the independent states or autonomous governments in the Near East, were admitted to the negotiations at Sèvres. They were simply told what terms they would have to accept; and every one was dissatisfied with his lot. The Greeks were given more than they could easily assimilate and administer, including Thrace, the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Samothrace, Mitylene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, and the administrative control of Smyrna with its hinterland; but they were dissatisfied because they were awarded an area of only 12,000 square kilometers around the port of Smyrna, when they demanded a square of 125,000 kilometers. Armenia was given too little territory, while no aid in any form was promised to enable this weak and youthful community to establish its national government. The Arabs, Syrians, and Jews were made promises without due consideration of actual conditions in Asia Minor, which the powers found exceedingly difficult, and even unwise, to put into execution later. And the whole Turkish nation was aroused into action,

from a position of lethargy and despair, by the proposal to deprive them, not only of their last European possessions, of the Ægean islands, of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia, but also of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, and Smyrna with its hinterland.

The blundering of European statesmen was bad enough. But the long delay which ensued between the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey (October, 1918) and the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), was sufficient of itself to deal a death blow to any well-intentioned plan of reorganization. For the Turks, Syrians, and Arabs, who were ready in 1918 to accept any reasonable scheme concerning their future status, were in quite a different frame of mind in 1920. As a prominent Kemalist said in 1922 to Demetra Vaka, referring to the time of the armistice, "We expected to be put out of Europe — and we were ready to go. There was no resistance left in us. From every lip one heard, 'Kismet!' Some said 'Angora'; others, 'We shall be put back into Turkestan.' The Allies could have done whatever they wished with us then." The delay, however, afforded an opportunity to discontented leaders and politicians, and to ambitious chieftains and scheming tribesmen, to start trouble for the European administrators and to launch patriotic movements and religious crusades with a view to forcing the foreigner out of the Near East. Chief among these were the "Nationalist movement" in Asia Minor, the Arab independence organization in Syria and Arabia, the sporadic religious uprisings in Mesopotamia, and the Bolshevik intrigues in the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. The withdrawal of the British troops from Armenia and the Caucasus, beginning on August 16, 1919, and from Syria and Mesopotamia between November 4, 1919, and January 19, 1920, gave a great impetus to these movements and to the

general spread of disorder. This was especially true in Asia Minor where the French failed to occupy promptly and with sufficient troops the interior posts in Syria evacuated by the British, and in Mesopotamia where the English left only a small military force and an insignificant number of officials to maintain order in an enormous territory.

The Nationalist movement in Asia Minor had its origin in an anti-Greek movement in the vilayet of Aidin in March, 1919, when Greek troops, with the consent of the Allies, occupied the port of Smyrna and adjacent territory. In places, the Turkish inhabitants resisted; and numerous atrocities were committed by Greek soldiers and officers who got out of hand and attempted, on their own account, to revenge earlier massacres of Greeks by Turks. Ultimately, M. Stergiadis — the new Greek High Commissioner — restored order, provided adequate protection for life and property, and created a just and efficient administration in the district under Greek control. But the mischief had been done. Exaggerated stories of the Greek atrocities, accompanied by misrepresentations concerning the policy of the Allies in regard to Turkey, were utilized to arouse the Turks of Anatolia and to win supporters for an uprising destined to save the Turkish state. And societies were organized in the various vilayets of the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of resisting foreign intervention and of preventing the dismemberment of the Sultan's domains. Mustapha Kemal Pasha — a Turkish division general and the hero of the Dardanelles campaign — who was sent out to Samsun, in May, 1919, to maintain order and to put to an end the revolt of the Third Army Corps, near Sivas, which had defied the Turkish Government and the Allies, became the recognized head of the movement.

This new leader, a real patriot and a man of unquestioned sincerity and ability, claimed that the principles of "self-determination of peoples" and "consent of the governed," as propounded by President Wilson, should be applied in Turkey-in-Asia. "The aim of the Nationalists," he exclaimed, "is to keep the Turkish lands for the Turks, maintaining the integrity of Turkey as it stood when the armistice was signed. The Nationalists act by resisting execution of the terms of the treaty where they conflict with our ideas. This is a people's movement; and without their support it will die. We are depending, too, on the aid of all Islam. The Turks are the last of the Moslem races to remain free; and Islam will strive to keep them free."

The new movement met with almost immediate success. Through a widespread, well-conducted propaganda, the Turkish people, who were utterly discouraged and impoverished by the losses and sufferings of the Great War, were aroused as never before to save the state. Mustapha Kemal was regarded as a man of destiny and the savior of Turkey. The most intelligent men of all classes — merchants, officials, religious leaders, peasants, and tribal chieftains — rallied to his support. In order not to appear as a rebel, and to make it possible for all Moslems to join the cause, he secured the help of the chief Kadi of Angora and the Abbot of the Dancing Dervishes in issuing "fetvas," or religious orders, stating that it was the duty of all Moslems to take up arms in defense of the Caliph (the Sultan), when the seat of the Caliphate (Constantinople) was occupied by the enemy. By the end of 1919, the new leaders were in control of the greater part of Anatolia, including Sivas, Angora, Kastamuni, Erzerum, Konia, Diarbekir and part of Kharput; and by the close of 1920 the movement had become a national affair. Conferences

of the leaders at Sivas and Angora in June, July, and September, 1919, resulted in the holding of free elections and the organization of a constitutional government for Asiatic Turkey.

On April 23, 1920, a "Constitutional Assembly," elected from 172 communes of Asia Minor, met at Angora and transformed itself into a regular national government by the passage of the so-called "national pact" on February 5, 1921. This famous document gave to the "Great National Assembly," as the representative of the sovereign people, all executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and declared the program of the new government to be: complete independence — economic, financial, and political — for Turkey, expulsion of all invaders from Ottoman lands, and control of the destiny of the Turkish people.

The outlook was very discouraging for the Nationalists, however, because of the general weakness and exhaustion of Turkey-in-Asia, the lack of national military organization and equipment, and the isolation of the new state. Accordingly, it was imperative to look abroad for aid; and soon emissaries were sent throughout the Near and Middle East from Egypt to India to secure the support of all Moslems. On April 25, 1921, an alliance was concluded with Afghanistan, while, in October of the same year, Rechid Bey was sent to arrange an "entente" with Persia; and a Persian-Afghanistan Treaty was signed on October 17, 1921. In this way, all Islam was rallied to the support of Kemal who was regarded as the champion of the Moslem world, and the Turkish Nationalist movement was transformed into an Asiatic cause. In the words of the Turco-Afghanistan Treaty, Oriental states recognized, "with infinite gratitude, that the era of the awakening and of the deliverance has begun for the East." And the whole Moslem world was soon tingling with the desire to see

Turkey saved and all the East freed from the domination of Europe.

Meanwhile, the Kemalists appealed to the only power in a position to give them material military aid. And, on March 16, 1921, an offensive and defensive alliance was signed between the Soviet Government of Russia and the Nationalist Government of Turkey, although both parties realized full well the tremendous differences between their respective political ideals and organizations. In February, 1921, the Bolsheviki had made treaties with Afghanistan and Persia. In the spring of that year, they had forced Soviet government on the Caucasus states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia; and, by July, they had recovered control of all Turkestan and completely reorganized it. Into this system of alliances and undertakings, the Turkish Nationalists now entered, and assisted the Soviet leaders in crushing Armenia in order to regain complete control of Turkish Armenia. But both parties were well aware of the dangers involved in this alliance. At the great Baku Conference in September, 1920, G. Zinoviev declared: "Never for a moment do we forget that the movement headed by Kemal is *not* a communist movement. . . . You must not do what the Kemalist Government is doing in Turkey. You must not support the power of the Sultan — not even if religious considerations urge you to do so. We believe the Sultan's hour has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic power to continue. You must destroy, you must annihilate faith in the Sultan. You must struggle to obtain real Soviet organization."

It was a mistake, however, to regard the Kemalist Government as autocratic. In reality, it was very democratic, and only the first stage in the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, within two years, the sultans of

Turkey were deprived of all their temporal power, yet retained, by election of the National Assembly, their position as the head of the Moslem Church. Nevertheless, one must not overlook the fact that a great contest is going on between the forces of communism and democracy for the control of the Near East. And the sooner Europe comes to the aid of democracy in Asia, in a spirit of coöperation and earnest resourcefulness, the sooner will the latter triumph, the incubus of Bolshevism be removed from the Orient, and a permanent peace established in the Near and Middle East.

Meanwhile, other important movements in Asia Minor were absorbing the attention and the funds of European states. Syria was in a ferment and the French were facing a serious situation. They were very slow in taking over the administration of the country from the British; and, in their anxiety to keep down expenses, yet at the same time to retain control of the economic and commercial interests, they made many serious mistakes. At first, although they recognized the position and rights of the various peoples of Syria, they tolerated the so-called Arab National movement and permitted it to gain a momentary ascendancy. This was led by the Emir Feisal to whom the British had promised an Arab kingdom. He was chosen King of Syria at a so-called National Assembly held in Damascus in March, 1920, which also proclaimed his brother, Abdullah, King of Iraq. But, although he formed a cabinet and attempted to set a government in operation in the vicinity of Damascus, he had great difficulty in maintaining order and in establishing stable conditions. And he made a grave error in failing to coöperate sincerely with the French officials.

At length, the French, finding it very difficult to give an efficient direction to the affairs of state under the exist-

ing conditions, advanced their troops to the vicinity of Damascus. And, on July 15, 1920, General Gouraud sent an ultimatum to Feisal demanding that his government recognize the French mandate, that the Arab army be disbanded at midday on July 19th, that the French forces be permitted to occupy Royak, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, that the new French currency be accepted, and that those persons responsible for the recent pillaging of towns and villages be punished before July 31st. In some way Feisal's answer was delayed; and the French forces under General Goybet occupied Damascus on July 25th, the so-called King withdrawing his troops into the desert villages, where they were soon disbanded. Thus ended the ill-fated Arab kingdom, after a troubled and precarious career of only four months.

A congress of Syrian leaders was held immediately in Damascus, which repudiated Feisal, recognized the French mandate, and assisted in the organization of a new Syrian ministry under Aladdin-ed-Rubi as premier. Unfortunately, Aladdin and two of his ministers were killed three weeks later in an Arab attack on a railway train on the Hedjaz railroad near Kurbet-el-Ghazali; but the work of reorganization went on steadily under French supervision in spite of this tragedy. Between July 23d and 31st, Aleppo, Hama, Adana, and Mersina were occupied amid the rejoicing of their inhabitants who had no wish for the rule of Turkish Nationalists or of Arabs. And General Gouraud started energetically upon the difficult task of establishing order and of creating an efficient government. The pacification of the country was finally completed between April 1 and July 31, 1921; but it was nearly a year later before the French succeeded in working out satisfactorily the details of the new administration.

Meanwhile, the boundaries of the new state were fixed

by the Anglo-French Agreement of December 23, 1920, which defined the limits of Syria, on the side of Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the Franco-Turkish Conventions of March and October 21, 1921, which fixed the northern frontier of Syria, as constituted under the French mandate. Its area is estimated as 60,000 square miles; and its population is about 3,000,000.¹ The country was placed under the control of a French High Commissioner, General Gouraud, and his advisers; and, for administrative purposes, it was divided into the five autonomous states of Greater Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, Alawiya,² and Jebel Druse. The first, with an area of 10,855 square miles and a population of 726,000, extends from Palestine to (and including) the city of Tripoli, and from the Mediterranean Sea to heights of the Anti-Lebanon range. It was declared an independent state on September 1, 1920; and Beirut was made the seat of the new government. The head of the state is a French governor — now Commandant Albert Traubaud, an able and discreet administrator, who is making a valiant effort to give the land peace and security, and to secure national unity and coöperation. There is a cabinet selected from the leading citizens of Greater Lebanon, but assisted by French technical advisers and a central administrative council of fifteen, on which the different religious and the six different communities that constitute the State of Greater Lebanon, are proportionally represented.

The State of Damascus, under the new organization, is composed of the old Sanjaks of Hama, Homs, and Damascus, embracing some 16,000 square miles of terri-

¹ Different estimates from reliable sources have given the population of Syria all the way from 2,700,000 to 3,335,000; but the returns of the census taken in the summer of 1924 indicate that the number of inhabitants at the present time is not over 2,500,000.

² "Territoire des Alaouites."

tory, with a population of approximately 600,000.¹ Its government consists of a Syrian governor, a native cabinet with ministries of the interior and police, finance, justice and pious foundations, public works, posts and telegraphs, "service economic," and gendarmerie and militia, and a national council elected on a wide franchise, which has power to vote on taxes, the budget, loans, and official decrees. The Turkish Sanjaks of Aleppo (reaching now to the border of Mesopotamia), Deis-el-Zor, and Alexandretta, including an area of 25,000 square miles with about 717,000 inhabitants, were united officially, on September 15, 1920, in the presence of General Gouraud, into a new commonwealth. Its government is similar to that of Damascus. But there is a civil secretary-general; and the government council is composed of the five ministers of state, the religious heads, two members from each sanjak, and the mayors of Aleppo, Alexandretta, and Antioch — the chief cities.

The territory of the Alawiya embraces about 2500 square miles of the rugged, mountainous district lying between Tripoli and Antioch, which is inhabited by fanatical and ignorant Moslem tribes ruled by warlike, feudal chieftains. Its people are followers of Ali, but antagonistic to the other Mohammedan sects. They number about 400,000 souls; and they demand local autonomy as earnestly as any of the other peoples of Syria. The Sanjaks of Latakia and Tartus and the seaport of Latakia² were joined to form the new state; and its central government is administered by a French officer, while local affairs are left largely to the native chieftains. The new governor prepares the territorial budget, approves the local budgets, and reports

¹As first constituted, Damascus included Jebel Druse and had an area of approximately 20,000 square miles and a population of some 706,000.

²Ladikiya.

directly to the French High Commissioner. He is assisted by advisers directing the departments of finance, public works, posts and telegraphs, public health and help, justice and pious foundations, and by French technical experts. And there is a consultative commission of twelve natives, composed of seven Alawiye, two Christians, two Moslems, and one Jew.

In 1922 the States of Damascus,¹ Aleppo,¹ and Alawiya were united in a Syrian Federation whose first parliament met at Aleppo in July of that year. Great Lebanon and Jebel Druse, however, remained autonomous communities. The latter, comprised of some 4000 square miles of territory in the Hauran and the Syrian desert with a population approximating 100,000 people, the great majority of whom are Druses, was constituted in 1921. By a treaty of March 4th in that year between General Gouraud and the Druse leaders a Druse state was organized with a native Druse governor elected for four years, an administrative commission and a popular assembly elected for three years. But French experts assist the Druse high officials.

The French started on this work of reconstruction under the most discouraging circumstances. The Great War had exhausted the inhabitants, and transformed the country into a land of desolation and decay. The finances were in ruins; and the taxes, fixed in the sixties, could not raise funds sufficient for the needs of the new Syria. As in all other countries, an economic and commercial depression followed closely on the War, which in the case of Syria was greatly intensified by the closing of the northern fron-

¹ December 7, 1924, General Weygand (successor of General Gouraud as High Commissioner) issued an ordinance creating a new Syrian state composed of the States of Damascus and Aleppo. Alexandretta and the surrounding district were given a sort of local autonomy. In January, 1925, General Maurice P. E. Sarrail was appointed High Commissioner.

tier to trade and the introduction of a depreciated paper franc in a land accustomed to Turkish gold and silver. An inherited border war with the Turks in Cilicia, and riots instigated in a number of chief cities and centers by discontented leaders, complicated the situation.

Moreover, the French mandate was not popular with a large portion of the people; and the position of the French was made still more difficult by the failure of the League of Nations to ratify their mandate officially until July 22, 1922 — two years after it had been approved by the Supreme Council of the Allies at San Remo — and by the introduction of martial law and of stringent restrictions on the press — deemed necessary for the establishment of order and security. And, in the early days of the French occupation, ambitious sentiments concerning French colonial expansion and trade rights in Asia Minor, freely expressed by prominent statesmen in Paris, created a bad impression and caused the Syrians to expect exploitation by the French. Premier Leygues, for instance, in December, 1920, assured the Chamber of Deputies that "France will occupy all of it [Syria] and always." Finally, the men whom the French put in charge of affairs in Syria in the first years were excellent officers, but they were not qualified to handle successfully such a complicated situation.

Nevertheless, the French are making progress. They have realized their earlier mistakes; and they are replacing their first administrators with men of broader sympathies and wider experience, such as Robert de Caix, who understand the Syrian peoples and customs, and the nature of the great task before them. They recognize that the chief needs of the new state are efficient government, public security, primary education, and improved methods in agriculture and industry. They have withdrawn more

than 30,000 of the 70,000 French forces of occupation, reduced the military budget accordingly, and appointed Syrians to important positions in the government of the new states. And in spite of the fact that the French treasury is depleted almost to exhaustion and increased taxation is a burden to the majority of Syrians and resented by the unreasoning masses, the French have done much to improve conditions and prepare the way for the future development and prosperity of Syria, during the few years of their administration. They have reopened Beirut Harbor, improved the ports of Alexandretta and Mersina, built 425 miles of railways and 200 of roads, erected, furnished and subsidized nine hundred schools, greatly modernized and extended hospital accommodations, established orphanages for Christian homeless children, and laid the foundations of economic prosperity.¹

Nevertheless, Syria has entered upon the most critical period of its history; and the French will have their hands full to handle the situation successfully, for the major portion of the work of reconstruction remains to be done. A new financial system, together with a regular income and budget for governmental expenses and public improvements, must be created. The system of justice must be completely reorganized, adequate protection be afforded life, property, and the rights of individual communities

¹ Yet, while contradictory reports concerning the success of the mandatory government in Syria come from the Near East, it is evident that the French administration thus far has neither satisfied the aspirations of the Syrians nor proved as just and as efficient as it promised to be. Financially, matters are improving. It is claimed that the deficit, which reached (Syrian) £3,730,000 in 1922, was reduced to £168,000 in 1923. But General Weygand who succeeded General Gouraud in April, 1923, reported in May, 1924, that, while the situation was gaining in strength, there was still a great need of stability and continuity in the French administration. The Lausanne Treaty should be ratified; the radical discussions of French policy should cease; and the Syrian people be given assurance and practi-

and religious organizations, and the political administration so perfected that the local autonomy of the different units will be a success and a Syrian national state will come into being. And a great effort must be made to revive trade and industry through the building of railways and good roads, the construction of harbors and docks, and the extensive agricultural development of such regions as the plains of Aleppo and Damascus, the Hauran and the coastal valleys, and through the furnishing of capital for public improvements and the development of the national resources.

And, finally, the French should never lose sight of the fact that Syria and its resources are for the Syrians and not for the French, and that the success of their venture in Asia Minor is very largely dependent upon their ability to win the confidence and coöperation of the people. So it is imperative that they treat with justice and discretion the rights and interests of the various nationalities in Syria, and that they execute their duties as a mandatory power in a friendly, impartial, and honorable spirit. As M. Poincaré wrote in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, on April 1, 1921, "Nous devrons être seulement le bon conseiller qui convainc et dont les avis sont avantageux à suivre. . . . Nous devrons apparaître là-bas comme des libérateurs et

cal evidence that the promises of the French Government will be carried out. Meanwhile the economic program, including increased transportation, works of irrigation, and cotton-growing, must be pushed along as rapidly as possible. As signs of a more liberal French policy, we note that some French technical advisers were employed in 1923 who are not under the control of the Governor-General; police, navigation, mail and telegraph were being placed, on January 1, 1924, under native Syrian control, including a native gendarmerie of 4477 men and a Syrian Legion of 6500 now being formed; native courts of justice are being reorganized and federalized with the aid of French magistrates; and a Franco-American Treaty was signed on April 4, 1924, granting to American citizens and interests an equality of rights in Syria and Lebanon and to the United States the right to establish educational and religious institutions in those countries.

comme des guides . . . et ne pas oublier que nous n'avons à établir en Syrie ni notre protectorate, ni à plus forte raison notre souveraineté."

To the south, in Palestine, the British are facing a situation equally difficult. The small region under the British mandate, embracing 9000 square miles of territory — about the size of New Hampshire — is economically dependent on Syria, and possesses little natural wealth outside of its agricultural possibilities. Yet, when the British took over the country, only about 200,000 acres were cultivated yearly out of a possible 800,000 acres; and the annual yield on more than one half of the land in use was far below the usual standard, owing to antiquated methods of production and a lack of skilled labor. There was no reason, however, why, with the aid of irrigation and the proper mechanical equipment on the farms, production on a large scale of cotton, maize, rice, dates, fruits, and vegetables would not be forthcoming, and the state set on its feet financially and economically, provided the necessary capital and trained labor could be found.

Unfortunately, neither the Arabs, who own valuable properties and constitute over seventy per cent of the population, nor the native Jews numbering about eleven per cent, could furnish the required capital, while the native landowners, as well as laborers, were, for the most part, indifferent workers, unprogressive, and lacking in resources and ambition. Yet there was plenty of room in the country for a larger population of industrious laborers and home-loving proprietors, for "Palestine," wrote the High Commissioner in his first proclamation, "properly provided with roads, railways, harbors, and electric power, with the soil more highly cultivated, the waste lands reclaimed, forests planted, malaria extirpated, and with town and village industries encouraged, can maintain a

large additional population not only without hurt, but, on the contrary, with more advantage to the present inhabitants."

Great Britain was assigned a mandate over Palestine at the San Remo Conference in April, 1920; but she had no spare funds for such an undertaking. Her policy in regard to that country, however, had been dictated since 1917 by two important considerations: anxiety lest she fail to secure and retain Jewish support during the War, and the desire to preserve her control over the Suez-Red Sea waterway to the East. In order, therefore, not to outrage these fundamental principles of British foreign policy, the British statesmen determined to solve the problem of Palestine by a unique social and political experiment: i.e., to base the government of the new community upon its Jewish and Arab intelligentsia — with emphasis on the former — and to procure the necessary capital and labor from the Jewish nation. And this in spite of the fact that such an undertaking was a delicate and dangerous affair requiring great tact and the most skillful management to ensure success. H. Belloc has aptly described it, as the "building of a pyramid upwards from the apex. It is an experiment in the most unstable of equilibriums." And even the English statesmen, themselves, perceived the rocks ahead. For, as Winston Churchill pointed out, although Great Britain is "pledged to a policy absolutely right in itself," it must "necessarily encounter a great deal of suspicion and resentment on the part of the majority of the people."

Unfortunately, the British upset their own apple-cart at the very beginning of operations; and they have been busy ever since trying to set it upright again, and to start it on its way. Their first blunder was the overemphasis of the Jewish phase of their plan, in a land chiefly owned and

inhabited by Arabs, before the move was fully understood by the people, and *before* any effort was made to introduce representative political institutions in which all classes should participate. The essence of the English proposal was contained in the Balfour Declaration, published officially on November 2, 1917, which read: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." And this British plan to create a national home for the Jews in Palestine was given special emphasis in the first proclamation of the High Commissioner, in July, 1920, and in the drafted mandate approved by the Council of the League of Nations on July 22, 1922.

Nevertheless, the proposal did not meet with an enthusiastic reception in Palestine. In spite of the assurances of Lord Milner that "it is not conceivable that we should give the house of somebody to somebody else. The Moslems have here a fatherland. So have the Christians. Then why not the Jews as well? You ask for justice, and I think that the Government is trying its hardest to be just with everybody," and of Winston Churchill: that Balfour's words were "*a* national home, not *the* national home," that the "Zionist movement will succeed only on its merits," and that "the present form of government will continue many years, i.e., until full self-government is established through the development of representative institutions" — no one was satisfied. On the contrary, the hearts of the people were filled with fear lest they lose their homes and their properties. And suspicion of the

British and their motives grew apace, owing to the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel — a broad-minded and capable Jew — as High Commissioner of the country with full powers, the unfortunate way in which the work of reconstruction was inaugurated under the direction of the Zionist Executive Commission, and the long delay — two years — which ensued before the League of Nations approved the mandate and before the introduction of representative government was even attempted. Meanwhile, the English authorities did little, between 1917 and 1920, to make clear the full details and meaning of their scheme, and dissatisfied national leaders stirred up counter-movements. By 1921, the country was in an uproar, the masses discontented, and riots broke out in all the cities of Palestine, so that martial law had to be temporarily established.

For this situation, a good deal of the blame lies with the Zionist Executive Commission to whom the British Government entrusted the work of raising funds and importing Jewish laborers for the rehabilitation of the country. This commission is the agent of the World Zionist Organization, whose purpose, as defined at the World Zionist Conference held in London from July 5 to 25, 1920, was to provide homes in Palestine for Jews brought from eastern Europe and to assist in the economic development of that country. All political issues and religious questions were barred from the discussions and activities of the association, and its energies concentrated upon this task, which included: the raising of a Jewish national fund, the purchasing of large tracts of land in Palestine, the parceling out of this land "exclusively on hereditary leasehold and copyhold," and the assisting of Jewish agricultural workers without means to settle on their own farms. But it was stipulated especially that "land purchased in Palestine shall be centralized under the control of the World Zionist Organization," and

“that all settlers, with or without capital, must cultivate their own lands themselves.”

All would have been well if this program had been carried out with tact and discretion. For the actual work of the Zionist Executive Commission in Palestine was excellent, during the four years from 1918 to 1922. It brought 20,000 settlers to the country,¹ acquired large tracts of land, expended \$5,000,000 on economic and cultural undertakings including important works of drainage near Jerusalem and Lake Tiberias, and assisted in the creation of the General Mortgage Bank and the Palestine Workman's Bank. It had in 1923 a large annual budget with \$500,000 for schools alone, controlled thirty-one agricultural settlements totaling 163,163 acres and one hundred and thirty-seven schools including two agricultural schools and two experiment stations, and had loaned over \$600,000 to settlers and to the Palestine Administration.

Unfortunately, the impression soon got abroad in the land that all the non-Jewish inhabitants would be dispossessed in time of their rights, privileges, and properties. The over-zealous efforts of the Zionist Executive Commission, and their systematic sectarian propaganda in the interest of a Jewish national home in Palestine, confirmed this suspicion. Their very slogan, “The land without a people for the people without a land,” was an insult to Arabs of the country. And they were unwise enough to use political influence to secure economic concessions, property, and even political rights — such as the official use of the Hebrew language — for their compatriots. To make matters worse, the commission introduced into the country undesirables from the slums of cities in central and south-eastern Europe, who gave a bad odor to the large percent-

¹ By 1925 the number of Jewish immigrants was about 53,000, but the Arab population had increased by approximately 80,000 in the same period.

age of excellent *haluzin*, or new settlers, homesteaded on the newly acquired lands, and it utilized the press to magnify the importance, the interests, and the rights of the Jewish people without consideration for the other inhabitants of Palestine. "There are Arabs," wrote the *Palestine Weekly* on February 23, 1923, "who have not yet realized that they are citizens of a conquered country, and that whatever privileges are accorded to them are not theirs by right, but by the good-will of a benevolent Government."

The reaction against this short-sighted, selfish policy was immediate. A determined opposition to the Zionist movement arose throughout the country, which increased rapidly till it embraced nine tenths of the population, including many orthodox Jews. Riots occurred in Jerusalem and other cities. And there ensued a rapid development of Arab national consciousness — totally unexpected by the British authorities. An Arab National Committee was formed to defend Arab interests, and to work for the recognition of the Arab's cause and rights in Palestine — both by Great Britain and by the world. And a far-reaching movement was set on foot to enlist all the Arabs of the country in a passive resistance to the new administration, and to the introduction of representative institutions, until the Arabs should be given a just share in the government and political institutions of the land.

Meanwhile, the British authorities were straining every nerve to organize an efficient administration, to prevent conflicts, to smooth out difficulties, and to promote the economic development of the country. They even stopped the immigration of Jewish settlers for a time, and adopted a policy of conciliation and fair play toward the Arabs. But they were woefully slow in producing their plan for representative institutions. For it was not till September 11, 1922, four years after the signing of the armistice with

Germany and two after the arrival of the first civil governor, that the British Parliament passed the act creating representative institutions for Palestine. Under this ordinance, the new government is to consist of a High Commissioner appointed by the mandatory power, and a legislative council of twenty-five members, of whom ten are the official appointees of the High Commissioner and fifteen are native representatives. Of these last, three members — one Moslem, one Christian, and one Jew — are appointed by the Chambers of Commerce (one) and the High Commissioner (two), and the other twelve are elected indirectly by the people — one from every electoral district. All citizens twenty-five years of age or over will vote for a secondary elector of whom there will be one for every three hundred voters; and the secondary electors will choose the representative of the district or province.

The powers of the High Commissioner were enlarged to include: the enforcement of the laws, complete control of administrative affairs, the deportation of unruly and dangerous persons, the division of the country into provinces for administrative purposes, and the control of all public lands, mines, and minerals. The legislative council will have the power to pass all ordinances necessary to establish peace, order, and good government; but it cannot originate any ordinance affecting freedom of religion or discriminating in regard to race, religion, or language. And every law must be approved by the High Commissioner, while Great Britain reserves the right in the interest of the general welfare to nullify any measure.

In addition, it is planned to create regular magistrate and district courts, and to establish Moslem, Jewish, and Christian religious tribunals with jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, alimony, guardianship, legitimation, minors, succession, wills, legacies, and the suits and personal status of

Moslems, Jews, and Christians. And, in September, 1922, an arrangement was made with the League of Nations, whereby the control of the Holy Places in Palestine was placed in the hands of an international commission named by the League which created a \$200,000 fund to finance the plan. In this way, it was hoped, some of the chief sources of national friction and conflict due to religious and racial difficulties would be removed. And, finally, to avoid legal linguistic complications, Arabic, Hebrew, and English were made official languages.

Notwithstanding the evident merits of this new scheme, and the well-intentioned efforts of the British authorities to put it into operation, it has failed completely, to date, as a governmental experiment. When the first elections took place in the spring of 1923, the great majority of Arabs refrained from voting. And when the High Commissioner organized a new council and appointed ten Arab members — eight Moslem and two Christian — in the first week of June, 1923, Arab public sentiment forced their resignation, although they were among the most respected, intelligent, and influential men in the country. New elections will be ordered; but there is little likelihood that the second experiment will succeed any better than the first, in the face of this passive resistance of the Arabs.

Just how soon the British will succeed in establishing national concord and representative institutions in Palestine cannot be foreseen.¹ But before any material progress can be made, the English statesmen will have to do two things: come to an understanding with the Arabs concerning the problem of a home for the Jews in Palestine, and apply the principle of self-determination in setting up representative government in the country. The Zionist Executive Com-

¹ Field-Marshal Herbert C. O. Plumer was appointed British High Commissioner for Palestine in May, 1925.

mission must be transformed into a conservative, broad-minded institution — representative of the best elements in modern Jewry — whose labors are strictly restricted to the work of assisting Hebrew farmers and landowners. The question of a home for Jews should be taken out of politics; and the control of immigration and the disposition of public lands should be retained by the Government and administered strictly on a non-partisan basis. And the representation in the legislative council must be apportioned justly in accord with the numerical strength of the different races. The new constitutional law is an English hand-made document, in the making of which the natives of Palestine had little to do. But to make it work, one will have to readjust it with the coöperation of the native leaders of all races and creeds, or enlist the assistance of the natives in constructing an entirely new scheme.

In any event, the Arabs will have to be given a large representation in any popular government of Palestine, because of their numerical superiority. This will mean, eventually, Arab control; but it does not follow that these Arabs will be the same persons as before the War, or that their control will be unrestricted. "The immediate future of this poor country is in Britain's hands," wrote the editor of the *Near East* on June 7, 1923, "and when we relinquish it, it will revert, purged and recharged, we hope, to the possession of the Arabs. But they will not be the pre-war Arabs. They will be Arabs to whom our administration has been an unforgettable model, who will, in especial, see that justice to other races is a 'sine qua non' of enlightened rule."

Eastward, beyond the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, lies the Emirate of Kerak, or Transjordan, an extensive region of arid and barren uplands stretching all the way from the Gulf of Akaba and the Hedjaz to the river Yar-

muk and the Syrian border. It is included in the British mandate for Palestine, as approved by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922; but the provisions of that mandate referring to a home and citizenship for the Jews are not applicable to it. The British Government, however, in the modification of the mandate dated September 16, 1922, has accepted full responsibility for conditions there; and they maintain in constant attendance upon the ruler a resident representative, who is directly responsible to the High Commissioner of Palestine. Since April, 1921, the country has been fairly well administered by Emir Abdullah, son of Hussein, King of the Hedjaz, and a council of native advisers; and it was granted local autonomy by Great Britain on May 25, 1923. It has a population of 300,000 to 500,000 roving Bedouin Arabs of whom some 30,000 to 40,000 are Christians and the rest Moslems. The budget for 1922-23 was £204,000, of which the British Government contributed £100,000.

When the British occupation of Mesopotamia, or Iraq, took place, a military administration succeeded the old Turkish régime. In a short time, peace was established, and material progress was made, both economically and politically, under the efficient direction of Sir Percy Cox. The country was divided into five administrative districts — Basra, Bagdad, Euphrates, Amarah, and Kirkuk — each under a British political officer. And these, in turn, were subdivided into smaller circuits under assistant officers who were either British or Arab. These officials became paternal rulers — preserving order, administering justice, and attending to the economic, educational, and sanitary needs of their communities. Railways covering some seven hundred and twenty-two miles were constructed from Basra to Bagdad (opened to traffic in January, 1920), and from Bagdad north to Sherghat, seventy-

five miles from Mosul. The public roads were greatly improved and extended; and a shipping port of the first importance was created at Basra by the building of extensive docks and wharves. Many public improvements were inaugurated; the condition of the towns greatly improved; large unproductive areas irrigated and planted; and the planting of the crops hastened by providing the farmers and tribesmen with seeds and implements.

Unfortunately, the British authorities had to depend, at first, very largely upon their own men, for there were very few Arabs with sufficient experience and ability to warrant their appointment to the middle or highest offices. "We have hardly found a single Arab," wrote Lord Curzon, "capable of holding a government position of any importance." Yet, wherever possible, the local chiefs were consulted, held responsible for their own people, and used in restoring order and in setting up the new administration. Indeed, the British Government was anxious to develop some form of local autonomy for Iraq as soon as feasible. Every effort was made to win the confidence and support of the people. A council of notables was formed in Basra to assist in the government of that province; and it was planned to organize similar advisory bodies in the other districts. Ultimately — within from three to five years — it was hoped that a central legislative council could be created with the assistance of these provincial assemblies.

In order to enlist the sympathies and interest of the inhabitants, a questionnaire was circulated, in November, 1918, among the chieftains of all the tribes of Mesopotamia, asking if they favored a new Arab state under British protection, if they desired a king over it, and whom they would suggest for their Emir, provided a kingdom was agreed upon. The answer was an almost unanimous

approval of the British system then in operation. The Sheiks of Kerbela expressed the general opinion, in these words: "From our point of view, we have experienced justice on the part of the British Government and perfect working of our affairs, and rest of mind and body, and improvement of our roads, and abundance of cultivation — things which we have not seen in the late régime; and, therefore, we do not want to elect a king over us, but a man well qualified for that post. The personage qualified for it is his honor, Sir P. Z. Cox. As for the boundaries of Iraq, we desire that Iraq should be a compact country, from north of Mosul Vilayet to the Gulf."

Unfortunately, no action followed these preliminary moves. A year and a half dragged by, while European conferences and diplomatic meetings met and adjourned; and the destinies of the new states of the Near East went begging. Sir Percy Cox was called to Persia to direct Anglo-Persian relations. A large part of the British forces of occupation were withdrawn from Iraq, and the annual subsidies for military, financial, and economic purposes greatly reduced. Yet, English officers were still omnipresent, while no positions of importance were held by natives. The British reputation for integrity suffered accordingly, for it looked as if they had forgotten their promises concerning Arab independence, while secretly working to retain the country for England. And uncertainty, restlessness, and discontent prevailed, ere long, throughout the land, while opportunities to make trouble were afforded to ambitious tribal leaders, politicians, and adventurers.

When, at length, in May, 1920, it was officially announced that Mesopotamia would be given its independence under a British mandate, the mischief was done — the country was seething with revolt. Nine months of disorder, uprisings, and sporadic fighting passed, many lives were lost,

and much property destroyed, before the British awoke to the danger of the situation. Finally, reinforcements were brought in from India, and peace and order restored. And, in September, 1920, Sir Percy Cox returned to Iraq and took up the long-delayed work of organizing autonomous government. "We are here to complete the task we have shouldered," announced the High Commissioner on October 8th — "to help the people of this country to work out their salvation as a self-governing state; and the sooner the people of Iraq realize this, and set to work to coöperate with us, the better for us all."

The position of the British Commissioner was, however, a difficult and delicate one. Since the British were responsible for the government and the maintenance of peace, they must have the power to enforce their advice. But the two leading elements in the society of the land wanted neither advice nor control. The Arab chieftain distrusted both the Bagdad Effendi and the British. His idea of self-determination was "the right to do what I like with my own tribe, and to pay taxes to nobody"; while the Bagdad Effendi thought no one but himself was capable of governing the country, had little respect for the Arab, and claimed that "to be advised under penalty to do what he does not want to do, does not make him feel free and does not make him feel comfortable." Yet it was imperative in creating any political organization for the land, to provide for the representation of all classes and elements, and to ensure to the mandatory a proper advisory rôle.

At length, when order had been thoroughly restored in the country and the way had been carefully prepared by skillful negotiations and propaganda, the question of an Arab ruler, or Emir, was again submitted to popular vote. And, on August 19, 1921, it was officially announced that

the unanimous choice of the nation was Prince Feisal, third son of King Hussein of the Hedjaz. He was duly crowned King of Iraq on August 23d; and a temporary government was immediately formed by the appointment of a cabinet headed by the Nagib of Bagdad, and the calling of an assembly of notables.

The new ruler was received with enthusiasm wherever he appeared. He was fortunate in securing promptly the recognition of his neighbor, Abd el-Aziz es-Saud, Emir of Nejd, and in obtaining the support of the great Bedouin tribes of Anizah dwelling in the desert stretches between Damascus and the Euphrates, the Dulaim tribes of the upper or middle Euphrates, and other Arab tribes and leaders of importance. He even induced some of them personally to submit to taxation and to support the new régime; and he announced a popular program, including the election of a national assembly, the formation of a constitution, freedom of religion, equality in commercial dealings with foreign countries, and a treaty with Great Britain that would abolish the mandatory relation and give independence to Iraq.

But a great work lies ahead of the King of Iraq. He must organize a stable and efficient government which shall be representative in character; and he must finance the new administration and the public improvements necessary to set the country on its feet economically and commercially. Of the two, the latter is the more difficult. For the new government is hard up financially, has no stable source of income, and possesses no credit in the commercial world. And, in a country where the public funds are raised by tribal contributions, and where the people are not accustomed to the modern methods of taxation and collection, it is an extremely difficult task to create a regular budget and system of taxation. Moreover,

there are no great industries in the land; and its natural resources are as yet undeveloped. The five oil wells now in operation are not very productive; and the future of this industry is still questionable. There is plenty of room for agricultural development; but a great deal of money and labor will have to be expended on irrigation, drainage, and navigation before agriculture and commerce will become nation-wide and will produce a national income of importance. Fortunately, the new state can count upon the support of Great Britain, for the British are extremely anxious to see a new régime established that will "claim the support and respect of the inhabitants." And this, not only because the British Government is so pressed that it must reduce its expenses in the Near East, but also because it honestly desires to see Feisal succeed. "Great Britain is not so much holding Mesopotamia," remarked Mr. Churchill at this time, "as allowing the country to hold itself."

To establish representative institutions and to create an efficient administration in a country such as Iraq is a task requiring great tact, inexhaustible patience, and consummate political judgment. But a good start has been made. A new electoral law was published in May, 1923; and a new national parliament was elected in January, 1924. It was composed of one hundred congressmen of whom five were Christians, five Jews, twenty tribal representatives, and seventy chosen by indirect ballot—all of the last ninety members being Moslem Arabs, Kurds, and Turks. The country is divided into three electoral circles or districts: Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. The voters of each circle choose a body of representatives who, in turn, elect the official delegates from their own circle. All persons over twenty-one years of age who pay taxes in any town or to the national government, or who inhabit any house

on which taxes are paid, are entitled to vote. In this way, it is hoped to make the administration representative of the whole country, and to prevent it from falling under the sway of Bagdad.

On October 11, 1922, a treaty of alliance was signed between Iraq and Great Britain, which paved the way for the ultimate independence of the new Arab state. The two countries are now friends and equals. Iraq will continue to be guided by Great Britain in international and financial matters, and will be supported by the armed forces of Great Britain should occasion arise. In addition, the latter will loan Iraq at once \$10,000,000, assist in the delimitation of the frontiers, and aid in securing the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. The treaty was to last for twenty years; but, fortunately, the policy of Cox¹ has prevailed, and by a protocol of April 30, 1923, this has been changed so that it will end four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. By a supplementary agreement of March 25, 1924, it was agreed further that Great Britain should furnish advisers for fifteen years, keep her troops in Iraq till 1928, train and command the army of the country, and have the right to extend her privileges later. On the other hand, Iraq is to extend to aliens the right of trial in mixed courts, to spend one fourth of its income on its army and on defense, to pay approximately \$3,000,000 for public improvements constructed by Great Britain,² and to assume its share of the old Ottoman debt.

The Constitutional Assembly was opened on March 27, 1924. The organic law and the electoral law were not adopted till July 10th and August 2d respectively; but

¹ Sir Henry Dobbs succeeded Sir Percy Z. Cox as High Commissioner of Iraq on September 15, 1923.

² The cost of the British occupation of Iraq is already enormous. Their expenses, 1919-20, were \$37,500,000, and in 1924 will probably be \$23,500,000.

the treaty with Britain with all its subsidiary agreements was duly ratified on June 10th by 38 votes to 25, despite a vigorous opposition. The final passage of the treaty agreement was due, however, to the adoption of a resolution asking the British Government to give Iraq just treatment in the financial arrangements and to secure all of Mosul province for Iraq. The success of the new accord with the British is, therefore, dependent on a satisfactory settlement of the Kurdistan-Mosul boundary dispute, the ability of the British, by conciliatory financial concessions and just treatment, to inspire confidence in their policy and the new administration, and on the establishment of stable government in Mesopotamia in accord with the organic law. Nevertheless, the independence of Iraq is in sight; and Mesopotamia has before it an unparalleled opportunity to set a fine standard for Arab states, and to become a bulwark of law and order in the Near East.

While progress was being made toward the establishment of autonomous government in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, little was being done to solve the most important and the most difficult of the Near-Eastern problems, i.e., the Turkish question. This was due chiefly to three things: the success of the Turkish National movement, the difficulty of reconciling the claims of the Greeks with those of the Angora Government, and the failure of the Allied powers to agree on methods of procedure. At the moment of the signing of the Sèvres Treaty, and for some time thereafter, Great Britain and France were willing to use Greece as a pawn to induce or to compel the Turks to agree to the terms of the Sèvres Agreement; but neither one was ready to recognize the Angora Government. After the fall of Venizelos and the return of King Constantine to power in November, 1920, both powers were inclined to reverse their earlier policy. For neither of them had any confidence in the ability or integrity of

Constantine, and they shared in the sentiment, "Not one cent for Tino." Nevertheless, from that moment down to the end of August, 1922, no agreement was reached between England, France, and Italy in spite of the fact that, whenever an actual crisis arose over any vital issue, these powers succeeded in presenting a united front.

The chief point of difference lay in the method to be used in solving the Turkish question. The British, with their usual stubbornness, insisted on the enforcement of the earlier program: i.e., the non-recognition of the Angora Government, the enforcement of the Sèvres Treaty with modifications, and the keeping of the Ottomans out of Europe but subject to European domination. And it took the sudden and disastrous overthrow of the Grecian forces in Asia Minor in September, 1922, as if one had exploded a great bomb in the camp of the Allies, to detach them from this short-sighted policy. On the other hand, the French and Italians, who wished to withdraw their military contingents from Turkey-in-Asia and to reduce expenses while still conserving their economic and commercial rights and interests, favored more and more the recognition of the Angora Government, and the settlement of the Turkish question through an *approchement* with that Government.

Although the Allied Governments retained control of Constantinople and established a "Neutral Zone" about the Straits, and Greece occupied Thrace and the city and district of Smyrna, the rest of the Treaty of Sèvres was never enforced. The Angora Government not only steadily refused to recognize it, but, with the help of the Soviet Government of Russia, recovered all of the territory assigned to Armenia in that agreement; while all good Moslems in the Near East and in India raised a hue and cry against the treaty on the ground that, if put in force, it would destroy the Ottoman state. Consequently, the

Supreme Council of the Allies was forced, at the London Conference of February 21 to March 12, 1921, to make a strenuous effort to effect a permanent settlement. As on earlier occasions, however, the Allies were determined to settle the questions at issue themselves. So the delegates from the interested parties were not admitted to the discussions, although Bakir Sami Bey representing Angora, Armad Tewfik Pasha, Constantinople, and Gouraris and Kalogeropoulos, the Greeks, were in London to present the case of their respective governments.

The revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, then proposed, reduced the area assigned to the Neutral Zone of the Straits, permitted the Turks to retain sovereignty over an autonomous Smyrna (city and district), admitted the Turks to membership on the judicial commission that was to replace the capitulations and on the International Commission of the Straits over which a Turk was to preside, and raised the Ottoman army to 30,000 and its gendarmerie to 45,000. In addition, the powers expressed their willingness to increase the size of the Turkish navy, to withdraw their forces from Constantinople, to suppress the foreign post-offices, and to facilitate the entrance of Turkey into the League of Nations, provided that the Ottomans agreed to the modified treaty, and recognized the right of the Armenians to a home on the eastern frontier of the old Turkish Empire.

These revised terms, however, failed to satisfy any one. The Turks demanded the abrogation of all concessions to Greece in the Sèvres Treaty, the recognition of Turkish sovereignty over all of Turkish Armenia, restoration to Turkey of all the old Ottoman territory except those regions with Arab populations, autonomy for Thrace, a defensive army for the new Turkish state, and the modification of the economic clauses of the treaty affecting Ottoman sov-

ereignty and independence. The Greeks, on the other hand, buoyed up by the earlier promises of the Allies, a great confidence in the superiority of their own army, and the popular demands for the realization of their national ambitions in Asia Minor, not only refused to give up one iota of their claims, but, on March 24, 1921, launched a military offensive from Smyrna to take for themselves the coveted lands in Anatolia. The army, however, was poorly equipped and had lost many of its best officers with the fall of the Venizelist Government; while its commanders spurned the advice of Generals Foch and Gouraud. Consequently, the Greeks were forced to call a halt in their operations within three weeks.

Not discouraged by this setback and steadily refusing to accept the terms of the London Conference, the Greek authorities continued their preparations for war; and by June they had a large and well-equipped army in Asia Minor. On the 19th of that month, Lord Curzon went to Paris for a hurried consultation with the French Government; and on the 21st, the Allies offered to mediate between the Greeks and the Turks, assuring the former that their claims, in the main, concerning Thrace and Smyrna would be granted if the Turks failed to accept the mediation proposals. Unfortunately, King Constantine and his ministers, confident of immediate success in their military maneuvers, were determined to settle the questions at issue in their own way and on their own terms. Accordingly, they refused the offer of mediation, claiming that they were forced to do so entirely by military considerations and the traditional aspirations of Greece calling for the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres; and, on July 1, 1921, they started on their ill-fated adventure.

With an army of 180,000 men, well-equipped with artillery and aeroplanes, the Greek leaders launched a great

offensive in Anatolia, which drove the Ottoman forces successfully back along the entire front almost to the city of Angora, but which failed to capture the city, or to destroy any large portion of the Turkish army. In September, owing to the approaching winter season, and the difficulty of transporting supplies and troops over bad mountain roads, the Greek forces were compelled to retreat to a defensible position and dig themselves in. Meanwhile, the Greek statesmen hurried to Paris and London, begging for financial and material assistance to continue the conflict. But they found that the Allied powers had hardened their hearts against Constantine and his supporters, because the Greek Government had embarked on this foolish undertaking in Asia Minor in spite of the advice and warning of Allied statesmen.

Meanwhile, the Angora Government was "making good," not only in uniting the whole country through its resistance to the Greeks, but also in its diplomacy. At the London Conference, the Angora representatives began negotiations to reach an understanding with France and Italy. On March 9, 1921, Sami Bey signed a secret agreement with Briand providing for the cessation of the Franco-Turkish hostilities in Asia Minor, the evacuation of Cilicia by the French, and the establishment of a definite frontier line between Cilicia and Syria. And, on March 12th, Count Sforza and Sami Bey concluded a secret convention for the withdrawal of the Italian forces from Asia Minor, and for an economic collaboration of Angora and Italy in the Sanjaks of Adalia, Mengia, Bourdour, Sparta, and in a part of the Sanjaks of Afium, Karahissar, and Katahia, on a basis of fifty-fifty.

The significance of the later treaty was far-reaching, since it secured for Angora the moral support of Italy in her future endeavors for peace and for the return of Thrace

and Smyrna, while it preserved for Italy her special rights in the Heraclea basin and other regions, and secured for her, as Sforza said to the Italian Parliament on April 12, 1921, "a vast zone in Asia Minor open specially to Italian economic penetration without any political aims" and the "sincere and cordial coöperation of Turkey, which is convinced of the honest and loyal intentions of Italy." Here was a settlement which took care of all of Italy's interests in the Near East — for both the present and the future — without the expenditure of a cent or the use of a soldier or a battleship. What a commentary on the policy of Great Britain and France from 1918 to 1921! And what suffering, bloodshed, and strife would have been avoided if these latter powers had only pursued a similar policy of coöperation and square dealing after the signing of the armistice with the Ottomans!

The Angora National Assembly held up these treaties for some time, because of a disagreement over some of the terms and of suspicion of the two powers due to the sudden Greek offensive. Meanwhile, Italy arranged for an armistice in Anatolia and withdrew nearly all her forces from Adalia by June 11, 1921, as evidence of her pacific and sincere intentions. And, on November 25th, the final treaty with Angora, on the lines laid down in March, was consummated. Likewise, for France, Henri Franklin-Bouillon went out to Angora in June to get in touch with Mustapha Kemal and the other leaders, and again in September, 1921, officially, to conclude the negotiations begun in March. Finally, on October 30, 1921, Youssof Kemal Bey — Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Angora Government — and Franklin-Bouillon signed the amended Franco-Turkish Treaty, which was promptly ratified by the Angora Parliament. By its terms the evacuation of Cilicia by the French was arranged for, the boundary between

Cilicia and Syria agreed upon, peace established between the Turks and the French, and a basis found for the participation of the French in the economic development of the new Turkish state. In this way the French were able to withdraw a large part of their forces in the Near East and reduce their expenses, while they secured the protection of their interests and concessions in Turkey, together with certain other notable advantages, such as the operation of the Bagdad railway from the Mediterranean to the Tigris River, and a ninety-nine-year lease of the iron, chrome, and silver mines in the valley of the Harchite (near the shore of the Black Sea in northern Anatolia).

This *approchement* between the Kemalists and the French was bitterly resented by the British — even though the French Government took considerable pains to explain that this new agreement had nothing to do with the principles involved in the enforcement of the Sèvres Treaty. Consequently, in a spirited address in London on November 24th, Lord Curzon took occasion to upbraid his allies for such actions behind the back of Great Britain while she was making strenuous efforts to induce the Greeks to accept the program of the powers and to end the strife in Asia Minor. And a lively controversy ensued till the conference between Lloyd George and Briand in London on December 22d and 23d, where unity was reëstablished and the Cannes Conference of the Supreme Council of the Allies agreed upon. The Cannes meeting of January 6, 1922, however, did not help matters. It merely hastened the fall of Aristide Briand who resigned on January 12th, after the French Chamber had expressed disapproval of the Cannes proposals concerning German reparations. The next day he was succeeded as Premier by M. Raymond Poincaré; and, after a conference at Boulogne on February 25th between Poincaré and Lloyd George, a convention of

all the Allied ministers was held in Paris from March 22d to the 26th to draw up a new program for the settlement of the Near-Eastern Question.

At this conference the Allied statesmen for the first time based their plan upon fundamental principles, and tried to deal justly with all the interested states. They strove to act with absolute impartiality in the interest of a permanent settlement; and their proposals included: the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Greece, the reëstablishment of the Turkish state on territory regarded as its own, compensation to the Greeks for sacrifices in the war, protection for Moslem and Christian minorities, and the maintenance of the religious and secular authority of the Sultan.

To facilitate a settlement the Greeks were asked to withdraw from Asia Minor within four months, and to give up their claims to the Smyrna territory and to part of eastern Thrace, while the Turks were requested to approve the demilitarization of the territory about the Straits, and to consent to the functioning of the International Commission of the Straits, the Ottoman Debt Commission, the Allied Liquidation Commission, and the Commission to prepare a scheme for judicial reform in Turkey. Moreover, it was suggested that Adrianople and Smyrna be placed under the administration of special commissions, that the Turkish army be raised from 50,000 to 80,000 men, and that Turkey be given great freedom in the organization of its new state, and be assured of the return of Constantinople and representation on the International Commission of the Straits. In this way it was hoped to provide a basis for discussion in a general peace conference, to make future Turko-Greek conflicts impossible by rendering a Greek attack on Constantinople or an Ottoman campaign against Macedonia extremely difficult, to pave the way for the payment of the Ottoman debt and the indemnity to the

Allies, and to secure protection for the subject races and for the persons and property of subjects of foreign states after the abolition of the capitulations.

In spite of this excellent program, and of all the pressure that the Allied Governments brought to bear on the Grecian and Turkish authorities between March 26th and the end of August, 1922, nothing was accomplished. Angora steadily demanded the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks and the cessation of all Greek atrocities, as a preliminary to any action on its part. On the other hand, the Greek Government refused to withdraw its troops until *after* the proposed conference had been held. And, unfortunately, the Allied states were not in a position either to force their plan for a settlement on the two states or to prevent the Greeks from transporting their whole army to Thrace, if they did evacuate Smyrna, and thus preventing an immediate settlement of the problems concerning that province and the region on the European side of Constantinople.

This deadlock continued till August 27th, when suddenly the Angora army arose in its might, overwhelmed completely the Greek army in Asia Minor, and, by September 10th, had either captured or driven out of the country all of its military forces. This collapse was not unexpected, for the Greek Government had been unable for months to raise, either at home or abroad, the funds necessary to provide for the pay and the upkeep of its army, the Greek general staff and command was greatly weakened by political squabbles, and the officers and men had lost interest in this wild-goose adventure in Turkey-in-Asia, which was fast reducing a poverty-stricken state to impotence and despair. And this disaster to the Greek arms was followed immediately by a military revolt which forced the abdication of Constantine on September 27th,

led to the arrest and execution of the leading members of his Government and to the introduction of a reform administration. But it will be decades before Greece can recover from the fateful political blunders of the half-dozen years following the Great War.

Meanwhile, the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy, fearing that the war might spread to Europe, met in Paris on September 21st and 22d, and dispatched a note to the Angora Government the next day. The Allied Governments "viewed with favor" the restoration of Thrace to Turkey and the calling of an international peace conference, but they demanded that Angora keep its troops out of Thrace till after the meeting of the convention, and that the Kemalists, in the interest of the peace of the world, recognize the internationalization of the Straits and the demilitarization of certain zones in the vicinity of these connecting waterways. To show that they meant business, the British and French hurried war-ships and reinforcements to the Dardanelles, and made preparations to prevent the passage of the Ottoman army into Europe. The Angora Government, however, far from being intimidated by the demands of the European powers, cleverly advanced its troops into the Neutral Zone and close up to the Dardanelles. Thus Europe found itself suddenly face to face with another serious crisis, but in a very awkward position if it became necessary to handle the affair without gloves.

Finally, on September 26th, the Allied Governments delivered an ultimatum to Angora demanding the immediate withdrawal of its forces from the Neutral Zone, and the holding of a preliminary conference at once. On September 29th, Mustapha Kemal Pasha reluctantly gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of the Neutral Zone, and his approval for a meeting of representatives at

Mudania on October 3d. This conference, at which Great Britain was represented by General Harington and Sir Horace Rumbold, France by General Charpy and Franklin-Bouillon, and Turkey by Ismet Pasha and Hamid Bey, unfortunately broke up within two days because the Angora delegates demanded that Thrace be given immediately to Turkey. But, after considerable negotiation and a rare exhibition of firmness on the part of the Allies, it was resumed on the 7th, and an agreement reached on the 9th, which brought the crisis to an end.

This preliminary treaty provided that eastern Thrace was to be evacuated immediately by the Greek army and such of the population as wished to leave, and that the Allied troops should maintain order till thirty days after the completion of the evacuation. The Angora military forces, however, were not to enter the country till after the signing of the peace treaty; but the Allies were to turn over the civil administration of Thrace to the Angora authorities, and the Angora gendarmerie was to assume the maintenance of order as soon as the thirty days had elapsed. In this way Angora was assured of the return of eastern Thrace, while the European powers protected the Christian inhabitants of the country and prevented the extension of the Greco-Turk conflict to Europe. In addition, a general peace conference was called at Lausanne, Switzerland, for November 13th, at which Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, Turkey, and Greece would be represented. Bulgaria and the United States¹ were also asked to send delegates, and Soviet Russia to participate in the Straits Convention.

¹ The United States sent to the first conference three "observers": Richard Washburn Child, United States Ambassador to Italy; Joseph C. Grew, United States Minister to Switzerland; and Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, American High Commissioner at Constantinople. At the second conference, Mr. Grew alone represented the United States.

The Conference of Lausanne actually opened on November 20, 1922; and, for the first time in history, all the interested states, except Russia, were represented in a convention dealing with momentous problems affecting the Near East. It broke down, however, on February 4, 1923, although an agreement on more than eighty per cent of the issues involved had been reached. The Allied representatives failed to take a sympathetic and broad-minded view of the situation, but assumed a superior, dictatorial attitude which the Turks resented. The Angora delegates, on the other hand, strenuously opposed the financial, economic, and judicial clauses as formulated, claiming that they threatened to deprive Turkey of her right to independent action and to the control of her own resources and development. It was evident that the European powers not only lacked a definite program for the solution of the Near-Eastern Question, but also that they were more anxious to secure certain personal selfish ends — such as the payment of the Ottoman debt, the maintenance of European concessions in Turkey-in-Asia, protection for alien persons and corporations, and the promotion of Allied trade — than they were to establish a permanent peace or to assist the new states in establishing themselves on a sane and livable basis. It is true that they stood out valiantly for the freedom of the Straits and the protection of Christian minorities, but they were quite willing that the welfare of Armenia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, or Arabia should be sacrificed to promote the interests of European states.

The need for peace in the Near East was so imperative, however, that none of the interested powers could afford to block the way. On the one hand, the Angora Government was in a desperate position. For, in spite of its advantageous strategic position and an army of 250,000

men, the country after twelve years of war faced ruin and the loss of all it had gained between 1920 and 1923 at the cost of enormous sacrifices, unless it could have peace and a free opportunity for national development and organization along all lines immediately. On the other hand, the European powers, although they held Constantinople and the Straits with 25,000 men and numerous warships, were in no shape to wage a successful military campaign. In fact, they were precluded from further costly military adventures in the Near East by a great need for financial retrenchment, by serious complications in home affairs, by the clamors of their nationals for a reduction of taxes, and by the deplorable financial and economic situation in Europe. Accordingly, after considerable diplomatic jockeying, the Lausanne Conference was resumed on the 22d of April; and, after three months of strenuous negotiation without a break, a final agreement was attained at 1.30 o'clock in the morning of July 9th, and the treaty was duly signed at 3.15 in the afternoon of July 24th.

The Treaty of Lausanne is a long and complicated document containing one hundred and forty-three articles grouped in five divisions: i.e., political, financial, economic, communications, and general. Before the final agreement could be reached, it had been necessary to remove a few of the most acute difficulties from the negotiations, which twice nearly wrecked the conference. At the end of June, an acute crisis arose over the question of Turko-Greek reparations, in the course of which a resumption of hostilities between the Turks and the Greeks was averted only by the eleventh-hour offer of Venizelos to transfer the railway junction of Karagatch and adjacent territory to Angora in lieu of a war indemnity. And, during the first week of July, the conference barely escaped

shipwreck again over important details concerning foreign concessions, the Ottoman debt, and the evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits. The controversy over concessions was adjusted by the recognition by Turkey of all valid pre-war (before October 29, 1914) concessions and of all contracts made by the old Constantinople Government before May 31, 1920 (when the Angora Government achieved complete control of the country), and by submitting a number of special disputes, including oil and railway rights and the Kurdistan-Iraq boundary problem,¹ to separate negotiation and arbitration. The problem of the payment of the Ottoman debt was settled by apportioning it among all the states which had been a part of, or now possess some of the territory of, the old Turkish Empire,² and by transferring to the Turks and the bondholders (of whom sixty-five to seventy-five per cent are French) the settlement of the actual method of payment (in gold or in French paper) through a sort of moratorium. And the question of evacuation was amicably solved by a provision for it to take place six weeks after the ratification of the treaty by Angora — and this at the request of the

¹ An Anglo-Turkish Conference on this question was held at Constantinople from May 19 to June 5, 1924, without result. On September 30, 1924, by mutual agreement the matter was referred for settlement to the Council of the League of Nations.

The report of the Commission of the League of Nations, made to the Council in September, 1925, describes Mosul as a distinct local community ethnographically belonging to Iraq, with a population chiefly Arabic, although there are a fair number of Kurds and a few Turks. The sentiment of the leading citizens and chiefs, obtained on the spot by the Commission, is in favor of unity with Iraq as long as Great Britain holds a mandate over that country. If the British should withdraw within a few years, they would then prefer to be joined to Turkey. Their chief anxiety is for security and peace.

² Professor Boul, appointed by the League of Nations to apportion the pre-war Ottoman debt, has assigned the proportion of the states as follows: Turkey, 62.25 per cent; Greece, 10.57 per cent; Syria, 8.15 per cent; and Jugo-Slavia, 5.25 per cent.

Turkish Government in order that the sensitive feelings of the Turkish nation, already on edge, might not be outraged by the continued presence of the foreign troops.

Throughout the negotiations, the advantage lay with Angora. Her leaders, backed by a united nation and a victorious army strategically well located, stood for certain honorable rights and fundamental principles absolutely essential to the independence and life of the Ottoman nation and for the maintenance of peace in the Near East. Her cause was just and reasonable; and she was fortunate in the character and ability of her representatives and of her statesmen. Although slow in action, they were men of firmness, breadth of view, and great diplomatic acumen. They were not to be hurried or bluffed into any misleading agreement; and they recognized clearly the weakness of the position of the European states, as well as the frequent divisions in the ranks of their opponents. In fact, they were not only quick to take advantage of every rift in the unity of the Allies, but they made every effort to break that unity. And they were past-masters in Oriental methods of delay, evasion, and "haggling for a trade." For, when given an inch, they demanded a mile; and they interpreted every concession as a "weakness to be capitalized." So exasperating were their methods that the Allied representatives were on the point several times of leaving the conference, and, on one occasion, Sir Horace Rumbold, one of the British delegates, is reported to have exclaimed: "The Turks make me sick."

On the other hand, the unity of the European states was far from perfect. They did not come to the conference with a well-digested program for the reorganization of the Near East. On the contrary, with the exception of one or two fundamental propositions, their platforms were self-centered, imperialistic, and commercial. The representa-

tives of the "Big Three" — Great Britain, France, and Italy — under the leadership of the late Lord Curzon, an experienced diplomat, but seeing world problems only through British spectacles and not in terms of international coöperation and progress, dominated the Allied delegation. And the efforts of the European powers were hampered continually by differences over questions of policy and by the complexity of interests involved in the problems before the conference. The national rights and prosperity of several states had to be safeguarded; and it was exceedingly difficult to reconcile conflicting claims and to keep in hand recalcitrant nations, such as Greece, whose ambition and blundering had been a contributing cause of the existing international crisis.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Turks achieved a substantial diplomatic victory. But it is remarkable that the negotiators actually reached an agreement on a treaty which, in spite of serious drawbacks, contains a real basis for a lasting peace and for the work of reconstruction in the Near East. The first move was to end the intolerable conflict of forces which had been raging since 1912, by the establishment of a general peace. With a view to making this permanent, the demilitarization of special zones on both sides of the Straits, of the *Ægean* islands lying near the entrance to the Dardanelles, and of zones on both sides of the Greco-Turk-Bulgarian boundary line in Thrace, was ordered. In addition, the removal of all the so-called "subject peoples" from Turkish control was provided for, through the recognition of the autonomy of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and the Arab communities of Arabia, and a wholesale exchange of Greeks and Armenians for Turks. This, together with guaranties of protection, political and legal equality, and just treatment for all non-Moslem minorities and nationals, will go far toward

the elimination of religious persecutions and racial conflicts. And, finally, the making of Constantinople a free port and the opening of the Straits to the merchant vessels and warships of all nations — an action made unanimous by the adhesion of Soviet Russia on July 20, 1923 — not only conferred a great boon on the trade of the world, but it also removed for all time one of the chief sources of friction and discord in the Near East.

Moreover, outside of the actual treaty agreements, there are two results of the Lausanne Conference which will have a far-reaching effect upon the stabilization of conditions in the Levant. For the first time in the history of Asia Minor, the principle of the open door was recognized as a basis for future international relations, through the efforts of the Angora representatives and of the United States. It is true that the "door" has merely been pried ajar. Whether it can be opened wide and kept open is a problem of the future. It is a pity, however, that a serious effort was not made to set up the same standards of just treatment and equal opportunity for all in the Near East as were created for the Far East and the Pacific at the Washington Conference. For those standards are so necessary to the maintenance of international peace and prosperity in any part of the world that they must and will prevail in the end in Asia Minor, in spite of the fact that Great Britain has recently gained an "oil mandate in Iraq," France a "cotton and tobacco mandate in Syria," and Italy economic and commercial rights in a special section of Anatolia.

In the second place, by giving the Turks a square deal and making possible the reestablishment of a Moslem power at the gateway between Europe and Asia, the fears of the Mohammedan peoples were quieted, a strong friend acquired by France and England in the Moslem camp, and the way opened for the creation of a just and honorable

relationship between the European states and the Moham-medan communities of the Near and Middle East. And, with the establishment of a stable Turkish state coöperating with European powers and with a galaxy of independent Moslem communities, such as Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, el Hedjaz, Afghanistan, and Persia, a splendid step will have been taken toward the stabilization of conditions in the Orient and the development of international confidence and good-will between the Christian and Moslem worlds. But this is not all. The permanent settlement of the old international feud for the possession of Constantinople and the Straits is set at rest by the official recognition of the Turkish claims to that region.

This would be an alluring prospect were it not for certain dark clouds still hovering along the horizon, and the uncertainty concerning the wisdom and the workableness of at least two sections of the Treaty of Lausanne. The provisions concerning the "compulsory exchange of populations," for instance, whereby some six hundred thousand Greeks and Turks are being transferred from one country to another, are causing grave apprehension. It is claimed that this transaction, when completed, will prove efficacious in preventing religious persecution and racial conflicts. It is the last step in a movement, inaugurated fifteen years ago by the Turks, to expel all the Christians and non-Moslems from Asia Minor, and to create a state wholly Turkish for the Ottoman people. Nevertheless, it is inhuman, and will prove a terrible ordeal for the poor helpless expatriates. One of the British delegates at the conference declared that it is the "most retrograde international act in two hundred years." And Lord Curzon characterized it as a "thoroughly bad and vicious solution for which the world will have to pay the penalty for a hundred years to come." But much depends on the

way it is carried out, the care exercised to protect the interests and possessions of the expatriates, and the success of the Joint Commission of Eleven (four Turks, four Greeks, and three members nominated by the League of Nations) in safeguarding and exchanging the properties involved, and in assisting the emigrants to start again in their new homes — altogether a monumental task requiring a fine sense of justice, a broad perspective, a rare executive ability, and an unusual capacity for hard work.

Again, the method of providing protection for Christian minorities and aliens in Turkey is causing considerable uneasiness. The capitulations have been abolished, together with all the foreign post-offices, the Supreme Council of Health of Constantinople and other international Sanitary Commissions; and Turkey has assumed complete control over its own courts and methods of legal procedure, save for the right of foreign legal advisers to receive complaints relating to the arrest and imprisonment of aliens. The word of the Angora Government is pledged to ensure for foreigners and non-Moslems the protection of a good judicial system, equality before the law, protection for life and property, and religious toleration. But there are no guaranties, save that of the League of Nations, that the Turks will live up to these promises; and no method of coercion is provided in the event that Turkey should fail to carry out its international obligations. Judging from the complete failure of the Ottoman Government for two centuries to fulfill its treaty obligations concerning Christian aliens and minorities, one is inclined to be very skeptical about this method of securing justice and fair dealing from the Turks.

Another source of disquietude lies in the failure of the European powers to keep their promise to Bulgaria regarding an outlet to the Ægean Sea for that state. This neg-

lect, together with certain earlier arbitrary decisions of the Allies concerning the boundaries of Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria, may be the cause some day of another conflagration in the Balkans.

But, above all, the most disastrous blunder of the negotiators of the treaty will undoubtedly prove to be the failure to settle the economic disputes. The questions concerning concessions and financial problems which aroused the most bitter controversy were taken out of the conference. This meant that no common ground had been found, either for the adjustment of these differences or for the regulation of commercial competition in the future. And European diplomacy, which might have become the servant of an intelligent international movement to promote the development and prosperity of the Near East, has become again the slave of a selfish commercialism seeking to perpetuate the old system of intrigue, of corruption, and of conflict. The United States fought for the open door, and negotiated with Turkey a treaty — signed on August 6, 1923 — favorable to the development of trade and friendly intercourse between the two countries. But it is not likely that the United States will participate actively in any struggle for concessions or that its nationals will secure any large share in the economic development of Turkey. On the contrary, unfortunately, the recent controversy over the so-called "Chester concessions," involving American capital for railroad and commercial developments in Anatolia, has united the European powers to an unprecedented degree in a determination to secure for their own nationals alone all the economic and financial concessions for the rehabilitation of the Ottoman state. The result is that the Turks will be compelled to continue their struggle for economic independence practically unaided and in the face of tremendous odds.

This is a grave situation, not only for Turkey, but also for the whole of the Near East. If the Turks succeed in maintaining their financial, economic, and commercial independence in spite of handicaps and of the web of intrigue and diplomatic maneuvers which will be spun about them by the powers in order to promote the selfish ends of European capitalists, all well and good. But, if they fail, the breakdown of the Turkish National movement will follow immediately, and the affairs of the Near East will be precipitated once more into chaos.

Therefore, the crux of the whole situation lies in the ability of the Turkish nation to make good. In this connection, one must realize that Europe is dealing with a *new* Turkey — one whose political ideals and whose government are far different from those of the old Ottoman Empire. Where formerly the reins of power lay completely in the hands of unscrupulous sultans, or of some irresponsible group of despicable Constantinople politicians, there is now the Turkish nation, led by men of high ideals and patriotic purposes, striving to conduct its own government in conformity with the highest standards of public efficiency and morality. Moreover, the brilliant and successful military and diplomatic struggle of the past three years has clearly demonstrated that the Turkish race possesses an indomitable spirit, an unexpected resourcefulness, and a remarkable power of recuperation. And, since peace has come, the plans of their leaders for educational reform and economic reconstruction show vision and a knowledge of the fundamental principles of statecraft. But will the new national régime succeed?

Fortunately, the young state is entering upon its career under very favorable auspices and conditions. The Turks are now complete masters of their own country, their own people, their own administration, their own courts,

their own financial, economic, and educational institutions, and their own destiny. They have a rich territorial home; and their possessions have been effectively consolidated through the loss of the non-Turkish communities of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia, and Iraq, which were for so many years a source of expense and anxiety, rather than an asset, to the old Ottoman Empire. Financially and economically, the new state has at this moment brighter prospects than its allies in the Great War, or than many a European state. For it has no crushing war indemnities to pay. The division of the Ottoman debt among the communities once component parts of the Turkish Empire leaves the general debt of Turkey comparatively light; and the Government will have a fairly easy task to stabilize the monetary situation, owing to the fact that there has been but a moderate issuance of paper money in the country since the War.

A republican form of government has been established with the sovereignty in a representative national assembly. This body is elected for four years and possesses both legislative and executive powers. It elects the President of the state and the Prime Minister with limited powers, whose terms of service are similar to its own. And the Cabinet is responsible to it. Just now the National Assembly is absolutely in the control of Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the People's Party,¹ which is the only well-organized political party in the country. Its immediate program includes the establishment of a national budget and an efficient administration, the creation of educational institutions sufficient to meet the needs of the entire nation,

¹ By March, 1924, a rift was apparent in this party, owing to the growing opposition to the Government's policy concerning the Caliphate, the separation of Church and State, the immigration problem, and the Kurdistan-Mosul boundary question. The Kemal-Ismet Pasha group was unable to pass the amendment to the constitution increasing the powers of the President.

the development of the natural resources so as to provide the state with a regular income and adequate transportation facilities at the earliest possible moment, the promotion of trade and industry and the improvement of agricultural conditions. All this is excellent, so far as it goes. But everything depends on the ability of the leaders and on the intelligence of the Assembly.

In addition, the country is freed from many irritating and onerous restrictions imposed on Turkey by European powers for over a hundred years; and its recent struggle for independence has given the Turks a national consciousness and solidarity unknown in Ottoman annals. Their self-respect has been enhanced by their successes and by their recognition as equals by the European states and by the United States. And the motive of self-preservation is certain to induce her leaders to "play the game" honestly and intelligently, since they realize that the future of the state is wrapped up in its ability to win the confidence, the good-will, and the coöperation of the world.

On the other hand, the new state is hampered by the unsavory reputation of the old Ottoman Empire, and by the abolition of the Caliphate and the separation of Church and State ordered on March 3, 1923, by the Angora Assembly, but which, although it has brought certain benefits to the new régime, has lost the Government much of the support of good Moslems both at home and abroad. Then the expatriation of some two million Greeks and Armenians — the best farmers, artisans, and business men in the country — is bound to be a serious blow to industry and agriculture. An intense nationalism demanding Turkish labor, Turkish capital, Turkish products, and Turkish ownership, and the importation of Turks from Thrace and Macedonia cannot make up for this loss. Moreover, it is generally conceded that the Turk is lacking in business

acumen and in initiative. This is due to the fact that, in the past, he has been content to let others transact his business deals for him and to let things drag. The developments of the last ten years, however, have demonstrated that the Turk can take care of himself, and is making good in banking, in business, and in industry, wherever he has a fair chance.

But this is not all. Commercial and economic expansion will be unavailing if peace is lacking. The new nationalism, although an important element in the stabilization of political affairs in Turkey and the Near East, cannot of and by itself guarantee the reconstruction of Turkey and the reorganization of the Near East.

"Unless the perpetual threat of war is removed," writes Nathaniel Peffer,¹ "Turkey can do nothing that will avail toward reestablishing itself as a nation. If Turkey must continue to concern itself first with foreign affairs, if it must concentrate always on defense, it can neither spare the energy and attention to work out its internal social problems, nor withhold enough money to pay the cost." Material aid and support must come also from the outside. And Near-Eastern as well as European powers must cooperate honestly and energetically in the work. Here, as in Russia, in China, and in Europe, there is an imperative call for native leaders. "The fundamental need of the day (in Turkey)," exclaimed one of the best-informed educators of the Near East, "is for leadership from within — leadership by thoroughly educated and highly trained men and women, natives of the soil, rightful heirs to the problem of the country and fully aware of the temper and traditions of the people, which must be observed for any work of rehabilitation."

¹ *Asia*, January, 1924, p. 42.

CHAPTER V

THE HEART OF ASIA

There is only one heir to Central Asia and no Power in the World will be able to prevent him from taking possession of his inheritance.

Will of Peter the Great

ONE of the most remarkable movements of modern times has been the expansion of Russia from the small duchy of Moscovy with an area of 784,000 square miles — approximately the size of Mexico — to a great empire of over 8,300,000 square miles of territory and a population exceeding 170,000,000. After Peter the Great had wrested the supremacy of the Baltic from Charles XII of Sweden, and secured an opening for Russia on the seas of the north, and Catherine II had obtained a large portion of Poland and a foothold upon the Black Sea, Russia found herself precluded from further expansion on the west and southwest by reason of the established European states there and the jealous opposition of those same states to her designs on Turkey and Constantinople.

Accordingly the Muscovite rulers early transferred their activities to Asia. There they met with little opposition, for no established states of any importance were encountered till the borders of the Chinese Empire were reached. The Russian advance, however, was slow and not always the product of deliberate design. Sometimes the gains were accidental or the result of propitious circumstances; but ultimately some 6,000,000 square miles of territory were acquired. This expansion took place in three regions: northern Asia — through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean; the "Heart of Asia" — through Turkestan to China, Afghanistan, and India; and the Caucasus — through Georgia


and Daghestan to Persia. The chief motives for increased territory were economic, commercial, political, and philanthropic. The economic were based upon the natural desire of a typically agricultural nation for more territory and outlets for the development of its economic life. The commercial centered in an ambition for increased trade connections with the great trade centers of the East. The political was a combination of a need for defensible frontiers on the east and southeast (against the pillaging, wild, nomadic tribes of the Steppes and northern Asia), of a national necessity for ice-free seaports, and of a natural craving for empire. And the philanthropic was a dual force composed of a desire to bring order, good government, and civilization to Asia, and a racial longing to give assistance and protection to all the brother Slavic nations and followers of Greek Christianity, which should ultimately lead to a triumph of Pan-Slavism, and which embraced other Christian and even Mohammedan tribal states as well — such as the native communities of Khiva, Bokhara, and of the Caucasus.

The success of the Russian expansion was due primarily to four things: a favorable geographical location, it being the only European state whose borders touched the continent of Asia; an absolute monarchical form of government which was especially adapted to continuous and effective diplomacy, and which was understood by, and appealed to, Asiatics; the absence of powerful and determined competitors, there being fifty-nine different nationalities in Siberia, thirty-four in the Caucasus, and forty-two in Central Asia; and a skillful method of dealing with Orientals. The Russians were adepts in the use of bribery, of intrigue, and of force when necessary. As General Skobelev remarked, when referring to the Turkomans, "The harder you hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards."

Moreover, the Russians were among the earliest Europeans to study the customs and languages of the East. And in asserting their supremacy they demanded of the subject peoples only recognition of the Czar, annual tribute, trade privileges, and cessation of pillagings, without insisting on any extreme or vexatious social or political changes.

The conquest of northern Asia and the region of the Caucasus does not call for extended treatment here. It is sufficient, however, to recall to mind how the Strogonovs — a discredited warlike clan of the Russian nobility — were banished by Ivan IV in the latter part of the sixteenth century. They crossed the Ural Mountains and settled in the town of Siber which gave its name to that vast region known to-day as Siberia. Under the leadership of their hetman — the redoubtable Yermak (or Jermak) — they occupied a considerable territory extending nearly to the river Irtysh, in the attempted crossing of which Yermak was drowned in 1584. During the next fifty years the Russian hunters, traders, adventurers, and armed forces pushed steadily eastward, crossing the great rivers and occupying all the northern territory as far as the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka. General Khabarov even occupied the valley of the Amur in 1649–50; but this was returned to China by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. No further advance was made for a hundred and fifty years; but a splendid work was done during the eighteenth century in the scientific exploration of the great region just occupied and in the study of its peoples, its topography, and its flora and fauna. Finally, between 1849 and 1857, the lower Amur was occupied and settled by General Mouraviev, and by the Treaty of Peking in 1860 the large district north of Amur was ceded to Russia. Thus a territory of over 4,800,000 square miles and with a population reaching 8,700,000 by 1910 was added to the Russian domains.

The region lying between the Caspian and Black Seas, including the old Kingdom of Georgia and the mountain districts of the Caucasus range, had been for centuries a "debatable land" between Russia, Persia, and Turkey, and had suffered from the intrigues of all three states. The rulers of Georgia in the sixth century adopted a form of Greek Christianity; and Peter the Great aided them in their contest with the Turks. Heraklius, King of Georgia, became tributary to Russia in 1783, to escape the intrigues of the Shah of Persia; and, in 1799, George XIII abdicated in favor of Alexander I of Russia, who incorporated Georgia within his empire in 1801. A conflict with Persia followed, resulting in the cession to Russia, by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, of the region north of the Caucasus between the mountain ranges and the Caspian Sea, including the ports of Derbent and Baku. As the outcome of further trouble between Russia and Persia in 1826-27, the former forced the cession to her of the provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan, south of the Caucasus, in the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828. As a result of two conflicts with Turkey, the Russians secured the ports of Poti and Anapa and two small districts north of the Caucasus on the Black Sea in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, and the port of Batum with the districts of Kars and Ardahan at the Berlin Congress in 1878. In this way a region of over 180,000 square miles — larger than Sweden — was acquired. But the native inhabitants of Circassia and Daghestan were not consulted in these arrangements; and, consequently, the country remained for a long period of years in a state of unrest and rebellion. The Lesghians of Daghestan — some 500,000 people — and neighboring mountain tribes, led by the intrepid Shamyl — a national hero as famous in the annals of the Caucasus as William Tell is in those of Switzerland or Andreas Hofer in the



Tyrol — defied the Russians and defeated their armies repeatedly for twenty years. Finally, Shamyl, deserted by the other tribal leaders, was surrounded and captured with his last troops at Gunib on September 6, 1859, by Prince Bariatinsky, who had resorted to burning the mountain forests in order to deprive the native forces of protection and hiding-places. The subjugation of the whole Caucasus was completed in 1864; and it was incorporated within the Russian Empire as the province of Transcaucasia, having an area of 95,406 square miles and a population which reached 6,818,000 by 1910.

When the Russians began their advance into Central Asia, that vast region was divided roughly into three distinct districts: the Kirghiz Steppes, Western Turkestan, and Eastern Turkestan — the last-named lying east of the Tianshan Mountains and belonging to the Chinese Empire which has since organized it as the province of Sinkiang. The Kirghiz Steppe was an arid plateau — almost a desert — extending from the vicinity of Omsk south to the forty-fifth parallel of latitude, or to the north end of the Aral Sea. It comprised an area of some 710,000 to 750,000 square miles, reaching approximately one thousand miles east and west and seven hundred miles north and south; and was inhabited by about 2,000,000 nomadic Kirghiz of Turanian blood. Western Turkestan lay south of the Steppes, extending southward four hundred miles from the Aral Sea to the borders of Persia and Afghanistan, and westward one thousand miles from the Caspian Sea to the Pamirs and the Tianshan Mountains. The area of this region is approximately 400,000 square miles; and its chief physical features are deserts, lofty mountains, and a few fertile valleys, or oases, watered by two rivers or their tributaries. The natives were only half civilized; and they were grouped into a number of tribal and poorly organized

units. Their number hardly exceeded 3,600,000; and they were ruled by untrained, incompetent khans, or tribal chieftains, who were intensely jealous of one another and constantly quarreling. With the exception of the Turkomans and some of the Kirghiz tribes, the inhabitants of both districts were unwarlike and untrained in the science of war. There were a few good-sized, fortified cities, but no really powerful states. The Khanates of Khiva — a fertile oasis of some 22,000 square miles and a population of 600,000 to 800,000 people — and Bokhara — claiming an area of over 100,000 square miles¹ and 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 inhabitants — were the only communities of any wealth or strength. But even these were neither rich enough nor sufficiently well organized to maintain an extended and effective resistance to invasion.

In 1554, Ivan the Terrible subdued Kazan and Astrakhan, extending the Russian territory to the Caspian Sea. The outpost of Orenburg on the Ural River was established; and a series of forts and trading posts created eastward, gradually, via Omsk to Semipalatinsk on the Irtysh River. In 1732 and 1790, the Little and Middle Hordes of Kirghiz tribes submitted finally to Russia. And, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russians had formed an irregular frontier — for approximately twelve hundred miles — across the Kirghiz Steppes, maintained by a series of fortified posts which were centers for military operations and commercial activities, and by a small force of twenty thousand Cossacks. This desert borderland remained, however, a constant source of trouble and annoyance to the Empire. The guard was never sufficient to prevent violations of the line; and marauding bands were frequently crossing into Russian territory to loot and destroy villages

¹ Rough estimates made at the time of the Russian conquest. See page 142 for the size of these dependencies as organized by the Russians.

and property. Conditions of life and of trade were hard and uncertain. Communication with the outside world was difficult and infrequent. And the attempts of the Russians to open trade routes to the chief marts of Central Asia were constantly thwarted, and their caravans pillaged by the roving, robber tribes of the steppes. Accordingly, the Russian statesmen determined to seek a defensible frontier and to take what steps they could to stabilize conditions in Turkestan. This movement, inaugurated in the early thirties and covering fifty years of activity, did not attain its full fruition till the Russians took Merv and reached the great Persian-Afghan-Hindu Kush mountain borderland in 1884.

Their progress for the first thirty years was very slow, for the difficulties of the undertaking were enormous, their officers and men inexperienced, and their resources limited. In the last twenty years, however, the Russian Government possessed much greater resources for its adventures in foreign expansion; and its forces were much better officered, manned, and equipped than in the earlier period. Consequently, their progress — directed by a superior group of able diplomats — was much more rapid. They had, fortunately, comparatively few setbacks; and their success was secured through a combination of exploration, intrigue, economic infiltration, and military force.

These Russian activities began at three points: Semipalatinsk on the Irtysh River, Orenburg on the Ural River, and Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea — the movement from the last-named town did not take place, however, until nearly ten years after the Russians had occupied Krasnovodsk in 1869, and after the advance from the other points had been successfully accomplished. After Humboldt had explored successfully the region south of Semipalatinsk, the Russians established their first fort at Sergio-

pol — two hundred miles south of their outpost on the Irtish River just mentioned. Then followed another period of exploration to the south and southwest, in which Federov Karelin and Schrenk distinguished themselves. In 1884 the Great Horde of the South Steppes and Lake Balkash — the last of the Kirghiz national groups — submitted to Russia; and Prince Gortchakov advanced the Russian forces two hundred miles to Kopal at the foot of the Ala Tau Mountains, and built a fort there in 1846-47. By 1855, another two hundred miles had been traversed and Verni (Vernoe) and the valley of the Ili River occupied, where great numbers of peasants and settlers followed the military forces, seeking new homes. Once more the explorers pressed on: Semenov up the Ili River, Valekinov to Kashgar and south as far as the Pamirs, and Goluber and Matkov to Issik Kul Lake in 1858-59. Meanwhile, the Russian forces followed slowly. They seized and fortified Tokmak in 1860; and in the same year China transferred to them the Issik Kul region and the valley of the Naryn River to the south of this lake. Finally they pushed on some forty to fifty miles and in 1862 occupied Pishpek — two hundred and sixty miles from Kokand to which they were already advancing from another direction. And in 1867, the whole of this great region was organized into the Russian province of Semipalatinsk with Verni as a capital, which was later divided into the two provinces of Semipalatinsk and Semirechinsk having a combined area of over 322,000 square miles and a population of over 2,000,000.

Meanwhile, the second movement, inaugurated from Orenburg, had made equally good progress to the south and southeast via the Aral Sea. By 1834, the Russians, going via the Ural River, had reached Dead Bay — an arm of the Caspian Sea — and established a fort there.

In 1847, we find them holding outposts on the Irgiz and Turgai Rivers, known as Forts Uralsk and Orenburg. The following year they reached Karabutak and set up another fortified post at Aralsk, near the northeastern extremity of the Aral Sea, called Fort Number One. From there the Russian outposts were gradually pushed southeastward along the Syr Daria (river) for one hundred and fifty miles to their next important station — Fort Perovsk — built in 1853. Their progress was expedited by a steamer brought from Sweden in parts and put together on the river. But, ere long, the Khivans and Tartars of Turkestan fortified the Syr Daria and effectively barred their advance for nine years.

Finally, General Chernaiev, with a large and well-equipped army and in accordance with a carefully planned program, forced his way rapidly one hundred and fifty miles to Djulek and the town of Turkestan, and then to Chinkent — a hundred miles farther — in 1864. When the news of this expedition reached Europe, it aroused considerable excitement in the capitals of the leading powers whose statesmen began at length to grasp the proportions of the Russian advance — although comparatively little was known of Turkestan in those days — and to begrudge her any considerable increase of territory or of trade. Great Britain, fearing chiefly for her Indian possessions, led the chorus of protests that ensued. But Prince Gortchakov — then Minister of Foreign Affairs — in a skillfully worded circular letter to the powers, dated November 21, 1864, succeeded in allaying all fears. He assured them that the chief motive of Russia in this advance was simply to secure an effective boundary in Central Asia — one that could be defended from border raids. It was highly desirable that the robberies and feuds of the Steppes should cease, but there was no chance of securing this while Russia

merely bordered on the lands of a number of irresponsible tribes. It was therefore imperative: that the Russian Empire should advance her line till it touched the boundaries of the organized agricultural states of Khiva and Bokhara, and reached the mountains extending from Kokand to China; that a line of forts should be established to hold this line and to maintain peace; and that the "western civilization" should be given to the natives, who must be taught that trade is better than pillage. Accordingly, the Russians were permitted to pursue their advance unhampered; and General Chernaiev took Fort Niazbek and the populous and important city of Tashkent — sixteen miles northeast of it and commanding its water supply — in 1865, while General Romanovski occupied Khojent, a strong military town covering the roads to Kokand, Tashkent, Bokhara, and Balkh, in the following year.

By this time the khanates and tribal chieftains of the interior of Turkestan had become suspicious of the motives of the Russians; and, in 1866, they all united, under the leadership of the Khan of Bokhara, in a "Holy League" against Russia. The Russian generals thereupon deliberately provoked a conflict with the ruler of the Khanate of Bokhara, whose intentions were peaceful, by seizing the property of Bokharan merchants in Khojent and Tashkent, and by arresting some Bokharan envoys who had been sent on a mission of protest to St. Petersburg. The Amir retaliated indiscreetly by imprisoning the members of a Russian mission sent to his capital to reestablish friendly relations and to secure trade concessions; and General Chernaiev led an army across the Syr Daria at Chinaz against him — only to be defeated. The Russians succeeded, however, in capturing and holding the two forts of Jizak and Ura Tube within the Amir's domains before the year closed.

The next year the Russian Government organized the whole region already occupied southeast of the Aral Sea into the province of Turkestan, containing a population of about 1,500,000 people, with the town of Turkestan as its capital, and on November 17, 1867, appointed General Kaufmann commander-in-chief of its forces in Central Asia. Kaufmann proceeded promptly to organize an efficient expedition against Bokhara; and in 1868 he thoroughly defeated the Khan's forces on the Zerafshan River, took the important city of Samarkand — noted as the burial-place of Tamerlane and as the religious capital of Turkestan with its marvelous Arab edifices — and compelled the Khan to sign a treaty of peace dated the 18th of June. By the terms of this agreement, the city of Bokhara was not to be molested; but the khanate was to be opened to the free trade and free passage of Russians. A small indemnity amounting to 125,000 gold tilla¹ was to be paid Russia, to whom was to be transferred the valley of the Zerafshan and the cities of Samarkand and Katta Kurgan, which gave them control of the waters of the Zerafshan and the crops of the Khanate of Bokhara.

These successes again aroused Great Britain, whose statesmen viewed with apprehension every step taken by the Russians that brought their boundary nearer to the frontier of India. During the years 1869 and 1870, an attempt was made by the British Government to secure an agreement with Russia that should govern the future policy and protect the interests of both states in Central Asia. It resulted in what was afterwards known as the "St. Petersburg Correspondence" in the course of which the idea of a system of "buffer states" was evolved. Lord Mayo, who was Viceroy of India from 1869 to 1872, suggested that the British and Russian possessions should

¹ Approximately 10,400 roubles, or \$5200.

be kept safely aloof from one another by the maintenance of two series of independent buffer states. The three northern ones — Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand — were to enjoy the protection of Russia, while the three southern — Kelat, Afghanistan, and Yarkand — should have the support of Great Britain or India. In this way definite limits would be set to the territorial expansion of both powers, and each state would have its share in the trade and commercial development of Central Asia. Russia gave the scheme her tacit approval, but did not consent to any definite arrangement in the matter.

Meanwhile, difficulties were arising between Russians and Khivans. The latter resented the presence of the former in Central Asia and their interference in the affairs of Bokhara and neighboring states. Moreover, the Khivans were suspicious of the Russians and embittered because of the way the latter were obtaining the control of the trade of Central Asia. The presence of the Russians was as obnoxious to them as it was to the Bokharans and the other peoples of that region; while the intriguing, pushing manners of the western traders and settlers was equally irritating. There is little doubt that the Khivan chieftains were secretly taking what steps they could to retard the Russian advance and to keep them away from Khivan territory; for the fear of annexation was ever hanging over their heads. In 1870, the Khan of Khiva forbade the exportation of grain or food into regions held by Russian forces; and an attempt was made to prevent all commerce between Russian forces and Khivans. And, in the next two years every effort was made diplomatically and commercially to hold up Russian progress; but all in vain.

The Russian Government, which considered a protectorate over the Khivans as an essential stepping-stone to the commercial and political domination of Central Asia,

viewed these hasty, fruitless activities in defense of national independence as the unfriendly acts of a defiant competitor and enemy. And she began to look about for excuses to start a movement that not only would remove an irritating opponent, but also would furnish a pretext for the establishment of a protectorate over the khanates. It was not necessary to wait long. By the end of 1872, Russia was able to report to the powers that another military expedition into Central Asia would soon be necessary, owing to the unsettled conditions and raids upon trade along the Khivan border.

Khiva, to which Russia held a legitimate claim since certain Kirghiz chiefs had transferred to the Russian czars their family rights to Khiva, was reported as sheltering rebellious Kirghiz tribes, defying Russian power by the practice of brigandage, and conspiring with Bokhara, Kokand, and Kashgar to overthrow Russian control in Central Asia. In a well-authenticated interview in London in January, 1873, Count Schouvalov — then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs — gave positive assurances to Lord Granville, at that time holding the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet, that this would be merely a punitive expedition. Four and one half battalions only — about 4200 men — were to be sent. And there was no intention of taking possession, since positive orders had been given that nothing should be done which would lead to a prolonged occupancy. What actually occurred was something quite different. General Kaufmann crossed the Khivan boundary with three columns composed of fifty-three companies of infantry and twenty-five of Cossacks — about 14,000 men all told — and secured the submission of Khiva without difficulty, even though Bokhara, aroused at the invasion of territory belonging to her friend and ally, came rather tardily to the rescue. She, too, was

forced to submit to the Russian army and to sign a treaty at General Kaufmann's dictation on September 28th, similar to that signed by Khiva on August 25th. These agreements provided for the opening of the khanates and the Oxus River to the trade of Russia with but a two and one half per cent import duty on goods going into Bokhara or Russian territory. No person should be admitted into the khanates without a Russian passport; and the Russians admitted were to enjoy the right of holding property and carrying on business. And, while Bokhara the noble, with its four hundred mosques, its baths, its gardens, its great caravansaries, and its flourishing trade, was required only to receive a Russian agent and to send a representative to the Russian Government at Tashkent, its political status, as well as that of Khiva, became a dependent one. The direction of their foreign affairs passed into the hands of Russia, for they were forbidden to make any commercial or other treaty without the consent of the Russian Government; and they became subject protectorates of the Russian Empire, retaining, however, in other respects their local autonomy.

In this way were acquired two rich and fertile oasis communities, one (Khiva) having 24,000 square miles of territory and 800,000 population and the other (Bokhara) 83,000 square miles of territory and 1,250,000 population. And last, but not least, the slave-trade in Central Asia was abolished, commerce with the interior communities and peoples was unfettered, and protection afforded to life and property. For in the same year — 1873 — the Russian province of Samarkand, comprising some 26,000 square miles of territory and a population approximating 700,000, was established with the city of Samarkand as its capital; and three years later, General Kaufmann, taking advantage of an uprising started by the Khan of

Kokand — now a metropolis of Central Asia with 112,000 people — assisted by the leading chiefs of Khojent, divided and defeated these leaders, and added a large district to the east and southeast of Samarkand. The local chieftains all submitted and the whole region was organized the same year into the Russian province of Ferghana, which embraced 55,483 square miles of territory with a population of over 1,200,000.

Within a short time, a connection was established between the province of Ferghana and that of Semipalatinsk where we have seen the Russians advancing from Semipalatinsk to Pishpek. This completed the main Russian forward movement into Central Asia. Three things remained to be done, however, before the Russians could reap the full reward of their efforts and feel secure in their control of the region and its trade. The district between the Caspian Sea and the Khivan territory — known as Turkomania — had to be occupied; the Russian outposts had to be pushed forward till they controlled the northern outlets of the great passes through the mountain barriers of Persia, Afghanistan, and India; and all the centers of Turkestan had to be connected by rail with the Russian system.

The Russians had early sought to obtain a foothold on the inhospitable eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. They made three attempts to establish a base of operations on its shore; one on the island of Ashoor-ada in the Bay of Astrabad in 1837-38 in the face of vain protests by Persia and England; a second at Krasnovodsk — south of Kara Bugaz Bay — in 1869; and the third at Chikishliar — above the Atrek River — in 1871. After the failure of General Lomakin's first attempt in 1877 to penetrate Transcaspia from Chikishliar, Krasnovodsk became the base of all the future Russian activities in that region as well as

the starting-point of its Transcaspian railway in later years. It was a difficult region for military operations under the most favorable conditions, for it is a country of deserts and arid plateaus extending southward to the rugged, wild foothills of the Kopat Dagh (mountain range), then forming the northern border of Persia. And in these foothills dwelt the powerful Turkoman tribes — the most warlike people in all Turkestan.

The dangers and difficulties having been fully demonstrated by the crushing defeat of General Lomakin's second expedition at Geok Teppe on September 9, 1879, the St. Petersburg statesmen selected their ablest warrior — General Michael Dmitriavitch Skobelev — as the commander-in-chief of their next army of invasion. He was assisted by General Kuropatkin — then a young man — who, after a distinguished career, became commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the Russo-Japanese War. After careful preparations, Skobelev's army left Krasnovodsk in July, 1880, 18,000 strong, and proceeded to occupy the inland territory by a series of marches toward the southeast. The brave Turkoman forces were defeated and driven back to their famous stronghold at Geok Teppe. Here the last remnant of their troops surrendered after a three weeks' siege on January 24, 1881, and 8000 of the garrison were deliberately slain as a warning to the other peoples of the region.

Thereafter, Skobelev's progress was steady and without serious opposition. On February 9, 1881, he took Ashkabad, and then moved his advance posts southeastward toward the oases of Tejend and Merv, and the commercial centers of Kaaka-Kalch and Sarakhs. And the success of his operations enabled the Russians to conclude with Persia the Akhak-Khorassan Boundary Convention on December 21, 1881, which assigned to Russia all of the northeast

rim of the plateau of Iran, north of the river Atrek, and confirmed her possession of the Merv and Sarakhs districts. This gave Russia access to the great mountain frontier of Persia and gave her a direct connection with the trade of Khorassan. Alexander III, who had no wish to draw the attention of Europe to these successes or arouse the suspicions of Great Britain, recalled Skobelev, after the receipt of a protest from the British Foreign Office, and appointed General Komarov in his place.

M. Alikhanov was sent on a special mission to Merv in 1882-83, where he secured a preferential commercial treaty by winning over the leading merchants to the Russian cause. And the Russian control became so extensive and effective throughout the whole region that, within a year, they were able to organize the vast area of 200,000 square miles lying between Persia, Afghanistan, the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara and the Caspian and Aral Seas, into the Russian province of Transcaspia. General Komarov became its governor-general in the spring of 1883. On February 18, 1884, Komarov secured at Ashkabad the allegiance of four leading chiefs and twenty-four notables of the Merv Tekkes, and was then able to penetrate without serious resistance the remarkable Tejend Oasis in the Kara Kum Desert, where for centuries the famous town of Merv — the "Queen of the World" — had flourished amid cultivated fields and orchards. He occupied the place and its noted fortress — the Koushid — on March 16, 1884, and, pushing on steadily southward, took the fortress of Sarakhs in May of the same year. Thus the occupation of all the strategic centers of the region was completed and the Russian forces brought within striking distance of the Afghan frontier.

Meanwhile, in 1873, England and Russia had reached an agreement concerning frontiers in Central Asia. This

Anglo-Russian understanding was the result of a correspondence between the Earl of Granville and Prince Gortchakov during the period from October 17, 1872, to January 31, 1873. At that time the Russian advance having reached the Khanate of Bokhara, the British were anxious to see delimited the unmarked frontier between that state and Afghanistan. The agreement then reached provided that the boundary line of Afghanistan should run from Siri Kul, or Lake Victoria, to the junction of the Oxus and Kokcha Rivers, and follow the Oxus (Amu-Daria) and the district of Andkhui on the north and northwest to pillar number 79 on the Oxus, set at about the sixty-sixth degree of east longitude. In this way, Badakhshan, Wakshan, Afghan Turkestan (including the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, Balkh, Andkhui), and Herat were retained by Afghanistan. The desert to the north and northwest of the Afghan boundary was referred to as "belonging to independent tribes of Turkoman" which included the Tekkes of Merv.

Therefore, when the Russian forces seized Ashkabad, Merv, Sarakhs, the British Government felt that this agreement of 1873 had been deliberately violated; and they entered a vigorous protest at St. Petersburg, which led to a spirited diplomatic controversy lasting nearly three years. The British statesmen were fully awake to the significance of the Russian advance in Turkestan, which now threatened to absorb Herat and push through Afghanistan to the border of India. But their hands had been tied by troubles in the Sudan where General Gordon was besieged in Khartoum, and by the reluctance of some of their leaders, such as Gladstone, to use force in the protection of British interests abroad.

However, while the diplomats wrote dispatches, the soldiers of Komarov were gaining possession of the Zulfikar

Pass on the road to Herat early in 1885; and in March they engaged with the Afghans in battle on the Kushk. The Government of India hastened to the aid of the Afghans; and there ensued the famous "race for Herat," as it was termed by the writers of that day. Before any serious conflict took place, however, the diplomats of the two empires had secured the appointment of a joint commission to settle this vexatious frontier question. It met in St. Petersburg, and its findings were embodied in the Russo-Afghan Boundary Convention in 1887, which determined the northwest frontier line of Afghanistan from the Persian border on the Hari-rud River to the Bokhara line on the Oxus (pillar number 79). Later, this was surveyed and marked for one hundred and fifty miles with pillars. In the main, this was a favorable decision for Russia, since it gave her access to the chief passes and trade routes into northern Afghanistan. Yet it was a great advantage to Afghanistan and India to have this vexatious frontier problem settled, to have Herat retained by Afghanistan, and to have adequate protection provided for the caravans and trade of this region through the control exercised by Russia over the restless Turkomans and desert peoples to the north of the line.

This Russo-Afghan Agreement marks the third step in the final erection of the southern mountain frontier of Russian Turkestan (the first two being the Russo-Persian Convention in 1881 and the Russo-British understanding in 1873). The fourth and last step in this work was the determination of the boundaries of the Pamir plateau. This famous highland barrier is a tremendous plateau and mountain region with an altitude of from 14,000 to 25,000 feet, situated north of the Hindu Kush and opposite to Chitral in northern India. It is known locally as the "Roof of the World"; but little information existed in

Europe concerning this region till the explorations of the eighties and nineties. Russian explorers appeared there from the north, while British travelers worked their way through from the south — notably the mission of Colonel Gromtchevski in 1889 and that of Colonel Younghusband and Davidson about a year later, both of which were forced to retire by the hostility of the Afghan natives. In 1891, Colonel Yonov attempted to occupy the plateau with a strong force. The Afghans resisted his advance stoutly, and England ordered several regiments of Goorkhas to their assistance. So Yonov was compelled to withdraw. But Russia apologized for the invasion of Afghan territory and agreed to a partition of the Pamir, after a long and heated correspondence. Finally, the matter was amicably adjusted in the Anglo-Russian Convention of March, 1895, and by the appointment of a commission in the following September to survey the region and mark the boundary line. By this convention it was agreed that this line should run from the eastern end of Lake Victoria (Siri Kul) to the Chinese frontier, and that it should mark, not only the boundary between Afghan and Russian territory, but also the line of division between the Russian and British spheres of influence. The long strip of land, now stretching like a finger between Turkestan and India, was to be retained by Afghanistan, thus preventing the possessions of the two empires from coming into direct contact. China was to be urged to mark her boundary, so that all cause for further disputes would be removed. And the whole region was carefully explored and studied by two Danish expeditions¹ under command of O. Olufsen in 1896-97 and in 1898-99, so that the world might have definite information concerning this heretofore inaccessible country.

¹ See *Journal of the Royal Danish Geographical Society*, 1897, and *Through the Unknown Pamirs*, by O. Olufsen, 1904.

Meanwhile, the work of railway construction had been begun, at the suggestion of General Annenkov, at Krasnovodsk, and a line built via Ashkabad and Merv to Bokhara and Samarkand, to which last-mentioned place the road was opened in 1888. Later, this was connected with a line from Orenburg coming by way of Kazalinsk, Turkestan, and Tashkent, and the railway extended to Khojent, Kokand, and Andijan in Ferghana, with a branch from Merv to Kushk on the border of Afghanistan. In this way the Russian Government completed its expansion in Central Asia, rounded out its frontiers, and consolidated its possessions by railways and trade routes. And altogether the Russian acquisitions in the Steppes, Turkestan, and Transcaspia amounted to 1,366,833 miles bearing a population of over 9,000,000 in 1910. Included in their new territory was a large district received from China when the Kuldja affair was settled at the Treaty of Peking in 1881. This region, reaching from the Ala Tau range to the Tianshan Mountains, rounded out the Russian holdings along the great Chinese mountain barriers, including the Issik Kul district, and gave her an additional share of Turkestan which she added to the province of Semirechensk.

The methods employed by Russia to procure these successes would meet with general disapproval to-day, when secret treaties, backdoor diplomacy, and dishonest practices are everywhere discountenanced. For there is little doubt that government officials used freely intrigue and bribes to stir up strife among the tribes, or to acquire rights in regions outside of their own territory, so that intervention would be necessary to preserve peace and to protect their rights and interests. And they deliberately deceived, not only native rulers and chiefs, but also European governments as to their purposes, until they had secured the advantages necessary to ensure the success of their plans

and made further resistance to their operations useless. The ultimate result of their activities was so far-reaching and so beneficial, on the whole, that some might plead for them that the end justified the means — particularly when one remembers that there is not one of the European powers which has not, in the prosecution of its schemes for colonial expansion, committed acts equally questionable and unjust. But the story of Russian expansion in the “Heart of Asia” becomes a sordid affair when we realize that the methods practiced there were only the reflection of methods in vogue throughout the whole Empire. At every stepping-stone of their progress we see too clearly the marks of those two great curses of the old Russian régime — graft and bribery. The power of the great Russian bureaucracy was omnipresent. All officials of the Empire were drawn from the nobility, the clergy, and the large social class known as *Tchinovniks* — the men with a job or pull, of which there were fourteen classes or ranks; and the pressure on the Government for promotions, commercial privileges, and financial openings was tremendous.

Asiatic Russia and Asia were looked upon by all as the “land of opportunity.” It was not possible to reward all public services with land, trade rights, or special privileges. So an honor system was created for imperial servants; and gold medals and titles in profusion were given to all officials, whether scientists, explorers, army officers or naval commanders, who made important discoveries, achieved special commercial triumphs, or won military victories for Russia in Asia. Central Asia was not considered the best field for army promotions by the military men, but it was worked to the limit. The difficulties in the way of advancement were numerous, but the opportunities were often at hand. For coupled with the ample system of rewards was the practice of permitting a wide discretion to officers in the

field. Commanders were allowed to make any advance, or occupy any piece of territory, or seize any strategic place, under the plea of necessity, that would further the advance or progress of Russia in Central Asia. If their successes were so pronounced as to attract the attention of European governments and to bring protests from foreign states, they were removed from their commands and offices. But they were invariably promoted to higher positions elsewhere.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the question was frequently heard in Great Britain: Is the secret and ultimate aim of Russian expansion in Central Asia the conquest of India? Books, pamphlets, newspaper and magazine articles, and speeches innumerable were written and delivered to prove that it was. And for months at a time the British lived with the fear of an Indian invasion and uprising hanging over their heads. Alexis Krausse¹ expressed the general feeling in Britain when he raised the question: If this is *not* the aim of the Russian Government, why have they spent so much money and sacrificed so many lives for such a poor, barren country as Turkestan? But he failed to grasp the real significance of their advance, writing as he did from a strong pro-British standpoint. Any fair-minded person, with all the facts before him to-day, must admit that the strategic and commercial advantages gained by Russia in its occupation of the "Heart of Asia" were fully worth the outlay.

Commercially, Russia's new position in the Middle East possessed great possibilities, for it brought her into intimate connection with the trade of Persia, India, and the East. It was a realization of the national ambition advocated in the will of Peter the Great, which urged the Russian Government to "advance to the Persian Gulf in order

¹ In *Russia in Asia*.

to reëstablish the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria and Persia, and to get a full share of the trade of the world."

Strategically, it was of the highest value to the Muscovite Empire, for two reasons. In the first place, Great Britain would be forced to keep large forces stationary in India, in the event of a military conflict with Russia or of a new Russian advance on Constantinople; and the Muscovite rulers would always have an excellent lever to use diplomatically against England in European or Near-Eastern affairs. As Skobelev was fond of saying: "The stronger Russia becomes in Central Asia, the weaker will England become in India and the more accommodating to Europe." And again: "To my mind the whole Central Asian question is as clear as daylight. If it does not enable us in a comparatively short time to dominate the Bosphorus, the hide is not worth the tanning. . . . Without a serious demonstration in the direction of India, a way in the Balkan peninsula is not to be thought of. It is indispensable to maintain in Central Asia, at the gates of the corresponding theater of war, a powerful body of troops, fully equipped, and seriously mobilized."

In the second place, it was a very important step toward the realization of the most cherished ambition of the sanest of the Russian statesmen: i.e., an alliance with Great Britain. "Our position," wrote Lebedev, in *Vers l'Inde*, referring to the Russian holdings on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan, "will compel the British to augment their military forces in India, to increase their expenses, and will reduce them to a state of perpetual alarm for their rule in Hindustan. In all likelihood it will bring us to the issue we desire: the conclusion of a close alliance between Russia and Great Britain that will be advantageous to both parties." And an *approchement* with England was ultimately achieved

in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of August 31, 1907, to the satisfaction of both empires.

At last, the Muscovite imperialistic ambitions were realized, and the Russian Bear firmly seated in the Heart of Central Asia with his claws resting on the mountain barriers of China, Afghanistan, and Persia. But what has he done with his possessions? Through a long period of years he was content to rule Central Asia by means of imperial governors and advisers, to extract taxes or tribute, and to enjoy special trade rights and facilities; but he never attempted to colonize the country, or to amalgamate it with the Russian institutions and system of government. Russia did, indeed, fill the country with soldiers and barracks, and give peace, protection, and a certain prosperity to the inhabitants for many years. But the interests of the Empire were always paramount and all-absorbing, while those of minor nationalities and local states were relegated to the background or neglected altogether. Confidence was placed in the efficiency of intrigue, bribery, and force; while conciliation and coöperation were unknown terms. And the great educational and economic institutions that are essential to a healthy national life and progress were lacking. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Russian colonial venture in the "Heart of Asia" did not prove a shining success under such conditions.

In the first place, it was an impossibility to graft a successful colonial policy upon the Russian system of imperial expansion and the methods of conducting affairs at St. Petersburg. In the second place, climatic conditions and the lack of good farming lands made Central Asia an unattractive place to Russian colonists. As late as 1914-15, there were only about 702,000 Russians — out of a population of 7,740,000 — in all Turkestan, and 3,184,000 out of a population of 13,230,000 in the Caucasus. And the

nomadic spirit of the Russians made it difficult for them to reconcile themselves to the sedentary, prosaic life of the settler. The soldiers were adepts in making the best of the frontier life, but the peasants never prospered in Central Asia.

In the third place, the country was already well populated by a variety of nationalities with different religions, ideals, and languages, and requiring different methods of treatment. There were Bokharans, Khivans, Turkomans, Mongols, Chinese, Afghans, Persians, and roving tribes of Kirghiz in Turkestan, most of whom were Moslems or Buddhists, and none of whom had any racial affinity with the Russians. And in the Caucasus, there were Lesghians, Circassians, Tartars, Georgians, Armenians, Turks, Jews, Mongols, Kurds, and Persians, the great majority of whom differed in religion, and all in race, from the subjects of the Muscovite Empire. In several instances, there were communities possessing population and territory sufficient to warrant them in aspiring to be autonomous, self-respecting states. Such was the case in Khiva, Bokhara, Georgia, the Kuban, and Armenia. Is it any wonder, then, that, when the Russian Empire crumbled, these communities immediately sought to set up their own governments and to put their own houses in order?

After the abdication of the Czar in March, 1917, the various communities and cities of Central Asia and the Caucasus remained faithful to the new democratic régime. Upon the withdrawal of Grand Duke Nicholas, the last Russian Viceroy of the Caucasus, and the Russian governors in Turkestan toward the end of March, the local officials took charge of affairs, but continued their support of the new government at St. Petersburg. The Khans of Bokhara and Khiva assumed full direction of affairs in their districts. And Mr. Khatissian, the Mayor of Tiflis,

sent a circular letter to the twenty-eight cities of the Caucasus urging their mayors to preserve order in their home towns and districts; while the town council of Tiflis, augmented by numbers to represent all nationalities, took the lead in setting up a government and in preserving order in the Central Caucasus.

But when the Bolshevik revolution took place in St. Petersburg on November 7, 1917, all of these communities severed their connection with Russia. The rulers of the Turkestan Khanates and cities refused to have anything to do with the Bolsheviks; and a number of independent communities arose in southern Russia, northern Caucasia, Transcaucasia, and Transcaspia, including the Kuban, the Crimean, the North Caucasus, and the Daghestan Republics.

The most striking and important move was made, however, by the three little states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Local national committees worked out a government for each community, and organized them under one central authority known as the Federal Republic of Caucasia, on April 22, 1918. Unfortunately, Bolshevik intrigues and dissensions over state boundaries and matters of policy proved stronger than the sentiments of national unity and coöperation; and the new republic was dissolved on May 26th. In its place there arose the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

Of these, Georgia — the "Pearl of Russia" — lying on the southern slopes of the Caucasus range and claiming an area of 50,400 square miles with a population of 3,000,000, was the first to organize. A movement for national independence was already in full swing there. At the beginning of 1918, a Georgian university had been established at Tiflis, all the schools, mines, and forests nationalized, and the Georgian Church separated from the Russian Holy Synod. Equality of civil and political rights, universal

suffrage, and freedom of religion were proclaimed; and a national council created to administer the affairs of state. After the declaration of independence on May 26, 1918, elections were held, and the government of the country placed in the hands of a president and five ministers, and of a national assembly of 109 members. This latter body ratified the act of independence on March 12, 1919. Finally on January 13, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies recognized the independence of Georgia; and, on May 8th, Soviet Russia signed a treaty with the new republic, recognizing its independence and providing for a resumption of commercial relations between the two countries.

However, the Republic of Georgia was in a dangerous situation. Its army was small; its resources limited; and its organization incomplete. Moreover, it was surrounded by unfriendly states, harassed by two hostile, covetous powers — Turkey and Soviet Russia — and isolated from Europe and America — even if any of the European nations or the United States had been inclined to aid it; but they were not. Its only hope, therefore, lay in its ability to play a waiting and neutral game in the Caucasus, to hold off the Turks and the Bolsheviki, and to gain time for national organization and development.

Unfortunately, the little republic was unequal to this tremendous task. In 1921, the Russian Soviet Government, which had overthrown the republican government of Azerbaijan in April, 1920, and concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Angora Assembly on March 16, 1921, sent the Eleventh Army Corps of Russia into Georgia to aid the Soviet forces in fomenting a revolution. On March 21, 1921, Tiflis was entered and a Socialist Soviet Republic established, after the gallant Georgian army had been dispersed and its political leaders driven into exile. The new régime is simply a Soviet military dictatorship — soulless,

inefficient, and corrupt — whose chief ambition has been to secure for Soviet Russia all the food, oil, and natural wealth of the country, and to reduce its bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to poverty and impotence, in the so-called interests of the workers. The railways were united with the Russian system and all the ships on the Caspian put under Soviet Russian control. All public and private property and resources were placed under governmental control; and all movable property, including food, grain, medicines, street-cars, locomotives, paper, and oil, was seized and shipped to Russia. Those who resisted, or were suspected of inciting revolt, were shot without trial. Business and industry languished; and the land became the prey to poverty, famine, and disease. Georgia, by the end of 1921, was a barren waste, whose people — only recently living in high hopes of an independent, national existence — were the slaves of a socialistic machine, living in misery and wretchedness. Its area was reduced to 25,760 square miles, and its population to a little over 2,000,000.

In October, 1921,¹ the former President of the Georgian Constitutional Assembly wrote: "All labor is conscripted. Between March and July, 1921, prices rose from five thousand to ten thousand per cent: the daily wage is one thousand roubles which is the price of fifty grammes of bad bread, less than that of an egg, while to earn a pair of shoes would take three years. There is an absence of almost all commodities, and especially of medicines, for almost every-

¹ Since 1921, thousands of leading Georgians have been executed by the Checa and tens of thousands deported to Siberia; the churches have been turned into Soviet clubs and dance-halls; all papers and magazines suppressed; taxes increased enormously; the country brought to the verge of financial and economic ruin; and a popular uprising between August 29 and September 22, 1924, put down in blood by an army of 60,000 men, amid burning villages, the massacre of women and children, and the execution of six hundred prominent citizens of Tiflis.

thing has been removed to Russia, including the entire railway stock — both rails, locomotives, and trucks — of the country. It is a military tyranny naked and unashamed, which in a few months has reduced this rich country to a desert."

Meanwhile, the neighboring republics were meeting with a like fate. Azerbaijan — a Tartar republic — located between the Caucasus Mountains, the Caspian Sea, Persian and Russian Armenia, was established by a Turanian people who inhabit that region, northern Persia and a portion of the Caucasus range extending nearly to Batum. It embraces a territory of about 33,970 square miles, and has a population of approximately 2,100,000. Its capital is Elizabetopol; and it controls the important port of Baku on the Caspian Sea. Its inhabitants are Mohammedans; and they have preserved their language and national traditions and customs for centuries. But they have no connection with the Turkish races or the Aryans, and they resent the name given them by the Russians — the "Turko-Tartars." After the declaration of independence in 1918, a constitutional government was established, composed of a responsible cabinet and a national assembly. The latter was elected by universal suffrage in which the Moslem women participated, and numbered one hundred and twenty members, including twenty Armenians, ten Russians, and a few Poles and Jews.

The life of the young republic was seriously menaced, however, in the spring of 1918 when a Bolshevik uprising occurred in Baku, in the course of which twelve thousand people were slain and the control of the city passed into Soviet hands. However, in the course of a few months, the city of Baku was retaken with the aid of Turkish troops, and the Bolshevik forces dispersed. A small Allied contingent under the British General Thomson occupied

Baku, on the request of the Republic, from November 17, 1918, to the end of 1919. And the new government proceeded rapidly with the work of restoring order and of creating an efficient administration throughout the country, until the independence of the Republic was officially recognized by the Supreme Council of the Allies on January 13, 1920.

Unfortunately, the Mussavat Cabinet, undermined by Bolshevik propaganda and weakened by frontier dissensions with Armenia over the provinces of Karabagh and Zenghezur, was forced to resign on April 28, 1920; and the government passed into the hands of an "Extraordinary Commission" composed chiefly of Moslems, and having a pronounced Bolshevik character. Two days later, the Bolshevik leaders of Petrovsk, who had secured the support of Soviet Russia and appeared in ships before the port of Baku, issued an ultimatum to the new commission. The next day they entered the city without resistance, and joined in the establishment of a Soviet republic.

The members of the foreign missions, with the exception of those from Persia and Italy, were arrested and imprisoned on an island. The Azerbaijan military forces were disbanded, and replaced by Bolshevik troops and Russian workmen, while the new government nationalized all property and wealth, evicted the bourgeoisie from their homes, and requisitioned everything in the way of food and movable property. Large quantities of oil and food were shipped free to Russia from Baku. Towns and villages were plundered; and Elizabethtopol burned and sacked because its Tartar troops refused obedience to the new régime and attempted resistance. The different provinces were all induced to accept Soviet rule, including Karabagh and Zenghezur, which came over on July 20, 1920; and the domination of the Soviet leaders became supreme.

From the very day, May 26, 1918, when Russian Armenia established its independence, it has had a tragic history. The territory of the new state was about 15,240 square miles, including the former province of Erivan and portions of the old Russian provincial divisions of Kars, Tiflis, and Elizabethpol, and the population was approximately 1,200,000. The Armenian claims, however, if allowed, would have given them, by additions from Persian and Turkish Armenia, some 125,000 square miles of land and a population of about 3,000,000 — allowing for the decrease in the Armenian nation due to the terrible massacres by Turks and Kurds since the beginning of the War. The government of the new republic was entrusted to a cabinet of eight members and a National Parliament of one hundred and twenty representatives elected by universal suffrage without regard to race, sex, or religion. The Prime Minister was elected by the Assembly to which all of the ministers were responsible. Dr. Alexander Khatissian, former Mayor of Tiflis, was the first Premier; and valiant efforts were made to set the new state on its feet — financially, economically, and politically. But in vain. For the country was poor and without resources; and the new administration labored greatly handicapped, amid many and serious difficulties, without a friend, and surrounded by implacable foes.

The Italian Parliament recognized the independence of Armenia on November 30, 1918; and, after the new state had started its new constitutional life with the opening of its first regular parliament in August, 1919, the United States gave its formal recognition to the young republic, on January 26, 1920. The Bryce Commission expressed the opinion on January 18, 1920, "that the whole of the ex-Ottoman Armenia be finally and completely separated from the Ottoman Empire, and that, failing an American mandate over the entire country, the Ottoman Armenian

provinces which border on the Erivan Republic be at once united with that republic, together with a port on the Black Sea." This was the minimum demanded by humanity, as well as by the interests of the British Empire. But it was not till April 23, 1920, that the Supreme Council of the Allies at the San Remo Conference decided to recognize the independence of Armenia and to increase its territorial possessions. They were largely influenced to take this action, because the United States had taken as yet no steps toward assuming a mandate over Armenia, and because they were determined to limit Turkey strictly to Turkish lands in Asia.

Nevertheless, in spite of the Sèvres Treaty of August 10, 1920, which transferred the greater part of the former vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis to Armenia, and the President Wilson award confirming these holdings, the Armenian Republic was doomed. For the rejection of the Armenian mandate by the United States Senate and the failure of the Allies to provide the new republic with protection and assistance, left that infant and helpless state a prey to its formidable and scheming neighbors, Turkey and Soviet Russia, since the Kemalist régime was determined to win back the lost Turkish provinces in Asia, and the Bolsheviks were resolved *not* to permit the existence of any strong anti-Soviet community in the Caucasus.

By the middle of October, 1920, the Turks had regained all of Turkish Armenia and invaded the territory of the new republic whose army, though making a valiant struggle, was soon forced into a position of great danger between the Turks and the Azerbaijan Soviet forces. The ascendancy of the Kemalists in Asia Minor was complete by February, 1921; and the advance of the Ottoman forces in Russian Armenia was resumed. But before the little Armenian Republic could be completely overthrown, the

Soviet Government of Russia intervened — not that it cared greatly about the welfare of the Armenians, but because it wished to establish Soviet control throughout the Caucasus, and because it proposed to advance its schemes against the Allies, particularly Great Britain, by an *approchement* with the new Ottoman Government. And, on March 16, 1921, a Russo-Turkish defensive and offensive alliance was signed, which gave the Russian Soviet Republic a free hand in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and provided for a division of disputed territories.

So Armenia was saved. But the Armenian Republic of Erivan, struggling valiantly till the last, went down before the combined onslaught of Turko-Soviet forces. Erivan was entered on April 2, 1921; and the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic — a miniature of the original state — established on April 21st. The triumph of the Russian Soviet Government in the Caucasus was now complete, since the Republic of Georgia had succumbed a month earlier — March 25th — and the Republic of Azerbaijan in April of the previous year. All that now remained was to ensure the maintenance of this supremacy.

On October 13, 1921, the Treaty of Kars was signed between the Angora Government and the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia (under the direction of Soviet Russia). By this agreement, the Angora Government acquired large tracts of Georgian territory — Georgia being permitted to retain its city and port of Batum — and about one half of Russian Armenia, while the former Armenian province of Nakhitchewan was transformed into a small soviet state under the protection of Azerbaijan. And the republics were not to recognize any international act which was not authorized by the National Government of Turkey; and the Grand National Assembly agreed not to recognize any act not authorized by the So-

viets of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Finally, under pressure of a great economic crisis in the Caucasus and of a counter-revolutionary movement in Turkestan led by Enver Pasha, a union of the three Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia was consummated in August, 1922, under the title "Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics," having its political capital at Baku, its economic center at Tiflis, and a federated government controlling foreign affairs, finance, transport, food, army, and labor. And this federation was followed, on December 30, 1922, by the formation of the "Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics" at Moscow,¹ which included the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, and the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republics.

This new alliance was a union of the chief socialist soviet states, within the bounds of old Russia, for the purpose of maintaining their common ideals and principles, of suppressing counter-revolution, and of consolidating the sovereignty in the hands of the Russian Soviet Government. It was the natural outcome of the treaties of January 16 and December 28, 1920, between Moscow and the White Russian and Ukrainian Soviets, and of negotiations between the representatives of the Russian Soviet and those of the Ukrainian and Azerbaijan Governments at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee in the summer of 1922. But it was neither a real union of equal states, nor a federal republic. Yet this "alliance" is more than its name implies — a league or alliance of soviet republics, since all authority is consolidated in the hands of a Central Executive Committee on which all the republics are represented according

¹ Officially approved by the Russian National Congress at Moscow on July 6, 1923.

to their populations, but which remains under the control of the Moscow Soviet Government. There is to be a uniform citizenship, a central capital — Moscow — and a federal budget. But the budget of each republic is to form an integral part of the national budget; and no member of the alliance is expected to resist the decrees of the central authority, in spite of the legal fiction contained in Article 26 that “every Republic has the right to withdraw from the alliance.” Therefore, this new union must be regarded as an important step toward the consolidation of all authority, within the limits of geographical Russia, in the hands of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

Sovereignty, under the new plan, rests legally with a Soviet Congress which meets once a year, and which is composed of representatives elected by the city soviets and the provincial soviets. The supremacy of labor is maintained by apportioning one representative to every 25,000 people in the cities, and one to every 125,000 in the country districts. The Soviet Congress has the sole power of ratifying and amending the alliance, and it elects the Central Executive Committee of 371 members, which meets three times a year, and which directs affairs during the intervals between the meetings of the Congress. The real executive power of the alliance, however, lies in the hands of the Præsidium of nineteen members and the Council of People’s Commissaries numbering twelve, including People’s Commissaries for Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, Communications, Posts and Telegraphs, Workingmen’s and Peasants’ Inspection, National Economy, Labor, Food Supplies, and Finance, all of whom are elected by the Central Executive Committee. In addition, a Supreme Court was created and “attached to” the Council of People’s Commissaries, the Court operating as an “organ of the State Political Administration” — the

Special Police. The con-federal powers over allied affairs conferred on the alliance are extensive, as is shown by the departments mentioned above. In addition, it will exercise control over the holding and distribution of lands and national resources, public education and health, citizenship and the rights of foreigners.

Although designated as an "Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics," the new union is far from including all the soviet republics and autonomous communities within the territory of the former Russian state, such as the Karelian Toiling Commune, the Autonomous State of the Zrian, the Far Eastern Republic, the Tartar Autonomous Republic of Kazan, the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, the Autonomous Kalmuk Province, the Autonomous Kirghiz Socialist Soviet Republic, the Daghestan Socialist Soviet Republic, the Sukhum or Abchazsk Soviet Republic on the Black Sea, the Bokhara People's Soviet Republic, and the Khivan People's Soviet Republic. Yet all these governments are, more or less, under the thumb of the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic. Its Præsidium addresses "friendly requests" to all the allied republics to adopt the laws passed by the Central Executive Committee; and these requests have never been disregarded. The truth is that the so-called allied republics do not dare to do so, for the support of the Russian Soviet Government is as greatly needed by these minor states as its power is feared.

In the Caucasus and Turkestan the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic is supreme. It has been shown above how the young Caucasus popular governments were overthrown and socialist soviet republics set up in their stead. In 1921, strengthened by treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan and aided by efficient propaganda offices at Orenburg and Tashkent, the Bolsheviki overturned the old khanate

governments and established Independent Socialist Soviet Republics in Khiva and Bokhara. Within the next two years they extended their control over all the Uzbeg, Kirghiz, and Turkoman tribes and peoples, and created in that great region, formerly included in Russian Transcaspia and Turkestan, the Soviet Republic of Kirghizia with 823,000 square miles and a population of 5,000,000, and the Central Asiatic Republics of Turkestan, Bokhara, and Khiva, having a total population of 8,000,000 to 8,500,000 and an area of approximately 650,000 square miles. And on September 17, 1924, through the action of the communist representatives at Tashkent, the Central Asiatic Republics were transformed and consolidated into the two Socialist Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and the two autonomous districts of Tadjik and Karakirghizia. These two new republics and the Kirghizan Republic are members of the Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics, but they are completely under the domination of the Russian Soviet Government. The autonomous district of Tadjik is affiliated with Uzbekistan, while that of Karakirghizia is directly under Soviet Russia proper.

Uzbekistan, with an area of 154,000 square miles and a population of 5,300,000, includes all the Uzbeks in the old political units of Turkestan, Khiva, and Bokhara, and embraces some 918,000 out of the 1,000,000 acres now devoted to cotton-growing. All of the Turkoman tribes are incorporated in Turkmenistan, whose area is a little less than that of Uzbekistan, but whose population numbers only about 830,000. It includes most of the old provinces of Transcaspia and West Khiva, and reaches from the Caspian Sea to Askabad. In these vast regions of Central Asia as in the Caucasus the main object of the Bolshevik leaders has been to get control of the natural resources of the country and to utilize them for the Russian Soviet Government.

And the new organization is grouped economically about Uzbekistan, upon which the other units are dependent, while this state is entirely dependent upon Soviet Russia — the sole consumer of its cotton. In this way the whole vast territories of the Kirghiz Steppes and Turkestan have become economic feeders of Soviet Russia.

But in Turkestan, the Soviet leaders have shown a rare intelligence and industry in their activities, and have achieved a notable success. "The whole region of Fergana has been made into one great center of supply to the rest of Turkestan and even Middle Russia," writes Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah, a well-informed native of the Middle East. "Coal mines have been discovered and worked in the Kokand district, where factories of small arms are turning out very large quantities of rifles and machine guns. The naphtha wells around Samarkand are producing as good material as those in Transcaucasia, and cotton-growing is growing apace in the fertile valley of Shar-i-Subz. The mulberry avenues of Surkhab are not neglected, and the silkworm industry has been successfully exploited. An Oxus canal recently excavated has made the region of Shar-i-Subz very fertile."¹ In addition, means of transport and communications have been greatly improved by the extension of the Orenburg-Tashkent and the Transcaspian railways to the border of Afghanistan, and by the building of good roads.

But there is another and darker side to the picture. With the fall of the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara, the country passed into the hands of hard taskmasters. All private property has been seized; and all the mines, industries, and plantations have been nationalized. Thousands of refugees have crossed over into Afghanistan, India, and Persia. The inhabitants who remained in Turkestan have

¹ *The Graphic*, July 23, 1921, pp. 106-07.

been enrolled and assigned to various positions in the mines, the cotton fields, the industries, the railways, or the administration, where they must toil at fixed but utterly inadequate wages. Individual liberty has disappeared. Life has lost its charm. Oriental ease, tranquillity, and freedom of action, have given place to modern bustle, activity, and serfdom. Will this new régime succeed?

The future of Central Asia, as well as that of all Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus, lies "on the knees of the gods." Neither the present government, nor the conditions of individual or economic life, nor the new Alliance of Soviet Republics, are expressive of popular will or sentiment. They are simply the outgrowth of the ideals, methods, and ambitions of the Soviet leaders of to-day in Russia. It is still a question whether they will survive in the form of permanent institutions or will disappear altogether in the course of time. It is true that the Bolshevist leaders have withdrawn many of their radical ideas and platforms — particularly in the field of finance and economics; that many able men have been drawn into their administrative circles, and that their efforts are now meeting with a greater success than at any time since the revolution began. Yet it is certain that the Bolshevist doctrines and institutions are doomed to failure unless they receive the ultimate approval and sanction of the Russian peoples. Soviet, or committee, form of government may survive in principle, while the present methods of representation and administration pass away. The Soviet leaders of the present day may succeed in uniting all of Russia in a great Socialist Soviet Alliance, similar to the Alliance of the four Soviet Republics just formed. More than likely some of the small states in existence to-day will be absorbed into larger republics, and various modifications will be made in the present method of federation. But it is reasonably certain that the great

Russia of the future, including Transcaspia, Transcaucasia, Turkestan, and the rest of Central Asia, dependent as they are and must always be on the Russian state, will be a great federation of republics with common ideals, institutions, and principles of government. Yet no such national triumph can be expected, nor can the Russian people live in peace and friendship with their neighbors or do their part in the promotion of international intercourse and harmony, unless their new national organization is founded upon the principles of honesty, integrity, efficiency, individual freedom, and democracy. And just treatment must be given to all the peoples and communities in Transcaucasia, Transcaspia, the Ukraine, the Crimea, Turkestan, Siberia, and the Far Eastern Republic.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERSIAN MUDDLE

Fardah Inshallah (To-morrow, please God)

IRAN — the land of the Lion and the Sun — occupies a strategic position on the highroad between Europe and Asia. Its territory, together with Asia Minor, forms the connecting link between Russia and southeastern Europe on the one hand, and the Middle East and India on the other. Yet its isolation, its lack of national highways, the apathy of its people, and the incompetence of its government have prevented it — even to this day — from becoming one of the great centers of international traffic and intercourse; and, although Persia has an area of 628,000 square miles — or nearly as much as the combined territory of France, Italy, Germany (under the Empire), and the British Isles — only about one fifth has ever been placed under cultivation. The country contains extensive regions where the mountains and arid plateaus predominate, it is true. Nevertheless, the arable area is considerable, with a rich and productive soil. Wheat, rice, barley, millet, maize, tobacco, cotton, and sugar are easily grown; and it is a good country for silk, wool, and fruit. Moreover, the great natural mineral wealth of the land, which includes oil, coal, iron, copper, sulphur, mica, arsenic, and salt, is still practically untouched. And even the native industries, such as the turquoise mines of Khorassan, the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf, and the looms which produced the world-famous rugs, carpets, and shawls of Persian handiwork, no longer turn out the products they once did.

The climate is healthful, but unique. For the country,

stretching as it does from the Persian Gulf — one of the hottest places in the world — to the mountains and high plateaus bordering on Transcaspia and the Caspian Sea, suffers from the extremes of heat and cold. As Cyrus remarked to Xenophon, “The people perish with cold at one point, while they suffocate with heat at the other.” But the central portion of Persia, which is for the most part an enormous plateau, enjoys a delightful climate — especially that part of it lying between the Elburz and Zagros ranges, which is reputed to have an atmosphere “remarkable above that of all other countries for dryness and purity.”

The present population of some 10,000,000 souls is a mixture of races. The old Iran and Turan are now indissolubly mingled; and the land of the Medes and Persians has been overrun by Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and other conquerors. The people are artistic, musical, intelligent, and mentally capable of great development. In the words of Henry Martyn, who knew them well, “They are a people clever and intelligent and more calculated to become great and powerful than any of the other nations of the [Near] East.” But, unfortunately, they are untrained, unscientific, and unambitious. They have been hampered for decades by poverty, lack of education, and a general paralysis of all forms of production and of national activity. And they have been the victims of a voracious aristocracy, a corrupt government, and — in more recent years — the political dissensions and intrigues of their leaders.

The Kingdom or Empire of Persia is one of the oldest monarchies in the world. It has lived through more tragic vicissitudes than any other nation on earth, and fallen, at length, into a state of decay that has been more stultifying than anything experienced by any modern political community. Under Cyrus and Darius in the fifth and sixth centuries before Christ, it was one of the great powers of

the world, including within its domains all of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Afghanistan, and Egypt. And for a long period thereafter, Persia played an important part in the politics of the Middle East under native and foreign rulers. But, during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, it gradually declined till it became an impotent, disorganized, and discredited state of the third grade, without resources, leaders, or friends. And one may truthfully say that it exists to-day only through the grace of God and of the British Empire.

The pitiful state into which Iran has fallen is due not only to the terrible kaleidoscopic adventures through which the nation has passed, that included numberless wars, conquests, invasions, civil and dynastic conflicts, but also, and in large part, to the rapacity, ambition, and incapacity of its monarchs. It is true that some of the Persian rulers were great warriors, adding many glorious pages to the nation's history, but the greater number of them were the most unscrupulous and despicable of men, perishing invariably by the hand of the assassin. And it is better that the rest — such as the notorious Mahmud Khan (an Afghan usurper) who had his three thousand Persian guards butchered and who bathed Ispahan (then the capital) in the blood of its best citizens till the city was almost depopulated, and the famous brigand, Nadir Shah, who, although he drove out the Afghans, made away with a whole royal house and committed other revolting crimes to further his own ambitions — should remain forever forgotten in the musty and bloody pages of Persian historic lore.

Nor can we except from this list the members of the Kajar dynasty, who have been on the throne since the end of the eighteenth century, with the single exception of the present young Shah. For was not the founder of their house that murderous and cruel tyrant, Agha Mohammed, of Turkish

origin, who sold twenty thousand women and children into slavery and ordered seventy thousand eyes of the inhabitants of Kerman brought to him on a platter? And there has not been among his successors a single unselfish patriot who has had the inclination or the ability to rescue the country from the lethargy and wretchedness into which it had fallen. It is true that the long, peaceful reign of Nasiru'd-Din, Shah from 1848 to 1896, was a decided improvement over the anarchy of the eighteenth century. For it was during this period that diplomatic intercourse with European states was begun, treaties of commerce negotiated, the slave trade abolished, a royal mint created, and Persia connected with the outside world through a postal and telegraph service. Yet even this well-intentioned ruler — the most enlightened of his family — not only failed to inaugurate any far-reaching reforms, but brought his state to the verge of bankruptcy by favoritism, extravagance, and costly European travels. And the suspicion and enmity of the Persian people were aroused by his disregard for popular sentiment, his attack on the ulema or religious leaders, and his liberal economic concessions to foreigners.

Meanwhile, other causes were contributing to the breakdown of the monarchy. Systematic robbery and graft went on unchecked in all departments of the government; and the administration was as corrupt as it was inefficient. The Shah possessed unlimited powers which were exercised through ministers who were seldom trained or intelligent, but were members of a corrupt palace ring whose chief ambition was to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. Cabinets were formed and dissolved rapidly without political significance or attempting reforms; and the National Council was only an advisory body seldom consulted. In addition, there was a large governing class, or aristocracy, which supported the monarchy, but utilized its

position and influence solely to advance its own interests and, to escape taxation.

On the other hand, there was no intelligent middle class to exert a steadying influence upon conditions and to bring pressure on the Government. The only champions of popular rights were the merchants of the towns and cities, and the religious leaders who controlled education and exerted a great influence over the masses. But the former, lacking in numbers, resources, and organization, were far from being competent to undertake a contest with the monarchy and the aristocracy; while the latter were conservative and narrow-minded, fearing that the inauguration of great reforms, or the introduction of foreign ideas and institutions, would deprive them of their privileges and their influence. And the great mass of the inhabitants were peasants, small farmers, or mountain tribesmen who were illiterate, untrained, and oppressed by the excessive taxes and the fearful economic conditions.

In the meantime, the general condition of the country was going from bad to worse. Nothing was being done to promote the general welfare, to develop the national resources, or to better the condition of the people. On the contrary, large districts in the center and south of the state lay idle, and the country was infested with bands of brigands who preyed systematically on all caravans and unprotected towns and villages. There was neither order nor security for life and property to be found anywhere, since the monarchy possessed neither regular police nor an organized militia, while the regular army was comprised of only a few untrained troops. In addition, to make matters worse, modern transportation methods and facilities were unknown. There were no railways, no harbors worthy of the name, and but few good roads.

Not the least alarming feature of this deplorable situa-

tion was the hopeless financial outlook. For the revenues of the state were at the lowest ebb and the public finances reduced to a terrible condition of disorder through constant speculation and the gross mismanagement of all public accounts; and the system of taxation was so inefficient and the method of collection so wasteful that only a small portion of the revenues ever reached the coffers of the state. There was some truth in the claim of a well-known Persian editor, that Persia had no national debt. But, as Lord Curzon has pointed out, "the most necessary objects of outlay were scandalously neglected, stinted, or ignored and . . . the country undertook no expense, but was content to scramble along as best it could from year to year, in order that the Treasury might receive its annual surplus."

When Nasiru'd-Din awoke to the fact that the state was almost bankrupt, he attempted to recoup by means of foreign concessions and loans. Already, between 1880 and 1888, the Shah had countenanced the opening to foreign trade of the Karun River as far as Ahwaz, and favored the extension of British commerce in southern Persia. In 1889, he gave Baron Julius de Reuter an exclusive bank-note concession, and to Prince Dolgorouky for Russia the first railway concession. In October of the same year, the Imperial Bank of Persia — the first national bank in the country — was opened in Teheran under a British charter issued to Baron de Reuter, together with certain mining concessions. Finally, on March 8, 1890, the Shah granted to a British corporation a monopoly of the Persian tobacco trade that was expected to produce large returns one fourth of which were to go to the Persian Government.

Meanwhile, the suspicions of native leaders had been aroused by these valuable grants to foreigners, and the cry went up that the country was being sold to aliens, while the rights of Persian merchants and citizens were ignored.

Jamalu'd-Din, a celebrated religious teacher and prophet, inaugurated a crusade against foreign concessions and went about the country calling upon the people to join in a boycott of the tobacco company. So great was his influence and so obnoxious was the tobacco concession that during the month of December no one in all Persia bought any tobacco. And, at length, the Shah was forced to pay the British corporation five hundred thousand pounds to rescind the contract, in order to free the land from this distasteful monopoly.

Nevertheless, the race for concessions went merrily on; but it received a sudden check — particularly as far as the British were concerned — by the assassination of Nasiru'd-Din Shah, their ancient friend and admirer, on May 1, 1896. Mirza Mohammed, who committed the crime, thought he was serving his country by freeing it from the control of an unscrupulous monarch believed to be the tool of foreigners. Fortunately for Persia, his act hastened the end of the tottering empire and gave an impetus to the movement for constitutional reform. The inauguration of this contest for popular rights, however, proved a fateful day for the harassed Persian nation, for it took place simultaneously with the beginning of foreign intervention in Persian affairs — an intervention by two powerful European states, which not only increased the disorder in the country, but wrecked the constitutional cause as well. To understand fully these developments, it is necessary to examine for a moment the position of Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East — particularly as it affected Persia and the Persian trade.

The relations of the British Empire with Iran cover a period of over a hundred and fifty years. They began with the establishment of British factories at Jask, Bushire, and Bundar Abbas in the middle of the eighteenth century,

and the granting of special rights to English traders by Shah Kerim Khan in 1763. In the course of time, the British secured a large trade in southern Persia, won the confidence of many Persians, and were responsible for the erection of the telegraph that played so important a rôle in opening the country to world intercourse. For many years they followed consistently a friendly but passive policy of non-intervention in Persian affairs, which had two cardinal principles: extension of British-Indian commerce in southern Persia and coöperation with the Persian rulers in their efforts to develop the resources of the country. "We desire above all things," said Lord Salisbury at a dinner in honor of Nasiru'd-Din in 1889, "that Persia shall not only be prosperous, but be strong — in order that she may pursue the peaceful path on which she has entered in security and tranquillity. And we entreat our illustrious guest to believe that, in seeking this commercial as well as political friendship, we are seeking no exclusive privileges for ourselves. . . . All we desire are those acquisitions which are achieved by industry and enterprise."

Yet this sympathetic and praiseworthy policy failed to get either party anywhere, because it was neither constructive nor continuous. And it failed to inspire confidence, since it was not accompanied by enlightened, sustained efforts to promote the development of Persia. For, unfortunately, the British diplomacy blew hot and cold by turns. And the home government by its procrastination and indifference deliberately threw away, from time to time, those favorable opportunities for constructive statesmanship which the genius of individual ministers, such as Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Sir Frank Lascelles, created. Nevertheless, thanks to the energy of the viceroys of India and the labors of British diplomats, consular representatives, and merchants in the Middle East, British

influence remained dominant in Persia almost to the end of the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile, in northern Persia, the Russians had been acquiring a most remarkable strategic position. It has been shown above (Chapter V) how, by the treaties of Gulistan and Turkomanchi, and the occupation of Krasnovodsk, Chikishlar, and Ashurada, together with the conquest of the Caucasus and Turkomania, Russia gradually deprived Persia of her northern provinces and transformed the Caspian Sea into a Russian lake. With the building of the Transcaspian and Caucasus railways in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Russians inaugurated a systematic policy of commercial and political infiltration into Khorassan through Ashkabad and into Azerbaijan via the Caucasus, Julfa, and Tabriz, which enabled them to dominate completely northern Persia and its trade by the opening of the twentieth century.

Russian diplomatic action in this affair was concerned chiefly with securing three things: a lion's share of Persian commerce and its natural wealth, an easy route to the border of India that would enable Russia to exert pressure on Great Britain quickly through a threat of invasion, and the perpetuation of a weak government in Persia that would ensure a Muscovite exploitation of Persian resources and render inevitable the establishment of the Czar's suzerainty over the land — or a great part of it. For twenty-five years, the Russians maintained successfully this eminently selfish policy, blocking every concession and effort at national development in which Russia did not have a dominating share, securing favorable commercial conventions, and making insidious loans to the Shahs — loans just sufficient to keep the Persian ship of state afloat and issued always with some silver cord of concession attached. Meanwhile, a continuous rivalry with Great Britain, accompanied by

acrimonious controversies and intrigues to block British commercial activities, kept the country in a state of unrest and disunion till the signing of the Anglo-Russian accord in 1907.

At the same time, Persia was entering upon the pathway of constitutional reform. Muzaffaru'd-Din, son and successor of Nasiru'd-Din Shah, lived only till January, 1907; but he had the honor of becoming the first constitutional ruler of his country — not so much by his own personal volition as by the force of circumstances. Although his reign began in 1896, the first reforms were not inaugurated till the summer of 1906, owing to the timidity of the ruler and the strength of the ultra-conservative elements about him. They followed an ill-advised movement to coerce public opinion and a prolonged persecution of popular leaders, some fourteen hundred of whom took "bast" in the British legation. But the crisis came, after a great popular demonstration in the streets of Teheran during July, 1906 had been broken up by the troops of the Shah, when the Teheran regiments threatened to join the popular cause. Then Muzaffaru'd-Din issued, on August 5th, a special firman ordering the drafting of a constitution, the calling of a national convention consisting of representatives to be chosen by the Kajar princes, the clergy, the nobility, and the merchants and tradesmen of the cities and towns, and setting September 9th as the day for the new elections.

The Court party, however, remained obdurate, refusing to take part in the elections till the Shah — suffering from a mortal illness — made a spirited and patriotic appeal to them, dated September 30, 1906. "Then know you all," he wrote, "that it has been through our own wish and initiative that this gift of liberty has been granted to our loyal subjects. . . . He who goes against this assembly, goes against our person. If you wish us to be pleased with

you, speedily elect your representatives so that by the grace of God the elections may be completed." At length, a majority of the delegates having arrived in Teheran, the Medjliss, or National Convention, was opened on October 7th. A lively controversy immediately ensued between the government forces and the popular leaders over the articles of the new constitution. And it was not till December 30th, after the Medjliss had happily hit upon a compromise scheme, that the constitution, known as the fundamental law of the land, was ratified and promulgated.

By these statutes, a limited constitutional monarchy was established in Persia, where the control of national affairs was to rest largely in the hands of the Medjliss. The great powers of the Shah, the "King of Kings," the "Shadow of God," and the "Center of the Universe," had passed forever from the unworthy hands of the Kajar family — particularly as they had long since ceased to govern in any such awe-inspiring and infallible manner as their titles would indicate. Still the right of succession to the peacock throne was preserved to the lineal descendants of Muzaffaru'd-Din; and they were given the power to approve, or veto, all laws, and to summon and dissolve the legislature. The new parliament was to be composed of two chambers: a National Assembly comprising one hundred and sixty to two hundred members elected for two years, and a Senate numbering sixty persons, one half of whom were to be elected and the other half appointed by the Shah. Their powers were to be extensive and coördinate, except that the National Assembly was to have the right to initiate and control all legislation affecting the finances, revenues, and expenses. The crown or state property and the crown jewels were turned over to the nation. All the ministers of state were made responsible to the Medjliss; and liberty of the press and of speech was established.

The Nationalists, who were responsible, in the main, for these reforms and who controlled the National Assembly, mistrusted the intentions of the new monarch, Mohammed Ali, who had acceded to the throne on the death of his father — January 4, 1907 — because he had been an unpopular governor at Tabriz and was reputed to be reactionary and unscrupulous. Nor did they have any more faith in his ministers or their measures — even those of the able Premier, Mirza Ali Asker Khan, known as the Atabak, whom the Shah recalled from exile in March. Accordingly, they blocked an Anglo-Russian loan, for they were unalterably opposed to foreign aid or interference; and they inaugurated a governmental policy of their own, which embraced five cardinal points: reorganization of the finances together with a strict limitation of the Shah's civil list and all government expenses, establishment of a Persian national bank, raising of new funds through home loans, abolition of the system of farming taxes, and the expulsion of Belgians and other foreigners in the customs service, who had been guilty of graft and incompetence.

In spite of this promising program, and the fact that they were able to force Mohammed Ali to dismiss M. Naus, Belgian head of the customs, and M. Priem, one of the financial advisers, from office on February 10, 1907, and to sign the charter for a national bank, the Nationalists failed to make any real headway with their reforms. The popular loan did not materialize; and the spring and summer passed away without any improvement having been made in the financial situation. Meanwhile, the Medjliss, instead of coöperating with the executive in an honest, intelligent effort to make the government function properly, dissipated its energies in a prolonged discussion and in a contest with the Shah concerning the authority and rights of the head of the state. Unfortunately, most

of its members were men without political experience or constructive ability. Only a small minority possessed any proper conception of the function of a parliament, while the majority believed they were called to Teheran not only to legislate, but also to govern. Consequently, the Assembly became a sort of glorified debating society, whose members were thrilled with an ambition to save the state, but none of whom possessed the genius to do so. Its efforts culminated, however, in the passage of the Supplementary Law of October 7, 1907, which declared that the sovereignty of the land rested in the people of Persia, and which endowed their representative — the Medjliss — with extensive judicial and legislative and executive powers.

The adoption of this measure was a great triumph for the Nationalists, not only because it marked their complete ascendancy in the Assembly, but also because the bill reduced the position of the sovereign and his cabinet to a state of practical impotence. The reactionary members of the Medjliss all went over to the ranks of the Nationalists, because they feared the next step would be the deposition of the Shah and the confiscation of the property of all his supporters; and the sovereign was left without a party and without influence. His ministers — now held to account for every decree they signed — refused to accept responsibility for even the most trivial measures; and, after the assassination of the Atabak on August 31st — reputed to be in collusion with the Shah to overthrow the Assembly and to sell the country to the Russians — both they and the ruler lived in constant fear for their lives.

Mohammed Ali, who had no confidence in popular government and who was ambitious to restore the old powers of the Shah, now found his position intolerable, and took steps to protect his own person and to break the

power of the Medjliss. On July 17th, he authorized the formation of a Cossack brigade composed of Russians and Persians under the command of Colonel Liakhov — a Russian officer — to provide protection for himself and the provincial governors. And, after trying in vain for four months to reach some compromise with the Assembly, he suddenly launched a *coup d'état* on December 15th, arresting Nasiru'l-Mulk and the other ministers and ordering an attack on the Medjliss. But just at this moment the news of a threatened popular uprising in all the chief cities and towns arrived, and the Shah lost heart. He freed the ministers on the 18th, and, after the formation of a new cabinet on the 20th, made peace again with the Medjliss by dismissing some of his reactionary advisers.

Nevertheless, this reconciliation proved futile, since it failed to restore confidence and coöperation between the executive and the legislature. And, after the attempt to assassinate the Shah, on February 28, 1908, the relations became so strained that all hope of securing a working, successful government disappeared. Recriminations and bitter criticisms were launched from both sides; and plots and counterplots filled the air. Finally, Mohammed Ali took refuge in a military camp outside of Teheran on June 3d, and declared the city in a state of siege on June 22d, appointing Colonel Liakhov military governor. The next day the Medjliss was dissolved by force, its members fleeing from the capital or taking refuge in the foreign legations. And an appeal to force was on.

The cause of the Shah was, however, doomed to fail, since his own resources were limited and he could gain but little popular support. At first, the Royalists were successful and took Tabriz — the center of the national movement in the north — after a siege. But in the provinces, the Nationalists, led by a group of patriots near

Resht and the Bakhtiyari chiefs and tribesmen from the mountain districts southwest of Ispahan, gradually gained the upper hand. By the following spring, they had most of the center and south in their control; and in May, 1909, they concentrated their forces for a drive on the capital. Meanwhile, after several abortive attempts to set up a workable government, the Shah appointed a national council of notables in December to draft a new electoral law. But the affair dragged along for months; and the new law, finally drafted by a committee of twenty, was only adopted by the council on June 10th and signed by Mohammed Ali on the 22d. It provided for the election of a single legislative assembly of one hundred and twenty members who were to be chosen by the three hundred and sixty members of an electoral college whose constituents were to be elected directly by the people. But before the elections could be arranged for, the Russian troops, which had advanced to Tabriz in the spring and the British forces which had landed at Bushire at about the same date, moved up to Enzali and Shiraz respectively by July 8th, while the Nationalists by a skillful move seized Teheran, on July 13th. A Royalist attack led by Colonel Liakhov failed to evict them; and on the 15th the Shah and his family took refuge in the Russian Legation. On July 17th, Mohammed Ali abdicated the throne in favor of his son Ahmed — then a young boy — who was invested with the sword of the Shah in the Russian Legation the next day, and entered Teheran on the 20th of July, as the new ruler of Persia. Thus ended the Royalist régime in Iran. The constitutional monarchy was, indeed, restored, but merely in name, for the real ruler was to be henceforth the Medjliss.

By the Protocol of November 7, 1909, in the drafting of which the representatives of Russia and Great Britain

participated, the old Shah was banished to Odessa, Russia, and given an annual pension of one hundred thousand tomans (about eighty thousand dollars) conditional on good behavior and his continued absence from the country. A new cabinet took office on July 21st with the Sipahdar — the chief of the Bakhtiyari and leader of the Nationalist forces — as Minister of War and Premier and Nasiru'l-Mulk as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new elections were ordered for August 6th, 7th, and 8th; some semblance of order was restored in the provinces; and the new Medjliss was opened on October 15th, while Nasiru'l-Mulk returned from exile on October 30th, and in November the new ministry began the business of reform and reorganization in earnest. As Sir George Barclay — the British Minister — remarked on November 30th, "For the first time, there seem to be indications that the Persian Government is sincerely trying to prepare a sensible budget and a scheme of control." But they were seriously hindered in this good work by two or three notorious brigands who, encouraged by Russian officers, defied the authorities in the provinces, by the presence of the Russian and British forces that had come to assist in establishing order in the land, and by the onerous terms demanded by Russia and Great Britain as a basis for any loan.

At this time these two powers were working in unison in their Persian relations, because of the accord reached by them on August 31, 1907. This agreement, after guaranteeing the integrity and independence of Persia and recognizing the special interests of Russia (in the north) and of England (in the south), created a commercial partition of the country through the establishment of three distinct economic spheres. Russia was to have the exclusive right to secure concessions in and to control the development of the district lying north of a line running

from Kasr-i-Shirin through Ispahan, Yedz, and Kakh to the junction of the Russian, Afghan, and Persian frontiers. Great Britain's sphere of influence was to lie south of a line running from the Afghan frontier via Gazik, Birjand, and Kerman to Bander Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The region lying between these two lines was to be a sort of neutral, buffer district between the two spheres of special influence, which should be open to a fair and free competition, where neither state should oppose the efforts of the subjects of the other to obtain concessions; and if any difficulties of international interest should arise in either of the spheres marked off for the two European powers, Great Britain and Russia were to confer before taking any action in the matter.

This celebrated treaty, embracing as it did other items in which Russia recognized Afghanistan and Tibet as parts of the British sphere of influence in the Middle East, and creating a complete accord between Russia and Great Britain in all matters affecting Central Asia, was one of the most remarkable diplomatic triumphs of recent times. It was the work of Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs; of Sir Arthur Nicolson, then the British representative at St. Petersburg; and of M. Isvolsky, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs; and it was a great step in the direction of international conciliation and coöperation, being based on the principles of fair play, equal rights, and free competition. Furthermore, it was of inestimable value to both states, since it freed them from the fears and dangers of armed conflict and the burdens of international competition and intrigues which had accompanied their ancient rivalry in the East for so many years.

On the other hand, no other treaty of modern times has been more bitterly assailed and criticized, both in Europe

and in Persia, than this agreement. British critics berated their Minister for having permitted a neutral zone to be set up and for ear-marking so small a portion of territory for Great Britain; for the sphere placed under British influence did not begin to cover the entire region of British activities and interests in Persia, and Russia was left a clear road to the Gulf of Persia, whenever she chose to push her activities in that direction. Russia had, indeed, been willing to accord a larger slice of the country to England, but it had been declined because the British military authorities had been opposed to taking more than could easily be defended from India, and because the Indian Government was loath to assume the responsibility — in case it should become necessary — of extending its control over one half of Persia. Russian writers accused their own Government of tying its own hands in the matter of any future territorial or commercial expansion in the Middle East. On the other side, the Persian leaders interpreted the treaty to mean the ultimate partition of their country between the two European powers. They were loud in their complaints that the agreement had been made without their coöperation or consent, and that it marked out officially special spheres of interest for both powers in their country, without giving adequate guaranties that the interested powers would *not* interfere in Persian affairs.

In this just criticism the Persian critics hit upon one of the three great weaknesses of the treaty. It was made without reference to the interests or welfare of Persia; and every article of it deals with the interests of the contracting parties, without a word being said concerning the rights of Persia. If the two foreign powers had been vitally interested in the reorganization of Persia and had taken a broad view of their own future interests in the country, they would have provided some method whereby the

rights of Persia would have been securely safeguarded, and some means of furnishing the new and weak Persian Government with the financial and economic assistance necessary to enable it to get on its feet and put through the most pressing reforms. The second weakness of the contract lay in the fact that the way was left open for a joint interference in the affairs of Persia at any time and for any reason that might be considered a "difficulty." It is true that, at the time of drafting this agreement, it was intended to prevent either of the contracting parties from interfering in Persia under the pretext of safeguarding its own interests. But the safety of Persia and the security of all concerned demanded the closing of the door to *all* forms of intervention, except in the extreme case where events warranted the maintenance — not procurable in any other way — of an efficient Persian Government through foreign support and assistance for a limited time.

The third weakness of the "Entente" was that, being drawn on broad and indefinite lines, the whole document was open to various interpretations. No matter how well it was understood by its authors or how well-intentioned they may have been, future ministers and diplomats were certain to put different interpretations on the phraseology of the treaty. Such a state of affairs was, indeed, not long in coming. In 1910, M. Sazonov — an ambitious and forceful statesman — replaced the mild-tempered Isvolsky as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Sir Arthur Nicolson was recalled from St. Petersburg to fill the position of permanent secretary in the British Foreign Office. In October, M. Pokhitanov — the violent and scheming Russian Consul-General at Tabriz — was transferred to Teheran; and, on November 5th, Russia and Germany signed the so-called "Potsdam Agreement"

recognizing the spheres of influence of these two powers in Persia and Turkey respectively. And from that time on, Russian diplomacy in the Middle East assumed an aggressive and determined tone, while the British Foreign Office exhibited a timid and complaisant attitude toward Russian activities in Persia.

The effects of the signing of the Treaty of 1907 on the trend of affairs in Persia, were soon apparent. In order to reassure the excited Persian officials and to prevent complications, the foreign ministers of both the interested states hastened to give the Persians assurances of their good-will and pacific intentions. Mr. Marling, British Chargé d'Affaires at Teheran, sent a letter to the Persian foreign office, dated September 5, 1907, in which he wrote: "Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the Mushiru'l-Mulk [when the latter was visiting London and St. Petersburg shortly before that date] that he and M. Isvolsky are completely in accord on two fundamental points: firstly, neither of the two powers will interfere in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects; secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo-Russian Agreement must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia. . . . M. Isvolsky's words, which include the intentions of England, were as follows: 'Neither of the powers seeks anything from Persia, so that Persia can concentrate all her energies on the settlement of her internal affairs. Russia's general principle will be to refrain from any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries so long as nothing injurious to her interests is done; and it is quite impossible that she should deviate from this principle in the present case.' The object of the two powers . . . is to assure forever the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but

their object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The two powers hope that in the future Persia will be forever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole world."

These pleasant assurances would have been cheering, if they had been followed by deeds eloquent with friendship, coöperation, and neutrality. Unfortunately, the policy pursued by both European states from the moment of signing the accord was such as to convince the least suspicious of Persian statesmen that the Anglo-Russian friendship was not disinterested. All through the long struggle — civil and military — between Mohammed Ali and the Nationalists, the powers did all they could to prevent the success of either faction, while claiming to favor the maintenance of "the existing chaos — till whatever element is strongest in the country gains the day." The troops of both states had set foot on Persian soil within eighteen months of the signing of the agreement of 1907. And the new Government, which took office in the fall of 1909, found itself impeded at every step for a year in its independent efforts at reform and financial reorganization. At length it realized that no progress was possible except through the negotiation of a loan with Russia and Great Britain. But when they found this depended upon their acceptance of the requirement (reduced to its mildest form after months of negotiation) that "the two powers expect that, before granting any concession for means of communication, for telegraph or harbors, to a foreign subject, the Persian Government will enter into an exchange of views with them," they indignantly refused it.

All through the year 1910 matters drifted from bad to

worse; and conditions in the provinces became distressful in the extreme, for there was no industry, no trade, no protection for life or property. In the south, tribal conflicts were numerous, brigands controlled the roads, and caravans were pillaged almost daily. And Great Britain, whose commerce in southern Persia was at a standstill, after securing the appointment of a strong governor at Fars by delivering an ultimatum to the Persian Government on October 16th, was forced to provide armed guards for the caravans from India and to send a regiment of troops to Shiraz.

Meanwhile, the position of the Persian Government had become desperate. The gifted and honest Foreign Minister, Husayn-Kuli Khan, was forced to resign because of the failure of the reforms and the constant heckling of Russian and British officials. And all the members of the Cabinet were subjected to hostile attack and criticism — ostensibly because of their supposed subserviency to foreign powers, but in reality because their traducers enjoyed Russian protection. Early in 1911, the Governor of Ispahan was wounded and the Minister of Finance — Saniu'd-Dawla — was killed by assassins who escaped justice because Russia claimed them as her subjects. And the Persian Ministry, seeking financial experts in France and Italy to reorganize its finances, found their efforts checkmated at every step by Russian diplomacy.

Finally, the Persian Government, convinced of its own inability to achieve the desired reforms unaided, and of the futility of independent activities, appealed, with the consent of Russia and Great Britain, to the United States; and, on February 14, 1911, after the Medjliss had voted the contract, an American Financial Commission was appointed for three years. It consisted of Mr. Morgan Shuster, Treasurer-General, and four assistants, all of whom

had had considerable experience in the customs service of the Philippine Islands. On May 12th, Mr. Shuster and two of his assistants arrived; and on May 30th and June 13th two treasury laws were passed, creating a Treasury Department, prohibiting all expenditures, except those approved by the Treasurer-General, and entrusting him "with the direct and effective control of all financial and fiscal operations of the Persian Government."

Mr. Shuster quickly recognized the two reforms essential to the successful reorganization of the Persian state: the creation of a new financial system and the establishment of public security. "Persia's sole chance for self-redemption," he wrote later, "lay with the reform of her broken finances. It might have been possible in the past to create a strong central government without sound financial operations — indeed, several of the old Shahs succeeded in maintaining a strong control throughout the Empire; but in recent years the time has gone by when Persia could be put in order except through an efficient handling of her taxation and other problems. The Persians themselves realized this and, with exception of the corrupt grandees and dishonest public servants, all desired that we should succeed." And again, in a letter to the *London Times*, "No one who has been in Persia a week can fail to realize that all possibility of reforming Persia's finances is absolutely dependent upon the prompt restoration of order throughout the Empire and the creation and maintenance of a strong central government powerful enough to make itself felt and its decrees respected to the furthestmost parts of the country."

Accordingly, the new Treasurer-General gave all his energies at once to the reorganization of the Treasury Department and the creation of a gendarmerie which should not only assist in the collection of taxes and customs

dues, but also render efficient service in preserving order throughout the country. With the first of these reforms, he made such excellent progress that by the middle of July the new system was running smoothly. All moneys were being paid to his account at the British and Russian Banks; and M. Monard, Administrator-General of the Customs, had been induced to transfer all the customs revenues to Mr. Shuster's account. But in attempting to inaugurate the second reform on an efficient, national basis, he soon discovered that he would have to reckon with the opposition of both Russia and England. This was apparent from the maneuvers of the Russian diplomats to keep the customs revenues from passing through the hands of the Treasurer-General and to prevent a material increase in Persian revenues from direct taxation by shielding those Persian grandees who claimed to be Russian subjects or protégés. Mr. Shuster won out in these early skirmishes; but he was not so fortunate in the contest concerning his appointments to the gendarmerie, which lasted from July to the end of November, 1911.

The Medjliss empowered the Treasurer-General, on July 6th, to engage an assistant to head the new Persian Treasury Gendarmerie whose headquarters were to be in Teheran. The next day the position was offered to Major Stokes, of the British army, both on account of his personal fitness and experience and his intimate knowledge of the Persian language, customs, and country. Indeed, there was no one else — not even a Swedish officer — who, for a year or more, would have been capable of performing the duties of this office satisfactorily. Yet, in spite of these facts, and notwithstanding the Persian Cabinet's approval of the appointment and the assurances of Mr. Shuster that neither the nationality of the candidate nor political considerations had any bearing on the appointment, and that Stokes

"would be under his personal orders and pursue no other policy in any respect than that which he might direct," Major Stokes was not permitted to undertake the work. For Great Britain, although Grey had first suggested on July 21st that Stokes resign from the Indian army before taking the new office, refused to accept his resignation; and Russia made strenuous objections to the appointment on the ground that it carried with it jurisdiction in northern Persia.

At the same time the Muscovite statesmen tried to prevent the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre, an Englishman, as head of the Treasury gendarmes at Tabriz, two other Britishers at Ispahan and Shiraz, and two Belgians. And, in October, they succeeded in blocking the nomination of twenty Swedish officers to the Persian service by using their influence with the Swedish Government. Nevertheless, Mr. Shuster persisted in his efforts to organize the gendarmerie on a sound basis; and his appointments — all of men thoroughly conversant with the Persian language and customs — were promptly approved by the Medjliss. And, in October, he stoutly resisted the attempt of the Russian Consul-General, M. Pokhitanov, to seize the property of the Shuau's-Saltana, the brother of Mohammed Ali and with him in exile, which the Persian Government had ordered the Treasurer-General to take over for debt.

The Persian Government stood firmly and consistently by Mr. Shuster throughout this contest, refusing to be intimidated, in spite of the many intrigues and schemes set on foot to ruin its plans for reform and to bring political disaster to the Nationalist party. Not the least of the things which, at this time, contributed to the disorder in the land, increased the national debt, and weakened the new constitutional régime, was the filibustering expedition of the ex-Shah Mohammed Ali, during the months of

August and September, 1911, which was conceived and executed with the full knowledge of the Russian Government. The forces of Mohammed Ali were, however, badly defeated. And, on October 4th, he fled to the extreme north of Persia where he remained under Russian protection till March, 1912.

At length, the Russian Government, realizing that it was not likely to gain its ends by diplomatic pressure and intrigues, issued an ultimatum to the Persian Cabinet on November 2, 1911. Under threat of a Russian invasion, the Persians were ordered to withdraw the Treasury gendarmes from the property of the Shuau's-Saltana and to forward to St. Petersburg an apology for this insult to Russia. No self-respecting executive could subscribe to such outrageous demands and retain a shred of its independence. Accordingly, the Persian Government made no reply to the ultimatum; and, within a few days, the Russian troops entered northern Persia where by the end of November they had concentrated forty-five hundred men at Tabriz and Kazvin. Then, the Russian Government hurled a second ultimatum on November 29th at the unoffending Persian Cabinet, which, in addition to the requirements of the first, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre, an assurance that Persia would appoint no foreign experts to government positions in the future without the consent of Russia and Great Britain, and the payment of an indemnity to cover the expenses of the Russian invasion. One can hardly find in history a more satanic method of adding insult to injury than this: to compel a helpless nation to write its own death-warrant and to pay for the invasion of its own territory — an invasion deliberately planned to destroy the last remnant of its independence.

The Persian Nationalists, however, kept up a bold front.

On November 30th, the Medjliss met in a long and strenuous session, lasting far into the night; and they voted unanimously not to comply with the ultimatum. And from that time till the 24th of December, the Cabinet was unsparing in its efforts to get the Russian troops withdrawn from the country and to persuade the Medjliss to submit or compromise. The National Assembly, however, refused, on the 11th and again on the 18th, to take any action, and, on December 20th, delegated full powers in the matter to a Committee of Five. The next day this Committee voted to accept the Russian demands; and the Persian Cabinet handed a note to the Russian Minister, on the 24th, announcing the dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre and agreeing to meet the other requirements, provided the words "will effect an exchange of views beforehand with the Russian and British Legations in Teheran" were substituted for the obnoxious phrase "without first obtaining the consent of the Russian and British Legations" in the article concerning the engagement of foreigners. And the same day the Regent, upon the request of the Premier and seven members of the Cabinet, dissolved the Medjliss by force. Thus ended Persia's one great national effort to achieve her own constitutional and financial reformation.

The reasons for this Russo-British interference in Persian affairs are now clear. In the first place, these powers were opposed to a reorganized Persia on the ground that it might become powerful enough to block the development of their own commercial and economic interests in the country. In the summer of 1911 there was every indication that Mr. Shuster would succeed in his reforms; and his success meant a strong and independent Persia. On July 11th, Sir George Barclay wrote Grey: "Mr. Shuster has now been two months in Teheran and his influence is already a leading factor in the situation. The Medjliss is

entirely at his command." And a little later, the Treasurer-General, commenting on the expressed wish of the best element in the country that he succeed, remarked: "Russia became aware of this feeling, and unwittingly paid us the compliment of fearing that we would succeed in our task. That she never intended to allow."

In the second place, the appointment of Persian advisers who would be subservient to the commands of the two European powers was essential to the advancement of their national policies. Unfortunately, Persia was so unluckily situated that, as the *Nation* so ably pointed out in 1912, she could not "hope in any other way to achieve rapid and effective reform, and on no other terms could she secure the loans she requires in foreign money markets"; while Russia and England were determined "to force upon her foreign experts who will be their agents. It matters little whether they confine their choice to men of British or Russian birth; their object manifestly is to secure nominees who will be the tools of their policy." But Mr. Shuster, being an honorable and trusted servant of the Persian Government, could neither recognize the Russian and British interests in Persia, nor be influenced by the intrigues of European or Persian officials. "The Medjliss was insistent from the very start," Mr. Shuster tells us in his *Strangling of Persia*, "that I should do nothing which would directly or otherwise recognize the existence of the so-called spheres of influence within Persia. This I gave them my promise at the outset not to do. For me to have done so would have been to break faith with the Government which employed me and to betray a trust which had been placed in me. My refusal to do this — a thing which the powers had encountered no difficulty in persuading the Belgians to do — was the real source of Russia's opposition to my work."

Further proof of these statements is to be found in the appointment of M. Monard as Treasurer-General, of other Belgians to the positions in the Treasury service held by fourteen Americans, and of Colonel Hjalmarson as head of the Persian gendarmerie — all of which were procured by Barclay and Poklewski-Koziell¹ upon the retirement of Mr. Shuster and his assistants. This was but a direct corollary to the two ultimatums, and a prelude to the next move of the powers, which clearly demonstrated the third motive for their intervention in Persian affairs. This was the desire to make the work of reconstruction in Persia dependent upon the granting of commercial and economic concessions to Russian and British subjects.

When the unhappy Persian Cabinet, in January, 1911, approached the powers for a substantial loan to enable it to pay its debts and to set the Persian house in order, it found that financial aid was only to be obtained by subscribing to a humiliating program laid down by Russia and Great Britain. This included promises that the money would be expended only in conformity with a plan drawn up by the European allies, and that the future conduct of the Persian Government would be in accord with the principles of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. But the heart of the whole matter lay in the fact that the powers made both the first advance of £200,000, and the entire loan of 30,000,000 tomans, contingent upon certain economic concessions to Russia and Britain. The former was to be given the right to construct and maintain for seventy-five years a railway from Julfa to Tabriz, which included the control of all coal mines and petroleum wells within forty miles of the right-of-way. And the latter was to receive a grant with similar rights for the proposed Mohammerah-Khorremabad railroad. Persia was to re-

¹ British and Russian Ministers in Teheran.

ceive one half of the profits of these railways over seven per cent, and fifteen per cent of the revenue from the mines on the state lands.

Naturally the Persian Government could not accept such compromising terms without attempting to mitigate them in some form. Accordingly, long discussions and tedious delays ensued, and it was not until February 6, 1913, that the concession for the Julfa-Tabriz railway was actually assigned to Russia — and then only after the powers had exerted their influence to secure the appointment of a "suitable premier and cabinet." Two days later, the St. Petersburg Government made the first advance of £200,000 of the loan to Persia. On February 9th, the Persian Railway Syndicate (British) secured an option on the Mohammerah road, through the intervention of the British Government, but it did not obtain the concession for that railway — including an option on its extension to Ispahan — till the following December. And in the same month, Russia procured the right to extend the Julfa-Tabriz railroad to Teheran via Aliat and Astara. Yet, in spite of all this dickering, the two railroads were never constructed; and Persia never received money sufficient to set her on her feet financially — to say nothing of the sums needed to put in force any far-reaching reforms.

The wisdom of Mr. Shuster's independent policy in the organization of the gendarmerie has been questioned. But he saw clearly that a firm stand must be taken in the matter in order to test the Treaty of 1907 which guaranteed the independence and integrity of Persia. If the country was independent, it surely had the right to appoint whom it pleased to collect its taxes or organize its gendarmerie. And it was difficult to conceive how the nationality of a tax-collector or of an officer of gendarmes could have anything to do with a bargain over economic concessions,

such as the Agreement of 1907. For, as Mr. Shuster remarked, "Major Stokes was not a bank, or a railroad, or a political or economic concession of any kind, and the voluntary tender to him of any post in the Persian service could, by no stretch of the imagination, be converted into a 'seeking' or 'supporting' by Great Britain of such a concession." Yet this Stokes episode and the Shuau's-Saltana incident demonstrated clearly to all the world that Persia possessed neither independence nor sovereignty, since she could no longer without question appoint her own officials or send her own gendarmes to serve a warrant on a Persian subject for debt! And the political nature of the accord of 1907 and the treacherous designs of Russia were equally apparent. As Mr. Shuster expressed it, when speaking before the Persian Committee in London on January 29, 1921, "I did what I did, inasmuch as it concerned an interest far more important than me personally, or my staying in or departing from Persia. After consulting with the elected representatives of the Persian people, and asking them whether they preferred being slain in a dark alley or to have the crime committed in the public square, their verdict was: the public square."

The proofs are conclusive that the guilt of Great Britain in this affair was as great as that of Russia, because the British Government not only countenanced the Russian intervention, but abetted her in it. "You might tell the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Russian]," wrote Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne (British Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg), November 14, 1911, "that I fully realize that the Russian Government cannot abandon the standpoint which they have taken in this matter. But the real and more substantial difficulty seems to be Shuster's anti-Russian policy in North Persia, and the Russian Government should, I think, make public their own case against

that. Could they not formulate their complaints against Shuster and make a formal demand respecting them?" And, again on the 16th, "If they [Russia] thought that no satisfactory settlement could be reached without the dismissal of Shuster I could urge no objection. I did not wish to suggest the dismissal of Shuster, but I mentioned it lest there should be an impression in St. Petersburg that I was disposed in his favor. As a matter of fact, he has given me endless trouble by his inconvenient appointments of British subjects in spite of all I could say to him."¹ And *The Nation* pertinently remarked, in commenting on Grey's explanation to Parliament at the end of November, 1911, "There is not a sentence which can be interpreted even as a faint deprecation of Russian action, not a word to limit her drastic intervention, not a hint of resentment at the rejection by Russia of the counsels of moderation which apparently he gave, not a phrase that would assist the Persians in saving something of the wreck of their national fortunes. The case is even worse than this. Sir Edward Grey has not merely gone out of his way to make a wholly gratuitous defense of the action which Russia is now taking; but he has explicitly sanctioned and adopted the stealthy extension of the Anglo-Russian compact which underlies the whole of the Russian aggression."

The Nationalist movement in Persia was thus strangled and the Persian Government kept in European leading-strings. And to what purpose? Certainly not for the benefit of Iran whose condition was infinitely worse in 1914 than in 1900, and whose state to-day is little better than it was twenty years ago. For after passing through all the vicissitudes incident to foreign intervention, the Great War, a Turkish invasion, and German and Bolshevist intrigues,

¹ Compare Grey's telegram to Buchanan on November 17, 1911. *British White Papers*. 1912. No. 4, page 52.

it still stands at the crossroads where it stood at the opening of the twentieth century. Surely not for the advancement of Russian interests, since her immediate material gain was insignificant, and since, through the Bolshevik revolution at home, she has lost a great part of her influence and trade in the Middle East. Nor, in any sense of the word, has it been profitable to Great Britain who — even to this day — has been unable to dominate the situation or to extract any solid profit, for all her diplomatic manœuvres, her expeditions and her expenditures — except possibly the control of the Persian oil wells, and this she might have secured in any event by a friendly policy.

Why, then, did the two European powers set out on this political adventure in the Middle East? The purposes of Russia — the instigator of the enterprise — are well-known. Her ministers aspired not only to control the lion's share of Persian trade, but also to dominate the Persian situation so thoroughly that the control of the national resources and material development of the country would remain in their hands for many years. For the realization of these aims, a weak Persia and a disordered state of affairs were essential. On the other hand, the interests of Great Britain demanded peace, security, and a strong government. Why, therefore, did Sir Edward Grey permit England to be drawn into the Russian scheme of intervention in Persia?

In addition to a natural desire to share in the economic exploitation of that country, his action was dictated by two diplomatic considerations of far-reaching significance. These were: the desire to maintain — at all costs — the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 which was the keystone of his policy in the Near and Middle East, and the fear lest Russia and Persia should be drawn into what he was pleased to call the "orbit of German diplomacy." To achieve these ends and to prevent Germany from becoming

too powerful, the British backed the French in their acquisition of Morocco and other African possessions and adopted a conciliatory attitude toward Russia in Turkey and Persia. It proved, however, a big price to pay. For the Muscovite statesmen conducted their affairs in the Near and Middle East pretty much as they pleased, the suspicion and antagonism of the German Empire was aroused to the highest pitch, and the British suffered a great loss of prestige in the Near East and Central Asia which it had taken them years to acquire.

If, instead of continually "baiting the Russian Bear" in a weak-kneed fashion, Grey had taken, from the first, a firm stand on incontestable British treaty rights, he could have easily safeguarded British interests without compromising British honor or arousing international jealousies. For a policy of non-intervention in Persia could in no way be considered a violation of the Treaty of 1907; and it had the great virtue of being the only policy in strict accord with British traditions and interests in Central Asia. Britain's wisest plan, therefore, would have been the maintenance of a strict neutrality in Persian affairs, while insisting that the Nationalists, assisted by Mr. Shuster, be given a fair opportunity to reform the Persian finances and organize a strong government. If the Persians had succeeded in their reforms, and if no suspicions had been aroused concerning the sincerity of the British friendship or the justice of their commercial interests, Great Britain not only would have won the undying gratitude of the Persian nation, but would have retained her prestige in the Near and Middle East as well, while securing unsolicited a large share in the financial and economic regeneration of Iran.

Unfortunately, Grey preferred to sacrifice the Persian lamb on the altar of Anglo-Russian self-interests; and the

Anglo-Russian diplomacy, which should have been conciliatory and constructive, was transformed into a discordant and destructive force. It kept Persia weak, divided, and impotent. It postponed its reconstruction indefinitely, and left it an easy prey to the Turko-German intrigues of 1914-16 and the Bolshevist propaganda of 1919-21. In fact, it has reacted upon its creators, leaving both of them with little influence in Persia and creating a world of trouble for them in the Middle East — much of which might have been avoided if Persia had become a strong, self-reliant state by 1914. As early as 1916, the German intrigues had met with remarkable success; and by the autumn of that year their influence was predominant in the Court circles. Between November 11th and December 15th, it was hourly expected in Teheran that the young Shah would join the cause of the Central Powers. All arrangements had been completed to have him join the Turko-German forces drawn up outside of the capital on the morning of December 14th, and to move the government to Ispahan. At an early hour on that momentous day, however, the British and Russian Ministers drove post-haste to the palace and, by force of arguments which have never been disclosed, persuaded the monarch not to go. And, from that day to this, one intrigue has followed another in the Persian realm, frustrating every constructive plan for reconstruction.

Meanwhile, Great Britain, having had a change of heart after the opening of the Great War, decided upon a complete reversal of her Persian policy. On March 16, 1916, Major-General Sir Percy Sykes landed at Bandar Abbas with three Indian officers and eight hundred picked men — all the Indian army could spare at the time — and proceeded to open the trade routes and restore order in southern Persia. By June, he had advanced to Kerman

—two hundred and fifty miles from Bandar Abbas. In November, he entered Shiraz, where some five thousand mutinous gendarmes were placed under his orders; and in March, 1917, he was officially recognized as the head of the Southern and Central Persian Gendarmerie by the Teheran Government. From that time on, Sir Percy performed prodigies of energy, accomplishing an incredible amount of work under great difficulties before the end of the year. After a brisk encounter with the leading brigand of the central region, he opened the Ahwaz road and let some twelve hundred loads of merchandise and produce into Ispahan. And his forces marched everywhere, relieving besieged places, uprooting Turko-German intrigues, stopping raids, opening new caravan routes, and restoring order. Finally, in April, 1917, Persia and Great Britain signed an agreement which paved the way for a British loan and the formation of a police force for all Persia to be composed of eleven thousand Persians, five thousand Bakhtiyari tribesmen, and eight hundred Indians, under British officers. And on July 6th, General Sykes arrived in Teheran, where he was received by the Shah and entrusted with the organization of the new gendarmerie.

The success of this movement to reestablish law and order in Persia paved the way for the activities of a second British emissary. Sir Percy Cox, one of the most gifted English diplomats and a man thoroughly versed in all the finesse of Eastern negotiations, was appointed Minister to Persia and High Commissioner in Mesopotamia. With the greatest tact and diplomatic skill he secured the signing, on August 9, 1919, of an Anglo-Persian Treaty. It began with a categorical assurance by the British Government that it would "respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia"; and, by its provisions, Great Britain was pledged to furnish Persia with expert advisers

in the administrative departments, officers and munitions for the new gendarmerie, a loan of £2,000,000 at seven per cent for twenty years, and assistance in improving communications and revising her tariff and customs. Of course, the Persian Government was expected to pay for all the reforms contemplated by the makers of this treaty. But, as Firud Mirza — then Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs — assured the *Temps* on October 12, 1919, no monopolies were granted to England in this agreement and Persia retained the right to select her own servants in the matter of foreign experts.

The British statesmen had grasped the salient points in the situation in the Middle East with rare insight. As early as September, 1919, Lord Curzon, at a banquet given to the Persian Mission in London, declared emphatically that the one great need of the Near and Middle East was "tranquillity," and drew attention to the necessity of securing it by blocking the Bolshevist menace in that region; and, in explaining the British policy to Parliament a few days later, he pointed out that, before the Persian nation could administer its own affairs successfully, it would be necessary to make secure the Persian frontiers, to restore order in the country, to establish modern transportation facilities everywhere, to reorganize the central and provincial administrations, to create an equitable system of justice, and to devise a sound system of national finance. With equal truth, he added that some form of outside assistance was essential if this great work of reconstruction was to succeed, for "the time has long since passed when the regeneration of Persia could have been accomplished by her own citizens and through her own resources." No state was, indeed, better qualified to assist Persia in this labor of reorganization than Great Britain, or more favorably disposed to coöperate on a just basis. And there was

no reason to doubt her good faith, since her statesmen were actuated by a desire to assist in the establishment of a strong and prosperous Persia, to restore peace and stable conditions in the Near and Middle East, and to safeguard the interests of the British Empire in Central Asia.

Unfortunately, through short-sighted diplomacy, stupid blundering, and unpardonable delays, the English Government threw away an unprecedented opportunity to advance the interests, not only of Persia and the other states of the Middle East, but also of the British Empire and of Europe. A more colossal diplomatic failure has seldom been seen in recent times. Instead of cultivating the confidence and coöperation of the Persian people by open, straightforward tactics, and by recognizing the Persian Mission to the Paris Peace Conference and accepting a mandate for Persia, the British Ministers aroused the suspicion and enmity of the Persian nation by paying the three Persian negotiators £131,000 to sign the Anglo-Persian Treaty, clothing all their actions and negotiations with the greatest secrecy, refusing the Persian delegation a hearing at Paris, and insisting that Persia accept a British protectorate. Moreover, the British paid large monthly subsidies to the Persian Government for over two years, over which there was no supervision and of which no record was kept, while they controlled and paid for the maintenance of the Southern Persian Rifles (in southern and central Persia) and regular British forces along the north-west frontier of the country and in the Caucasus. No wonder the Persian leaders were suspicious of the disinterestedness of the English Ministers — particularly when the subsidies were suddenly cut off in 1920 and the troops withdrawn from the Caucasus at the end of 1919 and from Persia in April, 1921, leaving the Persian Government helpless and the country exposed to Bolshevik invasion

and internal disorders. Little was being done also to promote the reconstruction promised in the Anglo-Persian Treaty. The revision of the customs tariff was completed only by the beginning of 1920, the military commission made its report in March, 1920, and the British financial adviser Armitage-Smith did not arrive till April of the same year — a year and a half after the signing of the treaty.

Nor was this all. During the same period, when the British were trying to induce Persia to accept British protection, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose concessions date from 1901 and the majority of whose stock is held by the English Government,¹ secured a monopoly over the Persian oil wells. This, as some critics have averred, caused all the Anglo-Persian negotiations from 1918 to 1921 to smell of petroleum. No wonder British influence in Persia declined rapidly, while the anti-foreign forces clamoring for Persian independence and freedom from European intervention grew apace. Before long all the protégés and friends of Great Britain found themselves politically in grave straits; and it became impossible for cabinet leaders with pro-British sympathies to retain control of affairs. Finally, in June, 1920, Vossugh-el-Dawla, Premier and signer of the Anglo-Persian Treaty, was forced to resign — able statesman that he was — when the British subsidies and support suddenly ceased, for his political strength in the country had disappeared. He was followed in office by Mushiru'd-Dawla in June and the Sipahdar-i-Azam in November of the same year, both of whom suspended the work of the British advisers and repudiated the Anglo-Persian Treaty. The Cabinet of the

¹ Austen Chamberlain reported to Parliament on August 14, 1921, that the British Government owned two thirds of the ordinary shares of the Company's stock and one thousand preferential shares (out of 9,500,000). The first carry two votes each and the second one for each five shares.

latter, brought into power by a combination of radical elements, tried, however, to establish an accord with the Russian Soviet Government. As reported, the Russians offered to cancel all Persian debts to Russia, to give back all the old Russian concessions for roads and railways, to compensate Persia for the damage caused in the country by the recent invasion of Soviet forces, and to transfer the Banque d'Escompte Perse (a branch of the old Russian Imperial Bank) to the Persian Government, in return for the privilege of assisting in the reorganization and administration of Persian affairs.

But the time was not yet ripe for such a move. The masses were unfitted for democratic government in any form; the country had little sympathy with Bolshevism; while a large percentage of the aristocracy and of the intelligentsia were strenuously opposed to foreign intervention of any sort. Instead, a new reform movement, set on foot by the younger leaders, to reform Persia from within by a régime of honesty and efficiency, conducted and controlled by the Persians themselves, soon occupied the center of the stage. On February 21, 1921, the Sipahdar-i-Azam Cabinet was driven from office by Reza Khan, member of a militant triumvirate which included Kasim Khan and Masud Khan, who marched on Teheran with twenty-five hundred Persian Cossacks. About two hundred prominent nobles, statesmen, and public officials were seized and imprisoned, while many others — including the Sipahdar — who were more fortunate, took refuge in the British Legation. And Seyyed Zia-ed-Din, the thirty-three-year-old editor of the *Raad*, descendant of the Prophet and prime mover in the *coup d'état*, became Premier of a new Cabinet in which Masud Khan was Minister of War. Kasim Khan was appointed military governor of Teheran and Reza Khan commander-in-chief of the Persian military forces.

At first, the administration of Zia-ed-Din enjoyed a widespread popularity, because of its energy and firmness, its implacable warfare on all forms of public corruption and incompetence, and its drastic reforms. A grand house-cleaning of all public officials accused or suspected of corruption, of speculation or of incompetence — particularly members of the aristocracy — was followed by the abolition of gambling and of the sale of alcoholic liquors. Then came the suppression of the opium department with its four hundred officials, and of the notorious Ministry of Justice whose name had become a synonym for delay and injustice. New tribunals were immediately instituted to hear the innumerable untried cases of which there were over three thousand in Teheran alone; and a new judicial system was planned. For the first time the interests of the common man were given due consideration, and agrarian reforms — including the redistribution of lands among the peasants — were inaugurated. Finally, energetic steps were taken to institute a financial and economic reorganization with the help of foreign advisers — the new leaders recognizing the need of expert advice and assistance.

Unfortunately, however, this new reform movement was foredoomed to failure. It was too much of a one-man affair; and its promoters, including Zia-ed-Din, his chief adviser Epekian, an Armenian editor, and the members of the new Cabinet, were amateurs in politics without any particular political following. And the reforms, although well-intended and greatly needed, were so hastily and drastically introduced that they alienated not only the Shah, but also the most influential men of all parties. And the new Cabinet soon became involved in controversies with the military group led by Reza Khan, which rendered the operation of the government and the execution of reforms more and more difficult.

Accordingly, the next turn in the kaleidoscopic whirlpool of Persian politics came quickly. On May 25, 1921, three short months after the beginning of its labors, the Seyyed Zia-ed-Din Government was forced out by Reza Khan, who had become Minister of War with the title of Sardar Sepah in the preceding April and had taken over the control of the national gendarmerie on May 6th. Since then Persia has been under the control of a military dictatorship with little change in internal conditions. She has merely succeeded in jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire, and then back again into the pan. In 1909, the Medjliss overthrew the power of the Shahs and established a constitutional monarchy. In 1921, the power of the grandees was broken. Still, the people have not come into their own. The control of the state has simply passed into the hands of the military group. Reza Khan, the so-called strong man of the country, has made and remade cabinets,¹ reorganized the military and police forces, dictated in the affairs of state, taken a hand in the making of national budgets, arrested the leader of the Conservative party and other politicians, reduced materially the prestige of the Shah by a move to create a republic,² and since October 25, 1923, occupied the office of Prime Minister. He has established a fair degree of order and stability throughout the land, and is promoting various financial and economic reforms; but whether he possesses the ability to effect the rehabilitation of Persia remains to be seen.

On July 27, 1922, the Medjliss passed an act conferring

¹ June, 1922; February and October, 1923; and April and August, 1924.

² March 21, 1924, the Persian New Year, was set as the date for the establishment of the Republic. The movement fell through, owing to big popular demonstrations staged against it and led by religious teachers and students. Reza Khan resigned on April 7th, but was recalled to the premiership by Parliament the next day and organized a new Cabinet on April 14th.

comprehensive powers on the Minister of Finance, and on August 15th engaged Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, former Economic Adviser in the Department of State at Washington, as the new Administrator-General of Finance for five years. Dr. Millspaugh and his staff arrived in November, 1922, and within a year a decided improvement in conditions was noticeable. The finances were reformed, a national budget approximating \$20,700,000 was prepared, and excellent reforms instituted in the system of taxation and the methods of collection. Cities, towns, and local chieftains have been induced to recognize the present administration, keep the peace, and pay regular taxes. A new Russo-Persian commercial treaty was signed on July 3, 1924; and various steps have been taken to introduce economic reforms, to encourage local industries, and to restore the national credit; and, finally, a vigorous effort has been made to provide the state with a regular income through railway and oil concessions to foreign firms¹ and through the normal taxes on oil, indirect taxes of various kinds, and the income from the public domain and from tobacco and opium monopolies.²

The future of the country is, however, still uncertain. The Persians have broken down, at length, many of the old handicaps due to ignorance, selfishness, corruption, and incompetence, and have turned over a new page.

¹ The Persian Government has given the Anglo-Persian Company an oil concession in the south for sixty years, and is trying to negotiate a similar concession in the north and a loan of \$10,000,000 with the Sinclair or the Standard Oil Companies. But Mr. Sinclair reported in September, 1924, that he was unable to raise the proposed loan in New York. Authorities in Persia believe this was due to the murder of Major Robert Imbrie, American Vice-Consul, by a mob in Teheran on July 18, 1924.

² The latest reports from Persia, show, however, that the Millspaugh Mission is having a difficult time in executing its financial and economic reforms owing to the determined opposition of the nobles, wealthy citizens, and influential politicians.

The natural resources of the state are sufficient to provide for the governmental expenses, and for a large part of the financial and economic reorganization so sorely needed. But the great work of reconstruction remains to be done; and the call for patriotic, trained leaders is imperative. Much depends upon Reza Khan and the new American advisers. Yet the responsibility rests even more strongly on the so-called Radical party composed of the younger generation of politicians and statesmen, which is committed to a program of progressive reforms and of honest, efficient government. Will the younger leaders rise to the emergency, and, striving valiantly and unselfishly, achieve a notable national triumph? No one can say. When will the rehabilitation of Persia be complete? "Fardah Inshallah!" ("To-morrow, please God.")

CHAPTER VII

THE RULE OF INDIA

IN no other part of the world has the British genius for administration received a more severe test than in the great Indian Empire. When the revival of European expansion began in the nineteenth century Great Britain was in undisputed possession of the old Moghul Empire with sovereignty over the greater part of modern India, while for nearly a hundred years British cotton goods had found a large market in that country. But the gains of the Lancashire mills and the prestige added to the British flag through its control over this great region with its enormous population — about three fifths of the whole British Empire — were small, compared with the service which the English rendered the whole world by the maintenance of peace, order, and free trade in that part of Asia, and the establishment of security, economic prosperity, and good government within India itself.

British relations with India began with the organization of the British East India Company, a joint-stock corporation, which secured a charter from Queen Elizabeth in 1600 to engage in the spice trade of the East Indies. The first trading posts in India were established at Masulipatam on the Coromandel coast in 1611, and at Surat on the western coast in 1612. Less than thirty years later, land for a factory was purchased at Madras from the local raja. In 1661, Charles II received Bombay in the dowry of Catherine of Braganza; and, in 1686, Calcutta was founded on the banks of the Ganges. Treaties granting commercial privileges were secured from the local rulers of the coastal regions; and in 1679 the Company obtained

a firman from the Moghul Emperor at Delhi granting to it special trade rights throughout his dominions — the greatest in India.

At first the operations of the British East India Company were confined to the promotion of commercial intercourse and trade without the use of force.¹ They had no desire to mingle in the rivalries of native rulers, or interfere in the politics of the country. But, when the great Moghul Empire began to disintegrate and conflicts arose between the Moghuls and the Marathas, the Company soon realized that it must meet force with force, or else withdraw from the Indian trade. So, in self-defense, without premeditation of conquest or political domination, the British were drawn into a policy of protection of their commercial privileges and interests in India. Ere long, powers of administration and control were added to the commercial activities and duties of the agents of the British India Company, and, as has happened in other parts of the world more than once, the success of the British in establishing political dominion in India was due to the genius of individual Englishmen, rather than to the activities of the British Parliament, or to brilliant plans of conquest conceived by its statesmen.

But, before the British were free to enter upon any scheme of expansion, it was necessary to have a reckoning with the French, who, after the founding of the French East India Company in 1664 and the establishment of trading posts at Pondicherry in 1683 and later at Chandernagar on the Hugli River, had made a strong bid for

¹ On November 24, 1616, Sir Thomas Roe wrote the Company: "A warr and trafique are incompatible. . . . Lett this bee receiued as a rule that if you will Profitt, seeke it at Sea, and in a quiett trade; for with out controversy it is an error to affect Garrisons and Land warrs in India." (William Foster: *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul, 1615-1619* (London: 1899), II, p. 344.)

the trade of India. Early in the eighteenth century, this competition developed into bitter rivalry between the British and the French East India Companies, in the course of which each party, supported by its respective government, resorted to intrigue and force to oust the other from its position in India. Finally, Dupleix — the brilliant French governor of Pondicherry from 1741 to 1754 — through the discovery of the weakness of the Moghul Empire, the employment of sepoys on a large scale, and the seizure of the lands of native princes in the interior by force, greatly strengthened the dominion of the French and seriously threatened the position of the British.

Fortunately for the English, the elder Pitt recognized the psychological moment for launching an attack upon the colonial possessions of the French. He very cleverly took advantage of the Seven Years' War in Europe — 1756 to 1763 — to keep France occupied with the conflict on the Continent by supporting the armies of Frederick the Great, while the British dealt a deathblow to French colonial expansion. The British navy cleared the seas of the French frigates; General Wolfe brought an end to the French dominion in Canada by his victory over Montcalm at Quebec in 1759; while the "heaven-born genius" of Lord Clive reduced the French and native forces in India to impotency. At the end of the war, the French possessions in India were transferred to the English, with the exception of a few minor holdings, Pondicherry, Mahé, Karikal, Yanaon, and Chandarnagar, which they control to this day.

In the work of creating a colonial empire, which followed their victory over the French, the British were wise enough not to impose English political institutions on their Indian subjects. There was no conscious attempt at British national expansion. On the contrary, in groping

about for a *modus vivendi*, British administrators attempted a political and economic experiment on an international scale. The English governor-generals maintained, to a large degree, the native rulers on their thrones and kept local institutions under a direct personal rule. This policy led to the development of the British Government in India along two distinct lines — the native states and British India.

To-day there are about seven hundred native states which embrace an area of 709,555 square miles of territory, and contain a population of approximately 70,890,000; while British India has 1,093,974 square miles of territory and about 244,300,000 inhabitants. In other words, all of India embraces 1,802,629 square miles — an area fourteen times greater than that of the British Isles — and a population of 318,942,480 — almost seven times as great as that of Great Britain and Ireland. The native states are governed by their own native rajas, or princes, who through treaties with the British Crown have accepted the suzerainty of Great Britain. Although they are strictly limited in their foreign relations, and the British sovereignty is represented by a political officer — a Resident or an Agent — acting in a more or less advisory capacity to the ruling prince, these states possess complete control over their own interior administrations. Their rulers are unhampered except by the usual restrictions imposed upon the executive power in such of them as have adopted modern constitutional monarchies with representative assemblies. Some of the larger states, such as Baroda and Mysore, are remarkably well governed; but the majority lag behind the provinces politically, while many of the small ones are geographically dependent upon the provinces, and have indirect contact with the Government of India through the agents of the provincial governors.

Some of the native states are large and powerful, such as Hyderabad, the domains of whose Nizam cover 82,698 square miles and whose subjects number over 12,470,000. Others are microscopic, Sandur, for instance, having only an area of 161 square miles and a population of approximately 11,700. Many of the smaller ones, while retaining their own local autonomy, are grouped into political units for administrative purposes. The Central India Agency, for example, contains about one hundred and fifty native states, while Rajputana has twenty-one. The North-West Frontier Province comprises about one third British territory and five political agencies, only one of which — Chitral — is a well-organized native state.

In British India, on the other hand, there are fifteen political administrations, nine of them being designated as "Governor's provinces" and six as minor provinces. The former include Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, Assam, and Burma; while the latter embrace Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, Delhi, the North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These provinces vary greatly both in size and in the number of their inhabitants. The old presidencies of Bengal and Madras and the province of Bihar and Orissa, as well as the United Provinces, are large both in area and in population. Bengal, for instance, covers 78,699 square miles of territory and has a population of about 46,695,000. On the other hand, Bombay and the Punjab embrace wide areas, but are not so thickly settled — Bombay with approximately 19,300,000 inhabitants on an area of 123,059 square miles, and the Punjab with 4,200,000 on a territory of 36,551 square miles. Burma is still more sparsely settled, having an area of 230,839 square miles with only 13,212,000 people. And finally, there are a few



very small provinces, such as Ajmer-Merwara, which contains less than three thousand square miles and less than a half million inhabitants, and Delhi with five hundred square miles and about five hundred thousand people.

The great Indian peninsula, washed on two sides by the waters of the Indian Ocean and shut off from the northern Asiatic world by the incomparable peaks of the Himalaya ranges, is a land of strange contrasts, of high mountains and lofty plateaus, of great rivers and lovely valleys, of barren deserts and fertile river plains. Its inhabitants — far from being one homogeneous people — are divided into a number of well-defined nationalities separated sharply from one another by language, creed, race, and tradition. According to Sir Herbert Risley, seven distinctive racial types are to be found in India, the mere enumeration of which will indicate to the reader the varied character of the races, for there are Turko-Iranians, Indo-Aryans, and Scytho-Dravidians, all of a fair complexion; also Aryo-Dravidians, Mongolo-Dravidians, and Dravidians of a complexion varying from lightish brown to black; and finally, Mongoloids of darkish complexions with a yellow tinge.¹ The Dravidians were probably the aborigines; and the various blendings were caused by successive invasions of Aryans and Mongolians.

The Indo-Aryan type, which probably represents the first Aryan invasion, inhabits the valley of the Indus and its tributaries, including the region of the Punjab, Sind, and the western part of Rajputana. Representing this type are the Rajputs, Jats, and Kashmiri. Tall in stature with light complexions, long heads and regular features, they are distinctly European. The Rajputs are a proud people, boasting of a princely origin and a racial purity uncontaminated by marriage with the baser peoples. They

¹ *The People of India* (ed. W. Crooke, London, 1915), pp. 33-35.

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are the aristocrats of India. In the deserts of Rajputana, they defied even the Moghul invaders of the sixteenth century and fought for their independence in a manner that was truly heroic. Nearly ten million Rajputs are scattered over northern India. They are priests and warriors; and, although landowners, they disdain to put hand to the plough and they hire servants for all manual labor. The Jat, on the other hand, is a hard-working ryot or peasant, weather-wise, skillful in handling crops and shrewd at a bargain. He is the typical peasant of the eastern Punjab and the western United Provinces, possessing the typical peasant's virtues and faults. "A Jat's laugh would break an ordinary man's ribs" runs the proverb; "his baby has a plough tail for a plaything; a Jat stood on his own corn-heap and called out to the King's elephant-drivers, 'Hi, there, what will you take for those little donkeys?'" Engrossed in his cultivation of the soil, the Jat is less circumscribed by religious rites and restrictions of caste than are most Indians; and he scandalizes the Brahmans by the practice of permitting widows to remarry.

In the region of the upper Ganges, particularly in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, we find a population in which the Aryan is strongly mixed with Dravidian blood. These Aryo-Dravidians are represented in the upper strata by the pretentious Hindustani Brahman and in the lower strata by the humble Chamars — the caste of tanners and leather-workers, who may not approach within twenty-four feet of a Brahman. In Bihar, the home of the ancient Kingdom of Magadha, which was ruled by the great King Asoka, and in Oudh, the home of the still more ancient realm of Ajodhya, we find distinctive nationalities, the heritage of a past celebrated in great epics. Leaving Bihar and passing into the rice-fields and forests of Bengal, we find the Indo-Aryan element becoming thinner and a

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darker race appearing. Indeed, the whole lower Ganges and Brahmaputra Valleys, including Bengal, Assam, and Orissa, are inhabited by the Mongolo-Dravidian type which is represented in its most easily recognized and numerous form by the well-known Bengali. The higher castes in Bengal, however, show strong traces of Indo-Aryan origin, although thoroughly mixed with Mongolian and Dravidian elements. From this upper stratum, numbering about four million, come the people who have adapted themselves most readily to European civilization; and hence the proverbial gibe at the Bengali Babu who affects European manners and dress, as "an Eastern donkey with a Western bray." But, nevertheless, from the ranks of the facile Bengali in recent years have come more lawyers, judges, teachers, scholars, physicians, journalists, legislators, and governmental administrators than from any other race in British India.

The Deccan, or the southland of India, is inhabited almost entirely by peoples of Dravidian stock. The chief exception is the race of the Marathas in southwestern India; but even the Marathas have a large portion of Dravidian blood, being the descendants of a Scythian or an Alpine race that made its way to the south and conquered and intermarried with the aborigines. They are the proud dwellers in the hills whose hero-king, the fierce Sivaji, defied even Aurangzeb, the Moghul Emperor. Haughty, indeed, are the Chitawan Brahmans of Bombay and scornful of lesser races; but even in their veins runs Dravidian blood. Among the strictly Dravidian races of the Deccan are the Paniyans of the Malabar coast, the Santals of Chota Nagpur, and the Kandhs of the forest-covered ranges of the Orissa coast, who until recent times offered human sacrifices to their deities, but who under the rule of the British have become law-abiding husband-

men. "Labor is the birthright of the pure Dravidian: whether hoeing tea in Assam, the Duars, or Ceylon, cutting rice in the swamps of Eastern Bengal, or doing scavenger's work in the streets of Calcutta, Rangoon, or Singapore, he is recognizable at a glance by his black skin, his squat figure, and the negro-like proportions of his nose."¹

Even more varied than the races of India are the languages, castes, and creeds. According to the linguistic survey of the census of 1901 there are two hundred and sixty-four distinct native vernaculars in the empire, some being the highly developed languages of ancient civilizations adorned with vast and beautiful literatures.² Northern India in particular has a great variety of languages, although the chief tongues — Hindi, Bengali, Panjabi, Rajasthani, Western Hindi, Western Panjabi, and Sindhi — are all descended from vernaculars akin to Sanskrit, the ancient Indo-Aryan tongue. Eighty-two million Indians speak Hindi; forty-eight million Bengali; sixteen million Panjabi; fourteen million Western Hindi; and four million Sindhi. Along the Chinese frontier in Bengal and Assam, fifty or more languages are spoken. In the Deccan, the Telugu tongue is spoken by twenty-four million; the Marathi by twenty million; Tamil by eighteen million; Kanarese by eleven million; and Santali by two million. Of these, the Telugu is noted for its beauty, and Tamil for its copious literature. As to other tongues, Gujarati is spoken by eleven million people in the upper part of the Bombay Presidency; Oriya, the language of Orissa, is spoken by over ten million people; while the Burmese language is spoken by eight million, to say nothing of Malayan, Pashto, Assamese, Gond, Pahari, Kashmiri, Karen, Shan, Bihari, and others too numerous to mention.

¹ *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (Oxford: 1909), I, p. 296.

² *General Report of the Census of India, 1901: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1904), *East India*, cd. 2047, ch. VII.

India, indeed, is a Babel of tongues, and the traveler is astounded at the number of newspapers and pamphlets in dozens of languages displayed in all railroad stations in the large cities. There is no such thing as a national language, although, since its adoption by the Moghul Court in the sixteenth century, Hindi or Urdu has served as a sort of *lingua franca*. It is spoken in perfect or corrupt form by Mohammedans all over India; and it is used by the strictest Hindus without offending their religious prejudices. But even this language is written in various characters; and thus, to the confusion of tongues is added the complication of different scripts.

The people of India are divided as sharply by religion as by language and race, for, similar as may be the social customs of the Mohammedans and Hindus, there is an ineradicable antagonism between the two sects. Out of every ten Indians, seven belong to the faith of Hinduism and three are scattered among the other faiths. According to the census of 1921, there were 217,000,000 Hindus and 69,000,000 Mohammedans in a total population of 319,000,000. It is thus seen that the Hindus outnumber the Moslems more than three to one; but the militant spirit of the Mohammedans largely makes up for their inferiority in numbers. The great grievance of the Hindus against the Mohammedans is that they kill and eat cows; and since the cow is the most sacred of animals for Hindus, this grievance will often excite the populace to violent riots. On the other hand, the Moslems object to music and processions in front of their mosques at all times and particularly during the fast of the Mohurram. Accordingly, a marriage procession from the house of the bridegroom to that of the bride with musicians and a cortège of elephants, if these can be afforded, will infuriate the Mohammedans, who fall upon the procession with latis,

or bamboos tipped with iron, while the police hurry to the scene and the affray ends with dead and wounded on both sides. The Mohammedans have a majority in Kashmir and Sind, as well as in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. In the Punjab and in Bengal, the Mohammedans form one half of the population; and all told, they comprise more than one fifth of the total population of India.

As to the remaining religions, the Sikhs are three million in number, and they form almost one sixth of the population of the Punjab. There are few Buddhists in India outside of Burma; but almost the entire population of that province belong to the faith of Gautama the Buddha. The Christians are nearly five million strong; of this number, about two hundred thousand are Europeans, one hundred thousand are Eurasians, and the remaining are native Indians. Nearly ten million people in India hold to the crude animistic worship of the aborigines. Finally, we should not forget the Parsis, a small sect, only one hundred thousand in number and originally coming from Persia, who profess the Zoroastrian faith. Scattered throughout India, they are a remarkably adaptable and progressive people and have furnished conspicuous leaders to the commercial and industrial enterprises of India.

The most remarkable phenomenon in the social structure of the country is the caste system. Caste is universal in India. Its origin is difficult to explain. Some authorities hold that it has grown out of occupation; and others maintain that its origin is racial. The Hindu, of course, believes that caste is of divine source. But certainly the Rig-Veda, the sacred hymns of the ancient Aryans, bear evidence that at the time of the early invasions caste was unknown, and the differentiations into Brahmans or priests, Kshatriyas or warriors, Vaisyas or husbandmen, and the Sudras or slaves, had not then appeared. Sir Herbert Risley

defines caste as "a collection of families or groups of families, bearing a common name which usually denotes or is associated with a specific occupation; claiming common descent from a mythical ancestor, human or divine; professing to follow the same calling; and regarded by those who are competent to give an opinion as forming a single homogeneous community."¹ One further qualification must be added to this definition, namely, the obligation of marriage within the caste. In India, under the caste system, it is impossible to rise in the social scale by individual prowess or ability. A man becomes a member of a caste by birth and by birth alone. There are thousands of castes and subcastes. Each new census brings to light more castes than were tabulated in the previous census. Among the Brahmans alone, there are at least two thousand castes. Some castes are national; others are provincial; and others are merely local, including perhaps but a single tribe. The Brahmans, who are spread all over India, number at least fifteen million; the Chamars, who by tradition are tanners, number twelve million; the Ahirs, who are herdsmen, number ten million; while the Churas, Bhangis, and Doms, who are scavengers, number about six million. In all, there are some sixty leading castes having more than a million members each. And there are thousands of lesser castes; but all of these castes are divided into subcastes and subdivisions.

Much has been said in recent writings concerning the baneful effect of caste in India. Certainly it shuts off Indians from free association with foreigners, while it breaks up Indian society into a myriad of separate units frequently hostile and jealous of one another. It hinders coöperation, both political and social. In the Central Provinces, which number fourteen million people, one

¹ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, I, p. 311.

fifth of the population belong to a stratum so low in the estimation of the Hindus that it possesses no caste at all. These people, as Sir Valentine Chirol says, live in "a state of degradation closely akin to slavery, which is not imposed upon them by any alien rulers, but by the ancient traditions of those of their own race and creed whose interest it is to perpetuate at the expense of their less fortunate fellow countrymen the most cruel form of tyranny."¹ The Brahmans may not be touched by these poor people without being defiled. They are "untouchables"; hence, they are required to live apart in villages of their own, and are forbidden to draw water from any but their own wells; while in the village school, if there be one, the little "untouchables" are relegated to mats on the outside veranda where they may pick up such scraps of teaching as they can. In the Deccan, the condition of millions of "untouchables" is the same to-day as that described by the Abbé Dubois more than a hundred years ago.² In the Madras Presidency, there are six million of these pariahs. Their condition is truly pathetic, inasmuch as the son of a scavenger or street-sweeper can be nothing else. But, on the other hand, we should remember that ambition does not stir mightily in the breasts of these lowly people. And caste has some advantages. It gives regularity and orderliness to social institutions. It promotes religion, morals, art, and craftsmanship. It is a powerful factor in Indian life, having roots that reach back into the dim past. It has suited India for several thousand years, and will not easily be eradicated, although there are some evidences of its moderation under British rule.³

¹ *India Old and New* (London: 1921), p. 215.

² Abbé J. A. Dubois: *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies* (translated by K. K. Beauchamp), pt. I, ch. v.

³ Compare Sir Valentine Chirol: *India Old and New*, p. 236.

After the caste system, no other factor has had so great an influence upon the life and social structure of India as its agriculture. For it is, and has been for centuries, essentially an agricultural country; and the problems of India — governmental, economic, and social — are universally colored by the fact that the great mass of its population obtain their living from the soil. There are, indeed, only thirty large towns and cities in the country; while the great majority of the people live in villages, and are either peasants cultivating small holdings averaging less than five acres or persons engaged in trades which minister to agriculture and the distribution of agricultural products. According to the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, over ninety per cent live a rural life, and few ever give a thought to matters beyond the horizon of their villages. "What concerns them is mainly the rainfall or the irrigation supply from wells or canals, the price of grain and cloth, the payment of rent to the landlord or of revenue to the State, the repayment of advances to the village banker, the observance of religious festivals, the education of their sons, the marriage of their daughters, their health and that of their cattle. They visit the local town on bazaar days and the subdivisional or district center rarely on business or litigation. They are not concerned with district boards or municipal boards; many of them know of no executive power above the district officer; and of Parliament, or even of legislative councils, they have never heard. In one province, it is stated that ninety-three per cent of the people live and die in the place where they were born."¹ While the Brahmans, the educated Bengali, and the members of the upper classes are competent to look out for themselves and their rights, the great mass of the Indian people are inarticulate or practically so.

¹ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India*, cd. 1909, sec. 133.

The British administration of India as it exists to-day was not created at any given time or place. It was rather the result of a slow process of political evolution under the firm but conservative hand of a benevolent government; and it is still in the period of transition. The limits of this book permit us to trace but briefly the course of this political development. It has been well said that the British ascendancy in India was won by Clive, consolidated by Warren Hastings, and welded into an empire by the Marquis of Wellesley. Clive, indeed, maintained the hold of the Company over its Indian possessions during the most critical period of the struggle between the British and French East India Companies, added immense prestige to the British flag by his victories over France and the native allies of the French, and increased materially the British political control over native princes. His successes aroused the British people and government to a real interest in Indian affairs. And, in 1773, the Governor of Bengal was made a Governor-General with control over the Company's holdings at Madras and Bombay, but subject to the authority of a Court of Directors in London appointed by the Crown, while, under Pitt's Indian Bill of 1784, the powers of the Governor-General were enlarged and the supervision of the government of the Governor-General and his Council was placed in the hands of the British Cabinet: i.e., Parliament, through a Board of Control.

Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General under the new régime, serving from 1774 to 1785, widened and consolidated the British dominion in India. He executed, with rare administrative ability and foresight, and an uncanny knowledge of Oriental psychology, the most difficult and complicated tasks, and laid the foundations of British political, financial, and economic policy in the lands under his control — particularly in Bengal. He received the

confidence and support of many leaders, and was justly popular among both Moslems and Hindus. And his wisdom, his fairness, and his foresight were amply justified by later developments, in spite of the small support given to his efforts at the time by the home government, and his unjust impeachment by Parliament.¹

Lord Wellesley, elder brother of the Duke of Wellington and Governor-General from 1798 to 1804, profited by the efforts of Hastings. At the opening of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company was in possession of Lower Bengal (from the sea to Benares), Madras (with a small adjacent district), and Bombay (with a little strip of adjoining territory), while some native states, such as Oudh, were paying tribute. Wellesley proceeded to unite these scattered holdings of the British, to shut out all foreign influences from the country, and to force the great Indian confederacies to recognize English sovereignty. In the Mysore War of 1799, he destroyed the dangerous power of the second great Mohammedan chief in the Deccan.

¹The misapplied eloquence of Burke in the impeachment of Hastings almost wrecked this statesman's reputation for all ages. The prejudices that Burke immortalized were repeated by Mill and Macaulay. In his introduction to *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, Sir John Strachey corrects these slanders, saying: "The task of writing a pretended history of British India fell into the hands of James Mill, the most prejudiced of men. His work remains to this day our standard and often worthless authority. He repeated every falsehood that ignorance or folly or malice had invented against the great men who had built up our empire. After this came the crowning misfortune. Macaulay, without independent inquiry, received as truth the baseless stories that had been recorded as history, and gave them fresh life in his glittering periods. Thus the fame of Hastings has become obscured. It is only in our own time that the work of reparation has begun. One of the imaginary crimes of Hastings, the judicial murder of Nandkumar, has been blotted out by Sir James Stephen. If I should help to satisfy students of Indian history that the crime of selling the services of a British army for the extermination of a noble people is imaginary also, the object with which this book was written will have been gained."

By the Treaty of Lucknow in 1801, the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh was compelled to surrender the Doab between the Ganges River and the Jumma together with Rohilkland, while the campaigns of Lord Lake in 1802-07 against the Maratha rajas (Sind and Holkar) destroyed the Maratha claims to the Central Provinces, and left the old blind Moghul emperor, Shah Alam, under British protection.

In the Deccan, the power of the Maratha Confederacy was broken by the Duke of Wellington in the second Maratha War, while, as early as 1801, the control of the Carnatic had been secured, and the Madras Presidency established — practically as it exists to-day. During the same period, through the application of force and the negotiation of treaties, many native princes were induced to disband their armies, make land cessions to the British, and to accept annual subsidies or grants from the British Crown. And the four great Indian powers of Wellesley's time — Oudh (the chief remnant of the Empire of the Great Moghul), Hyderabad, Mysore, and the Maratha Confederacy — all made peace with the English and recognized the supremacy of Great Britain.

In 1818, after the third Maratha War lasting two years, the Peshwa of Poona was deposed, his lands annexed to the territory of Bombay, and the Presidency of Bombay established. Soon afterward Madras and Bombay were connected; and, in a short time, the states of Rajputana recognized the British suzerainty. Meanwhile, in 1817-18, Lord Hastings — the conqueror of the Marathas — with a large army rooted out the Pindaris,¹ a widespread organization of banditti composed of the riffraff of the disbanded

¹ *Aggression of the Pindarries and Measures Adopted in Consequence: Brit. Parl. Papers (1818), East India; War in India: Papers Relating to the Pindarries and the Mahratta Powers: Brit. Parl. Papers (1819), East India; Affairs of the East India Company: Report from Select Committee: Brit. Parl. Papers (1831-32), East India, I, Appendix.*

Moghul armies and of Jat and Afghan robbers whose marauding bands had terrorized the whole interior by plundering the ryots, burning the villages, and torturing the inhabitants.

During the next twenty years, the servants of the Company were busy consolidating the British power in India, organizing an efficient administration, and improving the conditions of life and production. The Governor-Generals were, for the most part, men of talent who ruled with discretion and wisdom, and who possessed a wide sympathy for their subjects. As Macaulay writes of Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General, 1828-35, "He never laid aside the simplicity and moderation of a private citizen; he infused into Oriental despotism the spirit of British freedom; he never forgot that the end of government is the welfare of the governed; he gave liberty to the expression of public opinion; and his constant study was to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the nations committed to his charge."

For the first time, native Hindus were admitted into the service of the Company during Bentinck's administration; while some of the worst evils of paganism, such as suttee, or widow-burning, and thagi, or the strangling of human victims to appease the bloody goddess, Kali or Devi, were abolished, to the great blessing of the country. An important precedent for the treatment of incapable and corrupt princes was established in the dispossession in 1834 of the profligate ruler of Coorg, whose domains, on the petition of the inhabitants, were incorporated with British India. And, finally, a great step in the introduction of education and in the improvement of sanitary conditions was inaugurated by the foundation of the Calcutta Medical College.

During the rule of Lord Ellenborough, 1842-44, the

British dominion was expanded by the brutal war against the mirs of Sind followed by the inexcusable annexation of their territory. But the zenith of the Company's activities was reached during the administration of Lord Dalhousie who ruled from 1848 to 1856. Dalhousie possessed a genius for administration and a character of firmness and discretion essential to the enforcement of reforms. Along the humanitarian side, he abolished the cruel practice of branding criminals and of offering human sacrifices in religious ceremonies, founded the Department of Public Works for constructing roads, canals, and works of irrigation, completed the famous Ganges Canal, established an imperial post-office with cheap rates and a telegraph service, and turned the sod for the first railway, while promoting steamship navigation with England.

On the cultural side, important official steps were taken during Dalhousie's régime to create educational institutions and to give the people the elements of learning. In his remarkable *Dispatch of 1854*, Sir Charles Wood recommended that the education should be in the native tongue, that a "Grant-in-Aid" system be established to encourage the people to help themselves, and that the Government practice a policy of neutrality toward the various religious schools and religious education. In the same year, upon orders from London for which the *Dispatch* was chiefly responsible, a Department of Public Education was created in the Cabinet of the Governor-General, and each province was given an "Educational Department." Universities were founded in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The number of governmental colleges, teachers' colleges, high and middle schools was increased; and support was promised for the development of elementary education so that there would be conveyed to "the great mass of the people who are utterly incapable of obtaining any education by

their own unaided efforts, useful and practical knowledge suited to every station in life." Unfortunately, although the wise program laid down by Dalhousie was followed in the main, funds were lacking for so great an undertaking as the establishment and maintenance of public schools for the masses of India; and the British Government fell far short of its ideals in the matter of public education. In fact, little real progress was made during the half-century that followed, because of the failure of British statesmen to grasp the real need for educational reform and to follow the lead of Dalhousie. Few leaders were convinced of the wisdom of providing education for the masses; and the rest hoped that the higher education provided by the Government would "filter downwards" to the benefit of large numbers.

But it was along political lines that Lord Dalhousie accomplished his greatest work. He laid down three fundamental principles to govern the political action of the British authorities, which were enforced by him and by his successors. He insisted, in the first place, that Great Britain was in the country to rule for the "good of the governed." Under this rule, he justified all measures taken to exterminate brigandage and to establish peace, all efforts to ameliorate the position of the ryots and improve living conditions in the country, and even the extension of British control over provinces whose princes had proved corrupt or had failed conspicuously as administrators.

In the second place, he claimed that the native princes were not to be trusted, but, for the good of their subjects and the peace of India, should be kept under strict surveillance, and advised and assisted, when possible, to reform their administrations. If they intrigued against each other or against the British, or failed completely as

rulers, or maintained a corrupt and infamous court régime, they should be deposed, their lands seized and incorporated with British India. So, when the incompetent, intriguing, and military Sikh despots of the Punjab caused endless troubles on the northwest frontier (then) of India and repulsed the good offices and advice of the Governor-General, their power was overthrown by the British forces in the second Sikh War, 1848-49, and their country made a British province on March 29, 1849. In the years immediately following, the whole of the Punjab was pacified and a British administration successfully established through the efforts of the two Lawrences — Sir Henry and John — whose work has been described by Sir William Hunter as "probably the most successful piece of governing ever accomplished by Englishmen."

In 1852, Dalhousie was compelled, by the disorders in Rangoon and Southern Burma and by the inability of the King of Burma to set his own house in order, to inaugurate a new campaign of force and to annex Pegu, which, with Arakan and Tenasserim, became the province of Lower Burma. And finally, in 1856, the ruler of Oudh, who had been sustained in power by the British protection since 1765, was deposed, removed to Calcutta, and given a pension of £120,000 sterling, while his domains were annexed to British India; for the Nawab Wazirs had degenerated into debauched and vicious spendthrifts, without a spark of administrative ability, under whose exactions the peasants of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world were being ruined.

In the third place, the great Governor-General held that the British authorities were under no obligation to maintain a tyrant in power, nor could they be expected to hand over to a new dynasty, unquestioned, a province whose reigning raja died without direct issue. Accordingly, he

proposed the "doctrine of lapse"; i.e., that the political power and lands of all princes who passed away without direct heirs should be escheated to the British Crown. And he applied this doctrine in 1849 by adding to the Bombay Presidency the State of Satara¹ whose raja — the last descendant of the famous Maratha chieftain, Sivaji — expired in that year without heirs. And again, in 1853, by annexing the lands of the rajas of Nagpur — later incorporated within British India as the Central Provinces — of Jhansi, of Tanjore, and of Berar.

In general, the burden of government imposed by the East India Company was light. The administration of the British provinces was efficient, honest, and superior to that of the native states. The peasants were freed from the plundering of marauding bands, given protection, and even assistance in the cultivation of their lands. The lot of the masses everywhere materially improved, yet conditions generally were far from perfect. The rule of foreigners was resented in many quarters; and a great restlessness prevailed in various sections owing to the seemingly arbitrary acts and policy of the Governor-Generals. Opportunity was thus afforded to dispossessed princes and their sons, and to ambitious political leaders to start a movement against the British Raj. It culminated, at length, in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 — the Sepoys being the Hindu and Moslem troops in the British service — which was put down without great difficulty; for it was a military outbreak supported by certain princes and chieftains, rather than a popular uprising of the nation, the more conservative leaders and the masses taking little part in it.

The chief result of the Mutiny was the transfer of the

¹ Marquis of Dalhousie: Minutes dated 28th of February, 1856, reviewing his administration in India, 1848-56. *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1856), *East India*, H. C. 245, p. 7.

control of India from the East India Company to the British Crown — the Government of India Act of 1858 being established as the organic law of the land, and Queen Victoria becoming, in 1877, Empress of India. This act, together with the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and other Parliamentary statutes relating to India, was consolidated, at length, in the Government of India Act of 1915, as amended by the Government of India Acts of 1916 and 1919. By the original act, the old Board of Control was abolished and the administration of the Indian Empire in England was placed in the hands of a Secretary of State for India, a member of the Cabinet and responsible to Parliament, assisted by a Council of fifteen members, nine of whom must have resided in India for the ten years previous to their appointment. As the representative of the Crown, the Governor-General now became a Viceroy. He and his Executive Council constituted the "Government of India." In 1861 The Governor-General's Legislative Council was enlarged by adding from six to twelve members to the Executive Council.¹ Governors of the provinces, judges of the higher courts, and other high officials were to be appointed by the Secretary of State for India. And the Governors of Madras and Bombay were to be assisted by executive and legislative councils; while high courts of justice were established in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.

Nevertheless, there was no intention of creating a self-governing dominion in India, such as developed in Canada and Australia, for the time was not ripe for such a move. Nor did Parliament propose to meddle extensively in Indian affairs, even though India was dependent upon it, or to pass special legislation for that country. On the contrary, the legislative powers were delegated to the Governor-General in Council, and the supremacy of the

¹ 24 and 25 Victoria, c. 67.

Government of India over the provincial governments was established, subject in both cases always to the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament.

Nor did Parliament interfere, in any way, with that remarkable institution, the Indian Civil Service, through which the administration of India had been maintained so successfully for many years under the Company. With the exception of the Governor-General's and the provincial councils, and the special bureaus such as engineering, police education, and forestry, all the government posts involving serious responsibility were held by members of the Indian Civil Service. Of these the most important in provincial affairs was the Collector-Magistrate, who was at the head of the district — the unit of administration throughout British India. By the end of the nineteenth century there were about two hundred and seventy of these districts; and each Collector-Magistrate had authority over a million or more people. Within his sphere, his authority was comprehensive; British officers filled the chief positions under him and the minor posts were held by native clerks and employees of the provincial or the subordinate service.

In this way the local government of India passed into the hands of some twenty-five hundred Englishmen, of whom about twelve hundred belonged to the Civil Service, seven hundred were police officers, and six hundred medical men. A more remarkable corps of colonial officials the world has probably never seen. Many of them were graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, trained in the traditions of the service, imbued with high ideals of responsibility and discipline, and inspired with a rare devotion to their work and to the welfare of the people whom they governed. They sat in the executive and legislative councils and assisted in the formation of government

policies, while at the same time the Central Government looked to them primarily for information and advice and to carry out the details of administration in the provinces. This dual position, together with the assurance of an ultimate governmental reward for a successful and energetic career, gave them an unusual sense of importance — especially in an Oriental land such as India, where it was necessary to exercise a paternal rule over immense districts thickly populated with all sorts and conditions of men. No wonder they came to regard themselves as actually the Government of India.

In spite of the splendid achievements of the Indian Civil Service, the natives became restless under an awe-inspiring régime operating for their own good, while the upper classes resented the monopoly of the high offices by the Englishmen. To meet this situation, the British began to realize that Indians must be admitted to the Civil Service and to seats in the legislative councils. Certain minor offices had been open to natives since the administration of Lord William Bentinck; but it was not till 1853 that the introduction of the competitive system opened the Indian Civil Service to Indians, and 1870 before duly selected natives entered automatically into the service. It was difficult, however, even then to secure competent and practical administrators from the natives; and Moslem officers could not always be trusted with power over Hindus (or Hindus over Mohammedans). Yet, in spite of these disadvantages and the handicap of having to take the examinations in England, some twelve Indians had secured important positions in the Indian Civil Service by 1887. To gain admission to the higher offices was, however, a slow process — even in the provinces. In Bengal, for instance, the number of Indians receiving a salary of four hundred rupees a month only rose from three to thirty-three between 1871 and 1908.

In local government, the proportion of natives employed was much greater. The British had admitted the natives to the minor offices in increasingly large numbers since 1833. The number was augmented considerably in 1879 when orders were issued forbidding the appointment to certain local offices of any one but a native of India.¹ And it was increased still further in 1893 when a new Provincial Service was created in each province, which included some of the Indian Civil Service posts and was composed almost entirely of Indians — particularly in the administrative and judicial branches — while below it stood a subordinate service of minor offices filled wholly by natives.² So it came about that, under the administration of Lord Curzon at the end of the nineteenth century, there were 1,500,000 Indian and 10,000 European officials drawing salaries below sixty pounds a year. And of the 28,300 persons holding governmental offices paying sixty pounds and above, 21,800 were Indian. Naturally, educated Indians and members of the higher classes desired the higher positions calling for executive ability and administrative power; and this demand had, in time, to be met. It was, however, rather a question of policy than of the ability of Indians to fill the great offices of state. "The question at issue," said Lord Curzon, "is rather, not what is the maximum number of offices that can safely be given to Indians, but what is the minimum number that must of necessity be reserved for Europeans."

The process of providing for native representation in legislative assemblies and on municipal boards was equally slow. As early as 1860, Sir Bartle Frere had advised against the "perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people with few means of knowing, except

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1894), *East India*, cd. 7378, pp. 102-04.

² *Ibid.*, cd. 7378, pp. 82-101.

by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not.”¹ The next year Lord Canning, who felt the cogency of this reasoning, secured the passage of the celebrated Indian Councils Act of 1861 restoring legislative powers to the provincial governments and creating a new legislative council for the Governor-General by adding from six to twelve members to his Executive Council. Of the additional members, at least one half must be “non-official” members, namely, persons not in the service of the Crown. Legislative councils were, accordingly, established at once in Madras and Bombay, in Bengal in 1862, in the United Provinces in 1886, and in the Punjab in 1897. Moreover, in the legislative councils of the first three provinces a number of Indians were appointed as “non-official” members. In this way the British Raj benefited greatly from the criticism of projects of law by the natives, and the intellectual class of Indians were initiated into the business of government.

At the same time the Government of India took steps to lay the foundations for self-government in the municipalities. Between 1870 and 1874, municipal acts were passed for Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and Bengal, the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and Lower Burma, by which rate-payers were allowed to elect a number of representatives to serve in the town corporations. Thus, natives were associated with Europeans in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical aid, charity, and local public works. Under Lord Ripon, by the passage of a series of acts in 1883-84, practical independence and responsibility were conferred upon the committees of many towns by permitting them to elect a private citizen as chairman in place of the executive officer previously nominated by the provincial govern-

¹ Quoted from *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India*, cd. 9109, sec. 60.

ment; while many items of provincial revenue were transferred to the control of municipal corporations. At the same time a system of local boards was established beginning with the unit of revenue administration known as "taluk," or small district. These local boards were entrusted with the management of funds for sanitation, public works, and education; and the principle of election by rate-payers, in place of nominations by the Government, was introduced.

All of these innovations were excellent in themselves; yet they were only a beginning in the work of preparing the people of India for self-government. No great progress toward national autonomy could be expected till the best men of the country were admitted to important offices of state for training and experience, and the people were educated in the principles of government, the use of elective machinery, and the duties of citizenship. Lord Dufferin, Viceroy from 1884 to 1888, and one of England's greatest statesmen, wrote, in a dispatch of 1888, "It now appears to my colleagues and to myself that the time has come . . . to give a still wider share in the administration of public affairs to such Indian gentlemen as, by their influence, their acquirements, and the confidence they inspire in their fellow countrymen, are marked out as fitted to assist with their counsels the responsible rulers of the country."¹ As a result of his efforts and of those of his successor, Lord Lansdowne (1888-94), the Indian Councils Act of 1892 was passed, authorizing an increase in the number of members of the provincial legislative councils and empowering the Governor-General in Council, with the approval of the India Office, to provide for the nomination or election of these members.² Accord-

¹ Lord Dufferin's Minute of November, 1888.

² 55 and 56 Victoria, c. 14.

ingly, the indirect election of about one third of the provincial legislative councils was made possible.

No system of universal suffrage, however, was introduced, for India was not ready for that. Instead, nominating bodies from the native population, including municipal corporations of large cities, groups of municipal and district boards, owners of large estates, chambers of commerce, and universities recommended members to the provincial governors for appointment on the councils. These "elected members" were never in the majority, however, and seldom reached the number of eight. But the scheme admirably served the needs of the day; and under it India was governed for the next seventeen years. Much good resulted from the application of the elective principle; and, as the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* remarks, "the association of the leaders of the non-official public in the management of affairs even in a restricted and rudimentary form afforded an outlet for national aspirations and some slight degree of education in the government."¹

¹ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India*, cd. 9109, sec. 72.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RULE OF INDIA (*continued*)

“THE mills of the gods grind slowly”; but not more slowly than British reform movements. The intentions of British statesmen were excellent; their motives of the best. But they were not convinced — even at the close of the nineteenth century — of the need for expedition in the reorganization of the government of India. Nor did they realize the change which came over the East with the opening of the twentieth century; and it took a sudden explosion under the stern, coercive measures of a high-strung conservative Viceroy, such as the late Lord Curzon,¹ to awaken the British to the danger of delay and to the need for constructive governmental reform.

By education, training, and experience, Lord Curzon was eminently fitted to govern India. In addition to a parliamentary career he had made a study of Oriental politics, traveled extensively in the East, and written enlightening books about the peoples and countries of Asia. He was an administrator of rare ability; yet he failed completely to comprehend the spirit of the Orient and to gauge the pulse and current of its life. A compatriot has described him as follows: “There is no aristocracy left but ours capable of throwing up men like Lord Curzon, who assume rule over others like a cross of duty, and practice the duty like a vice. He is an extreme case even in his own class. Love of power for gain, or for the sake of some idea with which one is bursting, or to impress one’s neighbors is common enough, but these were not his motives. ‘I have only five years,’ he said when he became Viceroy of India. ‘For

¹ Lord Curzon died March 20, 1925.

such a task every year seems a minute, every minute a second — one might almost say there is hardly time to begin.' Here is love of power for its own sake, perhaps, but no vulgar lust; rather a passion for service that is almost a religion, a passion the more remarkable because he is by nature cold. It is the ardor of a mediæval prelate interpreting the ways of the immortals to men, magnificently ascetic, haughtily humble. For, haughty vice-regent as he was, Lord Curzon was deeply humble before the ideal of the *Pax Britannica* in Asia which he served." ¹

As a "benevolent despot," Lord Curzon sought to introduce efficiency and justice in the government; and, indeed, his economic and financial reforms were notable. He reduced the poor man's tax — the tax on salt; rescued the ryots in the Punjab from the greed of grasping money-lenders; introduced the principle of elasticity in the assessment of the land revenue; established coöperative credit societies for loaning money to cultivators; promoted irrigation works and railway construction; and, under his direction, improvements were made in the accommodation for third-class Indian passengers. According to Lovat Fraser, it was Curzon whose backing encouraged the development of the Tata Iron and Steel Company which has proved of inestimable benefit to both India and Great Britain.² And finally, it must be said that Curzon took India's side in the old controversy over the cotton duties. Nevertheless, this haughty advocate of efficiency lacked moderation and human understanding; and in attempting to reform the universities he blindly antagonized Indian opinion as it had never been antagonized before. It is true that the educational system was in need of reform. Curzon had inherited an unfortunate policy dating from the cele-

¹ London *Times*, January 31, 1921.

² *India under Curzon and After* (London 1911), pp. 326-27.

brated *Minute on Education* penned by Lord Macaulay in 1835. Macaulay, who was ignorant of both Sanskrit and Arabic, and who had no acquaintance with the rich realm of Indian literature and philosophy, had advocated the banishment of these studies from Indian universities and the concentration of attention on the study of the English language and literature and the Western sciences.¹ The Government of India followed his advice; and, to the error of forcing a veneer of Western culture upon unwilling Indians was added the mistake of selecting very inappropriate textbooks. As Paul E. Roberts has well said: "It would have been prudent to train the subject races for self-government by inculcating obedience to law and a sense of discipline. But the whole trend of English ideas for the next fifty years had been in the direction of a pronounced individualism and freedom from restrictive bounds of every kind. Englishmen with law-abiding habits and phlegmatic temperaments could indulge in revolutionary theories without any noticeable effect upon their practice. But the quicker and subtler brain of the Oriental is not so apt to keep speculation and action apart. The prose models, on which for many years Indian education was based, consisted of Burke, Bentham, Mill, and the philosophical Radicals. Absurdly enough, our Eastern subjects were prepared for taking their part in the government of the country by the study of writers who taught that government itself was at best a necessary evil. We attempted to raise a race of administrators on the literature of Revolt."²

By Curzon's time the universities had acquired the char-

¹ G. O. Trevelyan, *Life and Works of Lord Macaulay* (London: 1897), ix, pp. 404-07. The text of Macaulay's *Minute on Education* has recently been reprinted in *Report of Calcutta University Commission* (1917-19), vi, pp. 8-17.

² *Historical Geography of the British Dependencies: India*, viii, part 1, p. 304.

acter of official training schools; graduates expected to receive governmental posts for the asking. But, unhappily, the universities were overcrowded, and thousands of students were graduated each year when there was scarcely one tenth of that number of posts to be filled in all the civil or provincial services of the Empire. The professions of law and journalism could absorb but a small part of the newcomers, with the result that annually thousands of excitable young men, who had learned in college to criticize fearlessly every political and economic institution under the sun, were turned loose upon India; and, disappointed in not getting governmental positions, they vented their spleen by chronic agitation in their communities against the British Raj.

Moreover, the British rulers had not only made a grave mistake in limiting their support to institutions of higher learning instead of promoting normal and vocational schools to train teachers for the young and to prepare men for the trades, but they failed conspicuously to promote primary education. As a result, at the end of the nineteenth century, three out of every four country villages were without a school, barely one fifth of the boys in India ever saw the inside of a school, and scarcely one boy in a hundred completed a primary education, while the girls were even more neglected.¹

Such was the unhappy condition of education in India when Lord Curzon undertook his reform of the universities. The Indian Universities Bill of 1904 aimed to squeeze out of the faculties a large number of inefficient native instructors and to limit the number of students at the

¹ Compare *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1904), *East India* (Fourth Quinquennial Review of Education), cd. 2181, I, p. 135; II, pp. 79, 84, 107, 109; Sir John Strachey: *India, Its Administration and Progress* (London: 1911), ch. XVI; Joseph Chailley: *Administrative Problems of British India* (1910), pp. 478-527; J. Ramsay MacDonald: *Government of India* (1919), ch. XIII.

already overcrowded universities by raising the standards of admission and graduation. As might be expected, the bill raised a storm of protest from the natives, including such moderate leaders as Sir Pherozeshah Mehta and G. K. Gokhale. The Nationalists contended that Lord Curzon and his reforms aimed at strangling the intellectual life of India and at training the youth to become mere puppets of the British Raj, while they deplored the Viceroy's attitude of racial superiority.¹ Lord Curzon was not enough of a psychologist to understand the real nature of the native protest; and, without consideration for the popular outcry, the reforms were forced upon an unwilling nation.

The "intellectual class" might have submitted to Curzon's program had not the Universities Bill been followed by a blunder of enormous proportions; namely, the partition of Bengal. The division of this province of forty million people into two smaller provinces in the interest of more efficient administration was a measure which eminently commended itself to an apostle of efficiency, such as Lord Curzon. To listen to a popular protest against a measure of this nature was the last thing that an officer of his type would consent to do. For some reason not fully explicable to Western minds the partition of Bengal greatly offended the Bengalese. The high-caste Hindus protested that it placed the Mohammedans in a majority in the newly created province of Eastern Bengal, while Bengaiese Nationalists branded the measure as a degradation of the "Bengalee nation" and were not loath to tell the superstitious peasants that it was an insult to the terrible goddess Kali, the most popular of all Hindu deities in Bengal. Lord Curzon was aware of this agitation; yet he persisted in his plans.

¹ Compare G. K. Gokhale's powerful speech in the Governor-General's Legislative Council. (*Proceedings*, XLIII, March 4, 1904.)

After the partition went into effect, the agitation became violent. The vernacular press teemed with exhortations urging patriots to arise and destroy the British rulers.¹ The chief agitators resorted to the typical Oriental weapon, the boycott; and a ban was proclaimed upon Manchester goods in October, 1905. This was the beginning of the famous swadeshi movement to replace British fabrics with homespun materials. Students in Calcutta attacked merchants who sold Manchester goods; and B. G. Tilak in Poona took the lead in making bonfires of foreign fabrics. During the next three years the boycott appeared in Bengal and a number of other localities. It was never put in force throughout India, however, and its effect on British trade was not serious; for the decline in the importation of British yarns and cotton goods between 1905 and 1907 was comparatively insignificant.²

¹ When debating the Press Act, Sir Harvey Adamson quoted articles from the *Jugantar* and other native newspapers, one of which, in reference to the partition of Bengal, declared that "the ruthless knife of the butcher has severed in twain the throbbing body of the motherland" and exhorted all patriots to combine to avenge the sacrilege. Another article urged that blood be sacrificed to Kali; another that the Bengalese use the weapon of nihilists, namely, the bomb. In commenting on these quotations Sir Harvey said: "To an Englishman who knows not India, they would appear little more than bombast. But to impressionable and immature minds in the East they present an entirely different significance. We have already seen the terrible effect that they produce on the youthful student, and they must be judged by Eastern and not by Western standards. We have striking examples of how they convert the timid Bengali into the fanatical ghazi." (*Proceedings of the (Legislative) Council of the Governor-General in India* (1908), XLVII, pp. 9-12.) Among quotations from the vernacular press, a British paper in Calcutta quoted the following: "Mere words will not avail. Without the lathi and the bomb the Feringhi will not be brought to his senses. A Brahmin's curse on thee, Feringhi, that thou be consumed in the flame of India's brute force." (*The Englishman*, June 6, 1907, p. 12.)

² Compare *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1908), *East India (Trade)*, cd. 4390, pp. 24-25; *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1909), *East India (Trade)*, cd. 4912, pp. 34-35. The imports of British yarns into India fell from 45,780,000

Nevertheless, the swadeshi movement was the source of considerable annoyance and anxiety to the British authorities, because of the widespread political agitation which accompanied it, and the connection between it and the swaraj or home rule movement — so skillfully established by the leaders of the revolt. A national tone was struck by the founding of a national Bengali university. A new patriotic song called “Bande Mataram” (Hail, Motherland) stimulated the nationalistic aspirations; and a sort of universal sanction was given the movement by the National Indian Congress,¹ which, under the leadership of the conservatives, G. K. Gokhale and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, passed resolutions, at its Benares session in 1905, justifying the boycott and requesting the repeal of the partition of Bengal.²

Meanwhile, outside of the Congress the agitation increased in violence. Under the inspiration of reckless leaders, the Bengalese students adopted for the first time in Indian history the practice of hurling bombs at British officials. Numerous assaults and several assassinations occurred.³ The Government of India was compelled to

pounds in 1905–06 to 37,630,000 pounds in 1906–07. In the same period the value of imported cotton piece-goods declined from 390,177,000 rupees to 376,943,000 rupees — a comparatively small decrease.

¹ Lack of space forbids a description of this organization, which was founded in 1885 through the inspiration of Allan Octavian Hume and which has played a conspicuous rôle in Indian political life during the past thirty-five years. The reader is referred to: Sir William Wedderburn: *Allan Octavian Hume*; Sir Verney Lovett: *History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*; A. C. Mazumdar: *Indian National Evolution: A Brief Survey of the Origin and Progress of the Indian National Congress*.

² *Report of the Twenty-First Indian National Congress at Benares (1905)*, p. 31.

³ The story of the violent agitation is well told, although with sympathies leaning toward the English, by Sir Valentine Chirol in his *Indian Unrest* (London: 1910), chs. v–viii. The Indian side is told by Lajpat Rai: *Young India* (New York: 1916), chs. iv–v.

pass a Seditious Meetings Act, in 1907 and in 1908 an Explosive Substances Act, a Summary Justice Act, and a Press Act, the latter providing a sort of censorship of newspapers, pamphlets, and books. Even before the passage of the Press Act, the British undertook a vigorous prosecution of native newspapers for sedition;¹ and in July, 1907, a series of police raids began with the arrest and prosecution of the publishers of the notorious *Jugantar*. A year later, B. G. Tilak was arrested for a seditious article in his *Kesari* ("The Lion"), published in the vernacular in Bombay. He was sentenced to six years in jail and a fine of one thousand rupees. Thus, through the imprisonment and deportation of the leaders of swaraj, the British had the revolt well in hand by the end of the year 1909.

The Bengalese agitation was not without its effect upon the Home Government. When the Liberal Ministry was formed in 1905, the late Lord Morley, eminent Gladstonian and advocate of Home Rule in Ireland, was included in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for India — an appointment which presaged measures of reform in England's Eastern Empire. Englishmen were not prepared to surrender their control of India at the demand of agitators for swaraj, nor were they prepared to give India even that degree of home rule which G. K. Gokhale and the moderate leaders of the Indian National Congress desired; nevertheless, the sound political sense of British men of affairs led them to realize that reforms were necessary, reforms which would associate the best leaders of the Indian people more closely with the British rulers, and prevent in the future such egregious blunders as had marred the administration of Lord Curzon. The new Viceroy, Lord Minto, was recep-

¹ A complete list of prosecutions for seditious speeches and writings, numbering eighty-one cases, is given in *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1909), *East India* (*Prosecutions for Speeches, etc.*), H. C. 50.

tive to reforms; and the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, with the aid of some of the most brilliant officers of the Indian Civil Service, collaborated in drafting a scheme of reforms which was finally enacted into law by the British Parliament in 1909.¹

The authors of the Morley-Minto reforms did not aim to democratize the political institutions of India. They did not even intend to launch India upon the path of parliamentary government; and Lord Morley indignantly denied such aims in the House of Lords.² Their object was to carry the old system of British rule, based as it was on Moghul autocracy, to its logical conclusion, and to provide a method whereby the paramount power could obtain the ablest advice and coöperation of the well-informed and conservative opinion of native India. As a preface to his reforms, Morley began with the appointment of two Indians to his Council of India at Whitehall; and this was followed in March, 1909, by the appointment of the first native to a position on the Governor-General's Executive Council.³ As to the legislative councils, we should recall that the Indian Councils Act of 1892 had given India a meager system of representation; this was enlarged by the Indian Councils Act of 1909.⁴ Electorates were formed

¹ Lord Minto claimed the lion's share of the honor of framing the so-called Morley-Minto Reforms. (*Proceedings of the (Legislative) Council of the Governor-General of India* (1909-10), XLVIII, p. 48.) But whoever reads the dispatches and letters that passed between Secretary and Viceroy must be convinced that Morley's was the initiating and guiding hand.

² *Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series* (December 17, 1908), vol. 198, p. 1935.

³ John Morley, *Recollections*, II, pp. 160-61, 216-28, 294, 301-03, 334-35.

⁴ Technically speaking, the Morley-Minto reforms consisted of two enactments by the British Parliament — the Council of India Act of 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 35) and the Indian Councils Act of 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 4) — and the statutory rules made by the Government of India under the authority of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. The latter were published

out of municipal corporations, universities, chambers of commerce, the zamindars or large landholders, and certain business and professional classes. In five of the provinces, the Mohammedans were given special representation as minority constituencies; while in the Punjab, both the Mohammedan community and the Sikh landlords were given minority representation. The Governor-General's Legislative Council still retained its majority of "official" members as necessary to ensure the uninterrupted power of the Government of India to fulfill the constitutional obligations that it owed to the Home Government. In the provincial legislative councils, however, the "official" majority was abandoned, and here the representatives of the constituencies outnumbered the representatives of the Government. The councils had the right of debate upon the budget and of criticizing the administrative policy in all its phases, but they were powerless to withhold supplies and to control or hamper the administration. Nevertheless, the Morley-Minto reforms constituted a forward step in the development of Indian politics, for the Act of 1909 gave British officialdom the advantage of a broader native criticism, and it furnished the Indians with better means of popular protests.

The Indian Councils Act of 1909 was a bitter disappointment to the intellectuals who had hoped for swaraj, or at least for a parliamentary system. The Bengalese Nationalists were unplaced because the reforms did not include a rectification of Curzon's blunder in partitioning Bengal. But G. K. Gokhale, although himself disappointed with the Morley-Minto reforms, put aside his regrets and eloquently led a campaign in favor of coöperation. Gokhale

in *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1910), *East India (Executive and Legislative Councils)*, ed. 4787. The standard commentary on the Morley-Minto legislation is Sir Courtney Ilbert: *Government of India* (Oxford: 1915), pp. 108-35.

won the support of the intellectuals, rescued the Indian National Congress from the control of the radicals, and ensured the success of the reformed councils. It was clear, however, that India could not have peace until the partition of Bengal was repealed. Morley stubbornly opposed it as long as he was in office; but in a few years the good sense of Englishmen prevailed, and in Lord Hardinge's vice-regency, at the Delhi Durbar of 1911, presided over by the Emperor and Empress themselves, the announcement was made of the removal of the capital to Delhi and the rescinding of the partition of Bengal. This inexpensive reversal of policy brought rejoicing from the voluble native press and won hearty coöperation from many former malcontents.¹

Meanwhile, trouble was brewing in other sections of the Empire. Although some of the leaders of the "intellectual class" accepted the reform councils in good faith, and coöperated loyally in the work of putting into operation the new program, one powerful group rejected utterly the reforms and continued to demand swaraj vigorously. When the inadequacy of the Morley-Minto reforms became more apparent to British and Indians alike, these agitators had considerable ground for attack. Conspicuous among them was the well-known Bal Gangadhar Tilak whom Sir Valentine Chirol has called the "father of Hindu unrest." Belonging by birth to a powerful Brahman caste of the

¹The *Bengalee* of Calcutta, which for years had led the opposition to the British in Bengal, said: "The annals of modern India do not present a wiser or more brilliant or more far-reaching act of statesmanship than that which history will record to the credit of His Majesty King George V. . . . The whole of Bengal, and, we may add, the whole of India, will receive this Royal message, uniting the sundered provinces, with an outburst of enthusiastic gratitude that has never been equaled within the living memory. Once again, peace, contentment, and happiness will reign throughout the length and breadth of these provinces. The root-cause of the unrest will disappear." (The *Bengalee* (Calcutta), December 13, 1911, p. 4.)

Deccan, learned in Sanskrit literature and philosophy, editor of one of the most powerful vernacular newspapers in India, Tilak did not scruple to appeal to the most inflammable Oriental prejudices in opposing the British Raj in India. He had been imprisoned during the bomb-throwing episodes of 1908. Released from jail in 1914, he led the movement whereby the radical Nationalists captured the Congress at Lucknow in 1916. A coadjutor in this struggle was Mrs. Annie Besant, an Englishwoman of remarkable character, well known as president of the Theosophical Society, whose widely circulated newspaper *The New India* had raised the slogan of "Home Rule for India." An equally idealistic leader was Arabinda Ghosh, a scholar who had received a Cambridge education where he took first honors in classics, but whose eloquent articles in the press urging his compatriots to hatred of the British had probably incited much of the bomb-throwing in 1907-12. But able as the leaders were and inadequate as the Morley-Minto reforms proved to be, it is doubtful whether these things would have moved the British to modify the government of India had it not been for the great conflict in Europe. The Great War profoundly changed the course of Indian history.

In August, 1914, the outbreak of the Great War occasioned a remarkable display of loyalty and devotion to the King-Emperor on the part of the princes and peoples of India. If the enemies of British rule had hoped that, in such a crisis, India would strike a blow for independence, their hopes were not realized. Nearly all the ruling rajas placed their military forces and the resources of their states at the disposal of the Empire. Within two and a half months of the declaration of war, Indian troops were actually at the front in France. During the war, nearly 1,300,000 soldiers and non-combatants were recruited on

Indian soil; some of these troops saw service on the battle-fields of France, others in the Mesopotamia campaigns, and others in Egypt, Palestine, and East Africa; while a large number took the place of British troops withdrawn from the Indian army and stationed on the northwest frontier. The expense of training and equipping the Indian soldiers and even their support abroad was borne by the Government of India. Besides these contributions in men and equipment, India also made in 1918 a "free gift" of £100,000,000 to the British Empire, raised by means of war loans. Other gifts from the ruling rajas alone reached £5,000,000.¹

Naturally, this contribution of India to the cause of the Allies placed in the hands of the radicals a new and almost irresistible argument for political reforms. At the same time they were greatly favored by two events. The first was the passing of the great moderate leaders — Sir Pherozeshah Mehta and G. K. Gokhale — whose death in 1915 enabled the radicals to take control of the Indian National Congress at Lucknow in 1916, and to assume the direction of the Nationalist movement. The second was the unprecedented *approchement* of the Hindu and Moslem leaders. The jealousies between the sixty-nine million Mohammedans and the two hundred and seventeen million Hindus had long been an outstanding argument for the existence of British rule in India. For years the Moslems had stood aloof from the Indian National Congress, and had been considered a prop of the British administration; while the Hindus had inaugurated all the movements for

¹ India's contribution to the Empire during the Great War is summarized by Dr. Rushwood Williams in ch. 1 of the official volume *India in 1917-1918* (Calcutta); also published as *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1919), *East India* (*Progress and Condition*), H. C. 149. Compare Lord Sydenham: *India and the War* (London: 1915), and *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1914), *East India* (*Military*), cd. 7624.

independence, and resented bitterly the creation of the All-Indian Moslem League in 1906 and the granting of minority representation to Moslems in the Morley-Minto councils. However, the declaration of war on Turkey by the Allies and the rising of the King of the Hedjaz against the Sultan at the instigation of Great Britain aroused the Moslems of India, as it did those in other parts of the Near and Middle East. In this way the Mohammedans were driven into the camp of the Indian Nationalists; and, in December, 1916, at Lucknow, the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League came together and demanded of the British a definite platform of reforms, popularly known as the Congress-League Scheme.

Already, it was apparent to all that the Morley-Minto reforms were a failure due to their own inherent defects, to the rapid evolution of public opinion in India, and to the precipitation of democratic feeling occasioned by the Russo-Japanese War and the events and doctrines of the Great War period. "The reforms of 1909 afforded no answer, and could afford no answer, to Indian political problems," exclaims the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* of 1918. "Narrow franchises and indirect elections failed to encourage in members a sense of responsibility to the people generally, and made it impossible, except in certain constituencies, for those who had votes to use them with perception and effect. The conception of a responsible executive . . . was not admitted. Power remained with the Government and the councils were left with no functions but criticism. . . . The Morley-Minto reforms in our view are the final outcome of the old conception which made the Government of India a benevolent despotism (tempered by a remote and only occasionally vigilant democracy), which might as it saw fit for purposes of enlightenment consult the wishes of its subjects. . . . We have at present in India neither

the best of the old system nor the best of the new. Responsibility is the savor of popular government, and that savor the present councils wholly lack.”¹

In April, 1916, immediately after his arrival in India, the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, entered energetically upon a study of the improvement of the Morley-Minto reforms, which his predecessor, Lord Hardinge, had begun. The Coalition Government of Lloyd George admitted the necessity for further concessions to the Indian people; and, on August 20, 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, made his famous announcement to the House of Commons that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.” In the last months of 1917, Montagu and his staff personally visited India; and, after careful study and consultation with official and non-official personages in all walks of life, the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*,¹ outlining the proposed new reform legislation, was drawn up, and published in the summer of 1918.

In undertaking the study of reforms, the authors of the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* found that the preliminary spade work had already been accomplished. First, in point of time, was a scheme prepared shortly after the outbreak of the Great War by the eminent statesman, G. K. Gokhale.² Then followed a *Memorandum* prepared

¹ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India*, cd. 9109, sec. 81.

² *London Times*, August 15, 1917, p. 7; *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India (Constitutional Reforms: Addresses Presented to the Viceroy and State)*, cd. 9178, pp. 101-03.

by Sir William Duke in 1915 suggesting the system of dyarchy in the provincial governments — a suggestion accepted by the authors of the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, also the Congress-League Scheme adopted at Lucknow in 1916, as well as a Joint Address prepared by eminent Hindu and Mohammedan gentlemen with the aid of Mr. Lionel Curtis in 1917. All of these various plans aimed at decentralization of powers in India (in other words, at a transfer of powers from the Government of India to the provinces), as well as at the enlargement of the scope of the legislative councils. Gokhale's plan had accepted the Morley-Minto councils practically as they existed; the Governor's Executive Council was to be appointed by the Crown while the provincial legislative councils were to be elected by the same restricted electorates which had been set up by the Morley-Minto reforms. He was not aiming at an extension of popular control; but he did intend that the legislature should possess the power to vote the budget and thus have the power to check the executive or at least to force the executive to make compromises in administrative policies. The Congress-League Scheme went beyond Gokhale's plan in proposing that resolutions passed by the provincial legislative councils should be binding on the executive governments. Both of these plans were commendable for the proposal to establish some degree of provincial autonomy, but both were open to the objection that they invited friction between the executive and legislative departments. As President Lowell has well said: "Parliamentary government avoids deadlocks by making the executive responsible to the legislature. Presidential government limits deadlocks, because all the organs of the state must ultimately submit to a superior tribunal, the electorate of the nation. But a legislature elected by the people,

coupled with a Governor appointed by a distant power, is a contrivance for fomenting dissensions and making them perpetual.”¹

The *Duke Memorandum*, on the other hand, proposed a limited devolution of powers from the Government of India to the provinces and, within the provinces, a scheme of limited responsibility on the part of the legislative councils, while at the same time the franchise for the councils should be broadened.² The *Memorandum* avoided the folly of taking the control of administration from the Governor and his permanent officials and giving it to the elected majority of the Council. There were some subjects, like military affairs, relations with the native states and imperial finance which were vital to the British connection and could not be submitted to popular control. But on the other hand, there were subjects like education, sanitation, and public works which could, with safety, be placed in the hands of responsible heads of departments. Hence, the *Duke Memorandum* proposed to divide the functions of government between two kinds of cabinet officers, both sitting in one cabinet under the presidency of the Governor, the one kind being the heads of departments not under the control of the legislature, the other kind being the heads of departments chosen from the membership of the legislature and subject to its control. Such was the original suggestion of what later came to be known as the “dyarchy,” or dual government.

In framing their program, the authors of the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* adopted the “dyarchy” as outlined in the *Duke Memorandum*, but they proposed to restrict its application to the provinces. They favored the progressive

¹ A. Lawrence Lowell: *Government of England* (1914), II, p. 416.

² In its most convenient form the *Duke Memorandum* is found in Lionel Curtis: *Dyarchy*, pp. 3-37.

realization of self-government for India, but they saw no good reason at this time for altering the responsibility of the Government of India to the British Parliament, or for the wholesale inauguration of local autonomy. After an opportunity was afforded for discussion and criticism, and a committee of Englishmen and Indians — headed by Lord Southborough — had traveled through the provinces and reported, in February, 1919, on the problems of the franchise and the division of functions, the recommendations of the *Report* were embodied in the Government of India Bill which was passed by both houses of Parliament¹ and received the royal assent in December, 1919.²

This Government of India Act³ is the present constitution of India, and the first of the fundamental laws which will create the self-governing India of the future. In accordance with British legislative practice, the language of the act was general, while the details were to be worked out in statutory rules by the Governor-General in Council, with the sanction of the Secretary of State for India. In this way an elasticity has been attained which would not otherwise be possible, for it is not every year that a busy

¹ *Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons*, vol. 116, pp. 1428, 2295, 2411; vol. 121, p. 631; vol. 122, p. 429; *House of Lords*, vol. 34, pp. 973, 1053, 1127; vol. 35, pp. 263, 422; vol. 37, pp. 516, 740, 940.

² *Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons*, vol. 122, pp. 649, 757, 790, 838; vol. 123, pp. 943, 1301; *House of Lords*, vol. 37, pp. 940, 974, 1050; vol. 38, pp. 111, 362, 439, 538.

³ The Government of India Act of 1919 is cited as 9 and 10 George V, c. 101. The text is published in *Public General Acts* (1919), pp. 519-45. In 1915, all the fundamental British statutes relating to the government of India were consolidated into a new Government of India Act, cited as 5 and 6 George V, c. 61. After the enactment of the Government of India Act of 1919, the new act itself was consolidated with the Government of India Act of 1915 and published by the Stationery Office as *Government of India Act* (1915-16), *Showing Amendments Made by the Government Act of 1919*. This document will be cited hereafter as *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919).

Parliament can find time to pass a Government of India Bill. Accordingly, the power to expand the fundamental law of India whenever expedient, to adjust the new legislation to the varying conditions in the provinces, and to determine such vital questions as the division of powers and of revenue between the central government and the provinces, the procedure of councils, the communal electorates, woman suffrage, and the qualifications for electors, was delegated to the authority — Governor-General in Council — best qualified to deal justly and expeditiously with such matters.

The new régime of provincial administration was begun by the establishment of a sort of federal form of government. All questions subject to legislation have been officially classified under "central subjects" and "provincial subjects." Among the central subjects under the Devolution Rules of 1920 are: defense of India, central police organization, foreign affairs, relations with the native states, railways, navigation, telegraphs and telephones, customs, cotton excises, income tax and salt tax, civil and criminal law procedure, banking and insurance, emigration, and immigration.¹ Provincial subjects comprise a long list, being divided into two groups, "reserved subjects" and "transferred subjects." Reserved subjects are under the control of the Governor and his Executive Council; while transferred subjects are under the control of the Governor acting on the advice of Ministers chosen from the elected members of the provincial legislature. In other words, the administration of reserved subjects in each province is under the complete control of the representative of the Crown, but the administration of transferred subjects is under the control of the representative of

¹ *Rules under the Government of India Act* (1919, H.M. Stationery Office: 1920), Devolution Rules no. 3, schedule 1, pt. II, pp. 253-58.

the Crown acting with Ministers chosen from the elected members of the provincial legislature. This is the system of dyarchy, duality, or double government, as it is variously called. Among the more important reserved subjects are land-revenue administration, famine relief, irrigation, forests, civil and criminal courts, police, and prisons.¹ Among the transferred subjects are local self-government in municipalities and district boards, medical administration, public health and sanitation, hospitals, dispensaries, asylums, public education, public works, roads, bridges, coöperative societies, and regulation of the liquor traffic.²

While responsible government has been introduced into the provinces, autocracy still remains in the central government. At the head of the administration is the Governor-General, or Viceroy, assisted by the Governor-General's Executive Council, who manage the eleven departments of Home, Foreign, Political, Finance, Army, Public Works, and so on. The old Governor-General's Legislative Council has given place to a new bicameral legislature consisting of the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly, the former having about sixty members and the latter about one hundred and forty members.³ Under the Electoral Rules of 1920, the Governor-General nominates twenty-six members of the Council of State and forty of the members of the Assembly.⁴ Remaining members are elected by a limited electorate defined under statutory rules. It will thus be seen that the official *bloc* which was formerly used to vote down so many popular measures has disappeared

¹ *Rules under the Government of India Act* (1919, H.M. Stationery Office: 1920), Devolution Rules no. 3, schedule I, pt. II, pp. 253-58.

² *Rules under the Government of India Act* (1919, H.M. Stationery Office: 1920), Devolution Rules no. 6, schedule II, pp. 253-60.

³ *Government of India Act* (1919), secs. 17-19; *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919), secs. 63-64.

⁴ *Rules under the Government of India Act* (1919, H.M. Stationery Office: 20), Electoral Rules no. 3, pp. 126, 192.

from the legislature; but, since the Governor-General may disallow laws or may enact any bill rejected by either house of the legislature through his peculiar power of "certification," it is apparent that full autocratic authority remains in the hands of the Governor-General. More than this, the elected members of the legislature are not associated with the Governor in the administration of India; for none of the department chiefs are chosen from the elected members, and, so far as the central government is concerned, there are no "transferred" subjects.

In the nine Governor's provinces, the Governor's Executive Council consists of four members.¹ The Governor and his Executive Council administer the reserved subjects; while the Governor and Ministers, two or three in number, appointed from the elected members of the Legislative Council, administer transferred subjects.² The Governor's Legislative Council consists of nominated members, official members, and elected members in the proportion of about one, two, and ten.³ The size of the Legislative Councils varies in the various Governor's provinces, from one hundred and thirty-nine members in Bengal to fifty-three in Assam.⁴ The number of seats is determined by statutory rules; and all matters relating to the vexatious questions of qualification of members, qualification of native

¹ *Government of India Act* (1919), sec. 5; *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919), sec. 47. The Act of 1919 provided for eight Governors' provinces, including the three old presidencies of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and the five provinces of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, and Assam. In 1923, Burma became a Governor's Province.

² *Government of India Act* (1919), sec. 9; *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919), sec. 51.

³ *Government of India Act* (1919), sec. 7; *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919), sec. 72A.

⁴ *Government of India Act* (1919), schedule 1; *Government of India Act* (1915 and 1919), schedule 1.

electors, establishment of constituencies and communal electorates are likewise regulated by statutory rules.

With a view to admitting more Indians into the administration, the Government of India Act of 1919 delegated to the Secretary of State in Council power to "make rules for regulating the classification of civil services in India, the methods of their recruitment, their conditions of service, pay and allowances, and their discipline and conduct."¹ Accordingly, rules were made and steps taken by the India Office to promote a considerable Indianization of the Indian Civil Service,² and to award more high posts to natives, while provincial legislative councils with native majorities were endowed with the control of policies vitally affecting the work of the Civil Servants. As a result, the services are becoming progressively "Indianized," and the Indian Civil Servant has become merely an executive agent of the Government with a consequent loss of legislative capacity.

Just how far this "Indianization" will go in the near future is a matter of conjecture, although it seems probable that, whenever India becomes self-governing (whatever form of self-government is developed), the Indian Government will require British aid and agency. But this is a matter which the future self-governing Government of India must determine for itself. It is hoped that the task remaining to be accomplished in India, although different in kind, will be no less beneficently accomplished than that of the old romantic rule from the saddle. The new task will be undoubtedly more delicate and difficult and dangerous; for the Englishmen who remain by the side of the Oriental ruler of the coming generations will lack the authority of sovereignty and will necessarily depend upon

¹ *Government of India Act* (1919), sec. 36; (1915 and 1919), sec. 96B.

² See *India Office List*, 1922.

more subtle resources of political experience and a knowledge of the psychology of the East.

With the growth of self-government in India, the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms anticipated a corresponding decrease in the direct supervision of the British Parliament and a steady decline in the intervention of the Secretary of State for India in the day-to-day administration of Indian affairs. Accordingly, the salary of the Secretary of State has been transferred from the Indian budget to the British exchequer; and a Select Committee on Indian Affairs, composed of both Commons and Lords, has been instituted with the hope that its members, by reason of their experience and wisdom, would keep Parliament informed on Indian affairs, and promote steadily the development of political institutions in India under Parliamentary guidance.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Act was hailed by liberals all over the world as a step forward in colonial government. But in India, opinion was divided. The extreme Nationalists, under the leadership of B. G. Tilak, Annie Besant, and Mohandas Gandhi, expressed bitter discontent, claiming that the reforms were a sham and far from being a fulfillment of the promise of August 20, 1917. On the other hand, the moderate leaders, although disappointed in not obtaining a full measure of responsible government, were willing to accept the principle of dyarchy as a good beginning for a new constitutional development. The split between the moderates and the extremists came as early as the special Bombay Congress in August, 1918, scarcely a month after the publication of the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*. The following twelve months contained one of the strangest tragedies in the history of the British Empire. To appreciate fully the swaraj movement in 1918-19 we must remember that the end of the Great

War found India in an abnormal psychological condition. A terrible scourge of influenza had just swept over the land, carrying off 12,000,000 people; and, with the relaxation of the excitement of the world conflict, the public morale declined, while the suppressed aspirations of national independence broke forth with fury. At the same time, 69,000,000 Mohammedans chafed at the defeat of Turkey and the impending spoliation of the territory of the Caliph. With the growing unrest of the natives, there was an attendant apprehension on the part of the English community in India, an apprehension which was unduly increased in November, 1918, when the Rowlatt Sedition Committee published a report of highly nervous character picturing the existence of a criminal organization of enormous proportions.¹ A reaction in Anglo-Indian opinion against the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms now made itself strongly felt. Even the Viceroy appears to have shared in this reaction for he gave his support to two bills which would confer upon the Government extraordinary powers for the suppression of anarchy.

The Rowlatt Bills were introduced into the Governor-General's Council in February, 1919.² They raised a storm of protest from moderates and extremists alike. Mohammedans declared that the Government intended to arm itself with special powers before peace was signed in Europe, and before the fate of the Turkish Empire filled the Moslem community with dangerous discontent.³ Moderate leaders were suspicious that the Government

¹ *Report of Sedition Committee* (Calcutta: 1918); *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India (Sedition Committee)*, cd. 9190.

² *Proceedings of the (Legislative) Council of the Governor-General of India*, February 6, 1919; *Gazette of India*, January 18, 1919, pt. v, pp. 1-15, 121.

³ Information concerning these rumors is given in the speech of Srinavas Asatri. (*Gazette of India*, March 29, 1919, pt. vi, p. 757.)

aimed at rushing the bills through the Legislative Council in the belief that no legislature under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms could be persuaded to pass such measures. Extremist agitators denounced the bills as horrible weapons of a satanic government aiming to throttle free speech in India.

It was at this juncture that a new strategist appeared who took leadership out of the hands of Annie Besant and B. G. Tilak, and became the revered hero and saint of the extreme Nationalists. In February, 1919, Mohandas Gandhi announced that he would lead a passive resistance, or satyagraha, movement if the Rowlatt Bills became laws. This news caused consternation to the British and apprehension among the moderates. Annie Besant, with her keen understanding of Hindu psychology, solemnly warned Gandhi that his satyagraha movement would loosen forces that were bound to bring disaster. But Mohandas Gandhi refused this advice, believing that by invoking passive resistance to civil law he could coerce the Government into abandoning the Rowlatt Bills. Accordingly, on the first of March, a pledge was published binding his followers to refuse obedience to any laws designated by his central committee, while at the same time they must faithfully refrain from all forms of violence. Students and enthusiasts seized upon the pledge; and local committees were formed to educate the masses in the principles of passive resistance. At the same time rumors swept the bazaars like wildfire and were carried to the ryots in far-away villages that the Rowlatt Bills directed policemen to arrest any three Indians seen conversing together, and that the British Raj intended to interfere with the private life and customs of the Indian people.

Under these conditions the avoidance of violence was well-nigh impossible. On March 30th, the Nationalists in

Delhi ordered a hartal or suspension of business. The episode ended in an affray with the troops in which several persons were killed. This was the signal for a terrific outbreak of mob violence throughout northern India and the Bengal Presidency. In the Punjab, particularly, the disorders increased, culminating in a terrible affair at Amritsar, in the course of which General Dyer, nervously on edge because of an immense popular demonstration, ordered his troops to fire on the helpless citizens, killing some three hundred and seventy-nine and wounding about twelve hundred. This brutal outrage was bad enough; but the attempt of the Hunter Commission of investigation to whitewash the affair was worse.¹ Consequently, these Punjab grievances, combined with the so-called attack of the European states upon the Moslem Caliphate at Constantinople aroused deep resentment throughout the country, and furnished the Nationalists with fuel for a campaign of intense hatred.

Meanwhile, the satyagraha movement was taking on tremendous proportions through the remarkable personal influence of its leader. His words fascinated young students in the schools and universities, who longed for that traditional intimacy between master and pupil that Indians relish so highly. With bated breath they spoke of Gandhi as the Mahatma or Great Teacher; while thousands of them preached his doctrine of "non-coöperation with a satanic government"; and his reputation as a defender of Indian rights in Africa, his ascetic life, and the inherent power of his doctrine of soul-force gained for him the

¹The report of the Hunter Committee was published as *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1920), *East India*, cmd. 681. The results of the investigation by the Indian National Congress were published as *Report of the Commission Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress* (Lahore and Bombay: 1920). A scathing criticism of the British conduct made by an Englishman is Benjamin G. Horniman's *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (London: 1920).

reputation of a saint and the support of millions of his fellow citizens.

In August, 1920, when the electoral arrangements under the Montagu-Chelmsford Act were published, the Indian National Congress led by Gandhi called upon Indian patriots to refuse to coöperate with the new régime and to boycott the elections. The proclamation of the Congress urged students to leave the schools and universities, lawyers and litigants to boycott the British courts and carry their cases into private arbitration courts, candidates to refuse nomination for the reformed councils, and voters to stay away from the polls.¹ Under the delusion that swaraj could be obtained in one year, this program was launched with characteristic enthusiasm. But despite the admonitions of the National Congress and the immense popularity of the Mahatma, candidates of good character offered themselves for almost every one of the seven hundred and seventy-four seats in the two chambers of the Indian Legislature and the eight provincial councils. Because of the grievance of the Moslems over the Sèvres Treaty, there was a dearth of candidates in the Mohammedan urban constituencies in the Bombay Presidency and in the Punjab; but in other sections of India there was no lack of candidates. On the various election days in November and December, 1920, about one half of the six million qualified electors in India went to the polls and voted for representatives in the legislative councils.² The satyagraha movement thus failed to wreck the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Many of the followers of Mohandas Gandhi, of course, refused to use the ballot; and the result of their non-coöperation was the election of more conserva-

¹ The *Bengalee* (Calcutta), September 9, 1920, p. 4; Mohandas Gandhi: *Swaraj in One Year* (Madras: 1921), pp. 10-13.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1921), *East India (Constitutional Reforms: Return Showing the Results of the Elections in India)*, cmd. 1261.

tive members to the councils than would have been elected if the radical followers of Gandhi had gone to the polls.

After the elections, the legislative councils in the Governors' provinces were organized and began to function, while the new Indian Legislature was opened at Delhi in February, 1921, by the Duke of Connaught, who came to India for this specific purpose. His eloquent words deploring the shadow of Amritsar which had lengthened over the fair face of India, and his whole-hearted appeal to forgive the past, did much to quench the hatreds due to the Punjab grievances; and the sympathetic attitude maintained by the Government toward the expressions of criticism on this ground did much to pave the way to coöperation in the future.¹ Moreover, the Government showed a conciliatory attitude toward the demand for repealing the oppressive legislation of the past twelve years, including such unpopular acts as the Press Act of 1910. Within a year most of this legislation was written off the statute book with the result that another obstacle hindering good relations was removed. In spite of the fact that there were no ministers responsible to either chamber of the Indian Legislature, political parties made their appearance and assumed definite organization.

In the provinces the new governments ran smoothly. Some of the native politicians, who before the reforms had been leaders of the non-official majority in the Governor-General's Legislative Council, now chose the provincial councils as a scene of their careers. Here they had opportunity to become Ministers of "transferred subjects," and thus display their talents for administration as well as for parliamentary leadership. Among these leaders was Surendranath Banerjea, the veteran editor of the *Bengalee*,

¹ Compare the speech of Sir William Vincent: *Legislative Assembly Debates*, I, pt. I, February 15, 1921.

who now preferred a seat in the Legislative Council of Bengal rather than one in the Indian Legislature in Delhi, and whom the Governor of the province appointed to head the department of Local Government and Sanitation. Native politicians soon found the task of managing the departments and pleasing the legislatures more difficult than they had anticipated. And probably most of them were sincerely glad that India had not been given a larger measure of self-government until years of political experience should teach them moderation and willingness to compromise. On the other hand, the ministers found that the governors of the provinces had accepted the reforms in the same spirit as the liberal Secretary of State, and every courtesy and coöperation was offered on the side of the Executive Council. This was true not only in Bengal, but also in all the other provinces. In the words of Sir Valentine Chirol: "The policy, wisely adopted by Provincial Governors, of treating the two wings of their Government as equally associated with them in a common task of governance, has robbed the distinction between 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects, if not of all reality, at any rate of the invidious appearance of discrimination which might otherwise have attached to the word 'dyarchy.' As one Provincial Governor remarked to me, 'We are in reality skipping the dyarchy stage.' Indian Ministers, kept fully informed and drawn into consultation on all subjects, are learning to understand the difficulties of government and administration of which, as outside critics, they had little notion, and to value the experience and knowledge which their European colleagues and subordinates freely place at their disposal, whilst the latter benefit both from hearing the Indian point of view and from having to explain and justify their own."¹

¹ *India Old and New* (London: 1921), p. 238.

The failure of the non-coöperation movement to wreck the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms did not sound the death-knell of the satyagraha movement. Doggedly the followers of the Mahatma continued their agitation against the British Raj. In June, 1921, Mohandas Gandhi launched his supreme effort: the boycott against imported cloth and the promotion of household manufacture of khaddar, or homespun clothing. Thousands of Indian students picketed the bazaars to induce merchants to refrain from selling, and shoppers from buying, imported cotton goods. Bonfires were made of British calicoes; and, in a short time, stacks of "Gandhi caps" and khaddar cloth were ostentatiously displayed in the booths. But khaddar manufactured in the homes proved so crude and expensive a product that the finer imported cottons and silks were really much cheaper in price. And, while the year 1921 was, in the words of T. M. Ainscough, "one of the most depressed and difficult periods in the whole history of British trade relations with India,"¹ due chiefly to poor crops, high prices, and the decline in the value of the rupee, the boycott was a failure.

Meanwhile, Mohandas Gandhi, who had skillfully woven his satyagraha movement around the "Caliphate wrongs" and the "Punjab grievances," found himself at loggerheads with his Moslem supporters. The violent utterances of the Ali brothers, who attempted to turn the Caliphate Conference at Karachi in July, 1921, into a holy war against Great Britain, the warlike boast of the Caliphate volunteer organizations, and the Moplah outbreak in the following month very nearly broke up Gandhi's Hindu-Moslem combination. The resentment of the Nationalists over the arrest and imprisonment of the Ali brothers, however,

¹ *General Review of British Trade in India, 1919-21* (H.M. Stationery Office: 1921), ch. I.

afforded an unexpected opportunity to strike once more at the British Raj. Accordingly, Gandhi launched the last and most original weapon in his program: i.e., mass civil disobedience, the use of which was officially authorized by the All-India Congress Committee at Delhi early in November, 1921.

An experiment in the new movement was to be undertaken in the taluk of Bardoli under the personal direction of the Mahatma himself, but the attempt was postponed after the rioting of Gandhi's followers at Bombay upon the occasion of the arrival of the Prince of Wales. Consistent with his idealistic principles, after the use of violence the Mahatma refused to allow his disciples to proceed. By February, 1922, however, Mahatma Gandhi was persuaded that his followers were sufficiently disciplined to direct the opening of civil disobedience in that taluk. But once more his program was wrecked by an outburst of brutality, when the volunteers at Chari Chaura got out of hand and murdered some twenty constables and rural watchmen. And, for a second time, Gandhi countermanded civil disobedience.

But British patience was exhausted; and, on March 10th, the Mahatma was arrested and bound over for trial. By a curious coincidence, Edward S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India and a consistent opponent of Lloyd George's policy in the Near East, was forced out of office within a few hours of the imprisonment of Gandhi. He had committed the indiscretion of giving to the press a telegram from Lord Reading, Viceroy of India, urging the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.¹

The arrest of Mohandas Gandhi left his Hindu followers in a disorganized condition; while Indian Moslems were

¹ Concerning the relation between Montagu's resignation and the arrest of Gandhi see the *London Times*, March 11, 1922, p. 10; March 13, p. 12; March 16, p. 12.

bewildered by the action of the Angora Assembly in deposing Mohammed VI, who escaped under British protection to Malta. Finally, after Great Britain had signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Afghanistan in 1921 and become a party to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 creating a free and independent Turkey, the bubble of Pan-Islam, which had deluded millions of Mohammedans in India, burst. The last excuse for Moslem discontent disappeared. At the same time religious disputes in the Deccan and the Punjab showed that the old antagonism between Hindus and Mohammedans had reappeared; and it had become evident that not only had "civil disobedience" failed, but that Indians of all classes had become tired of the ceaseless agitation. In November, 1922, the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee of the Indian National Congress admitted frankly that mass civil disobedience was impractical; and the party of C. R. Das advocated at the same Congress that non-coöperators enter the reformed councils — a proposal finally adopted at the Congress at Delhi in September, 1923.

Meanwhile, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had passed beyond the experimental stage. Dyarchy was working satisfactorily in every province; and the new Indian Legislature was an improvement on the past. The campaign of the non-coöperators had very little effect upon the working of the new councils; and the influential people generally rallied to the support of the new régime.

It was to be expected that the native states would be affected materially by the Government of India Act of 1919, although it did not apply directly to them. Indeed, the British were in honor bound to consider the effect that the granting of self-government in the provinces would have upon the native states — especially in view of the important aid given by the ruling princes of India

to the Empire during the Great War. For there was little in common between the aspirations of Indian Nationalists — even of the moderate school — and the political ideals of the native princes bent on maintaining their independent existence; and agitation in British India might easily encourage and abet disorders and uprisings within the native states.

Accordingly, when the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were under consideration, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy encouraged a proposal for the establishment of a Chamber of Princes put forward by several ruling rajas of Rajputana; and informal conferences at Delhi in the winter of 1919–20 led to the formulation of a constitution for a Chamber of Princes.¹ Not all of the princes were prompt to associate themselves with the new chamber and some of the powerful rajas maintained an attitude of aloofness. Nevertheless, in February, 1921, the first session of the Chamber was opened by the Duke of Connaught sitting in the historic Audience Hall at Delhi. The Duke's emphatic reiteration of the inviolability of treaties dispelled the doubts of many of the princes, and the first session of the Chamber was inaugurated with enthusiasm. Naturally the extreme Nationalists saw in the Chamber of Princes a means of obstructing the democratic progress of India. The radical press denounced the rajas as an obstacle to Home Rule; and the agitation was carried into several of the native states. In view of the impending repeal of the Press Act of 1910, the second session of the Chamber of Princes in November, 1921, urged upon the Viceroy the need of legislation to protect the ruling princes against attacks in the provincial press of the provinces. The Viceroy agreed with the princes and, when the Legislative

¹ The text of the Constitution of the Chamber of Princes was published in the *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, February 8, 1921, pp. 55–62.

Assembly refused to pass the Indian States Protection against Disaffection Bill, he used his powers of certification and enacted the bill without the consent of the legislature.¹

Despite the fact that the functions of the Chamber are purely advisory, this institution promises to become a bulwark of defense for the integrity of the native states. As the *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* remarked, "the processes at work in British India cannot leave the states untouched and must in time affect even those whose ideas and institutions are of the most conservative and feudal character."² The Chamber of Princes was plainly intended to give the rajas some means of overcoming the handicap imposed upon them by the acceleration of the development of self-government in the provinces.

If India were free, what would be the first enactments of the new Government? To this question, almost nine out of ten educated Indians would reply: reduce the army, repeal the salt tax, and levy a protective tariff on cotton goods. This answer indicates that the financial and economic conditions of India are intimately reflected in her political aspirations. The salt tax, an inheritance from Moghul rule, has always been exceedingly unpopular. It is a burden upon the lowliest inhabitants of India; and the refusal of the British to give up this source of revenue has always been a cause of irritation. The doubling of the salt tax in March, 1923, by the Government of India's power of certification against the will of the Legislative Assembly — the second resort to this autocratic device since 1919 — almost imperiled the success of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. It is true that the enhancement of the tax rate was made in an heroic effort to balance the budget after a long period of annual deficits. Neverthe-

¹ London *Times*, September 26, 1921, p. 9; November 25, p. 9.

² *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms: Brit. Parl. Papers* (1918), *East India*, cd. 9109, sec. 312.

less, the use of this extremely unpopular tax, when other sources of revenue might have been explored, is an example of those stupid blunders which seem to imperil the existence of the British Empire.¹

The Indian people also resent being taxed to support the Indian army. For imperial defense, the British have felt it necessary to keep a large military force in India; and this army has been a charge, not upon the Home Government, but upon the revenues of India. To the mass of Indian people, the defense of the Khyber and northwest passes does not have the importance that it has in the eyes of the British. They do not fear the encroachment of the Russians or the Afghans; and they do not understand why they should be out of pocket to civilize the Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen. Hence, bitter complaints are made against the British Raj which, the Nationalists declare, has saddled the country with militarism.

It is true that the Government of India has often been admired as an economical government; and the praise has not been undeserved, in spite of the huge salaries paid to high officials who feel compelled to maintain a sort of Oriental splendor. Nevertheless, India is a poor country, where taxes pinch more sharply than in most countries, and the burden of the military defense imposed by the British is considerable. In the year 1856, the Indian army consisted of 40,000 European soldiers and 215,000 native soldiers besides 32,000 men in contingents paid by serving in native states. At the present time, notwithstanding the fact that the construction of railways has made the concentration of troops in India "ten times easier" than it was at the time of the Sepoy Mutiny, the army of India ordinarily comprises 75,000 British troops and a native

¹ Compare a trenchant editorial in the *Times of India* (Bombay), March 29, 1923, p. 5.

army of 160,000 troops, with the field and horse artillery manned entirely by the British.¹ And the cost of the army, which was £12,700,000 in the last year of Company rule, still remained at the high figure of £49,573,000 in a total budget of £127,300,000 three years after the Great War. Naturally, the publication of the *Esher Report*, which proposed a program of defense involving a further increase in the annual cost of the army in India, was met with a storm of protest. This report was made soon after the internal disturbances following the Great War and its framers entertained somewhat exaggerated ideas as to the necessities for imperial defense.² However, in 1923, to the immense satisfaction, if not surprise, of India, the Inchcape Committee (the wielder of the Geddes axe in India) recommended a very substantial reduction in military estimates, secured chiefly by decreasing the infantry forces,³ which was accepted by General Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief.

Notwithstanding the recent reduction in military expenditures, the army remains a difficult question, inasmuch as the Indian people are bound to begrudge its cost as long as it is not officered by natives. Previous to the Great War, the personnel of the commissioned officers was exclusively British. This was a sore grievance to aristocrats of the martial races like the Rajputs, the Sikhs, and the Marathas, who desired military careers and opportunity for obtaining high rank. The gallant conduct of Indian soldiers in the Great War, however, required recognition. Accordingly, during the War, more than one fifth of the King's commissions were given to Indians

¹ *India Office List*, 1922, pp. 378-79.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1920), *East India (Army in India Committee, 1919-20)*, cmd. 943.

³ A summary of the *Report of the Retrenchment Committee* is found in the *Indian Daily News* (Calcutta), March 3, 1923, p. 1.

who had won distinction in the field; and since the War, forty young Indians of good family have been appointed annually to England's celebrated military academy at Sandhurst and forty-four to the training college at Indore, with the intention of giving them, after graduation, commissions in the Indian army. But this was not enough to satisfy the popular demands for the Indianization of the army; and in March, 1921, the non-official majority in the Legislative Assembly carried resolutions that one fourth of the King's commissions granted each year should be given to His Majesty's Indian subjects.¹ The British, of course, are not prepared to grant such demands. For obvious reasons the Indianization of the army cannot proceed as rapidly as the Indianization of the Civil Service. If a large part of the army should become officered by natives, most Englishmen fear that the British rule would soon be ended. That day is a long way off; but the question remains a delicate problem of far-reaching political significance.

India is preëminently an agricultural country; but it is peculiarly subject to the disadvantages of an incomplete industrial development;² and its revenues have been derived, in large measure, from taxation on land. So that the question of the tariff raises the double problem of national income and protection of home industries. Indian protectionists recognize rightly the need of a new source for Indian revenue. And, although they realize that the increase of large industrial plants in India must necessarily be financed with capital attracted by the tariff protection, they contend that this capital could be found within the country, would be subject to Indian taxation, would em-

¹ *Legislative Assembly Debates*, March 28, 1921.

² Compare ch. iv in *Report of the Indian Industrial Commission* (1916-18), *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1919), *East India*, cmd. 51.

ploy Indian labor, and would not draw off the resources of the nation to Europe. In any event, they are unwilling to admit that Great Britain has the right to decide the matter for them. They believe that as long as India lacks fiscal autonomy, the tariff question will be decided in the interest of Lancashire and without consideration for the real interests of India.

The question is by no means settled, for, under the Montagu-Chelmsford Act, India certainly does not possess complete fiscal autonomy notwithstanding the popular misapprehension on this subject. At the same time the protectionist sentiments of the Indian people clash, not only with the free-trade principles, but also with the preferential system which Great Britain decided to follow in 1919.¹ Yet, as the Joint Select Committee of the British Parliament on the Government of India Bill in 1919 said: "Nothing is more likely to endanger the good relations between India and Great Britain than a belief that India's fiscal policy is dictated from Whitehall in the interests of the trade of Great Britain. That such a belief exists at the moment there can be no doubt. That there ought to be no room for it in the future is equally clear. India's position in the Imperial Conference opened the door to negotiation between India and the rest of the Empire, but negotiation without power to legislate is likely to remain ineffective. A satisfactory solution of the question can only be guaranteed by the grant of liberty to the Government of India to devise those tariff arrangements which seem best fitted to India's needs as an integral portion of the British Empire."² At the present time,

¹ In 1924, the Labor Government, supported by the Liberals, cut the preference down in amount and refused to extend it to new articles; in 1925, the Conservatives restored and extended the preferences.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1919), *Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, Report and Proceedings*, H. C. 203, clause 33, p. 11.

however, although India is on the road to fiscal autonomy, Indian opinion is fearful lest Parliament force the country into some scheme of Imperial Tariff Preference which will clash with its need for a protective tariff wall. To avoid this, the Indian Fiscal Commission, appointed by the Viceroy at the request of the Council of State in March, 1921, has urged the Government of India not to enter into any agreement of "Imperial Preference" without the consent of the Indian Legislature.¹

The political relationship of India to the British Empire, as well as the economic and commercial, is in a process of transition. Reform in self-government and trade intercourse goes hand in hand with readjustments in imperial relations. Before the Great War, India had practically no voice in imperial councils. When Joseph Chamberlain, the far-sighted Secretary of State for the Colonies, called the first Colonial Conferences of 1897 and 1902, and when the Ministers of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand came to London to discuss imperial concerns with the British Cabinet, India took no part in the proceedings. The Secretary of State for India was not even a member of the Conference. Nor was India represented in the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911. The War, however, changed the situation. In 1917, when Indian soldiers were standing side by side with the British and Dominion troops on many battle-fronts of the war, an Indian prince, the Maharajah of Bikanir, and a Hindu lawyer, Sir Satyendra

¹ The Indian Fiscal Commission reported on July 6, 1922: "In the first place, no preference should be granted on any article without the approval of the Indian Legislature. Secondly, no preference given should in any way diminish the protection required by Indian industries. Thirdly, the preference should not involve any appreciable economic loss to India after taking into account the economic gain which India derives from the preference granted her by the United Kingdom." (*Brit. Parl. Papers* (1922), *East India (Fiscal Commission)*, cmd. 1764, sec. 262.)

Sinha, were summoned to represent India at the first Imperial War Conference in London, and took their seats at the same table with British Cabinet officers and the Ministers of the self-governing Dominions. Before the War Conference adjourned, it recommended the representation of India at all future Imperial Conferences.¹ As a result, India has had two representatives at the Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923 — the Secretary of State for India and a native of India, appointed by the Government of India. In addition, it should be remembered, India was represented by both the Secretary of State and an Indian prince at the Paris Peace Conference, while the Versailles Treaty gave India, like the four self-governing Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, one vote in the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Representation in the Imperial Conferences has transformed the position of India from a subject to a partner in the British Empire; and it has brought India into direct contact, not only with imperial affairs, but also with British statesmen and the Ministers of the self-governing Dominions. Yet it is a matter of humiliation to India that her status in the Imperial Conferences is not equal to that of the other commonwealths of the British Empire — a situation which naturally results from the fact that she is not a self-governing Dominion. While this is technically true, it does not greatly impair India's position in the Imperial Conferences; in fact, because of the situation, Great Britain is led to support the Indian cause all the more vigorously in these conferences. But the question is a matter of pride to Indians, and will never be satisfactorily adjusted until India possesses equal status with the self-governing units of the Empire.

The most outstanding feature of the past decade in

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1917), *Imperial War Conference*, cd. 8566, p. 4.

India is the enormous change in the political life of the country. In few lands of the world has development along political lines been so rapid. Since the day when Lord Curzon struck the spark of Indian patriotism, the British have permitted India to go far along the path of responsible government. As a sequence of the reforms, travelers report a disagreeable change in the manners of the serving classes, who even under the reforms do not possess the ballot; the deference and obedience of former days has too frequently given place to insolence and abuse. Such changes, of course, are superficial excrescences — something to be expected when sovereignty over races is in the process of shifting. The same sort of insolence is exhibited to-day by the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Egypt, and it was a conspicuous trait of the freed slaves after the Civil War in America. In India, it is largely limited to the seaports. In the heart of India, the ryot ploughs his fields as his forefathers ploughed before him, having little knowledge of the British Raj, but grateful for the peace which the British rulers have brought to India. The English have indeed made enormous concessions in the matter of government, and, as the years go by, they are prepared to make even more concessions until India approaches the status of a self-governing Dominion. But it does not mean that British statesmen are prepared, or ever will be prepared, to permit India to leave the British Empire or to become an independent state. India still is and will long remain the “brightest jewel in Britain’s crown.”

CHAPTER IX

THE DEFENSE OF INDIA

INCLUDING THE PERSIAN GULF, BALUCHISTAN, AFGHAN-
ISTAN, NEPAL, BHUTAN, SIKKIM, BURMA, THE
SHAN AND MALAY STATES

LONG before the expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia began, the British had established a commercial supremacy in the Middle East. This had its origin in the work of the British East India Company, chartered in the seventeenth century, which concentrated its early efforts on the development of trade with India. But it was not long before the great strategic value and economic importance of those remarkable outposts of India — Persia and the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Lower Burma, and the Malay Peninsula — were recognized by British statesmen. And by the middle of the nineteenth century, the work of linking up these outlying regions with the Indian Empire had begun through the intelligent activities of English merchants, the discriminating efforts of British diplomats, and the skillful operations of British naval and military forces.

On the north, great mountain chains, high plateaus, and arid deserts, stretching in a long line from Yunnan in China to the Persian Gulf, formed a wonderful natural defensive barrier for India; while the Indian Ocean with its branches — the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea — afforded it equal protection on the east, south, and west. It was soon evident to British statesmen that the security of India and development of its trade with the northern frontier states would be seriously threatened if any foreign

power should penetrate this northern barrier. The English Government, however, was not ready to occupy this region itself. Nevertheless, it was fully determined to keep others out, and, ultimately, to incorporate the whole district within the British "sphere of influence." This simple program — known as the "British Monroe Doctrine of the Middle East" — became the corner stone of British diplomacy in Central Asia. It was described by Lord Lansdowne, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the House of Lords, on May 5, 1903, in these words: "I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." And this doctrine applied equally well to southern Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma. "India is like a fortress with the vast moat of the sea on her two faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder," exclaimed Lord Curzon in 1904, "but beyond these walls, there extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimensions. We do not want to occupy it, but we cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends; but, if rival and unfriendly influences creep up to it, and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would thereby grow up that might one day menace our security. This is the secret of the whole position in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and east to Siam."

Intimately connected with this fundamental precept of British foreign policy was the question of the control of communications between Europe and Asia. The Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea were integral parts of the water route connecting the West and the East,

over which Great Britain came to exercise a predominant influence through her control over Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Isthmus of Suez, Aden, and Oman. And the control of this water highway became increasingly important to the British with the development of British commerce with India and the East and the growth of British colonies and dominions beyond the seas. In addition, the Indian telegraph system was ere long connected with Europe under British-Indian-Persian control; and some day Persian and Mesopotamian railways will furnish another connecting link between Europe and the East in which the English will be vitally interested.

A third cardinal motive governing the British activities in Central Asia was the necessity of preserving peace and amity between the various peoples and tribes of the Middle East in order to promote the welfare of native inhabitants and states, the prosperity of India, and the development of British commerce. In the main, the English officials and agents maintained a lasting "Pax Britannica" in the Middle East for two centuries, although the hesitancy and blunders of the Home Government more than once involved the British in frontier difficulties and conflicts — particularly with the Afghans and Persians. No other state, however, was in a position to do this work or possessed the resources and qualifications requisite for its successful achievement. And the world owes a debt of gratitude to those intrepid and valiant men who, with a just and cheerful spirit, amid privations and difficulties, served as policemen and pioneers along the route to the East in a noble effort to promote the welfare of mankind and the interests of European states.

No one has described the British activities in the Persian Gulf more accurately than Lovat Fraser; yet his words apply with equal truth to the men who served in Afghan-

istan, in Baluchistan, in southern Persia, and in the mountainous regions along the northern frontier of India. "Within the Persian Gulf the influence of Great Britain reigns supreme," he wrote. "For nearly three hundred years our flag has flown upon its waters and on the coast that leads to its narrow entrance. It was flying in the Gulf of Oman before the Mayflower sailed from Plymouth. We have sailed and fought and traded and ruled throughout the narrow seas of the Middle East until every rival has gone down before us. By innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure, by the unflinching valor of our seamen, by the lonely and forgotten graves on those burning shores, by the very merit and restraint of our control, we have earned thrice over the right to keep our paramountcy inviolate. For more than a century we have made of the Gulf, by the force and prestige of our arms, a haven of peace. There is no part of our work in the world that can be contemplated with greater satisfaction. We routed out the nest of pirates, captured their strongholds, and destroyed their fleets. We suppressed slavery and stopped the importation of slaves from Africa. We kept the peace between the pirate chiefs and their successors, and bound them by a truce to refrain from hostilities at sea, so that to this day they are known as the 'Trucial Chiefs of Oman.' Out of that permanent peace grew treaties by which they acknowledged the British Government as their overlords and protectors. We established a protectorate over Bahrein and special and preferential relations with Koweit. We saved the native dhows from being plundered during the date season, and we maintained order during the annual pearl fishery. We surveyed the greater part of the Gulf; and, at the request of Persia, we created a sanitary organization which has kept the plague at bay. Our residents in the Gulf have been the

arbiters in all the quarrels of the chiefs on the Arabian coast, and we have time and time again averted bloodshed. If we were to withdraw, slavery and piracy and kidnapping and anarchical strife would reappear to-morrow.”¹

In the nineteenth century, Great Britain began to increase her activities along the northern border of India; and, soon after the middle of that century, she commenced to work out a frontier defense for the Indian Empire. Her efforts were spasmodic and made without reference to any preconceived plan, for it was not till the last decade of the century that the main features of the system now in force were definitely adopted. Mistakes were often made, but few serious difficulties were encountered. Wherever possible, the natural mountain barriers were utilized and the chief passes leading into India were taken over and fortified. Through a series of agreements and understandings, secured for the most part between 1865 and 1912 with independent and semi-independent frontier states and the tribal communities, a great buffer region stretching across Central Asia from Aden and the Persian Gulf to Siam and the Malay Peninsula was placed under British protection. This sphere of influence was intended, and has served admirably, to promote three aims: i.e., the strategic defense of India and other British possessions, the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, and the advancement of the commerce of India and Great Britain.

The states and tribal communities included within the region just described were permitted to retain their independence and local autonomy, but received financial assistance and political advice from the British. Their rulers and chieftains were paid annual subsidies to police and guard the frontier districts under their control; and English officials served as mediators in the settlement of

¹ Lovat Fraser: *India under Curzon and After* (London: 1911), p. 82.

border controversies, preventing many a tribal war. Intervention in the internal affairs of native states was not intended and seldom permitted; but, where it proved necessary and expedient, British agents were stationed at native capitals to advise the local governments. And, when compelled by circumstances to take over the administration of a state, as in Burma, the British-Indian authorities deposed the old and corrupt régime and promptly gave the country an efficient government under their own trained and able officials — usually till such time as the native people were able to undertake the management of their own affairs. The policy of Great Britain was one of conciliation, coöperation, and friendship. She gave a fair compensation for value received, and strove honestly to win and to retain the confidence of all the border peoples.

Early in this work of frontier building, the British turned their attention to the barren wastes and arid plateaus of that region on the western border of India, geographically known as Baluchistan. Its area was approximately 130,000 square miles¹ — about the size of New Mexico; and its 500,000 inhabitants² who eked out a precarious existence in the habitable portion of the territory, were hardy tribesmen ruled by their own chiefs and overlords. When Sir Robert Sandeman went out, as British Agent, to Kalat, the chief town, in 1875, he found the country in a distressful state. The numerous tribes were constantly warring among themselves, and the land was a prey to marauding bands. The passes were closed to trade, and there was no security for life and property anywhere. No chieftain or leader possessed sufficient authority to maintain order, while the Afghans were intriguing and stirring up trouble in order to secure control in the north.

¹ The most recent estimates place this area at about 134,600 square miles.

² By the census of 1921 the population was nearly 800,000.

The Khan of Kalat, the foremost chieftain of Baluchistan, was soon induced, through the signing of the Treaty of Jacobabad in 1876, to place himself under British protection; and Sir Robert entered upon a remarkable work of pacification and reorganization that not only proved of inestimable value to the country, but earned for him a well-deserved popularity throughout the land. With his help, and that of Sir James Browne and Hugh Barnes who succeeded him, the civil war was ended, order and security established, justice and protection given the people, trade developed, and the markets of the land opened to the commerce of the world. In addition, he was the originator of the plan which created British Baluchistan — now a large territory of 54,228 square miles with a population of over 400,000 and administered by a British Chief Commissioner and Agent.

In 1877, during the troublesome years preceding the second Afghan War, British troops occupied Quetta; and, in 1879, this cantonment with some adjacent territory was taken over and administered by the British for the Khan of Kalat. At the close of the Afghan War — 1881 — Great Britain acquired the districts of Pishin, Thal, Duki, Sibi, and Shahrig from Afghanistan, which were officially constituted into British Baluchistan in 1887, while Quetta and Bolan were definitely assigned to the British by the Khan of Kalat for a yearly stipend, in 1883. With these little territories as a basis, British Baluchistan was gradually extended by the acquisition of the Bori and Zhob valleys in 1886 and 1889, Khetran in 1887, Chagai and western Sinjrani in 1896, Nuskhi Niabat in 1899 and Nasirabad in 1903 from the Khan of Kalat on the same plan of annual rents. In this way, the British secured possession of the lands and the valleys which control the passes and the routes into Afghanistan and Baluchistan

from India, and of a long strip of territory across the northern part of Baluchistan, through which passes the great caravan route to Persia. The remainder of the country, comprising some 80,410 square miles, was left under the control and administration of its two great native chieftains: the Khan of Kalat ruling over some 73,272 square miles of territory, and the Jan of Las Bela controlling 7,132 square miles. Both, however, enjoy British protection, and have profited materially from the presence and coöperation of the British officials.

The adjoining Kingdom of Afghanistan, with its rugged mountains, its desolate valleys and plateaus, its warlike but fickle tribesmen, its poverty and its absolute Amir, has always been an unknown land and an enigma to Europeans. There has been absolutely nothing about the country to attract them — unless it was a thirst for geographical knowledge that could only be assuaged by a survey of its barren ranges. On the other hand, the 6,300,000 Afghans in their inhospitable state of 245,000 square miles have little in common with the rest of the world — not even with their neighbors — except the Mohammedan religion. And both the Amirs and the people prefer isolation, freedom from European intervention and the presence of foreigners, and the unhampered management of their own affairs.

At no time have the British wished to annex Afghanistan or to interfere seriously in its internal affairs; but, for nearly a hundred years, the policy of Great Britain has been to keep the country within the British sphere of influence, while she kept other powers out and maintained peace and security along the northern frontier of India; and, while it is unnecessary to recount here all the unhappy vicissitudes of the Anglo-Afghan relations, it is well to remember that the British influence remained

dominant in Afghanistan from 1837 till the Great War. Nevertheless, British diplomatic blunders have seldom been more costly, and the folly of indecision and procrastination more clearly demonstrated, than in the British dealings with this country, where the terms "masterly inactivity," "watchful waiting," and "dry friendship" had their first application, in critical times when a decisive action was imperative and the Amir's need of a real friend was greatest.

On the occasion of the first Afghan War, 1838-42, the British, who had made the serious blunder of backing the "wrong horse" in a civil conflict for the Afghanistan throne between Dost Mohammed and Shah Shuja, were drawn into a costly invasion of the country in order to uphold their own prestige. This action grew out of the Auckland-Ellenborough policy of intervention with a view of keeping out the Persians and of preserving the Afghan state. Shah Shuja was triumphantly seated upon the throne through the aid of English troops; but a revolt and massacre of English officers and men followed almost immediately. Disaster after disaster befell the British till General Pollock with a large army subjugated the whole country. And the only substantial results of this expense and display of energy were the maintenance of the British supremacy and the ultimate elevation of the despised Dost Mohammed — an exile in India — to the throne.

At Peshawar, on January 26, 1857, Afghanistan was at length definitely placed under British protection by a treaty signed by Sir John Lawrence and Dost Mohammed (Gholam Hyder Khan), at the moment when Persia was again invading the country. This agreement — the completion of a friendly accord reached nearly two years before — provided that Great Britain should furnish the Amir with a yearly subsidy of ten thousand pounds, and with officers and munitions of war to assist Afghanistan

in its conflict with Persia. In addition, the Amir and England were to exchange Agents-Resident at Kabul and Peshawar respectively — to respect each other's territorial integrity, and to maintain a perpetual friendship. Three months later in Paris, on March 4, 1857, Great Britain skillfully negotiated a treaty with Persia which freed Afghanistan from all future danger of invasion from the west; for this convention, in addition to securing from Persia the surrender of all its claims to territory in Herat and Afghanistan, the recognition of the independence of Herat and Afghanistan, and the promise to restrain from all interference in the affairs of its neighbor, provided for the mediation of England in the event of any future difficulties between Persia and Afghanistan.

So far, so good. But, unfortunately, this happy state only lasted during the lifetime of Dost Mohammed. On his death, in 1863, the British declined to interfere in the contest for supremacy which ensued between his sons — Shere Ali and his fifteen brothers. Even in 1869, when the triumph of Shere Ali was complete and he was pleading for British protection and a treaty of alliance, he was given a stone — in the shape of an annual subsidy of thirty thousand pounds — by Gladstone, who had no desire to renew the old friendship with its responsibilities, and who was opposed to intervention in the affairs of the native independent states of the Middle East. But the folly of such “laissez-faire” methods in Central Asia was soon apparent. In the early seventies, when the Amir became alarmed at the rapid advance of the Russians in Turkestan and at the taking of Khiva and Bokhara in 1873, and was refused British protection, he naturally cultivated the friendship of Russia to save his country from invasion; and, within the next three years, Russian influence became dominant in Afghanistan, so that the St. Petersburg Government

was able to send the Stolyetov Mission in 1878 to reside at Kabul.

Meanwhile, Great Britain, aroused by the Russian successes, spent the same period vainly trying to regain her lost prestige and to induce the Amir to dismiss the Russian envoys and to receive her own representatives at Kabul. Failing to secure their so-called rights, the British embarked on the second Afghan War — 1878–80. In the first year, the British forces under Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts invaded Afghanistan from two directions, decisively defeated the Amir's troops, and forced Shere Ali to take refuge in the northern province of his domains, where he died at Mazari-Sherif in February, 1879. His son, Mohammed Yakob Khan, elevated to the throne through the influence of the British, concluded the Treaty of Gandamak in May, 1879, by which the districts of Karum, Pishin, and Sibi were transferred to Great Britain to complete the scientific frontier of India, the control of the foreign affairs of Afghanistan passed into British hands, and a British Resident was received at Kabul. The former friendly alliance was renewed; and Great Britain was to pay the new Amir an annual subsidy of three hundred thousand dollars a year. Unfortunately, the majority of Afghans were dissatisfied with this English-made government; and, in September, it was overthrown, the British Envoy at Kabul — Sir Louis Cavagnari — and his staff murdered, the revolt renewed, and the British forces besieged in various towns.

Lord Roberts hastened back to the country with a large army, subjugated the Afghans in a remarkable campaign in 1880, and assisted Abdurrahman Khan — nephew of Shere Ali — to ascend the throne.¹ But it took the new

¹ Mohammed Yakob Khan abdicated voluntarily in October, 1879. He took up his residence in India, and died at Dehra Dun on November 15, 1923.

Amir ten years to organize an efficient centralized administration and to establish his authority throughout the land. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Gandamak and the old alliance with Britain were renewed. By later agreements and the treaty of November 12, 1893, the Amir was promised help if attacked by outside powers, his annual subsidy raised to six hundred thousand dollars, his right to purchase arms and ammunition recognized, and the Indo-Afghan boundary question definitely adjusted by the assignment of Khafiristan to Afghanistan and Waziristan to India. Abdurrahman Khan remained the faithful friend of Great Britain through his long and successful reign which terminated with his death in 1901.

His son, Habibullah, confirmed the alliance in the treaty of March 31, 1905, after the mission of Sir Louis Dane to Kabul during the period from December, 1903, to March, 1904, failed in an effort to draw Afghanistan into a more intimate relationship. The new ruler accepted the annual subsidy and British protection, and was quite willing to be guided in foreign affairs by Great Britain; but he was strenuously opposed to any interference in internal affairs, being suspicious and critical of British actions and representatives. Great Britain, on the other hand, treated the Amir with respect and generosity, and kept her word not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country so long as Habibullah kept his treaty obligations — even after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of August 31, 1907, in which Russia recognized the special position of England in Afghanistan and her convention of 1905 with Habibullah. And this *status quo* was maintained down to 1918, when, of her own accord, Great Britain restored to the Amir complete freedom of action in both home and foreign affairs.

On February 21, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated; and

his third son, Amanulla Khan, assumed the reins of power in his stead. During the next two years, Kabul — the capital — was the scene of endless intriguing. The Soviet Government of Moscow sent a mission to Afghanistan, and did its best to win over the Afghans to Bolshevism; while the British sent Sir Henry Dobbs to Kabul to counteract the efforts of the Soviet leaders and to secure the renewal of the old Anglo-Afghan alliance. The new Amir, however, had no real interest in Bolshevism; nor did he care to resume the old relations with Great Britain — especially while that power was engaged in partitioning the friendly Moslem state of Turkey. Consequently, both the Soviet and the British missions failed completely; and Amanulla became instead the ally of his Mohammedan neighbors — Turkey and Persia — by the Turco-Afghan Treaty of April and the Afghan-Persian Agreement of October, 1921. Meanwhile, Great Britain had begun to show a change of heart; and Sir Henry Dobbs was recalled to Kabul where he negotiated the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of November 22, 1921. By this agreement Afghanistan ceased to be a vassal state, for the new treaty was a convention of friendship between equal powers who were to arrange a reciprocal exchange of diplomatic agents. Under its terms, Abdul Hadi — a journalist — became the first Afghan Minister to London, and Major F. H. Humphreys, with a staff limited by the treaty to five persons,¹ the first British Minister to Kabul. In addition, an unsettled boundary problem was adjusted by the transference of a small strip of territory — Torkhani — to Afghanistan.

Amanulla, therefore, may now justly claim that the independence of Afghanistan began with the commencement of his reign. From the day of his accession, he has exer-

¹ One military attaché, three secretaries — two British and one Oriental — and one surgeon.

cised a free hand in both foreign and domestic affairs; and now Great Britain gives the seal of approval to this freedom of action. The British, who cannot countenance any interference by an outside power in Afghanistan, are content to retain a strong, though friendly, influence in the country, so long as the Soviet Government has been checkmated. But the real significance of the new treaty lies in the change of policy by the British Government — already shown in Egypt and Mesopotamia — whereby it proposes to exercise by means of friendly alliances a dominant influence over certain Moslem states — now independent — which it formerly controlled as subject or mandated communities.

Kashmir — a well-governed native state occupying a picturesque and strategic position on the southern slopes of the Himalaya ranges — has always had a peculiar fascination for Europeans, because of the scenic charm and grandeur of its location and the pleasing manners and customs of its people. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, it was a tributary community of Afghanistan. But Runjit Singh — one of the most powerful and distinguished potentates of his time — who ruled the Punjab from 1780 to 1839, annexed Kashmir to his extensive territories, all of which lay then beyond the northern confines of India proper.

After the second Sikh War — 1848-49 — which the British were compelled to wage against the rulers of the Punjab because of their intrigues in the northern provinces of India and the corruption of their government, that state was made a province of India and placed under the administration of British officials. The Prince of Kashmir, learning that Great Britain was about to levy an indemnity of five million dollars on the Punjab to cover the cost of the war, offered to pay the assessment on condition that

Kashmir was given its independence and that he himself was permitted to assume the title of "Raja." The wisdom of the British authorities in promptly accepting his offer led to the establishment of cordial relations between the two states which has been highly advantageous to both parties. In 1877, the Raja of Kashmir took a prominent part in the ceremonies held in connection with the conferring of the title of Empress of India upon Queen Victoria. In 1878, his friendship with the British was further strengthened by placing Chitral under his supervision, and by entrusting to him the defense of a section of the northern frontier. And the Government of India has stood loyally by the Raja of Kashmir ever since, giving him protection and annual subsidies, while its ruler has remained one of the most trusted supporters of the Indian régime.

On the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush Mountains and between the administrative frontiers of the Punjab, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, lie the districts of Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, Dir, and Chitral, and to the east and north-east, beyond and within Kashmir, the districts of Gilgit, Hunza, and Nagar. All of this region, which embraces a wild, inhospitable mountainous country without roads and difficult of approach, is inhabited by groups of unruly, warlike tribesmen who love fighting and the wild freedom of the hills. For years, these people, living beyond the confines of any civilized state, were a constant menace to their neighbors and to the peace of the Middle East; for they lived chiefly by raiding and plundering villages and caravans, were restless under any restraint, and maintained a constant hostility toward outside communities and each other. So that this whole northern frontier was the scene of feuds, tribal conflicts, and border troubles in an endless procession.

Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the

British Government had no definite policy concerning this frontier region — other than to send a military expedition into the country to restore order whenever the disturbances became too great or endangered the neighboring communities. This method of dealing with these border brigands proved highly unsatisfactory. In the first place, it was very costly. In the fifty years between 1848 and 1898, some fifty-four such expeditions were sent into the country at the expense, to the Indian Government, of millions of dollars and thousands of lives. In the second place, its results were almost negative, since nothing of permanent value was accomplished, and all the work had to be done again every year or two. But the complete subjugation of these warlike tribes and the holding of them down permanently by force was not to be thought of, on account of the prohibitive cost and great difficulty of extending the Indian system of military roads, railways, and outposts up into the heart of the Hindu Kush. Some other method of control, therefore, had to be devised in order to defend the frontier of India, to render easy the approach of the British to the Afghan or Kashmir passes into Afghanistan in case of danger, and to preserve peace and security for trade throughout the northern districts.

In 1888, the mission of Sir Algernon Durand was sent to Gilgit, Chitral, and Hunza. He established his headquarters at Gilgit, and by 1894 had made great progress in the work of organizing a new system of frontier control. In 1890-92, the Kashmir-Gilgit road was built, connecting Srinagar with Gilgit — two hundred and forty miles — and greatly facilitating trade and the movement of troops to the frontier when desired. In 1891-92, 1893, and 1895, respectively, the Hunza-Nagar, the Chilas, and the Waziras tribes were induced by military expeditions to stop their quarrels and place themselves under the protection of the

British Agent. The Chitral chieftains alone remained obdurate; and a revolution broke out there lasting from 1892 to 1895, during which the new British Agent — Dr. George Robertson — was besieged in Chitral from March 3 to April 20, 1895. But in 1895–96 the British authority was reestablished, an Agency opened at Chitral, and a road built to it from Gilgit, and, in spite of the attempted rising of a number of chieftains in 1897–98, the British established a firm control over the frontier.

Lord Curzon, with a view of providing an adequate defense for the Indian frontier and of maintaining peace, order, and security on the border, went a step farther than establishing Agencies among the wild tribes of the Hindu Kush. He employed the chiefs and their tribesmen to defend the frontier and to preserve order, while he extended the Indian railways far enough to bring the British army posts within easy reach of these native outposts. In this way, some twelve hundred Chitral scouts and chiefs were given regular employment by the payment of subsidies, and the Khyber and Samana Rifles, composed of native troops and British officers, were organized; while the tribal forces on the frontier were increased to ten thousand and the British regular frontier guard reduced from fifteen thousand to four thousand; and the railroads were continued north and northwestward till they reached Dargai, Jamrud, Thal, and the foot of the leading passes. Finally, in 1901, all of this frontier region, lying outside of Kashmir and composed of five Political Agencies, was organized in a British administrative district, known as the North-West Frontier Province, under a governor directly responsible to the Viceroy of India. Its population of Pathans and Moslems numbers more than 3,800,000; and its area is 38,665 square miles, of which some 13,418 square miles lie within the administrative frontier of India. The results

of this new policy were soon apparent. Between 1898 and 1905, it cost the British-Indian Government only £248,000 to maintain order and defend the frontier, and there were no border wars; while from 1894 to 1898 the British expenses on account of frontier conflicts had amounted to £4,584,000. Since then, there have been — and probably always will be — sporadic outbreaks here and there, from time to time; but the period of terrible and costly frontier wars has passed — we hope forever.

Among the numerous native peoples inhabiting the mountain terrace stretching along the northern and eastern frontiers of India, none have caused the British so little concern as the Goorkhas. Their tight little Kingdom of Nepal, with 54,000 square miles of territory and 5,600,000 inhabitants, has been well-governed, while the people live to themselves and make little trouble for their neighbors. Ever since the Treaty of Segowli, signed after a brief British punitive expedition on December 2, 1815, there has been a British Resident and small garrison in the capital, but the English have never interfered in internal affairs. In 1885, the present arrangement, whereby Nepal enjoys British protection and permits Great Britain to direct her foreign relations and act as an arbiter in disputes with her neighbors, was concluded. The country is controlled by a military oligarchy whose chief representative is the Prime Minister — since 1867 the real ruler of the land. From 1901 this position has been held by His Highness Maharaja Sir Chandra Shamsher Jung Bahádur Rana, who holds high rank in the Goorkha military establishment, is a major-general in the British army, and is sincerely attached to the Anglo-Indian régime. But the young king — twenty-eight years of age in 1924 — bearing the wonderful, high-sounding title of Maharajadhiraja Tribhubana Bir Bikram-Shamsher Jung Bahádur Shah, is

obliged to content himself with the honors and emoluments of an office without power.

Lying amid the high mountains between Tibet and India, and possessing an area of 20,000 square miles and a population of 250,000, the little Kingdom of Bhutan had its beginning in those stormy days of the sixteenth century, when the famous Shabdung Rimpochi Nawang — a leader of the Dukpa sect of Brahmans — forced his way over the Lingzi Pass from Ralong, China, into the country. Between 1557 and 1592, he united all the local tribes in an ecclesiastical state similar to Tibet,¹ where the leading officials are reincarnations of Buddha and possess both religious and political power. As in Tibet, there is no royal house or ruling family, but the rulers are elected by a council of priests.

The Anglo-Bhutanese relations began with the sending of the George Bogle mission to that country by Warren Hastings in 1774, to adjust certain border troubles. The Bhutanese pushed down into the lowlands of the Assam border, from which point of vantage they defied the British for decades, raiding the villages and plundering the inhabitants of northern India, till the situation became intolerable. Although several missions were dispatched to Bhutan by Indian Viceroys and a part of its territory — the Assam or Eastern Duars (Dwars) — was annexed by the British in 1839-41, no definite settlement was reached with the Bhutanese till after the mission of Sir Ashley Eden in 1863 and the military expedition of General Sir Henry Tombs in 1865. By the Treaty of Sinchula, concluded on November 11, 1865, Bhutan was given British protection and guaranteed a yearly subsidy of fifty thousand rupees; and, in the future, the British were to arbitrate in all disputes between Bhutan and neighboring states; and

¹ See Chapter X.

the boundary difficulties were finally adjusted by the transfer of the Athara or Western Duars to Bengal and the Eastern Duars to Assam.¹

Nevertheless, the status of Bhutan remained uncertain, since there was no British Resident in the country and no special method whereby the British could exert any control over the situation. Early in the twentieth century, a special effort was made to bring about closer relations. Between 1905 and 1907, J. Claude White — British Resident in Sikkim — made three trips into the country, and won the confidence of many of the leaders. Sir Ugyen Wang-chuk, the Tongsa Penlop, and a friend of England, was a special subject of his attention. In 1905, J. Claude White took to him the insignia of a Knight Commander² as a reward for assistance given the British Tibetan expedition in 1904. And in 1907, when Sir Ugyen Wang-chuk was elected Maharaja of Bhutan, White attended his installation as the representative of the Indian Government, bringing many presents. Finally, on January 8, 1910, a definite treaty was concluded between Bhutan and Britain, in time to give the British a free hand in the Tibetan crisis of 1910–11. By this agreement, Bhutan placed itself under British protection and agreed to be guided in its foreign relations by Great Britain. The English on their side promised to pay an annual subsidy of one hundred thousand rupees, and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the country; and, in all disputes between Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Cooch Behar, the British Government was to act as arbiter.

The little Kingdom of Sikkim or Dejong — “the land of rice” — having an area of only 2818 square miles and a

¹ From 1905 to 1912, all of the eighteen Duars were part of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and since 1912, of Bengal.

² Knight Commander of the Star of India and later Knight Commander of the Indian Empire.

population over 87,000 — is situated between Nepal and Bhutan amid the high ranges and valleys of the southern Himalayas. Its chief importance for India lies in its strategic situation, for through it, via the Chumbi Valley, passes the great highroad to Tibet. For decades it was the nest of border conflicts and troubles, because of the influence exercised by the Dalai Lama over its people for nearly three centuries; for in 1641, the Great Lama of Lhasa induced the inhabitants of Sikkim to accept the Buddhist religion; and, thereafter, there was continuous struggle between the Tibetans, the Bhutanese, and the Nepalese for the control of the country. In 1817, the British finally drove out the Nepalese and restored the Raja to power; and during the next seventy years, they had to interfere three times to settle local conflicts, to restore order, and to maintain their own prestige — notably in 1834–35 when India annexed the Darjeeling district, and in 1861 when the Tumlong (then the capital) Treaty was signed placing Sikkim under British protection.

Finally, in 1888, on account of the constant Tibetan-Sikkim intrigues, the weakness and corruption of the Sikkim régime, and the violation of the British-Sikkim treaties by its Maharaja, the British decided to settle the question once and for all. A punitive expedition was sent into Tibet and Sikkim, the Maharaja and the Maharani (his intriguing Tibetan consort) removed to Kurseong in the Darjeeling district, and J. Claude White was dispatched to the country to take direct control of its affairs, as British Political Agent. A Council of Regency numbering eight members was appointed by White from the chief lay leaders and the most influential priests of the country, all of whom supported him loyally and efficiently; and during the twenty years' (1888–1908) residence of Claude White, a most remarkable transformation took place in Sikkim — in spite

of the natural poverty of the country and the deplorable conditions prevailing on every hand.

The whole state was surveyed and districted. A system of taxation was devised which should be a light burden on each district; and a regular budget and an annual income were created. So successful, indeed, were these efforts at reorganization, that this income, which was only about \$2500 in 1888, increased to \$570,000 by 1898. The country was opened to trade by the construction of a network of roads, centering in a fine one from Siliguri (terminus of the Royal Bengal Railway) to Gangtok — sixty-four miles; in 1894, a trade mart was opened at Yatung; and the Government of India was persuaded to permit the introduction of foreign capital into the land in 1906. Meanwhile, White cultivated the friendship and secured the coöperation of the headmen in every town and district, and of the lamas in the monasteries, in the work of reconstruction. Immigration was encouraged; and large numbers of Nepalese occupied the sparsely settled and undeveloped regions; and apple-growing, cloth-making, carpet manufacturing, and other native industries were successfully promoted.

In 1895, the Maharaja and family were permitted to return; but he was held in check by the new administrative system and the presence of the British Political Agent. The British, however, treated the royal pair well and cultivated their friendship. In 1902, the Sidkong Tulka — son and heir of the Maharaja — and his mother — the Maharani — made their first appearance in the public life of India by attending the Imperial Durbar, or Council of Princes of India, at Delhi, where they were fêted and greatly impressed with the British-Indian imperial system. In 1904, the Maharani and her son went to Calcutta to meet the Prince and Princess of Wales; and since the accession of the Sidkong Tulka to the throne in 1914, the

relations of Sikkim and India have been cordial; while the British, although still maintaining a Political Agent in the country, interfere very little in its internal affairs.

Along the northeastern and eastern frontier of India — from Bhutan to Siam — there lie a series of high mountain ranges which not only form the boundary between Tibet and India, Burma and China, and Burma and Siam, but which also run far southwards forming the boundary between the provinces of Assam and Burma, and the watersheds between the Brahmaputra, the Surma, the Chindwin, the Irrawaddy, and the Salween Rivers. Assam, with 53,000 square miles of territory and a population of over 6,750,000, embraces the valleys of the Brahmaputra and the Surma Rivers with the intervening mountainous watershed, and is separated from Burma by the Patkai Hills, the mountains of Manipur, and the Arakan Yoma. Along the Assam-Tibetan frontier dwell the wild mountain tribes of Akas, Dafflas, Miris, Abors, and Mishmis; while on the hills near Burma there are the Naga Hill tribes, the native State of Manipur, Cachar, the Lushai Hill tribes, Hill Tippera, and Chittagong with its "hill tracts."

Burma — a huge territory of 231,000 square miles with a population of 12,000,000 — is also chiefly a country of mountains and high plateaus crossed from north to south by the fertile valleys of the Irrawaddy, the Salween, and the Sittang, except in the south where the land slopes down into great alluvial plains about the estuaries of the three rivers just mentioned, between the Arakan Hills and the Dawna Range. It, too, has its hill peoples; on the western side, the Arakanese and the Chin Hill tribes; on the north and northeast the Kachin Hill tribes; and, on the east, the North and South Shan States and the Karenni. The modern history of this whole region, reaching from Bengal to Siam, is the story of the conflict between the

Burmese and the British on one side, and between the Burmese and Siamese on the other, for the control over these mountain districts and peoples.

The Burmese State was founded about 1540 by a Burmese Prince of Taunger-Byeen-noung who conquered Ava, Pegu, Martaban, and part of Manipur, and established his court at Pegu and then at Ava. After a period of civil conflict, his house was succeeded by another dynasty whose capable and warlike rulers — Alompra the Hunter and Bhodan Phra — in the eighteenth century greatly enlarged and strengthened the state. They won back Pegu which had revolted, secured dominion over the hill tribes and Shan States, annexed Arakan in 1783, and forced Siam, after a long struggle, to cede to them in the Treaty of 1793, Tenasserim and Mergui (with the ports of Tavoy and Mergui). Early in the nineteenth century, they invaded Manipur and Assam; but there they soon found themselves involved with a vigorous opponent — Great Britain.

The British East India Company, in addition to its trading posts in India, had early established commercial marts on the coast of Burma, and as far east as Indo-China. In 1702–09, it claimed to have factories in “Siam, Cochin-China, Pegu, Patang, Quedah, Johore, Cambodia, Ligore”; and throughout the eighteenth century, it steadily increased its trading posts and extended its protection over the native tribes and states in the vicinity of these factories, at first in Bengal, and then in the neighboring countries. In 1760, it was ceded the port of Chittagong by the Nabob Mir Kasim of Bengal, which gave it control of the Bay of Bengal as far as Arakan, and made it possible for it to secure considerable influence in the Chittagong district. In 1762, the Raja of Manipur appealed to the British for protection; and toward the end of the century,

Cachar and the tribes of Lakhimpur sought for the same protection against the Burmese.

During the first twenty years of the nineteenth century, the East India Company sent four missions under Captains Symes, Cox, and Canning to the Kings of Ava, and made every effort to secure a settlement of the border troubles and protection for British trade, but without success. On the contrary, the Burmese armies invaded Manipur and Assam in an attempt to impose their sovereignty upon the hill tribes. In January, 1824, Bundula—the great Burmese general—entered Cachar, and in May he reached Chittagong, forcing the British to enter upon the first Burmese War to protect their interests. A British expedition under Sir Archibald Campbell promptly occupied Rangoon with little difficulty, and, with the aid of the British warships, took over Tavoy, Mergui, and the coast of Tenasserim. In the next year, Bundula was recalled and sent against the British with sixty thousand men; but he was killed in action and his forces dispersed, while the British army advanced to Prome, and to within fifteen miles of Ava, when the Burmese ruler sued for peace.

By the Treaty of Yandabu, signed on February 24, 1826, the Kings of Burma gave up all claims to Assam, and transferred to Great Britain Arakan, Yeh, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim. In this way, the British obtained complete control over the whole of the Bay of Bengal and secured a protective frontier on the east of India, while the territories of Burma were restricted to Pegu with the seaport of Rangoon and Upper Burma or Ava. But this treaty and a commercial agreement negotiated by John Crawford in the same year were enforced only under duress, for the Burmese rulers were far from pleased with the situation.

The Government of India sent an Agent to Ava, and

tried to win the friendship and coöperation of the Burmese King; but they had to recall their representative in 1840 without having accomplished anything. The troubles and difficulties steadily increased during the next ten years. Acts of violence against British ships and seamen were frequent; hostility toward everything British was shown by the Burmese people and ruler; and King Pagan — 1846 to 1853 — refused to heed the complaints of the Indian Government or to make reparations for the losses of British traders or the insults to British subjects and the British nation. Accordingly, Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General of India, inaugurated the second Burmese War in 1852 with a view of upholding the British prestige and of affording ample protection for British trade. General H. T. Godwin, ably assisted by Commodore Lambert, landed at Rangoon and occupied Prome once more; and, on January 20, 1853, Pegu, with Rangoon and the entire delta district, was officially annexed by the British. King Mindon — 1853 to 1878 — refused for some time to recognize this annexation, although he received the mission of Sir Arthur Phayre in 1855. Finally, in 1862, diplomatic relations were resumed, the cession of Pegu recognized, and the province of Lower Burma formed by the union of Pegu, Tenasserim, Tavoy, and Mergui with Phayre as Chief Commissioner; and, in 1867, by the Treaty of Mandalay, free trade and regular diplomatic intercourse were officially established between Burma and Great Britain.

But the end was not yet. With the accession of King Thibaw in 1878, the troubles began again. The new ruler — weak, corrupt, and inefficient — adopted a hostile attitude toward the British. The treaty with England was violated, trade monopolies granted, British representatives insulted, French and Italian agents welcomed, and alliances with European states sought. In addition, a fine

of £230,000 was imposed upon the Bombay-Burma Trading Company and other restrictions laid on British trade, while the court of King Thibaw became hopelessly corrupt and his administration disintegrated to such an extent that the whole country was in disorder, trade at a standstill, and protection for life and property completely lacking. In addition, taxes rose incredibly and conditions of life became unbearable, while the situation in Burma reacted seriously upon the eastern frontier regions of India. Finally, on October 22, 1885, Lord Dufferin, Governor-General of India, issued an ultimatum to King Thibaw and ordered the British forces to Burma. On November 28th, Mandalay — the capital since 1860 — was occupied, and King Thibaw deposed and an exile by the end of the year; and, on January 1, 1886, Upper Burma was made a British province and placed under a British Commissioner. Thus ended the third Burmese War and the Kingdom of Burma.

There remained, however, the questions of pacification and reconstruction. Already, for many years, the British had been trying to stabilize conditions along the eastern and northeastern frontier of India, as their hold over Assam and Burma increased. In 1830, Cachar came into their hands upon the death of the last raja. In 1838, Lakhimpur was put under a British administration; and between 1832 and 1849, ten expeditions were sent into the Naga Hill country to preserve order and establish British supervision. The whole of the Cachar country was placed under British control in 1854; Bhutan brought under British influence in 1865; an inner line laid down in 1873 in a number of the districts of hill tribes in northeastern and eastern Assam to mark the extent of British protection; all of Assam organized as a British province of India in 1874; and the attempt was made to preserve order and promote trade and friendly relations through the preserva-

tion of the local autonomy of hill tribes and native states, and the hiring of the tribal chieftains to keep the peace and defend the frontier.

Nevertheless, the situation on the northeastern frontier remained uncertain and a constant menace to the peace and security of India so long as the State of Burma and its dependent communities stood without the British sphere of influence and was ruled by incompetent and irresponsible potentates. With a view, therefore, to stabilizing conditions, and with an honorable desire not to leave "unoccupied areas" in that great mountainous region which were not under the control of some responsible government, such as China or India, the annexation of Burma was undertaken. The moment this was accomplished, the British set to work upon the pacification of the country, which took about three years. It then became imperative that Great Britain should place under her protection all the mountain peoples living on a wide glacis along the northern and eastern frontier of Burma. The first of these native groups to be approached were the Kachin Hill tribes dwelling north of Bhamo. There were seven in all, occupying an area of some nineteen thousand square miles with centers at Bhamo, Myitkyina, Katha, and Mogaung; they were secured through the instrumentality of four military expeditions sent there under Captain Cook, Major Adamson, and Captain Triscott between 1886 and 1889; and a direct connection was soon thereafter established between the tribal headquarters at Bhamo and Mandalay — the capital of Burma — by rail to Katha and the Irrawaddy River; but the tribes retained their own local autonomy.

Between 1888 and 1890, the British established their control over the Chin Hill tribes in the course of two military demonstrations with but little loss. These native peoples inhabit a district some two hundred miles long

and one hundred to one hundred and fifty miles in width, in the west and northwest of Burma along the Assam frontier, which embraces the Chin Hills, the region of the upper Chindwin River, the Pakokko and Arakan Hills. About the same time, the five Karen States in the valley of the Salween River, together with some Karen settlements to the south, were given British protection, but allowed to maintain their local independence.

There are three branches of the Shan family, two of which were tributary to Burma and one—the Laos¹—was occupying the northern part of Siam and the northwest section of Indo-China, when the British began to intervene in Burmese affairs. The Shan tribes of Burma occupy a mountainous region of some sixty-eight thousand square miles on the Chino-Burmese frontier; and they are divided into two groups: the North Shan States and the South Shan States. The latter are thirty-eight in number, grouped about the town of Taunggyi as a political center; and, in 1886, it was a question whether they would accept British protection or go over to China. But in that and the following year, A. H. Hildebrand and Sir George Scott, supported by a military expedition, induced the chieftains, led by the Sawbwa of Mongnai, to accept the Anglo-Indian overlordship, and to dissolve the confederacy recently formed under the Limbin Prince to secure their independence from King Thibaw of Burma. The whole situation was succinctly summed up by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw when he said to the British Commissioner: "Since the conquest of Burma by the British, we, chiefs of the Shan country, must first of all consider which side (India or China) would confer on us peace and happiness, and then enter into friendly relations with the Government of such side!" And, finally, Hildebrand was able to report on

¹ See Chapter XI.

June 22, 1887, "The Southern Shan States have now all given in their submission; caravans of cattle and peddlers move about from state to state with perfect freedom and confidence, a condition of things which had hardly existed since the accession of King Thibaw in 1879."

The North Shan States are five in number, having Lashio as a political center. Two of them were brought under British influence through the work of Hildebrand and Scott in 1888-89; but the rest were not induced to accept the British overlordship till 1893-95, after the internal feuds had ceased. Lashio is now connected with Mandalay by rail — one hundred and fifty miles — and lies on one of the main highways of intercourse between India and the Chinese province of Yunnan. Taunggyi is also connected with the Mandalay-Rangoon railway system; and good roads have been built up into this region.

On the Assam-Burmese frontier, the hill tribes were also being brought under British supervision. Between 1866 and 1887, some eight expeditions had been sent into the Naga Hills, where British suzerainty was established by 1892, and whose administrative center — Kohima — was garrisoned and connected by the Dimapur-Manipur road with the Assam-Bengal railway. Meanwhile, the Lushai Hill tribes accepted British protection. In 1891, when Governor Quinton of Assam went to Manipur to mediate in a contest for the throne, he and four companion officers were treacherously slain. The Government of India promptly sent an expedition into the country, punished the murderers, and took over the administration for the infant raja. Slavery and forced labor were abolished; a budget created with a land tax in the valleys and a house tax in the hills; the boundaries of the state marked; people disarmed; order established; and roads built connecting the capital — Imphal — with Dimapur on the Assam-

Bengal railway. Finally, in May, 1907, the country was turned over to the young raja — Chura Chand — and a council of six, one of whom is a member of the Indian Civil Service; and Manipur joined the list of independent native states on the frontier of India enjoying British protection.

Meanwhile, it had been necessary to keep the control of Burma entirely in the hands of a British Lieutenant-Governor and his appointive council and to reorganize the entire administration. But, in December, 1922, after the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in India, Burma was given its own Legislative Assembly of one hundred and three members, of whom seventy-nine are elected for three years on a fairly broad franchise, and twenty-four are appointed by the Governor. As in the provinces of India, certain subjects are "reserved" for the action of the Lieutenant-Governor and his council. But a large proportion of "transferred subjects" are assigned to the new assembly. Thus, complete local autonomy is being worked out for the Burmese people, while Burma is being given peace and protection within the orbit of the British dominions.

Notwithstanding all these efforts to provide India with a defensible and well-ordered frontier, the protection would have been inadequate and conditions remained unstable unless the borderland had been firmly and efficiently united with the Indian system of railways and defense. Fortunately, such a unity was worked out between 1886 and 1893 under the direction of Lord Roberts and at a cost of \$17,000,000. Entrenched camps were placed at strategic centers where military provisions could be stored, arrangements made for the support and operation of the army in the field, and the defense of the mountain passes made easy. In addition, direct communication was established between the camps and the chief railway centers of

India and by branch lines, such as the Quetta-Chaman, Nuskhi, the Darjeeling, the Bikna Thuri, Cooch Behar-J'hainti, and the Peshawar-Dargai extensions. The railways were brought up to the very foot of the passes into Afghanistan and the Tibet borderlands; while good roads were built into the heart of the mountain districts under the control of native chieftains, and to the capitals of dependent border states. And finally, the coast defenses, including improvements at the ports of Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon, were greatly strengthened, and a regular "Transport Department" created, so that the landing, loading, and transporting facilities for troops, cavalry and artillery were perfected for the first time.

Through the efforts of Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief, 1902-09, the Indian army was completely reorganized, rearmed, and redistributed in convenient divisions under one commander-in-chief, so that it would serve efficiently the dual purpose of internal defense and of offense against invasion from the north. Not all of his plans were carried out, however, owing to a necessity for financial retrenchment. But, when the Great War came, it found the Indian field army greatly improved in organization and equipment.¹ In addition, a larger percentage of the troops was being recruited from the native peoples, increased pay given to native soldiers, and native princes encouraged to

¹ Under the Auxiliary Forces Act and Indian Territorial Force Act of 1920, the British garrison in India is set at 75,896 men, an Indian Territorial Force created to form a second line to the regular army, but not subject to overseas service, a number of commissions opened to Indian officers, and an Auxiliary Officers' Corps formed of those who served in the Great War. Forty Indians are now nominated annually to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and forty-four appointed to the training college at Indore. And the *Report* of the Esher Commission in September, 1920, recommended improvements in the conditions of all ranks — British and Indian — and the appointment of a military council to assist the Commander-in-Chief who should become the sole military adviser of the Government of India.

enter the service as officers. An "Imperial Cadet Corps" was organized to train the sons of rulers and chieftains; many able men were given employment in tribal levies officered by British officers — including the famous "Guides" — and used to police and protect the frontier regions; while the number of tribal communities and native states paid to defend the frontier was materially increased, the trade routes kept open, transportation provided for caravans and police, and peace maintained.

To complete the defense of India, and to secure for the British direct communication between England and their increasing possessions in the Far East and the Pacific, one thing more was needed: i.e., the control of the Strait of Malacca and the Malay Peninsula. Fortunately for Great Britain, the incomparable value of this control was visioned early by two remarkable Englishmen — Sir Francis Light and Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles — whose foresight and genius prepared the way for the creation of the British dominion in the East Indies and the South Seas. Sir Francis Light, after fifteen years of persuasion, was permitted by the British East India Company to occupy the harbor of Penang Island — off the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and opposite the State of Kedah — in July, 1786. For a yearly subsidy of ten thousand dollars (Straits) he promptly secured from the Sultan of Kedah the right to trade in tin, rattans, and timber, and to use the island as a trading post and as a place to repair and provision ships. In 1790, Penang with an area of one hundred and eight square miles was permanently ceded to the British for increased subsidies; and, ten years later, a district of two hundred and eighty square miles on the mainland — now known as the Province Wellesley — was obtained from the ruler of Kedah, after a military expedition and a further augmentation of the yearly subsidy.

In the course of 1817-18, Stamford Raffles, who, after his retirement as Lieutenant-Governor of Java, had become Governor of Bencoolen on the island of Sumatra and was devoting his energies to the study of Malay life in that region, convinced the Governor-General of India of the imperative need for British control in the Strait of Malacca. He was commissioned to find a port there, which would not only secure the control of the Strait for the English, but also would provide them with an outpost for the expansion of their trade in the East Indies and the Pacific; and, on February 6, 1819, he was successful in securing for this purpose a port and land for a factory on the island of Singapore — at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula — by treaty with the Sultan of Johore and the Tumongong of Singapore. With a rare vision of the future greatness of the new possession, he wrote, on June 10, 1819, "Our station completely outflanks the Strait of Malacca, and secures a passage for our China ships at all times and under all circumstances. It has further been my good fortune to discover one of the most safe and extensive harbors in these seas, with every facility for protecting shipping in time of war. . . . You may take my word for it, this is by far the most important station in the East; and, as far as naval superiority and commercial interests are concerned, of much higher value than whole continents of territory."

The island of Singapore with an area of two hundred and seventeen square miles, "together with the adjacent seas, straits, and islets to the extent of ten geographical miles from the coasts of the said island of Singapore," was permanently transferred to the British East India Company on August 2, 1824, by a treaty negotiated by John Crawford with Sultan Hussein of Johore and the Dato Tumongong of Singapore for greatly increased subsidies

which were now granted for life. Fortunately, the British Government, which had only grudgingly approved the treaties, made Singapore a free port, on the advice of Raffles, and thereby laid the foundation for its future greatness and for the successful establishment of British trade in the Far East. "Our object is not territory but trade," wrote Stamford Raffles on June 10, 1819, "a great commercial emporium and a fulcrum, whence we may extend our influence politically as circumstances may direct. . . . One free port in these seas must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly."

Meanwhile, another wise move was executed. Malacca — an old Portuguese settlement on the west coast of the peninsula and commanding the Strait of Malacca which the Dutch had held since 1641 — had been occupied by the British (1795) during the Napoleonic Wars. It was restored to the Dutch by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. But, on the advice of Stamford Raffles, the British recovered it in 1824 by exchanging for it their insignificant holdings at Bencoolen on the island of Sumatra. And all of these possessions — the island of Penang, Singapore, Malacca, Wellesley Province, and the Dindings (the island of Pangkor and a strip of the mainland opposite secured from the Sultan of Perak in 1826) — were incorporated in 1867 into a British Crown Colony, known as the Straits Settlements and administered by a British governor and his executive council.

In this way, the British were brought into intimate relations with the Malay Peninsula and the Malay people who inhabit it. The peninsula is seven hundred and fifty miles in length; and its width varies from about sixty miles at the Isthmus of Kra to two hundred miles. Its area is about seventy thousand square miles and it has a population at the present time of over two million. The

chief inhabitants of this great tropical region, with its mountains, its forests, its rivers, its marshes and jungles, and its mines of tin and gold, are a small brown race of the Mohammedan faith known as Malays. They are improvident, indolent, easy-going, and, when the British came into contact with them, in a low state of civilization and of quite a different character from any other people with whom the English had had dealings. They were fond of gambling and fighting, and enjoyed an infamous reputation in Europe because of their piratical expeditions and attacks upon foreign traders. On the other hand, they are good-natured, courteous, self-respecting, faithful to their friends, and intensely devoted to their rajas and their chieftains, and to their native customs. But both chiefs and people had to be treated and led like children. "Malays require to be treated more like children," wrote Sir Andrew Clark in 1874, "and to be taught; and this especially in all matters of improvement, whether it is a question of good government and organization, or of material improvement by opening means of communication, extending cultivation, and fostering trade."

In the early seventies of the last century, when the young British colony of the Straits Settlements was officially launched on its career, conditions on the Malay Peninsula were very bad. The whole region was in a state of disorder and confusion. Trade was at a standstill, for there was no protection for life and property anywhere. The sultans of the various Malay states possessed little real authority, being helpless in the face of the intrigues and quarrels of their own chieftains, and continually embarrassed by civil contests for the throne or conflicts with their neighbors. The tin mines of those days — the chief source of revenue for the sultans — were owned and operated by rival groups of Chinese traders employing over

seventy thousand laborers, who fought among themselves, and struggled against great odds to protect their properties and to get out their annual product in safety. Pirates infested the coasts and rivers and preyed on the commerce of the straits and the trade of the peninsula with such success that not only the Chinese, but also some two hundred and forty-eight British traders were begging the British Government for protection. So great was the cry for peace and security that a leading Chinese merchant wrote the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang on October 24, 1872, "When the British flag is seen over Perak or Laroot, every Chinaman will go down on his knees and bless God." The same sentiment was shared by the sultans. Speaking of the Sultan of Selangor, Frank Swettenham wrote on December 18, 1874, "Until I came, he never knew what it was to live free from fear and anxiety. He has hitherto been and still would be without the assistance of the Government, powerless to perform them [the duties of a ruler], surrounded as he has been and would be again, were he left to himself, by unscrupulous chiefs who not only would oppose him, but by open threats would prevent him from making good his promises."

Accordingly, from motives of humanity as well as by the necessity of protecting British trade interests, the British authorities were forced to intervene in the affairs of the Malay Peninsula. A favorable opportunity was at hand, for in 1872-73 a civil war was raging in Perak over the question of the succession to the throne of that state. Sir Andrew Clarke — Governor of the Straits Settlements from 1873 to 1875 — acting on instructions from London, succeeded in establishing peace and settling the succession question to the satisfaction of all parties by the Treaty of Pangkor on January 20, 1874, signed with the chiefs of Perak and Laroot. Then, Clarke, whose policy embraced

"no obligations, no entanglements, no complications," but was concerned merely with personal "voluntary arrangements with the chiefs called treaties," instituted a system of British Residents without position or power except to advise the sultans in all matters save religion and native customs. Real assistance could only be rendered the rulers (claimed the Governor) by "an officer living on the spot, whose time should be devoted to carefully studying the wants and capabilities of each state, the character of the sultan and his chiefs, and to making himself personally acquainted with every portion of the country, and thus fitting himself for the post of Counselor."

Accordingly, British advisers were provided immediately for the Sultans of Perak, Selangor, and Sungei Ujong. These Residents, with great tact and discretion, but at the cost of great personal discomfort and labor to themselves, explored the countries to which they were sent, won the confidence of the rulers, and assisted them in reorganizing the government and the finances, in establishing peace and security, and in improving the conditions of life in their domains. So great was their success and the contentment and prosperity it brought the country that Sir Andrew Clarke was able to write the Colonial Office on September 15, 1874: "There is no hesitation on their part [the Malay chiefs] in accepting our flag and coming under our rule." And one chieftain of Selangor who had been opposed to the British at first wrote Clarke: "We are very much obliged to our Friend for the officer whom our Friend has chosen. He is very clever; he is also clever in the customs of the Malay Government and he is very clever in gaining the hearts of Rajas and sons of Rajas with soft words delicate and sweet, so that all men rejoice in him as in the perfume of an open flower."

It was not all smooth sailing, however; and the work

had a temporary setback by the murder of James W. Birch, Resident in Perak, in September, 1875. Fortunately, Sir William Jervais — the new Governor of the Straits Settlements — with great promptness sent an expedition to Perak, which captured the criminal chiefs and took them to Singapore for trial and punishment. This action not only added immensely to the British prestige on the peninsula, but strengthened greatly the position of the Residents and ensured the success of the system of advisers. The British Government, however, which was faint-heartedly supporting the new policy, fearing the Residents or counselors would assume too much power and insisting that "appointments be made only with the full consent of the native governments" and that the "expenses be defrayed by the Government of the Straits Settlements,"¹ did not approve. Nevertheless, Sir William Jervais was fully justified by the results. For, as he wrote to Lord Carnarvon, "We could not possibly intervene for this purpose [to release the Malay States from anarchy and confusion and to restore order and good government] only to retire upon the appearance of any difficulty. Such a course would be unjust to the States, dangerous to our own settlements, and prejudicial to our interests in this part of the world."

With the start already made, the system of counselors soon proved to be the making of the Malay States, and the one thing that made possible the ultimate extension of British influence throughout the peninsula; for, as a result of the excellent work of such able men as Sir Hugh Low and Sir Frank Swettenham, the direction of the whole administration in the different Malay States passed into their hands, since they were compelled not only to advise the sultans in all public affairs, but to direct also the affairs of state through the rulers, "to organize an armed force to

¹ Earl of Kimberley to Sir Andrew Clarke, September 20, 1873.

take into their own hands the collection of revenue, to listen to all complaints, to punish evil-doers, to repress armed gangs of robbers [pirates], to apprehend criminals and to see justice was done." In twenty years' time, successful administrations had been built up by the British Residents in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan — a confederacy of nine states formed in 1895 out of a number of small states and the group known as Sungei Ujong — and Pahang.¹ The country was at peace; life and property secure; the people content and prosperous; good roads and railways constructed; navigation of the rivers greatly improved; debt slavery and other savage customs abolished; many public improvements instituted and public buildings constructed in the cities; and the whole situation in the peninsula completely changed.

In July, 1896, the four States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang were united under one administration known as the "Federated Malay States," through the efforts of Sir Frank Swettenham who prepared the plan of federation, visited all the states to explain the proposal, and presided over the great conference of the chiefs at Kuala Kangsar where the union was consummated. All the sultans retained their individual positions and powers. The Residents were to continue their work as usual, but were put under the supervision of a Resident-General or High Commissioner, who is now also the Governor of the Straits Settlements. A chief secretary was appointed to coördinate the administration of the Federation; and Kuala Lumpur in Selangor was selected as its capital.

Meanwhile, Johore — a Malay state with an area of seventy-five hundred square miles at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula — with which the British

¹ Put itself under British protection and accepted a Resident in 1887.

had had friendly relations since their purchase of Singapore from it in 1819, entered upon a definite relationship with the British by the Treaty of December 11, 1885. Ten years later, when the government of Johore was reorganized giving the Sultan executive and legislative councils, the state came unofficially under British protection. And by the treaty of May 12, 1914, this protection has become complete through the acceptance of a British "General Adviser" by the Sultan.

On the eastern side of the peninsula, British corporations secured extensive commercial rights and concessions from native rulers — particularly in connection with the opening of tin mines; and appeals were made to the British Government for protection and assistance which the rightful suzerain — Siam — was not disposed to give. Consequently, by the Treaty of March 10, 1909, Great Britain took over from Siam her suzerain rights over the four Malay States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis with its islands.¹ The local autonomy and territorial integrity of these states were not changed, the sultans continuing to rule assisted by Councils of State. But they are now under British protection, and are assisted by a British adviser.

There are, therefore, on the peninsula, three forms of government: the Straits Settlements administered directly by the British, the Federated Malay States, and the Protected Malay States. Just what the developments of the future will be, none can say.² There may be an extension of the Federation to include all the Malay States, and even the Straits Settlements; or the present organization may stand.² In any event, British protection and British ad-

¹ See Chapter XI.

² In the final solution of the Malay problem one factor of prime importance, a discussion of which space does not permit here, must be given full consideration. This is the large immigrant population of Chinese and

visers have come to stay on the Malay Peninsula, for the Malays are utterly incompetent to rule themselves. Yet they are being dealt with justly; their states are prosperous; their people protected and happy, while the British are enjoying the commercial and political prestige which the control of the peninsula and the straits gives them.

Thus, the last link in the long line of defense from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca was forged; and Great Britain has successfully consummated a notable work in colonial defense and administration through the occupation and fortification of the great natural mountain frontier of India, and by the creation of a sphere of influence under her own control extending the whole length of the land border of that country from Aden and Oman to Singapore. Although Egypt has been given independence, Great Britain still holds her mastery there, and retains her ancient hold over the Sudan, the Suez Canal, and British Somaliland. By right of the mandates of 1920, she controls Palestine and Mesopotamia. Her Residents or Agents exert a dominating influence in Aden, Oman, the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan, Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, northern Burma, the Shan States, and the Malay Peninsula. And, since the extension of the British influence to Tibet¹ and the resumption of friendly relations between England and Afghanistan, the supremacy of the Anglo-Indian Empire is successfully maintained from Egypt to Johore. Moreover, not only is the position and trade of India secure, but the water route to the Near, the Middle, and the Far East, to Australia and New Zealand, and to the British and European possessions in the Pacific, is also open and safe, not only for British vessels, but for the ships of all nations.

Indians which is steadily increasing and which already outnumbers the Malay in at least one state.

¹ See Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

TIBET AND THE TIBETAN MARCHES

TIBET or "Bod" occupies that strange and vast highland region, known as the "roof of the world," lying west of China proper and north of India and the Himalaya Mountains. Embracing a vast territory — approximately 463,000 square miles — of great tablelands dotted with lakes and of lofty mountains separated by shallow, barren valleys, it is shut off from the rest of Asia by mighty mountain ranges including on the south the two highest chains on the earth. A number of the great rivers of Asia — such as the Indus, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Mekong, and Yangtze-Kiang — have their sources among the snows and glaciers of those wonderful ranges and flow down into the fertile valleys of India, Siam, Yunnan, and Szechwan. The position of this land of the Lamas is as strategic as it is unique, for through it pass some of the important trade routes between India and China, and it forms a natural rampart of defense, as a buffer state, both for India and China; and it has an intimate connection commercially, religiously, and politically with the border states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. For centuries it has been a land of exclusion and mystery — out of touch with the rest of the world, while little was known either of its inhabitants or of its geographical features. Foreigners were unwelcome; and no one but the Chinese Amban, or representative, was permitted to enter Lhasa, the capital; and only in recent years have such intrepid travelers as Rockhill, Landor, and Sven Hedin been allowed to bring us some definite knowledge of the nature of the country and the character of its inhabitants.

The population of Tibet comprises a goodly number of

semi-independent tribes who are ruled either by their own chieftains or by the lamas of their own districts, but who have recognized for years the suzerainty of China or of the Dalai Lama, paying tribute in the form of annual gifts. They are members of the Turanian family, belonging to the Turko-Mongolian branch, and being of a distinctly Mongolian type with high cheek-bones, broad noses, brown complexion, black hair, and short, stocky bodies. They are a hardy people, inured to privations and discomforts; and they are naturally indolent, easy-going, and peaceful in their habits and life. The Republicans of China, since 1911-12, have been fond of referring to them as one of the five races of the Chinese Republic, and offered them representation in the Parliament of China. The Tibetans, themselves, however, never considered their country as an integral part of the Chinese realm, and have taken no part in the new republican régime. On the contrary, they have been held together for centuries more by the common ties of blood, language, religion, and custom than by the flimsy, indefinite system of supervision introduced by the Chinese. During all this time, in spite of the presence of Chinese officials, soldiers, traders, and colonists, practically no progress has been made in assimilating them into the Chinese state.

The religion of the Tibetans is that form of Buddhism known as Lamaism; and the government of the country is in the hands of a hierarchy of lamas. The headship of the lamas dates from the days of Kublai Khan who made the red-capped Abbot of Sakya the ruler of Tibet, and of Gushi Khan — his Tartar successor in Central Asia — who transferred the control to the yellow-capped priests and created the office of Dalai Lama. This last-mentioned official, together with the Tashi, or Teshu, Lama, became the head and source of all power — religious and political

— in the state. In course of time, however, the Dalai Lama became the chief authority in matters of government and life, because, as the reincarnation of the Buddha of Infinite Mercy and Justice, he was the supreme arbiter of men's acts and of their future. On the other hand, the Tashi Lama, as the reincarnation of the Buddha of Boundless Light, found his power limited to religious ceremonies and functions. This Grand Lama of Tashilumbo took up his residence near Shigatse, and took his name from the celebrated monastery of Tashilumbo — “mountain of blessings.” The Grand Dalai Lama established his headquarters at Lhasa in the great monasteries situated to the southwest of that city, where he became a personage of great importance owing to the extension of Lamaism into Mongolia, Manchuria, China, Asiatic Russia, and India.


The Dalai Lamas were assisted in the management of the affairs of state by an executive council of four royal advisers — the Shapes — and by certain provincial and district lamas who were heads of local monasteries and administered the various provinces and districts of the country; and there was a national assembly, or Tsong Du, composed of laity and churchmen and held at Lhasa, which was supposed to exercise a controlling influence in matters of general importance and in the direction of foreign affairs. In 1720, China secured a control over the country by driving out the Tartar overlords and obtaining the right to appoint two Ambans, or Commissioners, with the power of general supervision, to reside at Lhasa. These Ambans were assisted by two or more Viceroys, or Garpans, who kept an eye on the large political divisions, and a number of inferior officials, known as Jongpens and Tarjums, who supervised the administration of the smaller districts. Tibet as a whole was divided roughly into two parts — one

directly under the control or supervision of China and the other subject directly to the Dalai Lama. The former, for convenience, may be designated as Inner and the latter as Outer Tibet. Inner Tibet embraces the two districts of Amdo and Khamdo. The former, which was transformed into the Chinese province of Chinghai in 1912, embraced all of northeastern Tibet including Koko Nor, Tsaidam, and a large region north of the upper courses of the Yangtze-Kiang. Under the Empire, Amdo was administered by the Imperial Controller-General of Koko Nor, who was stationed at Sining Fu in Kansu, and who has since been replaced by a Republican Commissioner. Khamdo was originally a large district with indefinite borders extending from the Yatung River to Lhorongjong, the eastern part of the central division of Tibet proper, and supervised by the Governor of Szechwan resident at Chengtu. It was supposed to include the lands of the five Horba tribes, the eighteen Nyarong states, the six districts of Litang, Batang, Derge, Markams, Draya, and Chiamdo; but these were all Tibetan communities ruled by their own chieftains, where the Chinese suzerainty was hardly more than a name. A number of the Nyarong states and other districts were actually controlled by the Lhasa Government or by the local lamas. So that a confusion of jurisdiction arose that led to disputes and conflicts. Uprisings and troubles beyond the Yatung River led the Manchu Emperors in recent times to incorporate the eastern part of Khamdo, including Litang and Batang, within the province of Szechwan. But, since the rulers of Tibet never recognized this proceeding or any of the other attempts of the Chinese Government to extend its direct rule over this region, one is not justified in assuming that the present boundary line, as it appears on Chinese and other maps, is an absolutely correct division of Tibetan and Chinese terri-

tory — particularly as no effort has been made either to delimit this line by accurate surveys or to secure the consent of the local chieftains and lamas to the erection of such a frontier. But it remains a delicate and perplexing question that must be solved before peace and security can be permanently established in China and Tibet, and in the determination of which the character and wishes of the native peoples of this region must play a large part.

Outer Tibet was under the direct rule of the authorities at Lhasa and included the three provinces of U or Wei, Tsang, and Ngari, and the great northern plateau of Chang Tang. Wei, or the central province, has Lhasa as its capital and embraces, besides a number of central districts such as Po, Pemakoichen, and Zayul, the pastoral tribes (Dokpa) north and northeast of Tengri Nor. The Tibetans consider that it includes also a number of the districts of Khamdo, of which the chief is Chiamdo. The province of Tsang is the south-central part of Tibet extending from Wei about two thirds of the way west to Lake Manasarowar. And Ngari Province embraces the whole of the southwest part of the state including the region of the sources of the Indus and Sutlej Rivers and extending to the borders of Ladak and Kashmir.

British interests in Tibet center about two things: the defense of the Indian frontier and the protection and promotion of the trade between India, Tibet, and China. Neither the British Government nor the Indian administration has ever shown any inclination to extend the Indian rule north of the Himalayas or to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. Their interest in the welfare of the frontier peoples and in the promotion of legitimate intercourse and trade between them and the Indian peoples has been sincere and straightforward. Their first serious efforts to open trade routes to China via Tibet and Yunnan



met with a cold reception from both Tibetans and Chinese. Although China signed the Chefoo Convention in 1876, the O'Connor Convention in 1886, and the Calcutta Agreement of 1890, which permitted India to send expeditions through Tibet and Yunnan and provided for the keeping open of a trade route between India, Yunnan, and West China, the Chinese authorities either evaded their responsibilities purposely or were unable to fulfill their promises; while the Tibetans systematically opposed the work of the Macaulay expedition in 1884 and all other efforts to open up trade routes into or through their country. In spite of a further trade agreement on December 5, 1893, between Great Britain and China, which was nominally accepted by Tibet, providing for a trade mart at Yatung (in Tibet just beyond the Sikkim frontier) and for free trade (except in certain prohibited articles) for five years between Tibet and India, the Lhasa Government continued its policy of obstruction. The boundary pillars between Tibet and Sikkim were torn down, a wall built across the trade route to Yatung, and Tibetan merchants were forbidden to cross the border. Yatung proved an impossible market-place; a ten per cent duty was levied at Phari on all goods that reached there; and letters of protestation from the Viceroy of India were returned unopened.

This kept up for ten years. Meanwhile, a *coup d'état* took place in Lhasa which put the control of affairs in the hands of the Dalai Lama and his intimate friend and adviser Dorjiev. The latter, a Mongolian Buriat from Lake Baikal, who shared the Dalai Lama's antipathy toward England and China, became an instigator of intrigues for Russian support. He visited St. Petersburg twice, returning with assurances of friendship and arms and ammunition. But all his efforts were unsuccessful, for the Dalai Lama was unable to secure the consent of the National

Assembly to the plan for Russian intervention. The patience of Great Britain was at length exhausted and her suspicions thoroughly aroused. Taking advantage of the sudden preoccupation of the Russians in their war with Japan, a British military expedition was sent, in the summer of 1903, through the Chumbi Valley into Tibet, with the purpose of securing British trade rights and of teaching the Tibetans a lesson. However, in order not to arouse the susceptibilities of the inhabitants and to convince them of the peaceful intentions of the British authorities, the column advanced very slowly and did not reach Gyantse till April 11, 1904. Getting no response to their overtures for a conference even at this late date, the British forces under General McDonald and Colonel Younghusband pushed on, taking the Gyantse Jong (fort) on July 6th and entering Lhasa on August 7th. The Dalai Lama and his supporters had fled. But negotiations were opened with the Tsong Du and a definite treaty signed on September 7th. The terms of this convention¹ included: recognition of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier line as established by the treaty of 1890, opening of three places in Tibet to the Indian trade—Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok—where the trade should be supervised by British and Tibetan agents, and the establishment of free trade between India and Tibet on a basis to be determined later by a joint commission. In addition, Tibet agreed not to alienate any of her territory, economic resources, or revenue to foreign powers, nor to permit the agents of such powers to enter her country.

The moderation of the British and the exemplary conduct of their troops won for them the respect and confidence of the Tibetans. "These were the undertakings made on

¹ The indemnity of \$2,500,000 laid on Tibet by this treaty was reduced shortly after by the Viceroy of India to \$800,000, or from seventy-five to twenty-five lakhs of rupees.

paper with the Tibetans," wrote Colonel Younghusband at the time, "but a surer guarantee for effecting our main object was that they were made with a reasonable amount of good-will. The Tibetans were certainly much better disposed toward us at the conclusion of the treaty in Lhasa than they were before we entered the country."

The Chinese Government sustained the move throughout, the Chinese Amban at Lhasa assisting in the negotiations and being present at the signing of the treaty in the Potala;¹ and, on April 27, 1906, China signed a convention with Great Britain approving all the provisions of the Tibetan treaty and agreeing to coöperate in the steps necessary to put it into operation. In addition, she promised not to permit any other power to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, while England gave assurances that she would not annex Tibet or interfere in her administration. The integrity of Tibet was still further guaranteed by the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, in which both parties agreed not to send representatives to Lhasa or to seek concessions or pledges of revenues in Tibet, promised to abstain from all interference in the internal administration, and recognized the suzerainty of China and the special interests of England in the country. China, moreover, took advantage of every occasion to participate in the various diplomatic moves, so that her right to act as an intermediary between Tibet and foreign powers would be clearly demonstrated. She told the Tibetan Government that the payment of the indemnity was a matter of adjustment between China and India; and she took up the question with England when the first installment came due, on the ground of the poverty of Tibet, paying it all off promptly on January 1, 1908. And this move was intended, as Sir Ernest Satow (British Minister at Peking)

¹ Sir Francis Younghusband: *India and Tibet* (London, 1910), p. 303.

wrote in 1910, "to force the hand of the Indian Government and induce them to accept an arrangement which the Chinese Government could afterward quote as a precedent."

It soon became evident that the Manchu Government had decided to reverse its earlier policy and to substitute for its lenient suzerainty a strong sovereign control over Tibet. But this was something that neither the Dalai Lama nor the British authorities were prepared to admit as being within the bounds of the Chinese rights.

The first move of the Chinese Government was to invite the Dalai Lama, who had been an exile in Mongolia since the events of 1904 in Tibet, to visit Peking. He arrived there on September 28, 1908, and till his departure on the 21st of December, was housed in the Great Yellow Temple, located outside of the north wall and built by the Emperor Shun-chih for the Dalai Lama in 1653. He was treated with the respect and courtesy due his exalted position at the head of the Lama Church, but it was pointed out to him very clearly that he was a vassal of China rather than an independent prince. He was to report to the Imperial Resident in Tibet instead of addressing the Throne directly, since both his land and his people, as Prince Ching assured Sir Ernest Satow, were subject to China. On November 2, 1908, an imperial decree was issued conferring on the Dalai Lama the title of "Loyally Submissive Vice-Regent," granting him an annual subsidy of ten thousand taels (to be paid, however, from the Szechwan provincial treasury), and requesting him to leave at once for Tibet. The net result of this visit was twofold: it confirmed the Dalai Lama in his suspicion that the Chinese authorities had very definite designs against the independence of his country and it reëstablished confidence and friendly relations between him and the British authorities. The British Minister in Peking, however, conducted himself in a

perfectly non-partisan manner, limiting his movement to a formal exchange of visits and presents.

The Dalai Lama reached Lhasa on December 25, 1909, to find that the Chinese Government had forestalled him by several months in taking skillful and determined steps to place Tibet and the Tibetan Marches under direct Chinese sovereignty. The old method of maintaining Chinese domination in these regions by garrisons and colonization had failed; and numerous revolts by the Tibetans of western Szechwan and Yunnan between 1904 and 1908 demonstrated the need of reform and of a strong hand. In an imperial decree of March 9, 1908, Tibet was referred to as "a rampart for the Province of Szechwan" and reforms were ordered in the "training of troops, promotion of education, development of agriculture, mining and industries, improvement of communications, and . . . in the government." And Chao Erh-feng, who, as acting-governor of Szechwan had demonstrated his ability as an administrator, was appointed Amban of Tibet and High Commissioner of Frontier Affairs in Szechwan and Yunnan. He was expected to perform a work in those regions similar to that of the Marquis Ito in Korea; and his brother, Chao Erh-hsun, who had been occupying an important position at Hankow, was made Governor of Szechwan, in order that the sinews of war might be provided from that rich province.

In September, 1908, Chao Erh-hsun arrived in Chengtu and Chao Erh-feng, having made careful preparations for his new work, departed for Tachienlu. He recruited Chinese troops for service in Tibet on promise of good pay and began the construction of good roads and a system of transportation. By November, 1909, he had restored order in the whole of western Szechwan, won over Derge for China, and arranged for the incorporation of a good

part of the Tibetan Marches into the administrative system of Szechwan. He advanced steadily toward Tibet, building a road from Derge to Batang, and arrived with two thousand men at Chiamdo on February 15, 1910.

Meanwhile, H. H. Lien Yu — Chinese Resident at Lhasa — who, supported by Chinese troops and the Peking Ministry, had been undermining the political and religious powers of the Dalai Lama, assumed the position of a dictator. Accordingly, the Dalai Lama,¹ realizing that his fall was only a question of days and fearing capture because of the advance of a column of Chinese soldiers on the capital, fled on February 12th; and he was formally deposed by the Chinese Government on the 25th. But on the 23d, Sir Edward Grey, through the British representative at Peking, entered a protest against this intervention in Tibet. England had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet, Grey asserted, but she could not remain indifferent to conditions in a region so near Nepal and other frontier states under her protection; and England, China was also told, felt that she had a right to expect a friendly explanation from China before the Chinese Government embarked on a policy that appeared to violate the treaties of 1904 and 1906. China replied, on February 26th, that this new movement was merely to introduce a more efficient police system and government so that China could more effectively fulfill her treaty obligations to foreign powers. No further aggressive action than the deposition of the Dalai Lama was

¹ "Last year when I reached Lhasa, I found the Chinese Resident, Lien Yu, and some Ministers of China with their ill-will ready to snatch away the spiritual as well as the temporal power of Tibet. That is the reason why in the Kham district many monasteries have been destroyed, persons killed, and the properties plundered. Besides, a large number of Chinese troops came to Lhasa and killed and wounded some Tibetan officers of various ranks. I was, therefore, compelled to leave Lhasa with the Ministers and a small number of suite for the neighboring country [India]." (Dalai Lama to W. W. Rockhill, dated at Darjeeling, October 4, 1910.)

intended unless rendered necessary by unforeseen circumstances.

Again, on April 8, 1910, Great Britain warned China that she could not permit any administrative changes in Tibet to affect the integrity of Nepal and adjoining border states, that she would hold China to the strict fulfillment of all treaty agreements, and that it was inadvisable for China to station troops near the borders of India. The Viceroy of India ascertained that there were already some thirty-four hundred Chinese troops in Tibet; and in July following, steps were taken to protect Indian interests by establishing British military posts at Gyangtse and Yantung. But the unsettled conditions continued, and the Dalai Lama, in spite of overtures from Chinese officials in the summer and fall of 1910, refused to return to Tibet.

When the Revolution broke out in China in 1911 resulting in the establishment of a Republic, a similar struggle occurred in Szechwan between the central authorities and the Republican leaders. In the midst of this civil discord, Chao Ehr-feng, who had succeeded his brother as Governor of Szechwan and had taken part first on one side and then on the other, was transferred by President Yuan to his old job as Warden of the Marches on October 26, 1911, only to be forced to turn over the government of these districts to the President of the Provincial Assembly on November 27th. Shortly afterward, he was executed; and ere long the whole district of eastern Tibet and western Szechwan was again in a furor owing to uprisings of the Tibetan tribes who drove out the Chinese garrisons. Tibet also joined the movement; and the Chinese troops there were speedily shut up in Lhasa and other towns. The Dalai Lama and Dorjiev returned to the country and to Lhasa after the surrender of the Chinese garrison in the capital in August, 1912.

Meanwhile, presidential orders were issued during March and April, 1912, declaring Mongolia and Tibet integral parts of China and putting them on the same footing as the eighteen provinces with representation in the National Assembly. A new province, named Siangchen with Batang as capital, was created out of western Szechwan and eastern Tibet; and a military expedition under the military governors of Yunnan and Szechwan was organized to recover Tibet, and proceeded as far as Chiamdo. But at this point Great Britain again interfered, sending a Memorandum to Peking on August 12th, and closing all communication between China and Tibet via India. In her note England asked China to refrain from the expedition into Tibet on the ground that it was a violation of the treaty of 1906, adding that Great Britain could not countenance the establishment of Chinese sovereignty over a state with which England had independent treaty relations. And China was invited to come to an agreement with the British along these lines, which, however, would have to be made antecedent to the British recognition of the new Chinese Republic.

China stopped the advance of her troops, whose energies were then directed to the restoration of order on the Chinese side of the border, and made an agreement with Tibet the same month for the withdrawal of the Chinese garrisons of Lhasa and neighboring towns via India. But she protested, in her answer to England on December 23rd, that she had no intention of making Tibet a province of the Chinese Republic. Her only motives in sending troops into the country were: to preserve the traditional system of government and to restore peace and order. She thought no new treaty was needed, and urged the British to recognize the Chinese Republic without further delay.

Meanwhile, Tibet was taking things into her own hands.

On January 2, 1913, the Tibetan authorities declared the independence of Tibet and announced the conclusion of a treaty with Mongolia. And by March, all the Chinese civil and military officials had withdrawn from the country. The Tuteh of Szechwan failed in the same spring to make headway against the revolting Tibetan tribes of the Marches, and was dismissed from office. And President Yuan sent a representative to Chiamdo in a fruitless attempt to secure from the Dalai Lama a settlement of differences and an agreement as to frontiers. At this juncture, Great Britain pressed her earlier suggestion for a conference; and on October 10, 1913, delegates from England, China, and Tibet met at Simla, the British representative, Sir Henry McMahon, presiding.

The Tibetan plenipotentiary presented his case at this session and the Chinese made their reply on October 30th. The proposal of the Tibetan delegates included: independence of Tibet, restoration of the old Tibetan frontier line to include all lands east of Chiamdo inhabited by Tibetans; negotiation of new trade regulations, removal of Chinese officials and troops from Tibet, recognition of the Dalai Lama as head of the Buddhist Church in Mongolia and China, and compensation to Tibet for forcible exactions of property and money belonging to Tibetan subjects and monasteries, and for "damage" done to the persons and property of Nepalese and Ladhakis. The demands of the Chinese representative embraced: restoration of the former *status quo* in Tibet where that state would be an integral part of China, but not a province, reappointment of a Chinese Resident at Lhasa with an escort of twenty-six hundred troops, direction of military and foreign affairs in hands of the Chinese authorities, amnesty for pro-Chinese Tibetans and restoration of their property by the Tibetan Government, and settlement of the boundary dispute on

the basis of the Chinese claims that would give Chiamdo and all east of it to China.

In order to give each side time to formulate its respective territorial claims, together with legal evidence of its rights, the date of the next session was postponed to January 12, 1914. After a careful examination of all the evidence in the matter, Sir Henry McMahon, with a view to breaking the deadlock and giving a just treatment to both claimants, proposed on March 7, 1914, to divide the whole country into an Outer and an Inner Tibet by drawing a line along the Kwenlung Mountains to the ninety-sixth degree of longitude, then south to a point south of the thirty-fourth degree of latitude and from thence in a southwesterly direction to Rima. *Outer* Tibet, which was to include Chiamdo, was to have an autonomous government, though nominally under Chinese suzerainty. China might have an official representative at Lhasa with an escort of not over three hundred men, but she was not to convert the country into a province of the Republic or send troops or colonists there. Both England and China were to refrain from interference in internal affairs, but the British Agent at Gyantse might visit Lhasa. *Inner* Tibet, which should embrace Litang and Batang, was to be under the direct control of China and the Chinese authority and institutions should be reestablished there. The inference was that Inner Tibet should be organized as a distinct territory administered either by officials of the Central Government of China, or by representatives of the Szechwan provincial régime. A new trade agreement between Great Britain and Tibet was to be negotiated without delay; and Great Britain was to act as an intermediary in all disputes between China and Tibet. But nothing in the agreement was to prejudice the right of the Tibetan ruler to appoint the high priests in the monasteries in

Inner Tibet and to control all matters affecting religious institutions.

Finally an agreement embodying all these points was initialed by the representatives of India, China, and the Dalai Lama on April 27, 1914. The Chinese Government, however, refused to confirm the treaty on the grounds that Chiamdo could not properly be included in Outer Tibet and that Litang and Batang could not be made a part of Inner Tibet, since they were integral districts of the province of Szechwan.

After a reasonable delay, to afford China an opportunity to reconsider her decision, the Indian and Tibetan delegates arranged for the resumption of commercial relations between India and Tibet and signed the Simla Convention on July 3, 1914. In this way Tibet secured her autonomy; and Great Britain notified the Chinese authorities promptly that, until she was ready to sign, China would be deprived of all the advantages and privileges of the treaty.

The events of 1910 to 1914 just described completely transformed the position of Tibet, raising it from a dependent, subject community to a full-fledged autonomous state. In the main, one may attribute this fortunate outcome to three important factors. There was, in the first place, the genuine desire on the part of the Tibetans to be free from Chinese control, evidenced by their resistance to the encroachments of Chao Erh-feng and by their activities in ridding their country of the Chinese garrisons. In the second place, the inability of the Chinese authorities to cope successfully with this thorny problem was well demonstrated by the fact that all their attempts at reform and efficient government only served to antagonize and embitter the Tibetans, since they were based on a misconception of the situation and the use of force, intrigue, and Chinese colonization. On the other hand, the endless

internal troubles and financial distress precluded the Republican régime from giving the matter serious consideration and skillful, sustained treatment. The third factor was the British Government, which changed its policy from a neutrality that recognized the sovereignty of China and forbade any interference in the internal affairs of Tibet to an active participation in the movement for local autonomy in that country. It is evident that the British and Indian authorities felt that the security of the Indian frontier would be better served through the establishment of an independent "buffer" state to the north, bound to the British Raj by bonds of friendship and of common interests, than by the perpetuation of a situation where China exercised an uncertain control over a turbulent people, where the Chinese Government could easily throw detachments of its own troops on the Indian frontier at any moment, and which left the border states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan an easy prey to Chinese and Tibetan intrigues. On the other hand, it is true that the British statesmen recognized that this was the only practical and workable solution of a problem which had been for years a source of trouble and discord and a stumbling-block in the way of all progress and the maintenance of peace in Central Asia.

It does not follow, however, that the whole question was settled by the establishment of Tibetan autonomy. On the contrary, the Treaty of Simla was merely the creation of a basis upon which to work out the solution of the Tibetan problem. And, since it has been accepted by the Tibetan people and approved by the British and Indian authorities, all that remains to set the ball going is the consent of the Chinese Government. Once the coöperation of the Chinese Republic is secured, it will not be long before peace and order is established in the Tibetan Marches

and on the frontier, and before an equitable and just basis for freedom of trade and intercourse between the peoples of Tibet, China, and India will be created.

Unfortunately, up to the present writing, the Chinese authorities have refused to agree to any compromise in the matter. This is due largely to the weakness of the Central Government, the foreign and domestic controversies which have absorbed the energies and resources of administrators, and the failure to accept any definite boundary line along the Tibetan-Chinese frontier. Meanwhile, conditions on the western border of China continue as bad and hopeless as ever. The Chinese officials continue their atrocities against the Tibetan peoples and monasteries; and the Tibetan tribes retaliate in kind. In the summer of 1919, Major Eric Teichman, attached to the British Embassy at Peking, and the late Dr. Shelton,¹ head of the Christian Mission at Batang, succeeded in creating an armistice for a month, which, after a conference at Chiamdo, was extended for a year. On May 30th of the same year, Sir John Jordan — British Minister to China — who had been pressing the Chinese Government for a settlement ever since 1914, received a definite proposition from the Chinese Foreign Office concerning the proposed Sino-Tibetan frontier line. While willing to approve the general terms of the Simla Agreement, the Chinese Government now suggested a radical departure from the boundary line as proposed in that document. It demanded that the native chieftains of Tachienlu, Litang, and Batang should remain under the administration of the province of Szechwan, but suggested that the territories of the thirty-nine chiefs of Chiamdo, Riwoche, Draya, and Markams should remain under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama as a part of Outer Tibet. Furthermore, in consideration of the fact that the

¹ Killed by brigands in 1923.

British plenipotentiary agreed to the reversion to Chinese control of the territory lying north of the Kuenlun Mountains and forming part of Chinghai and Sinkiang, the Chinese authorities were prepared to make the southern portion of Chinghai — on the south of the Kuenlun range and including the district of Derge, Horba, and Nyarong — a part of Inner Tibet. It was understood, however, that this Inner Tibet, so-called, should be under the jurisdiction of China, and that the original Chinese jurisdiction over Yunnan and Sinkiang should be maintained.

This new Chinese proposal was practically a reversion to what was known as the Ningching Shan boundary line (three days west of Batang) which had been demarcated by the Manchu rulers in 1727. Generally speaking, this means a return to the old historical frontier of China and Tibet; and it would be the most practical and feasible solution possible of this tangled question. Sir Henry McMahon's suggestion of an Outer and Inner Tibet did not appeal to the Chinese; and it was a diplomatic blunder to have dragged this new feature into the discussion; for, as the Chinese proposal just given above shows, it was possible to solve the boundary problem without recourse to this new complication; and, even though the Chinese regarded their own proposition as in no way measuring up to their just claims or rights, they were willing to accept it as a compromise.

Unfortunately, the British Foreign Office permitted three months to elapse before it wired Sir John Jordan its approval of this Chinese proposal. By that time — August, 1919 — the Shantung question had come to the front and the Chinese people had been greatly incensed over the treatment of their representatives at Paris and the bargaining away of Chinese territory at the peace negotiations without consulting China. Accordingly the Chinese Government

felt that the people would not tolerate any further cessions of the national domains, such as were apparently contemplated in the Tibetan treaty. And they reasoned that it was useless to make any concessions to foreign governments in the future, as no just treatment — not to speak of favors — was to be secured thereby. Consequently, they have declined, up to the present writing, to conclude the proposed arrangements concerning the Sino-Tibetan frontier.

No settlement of the Tibetan question is possible, therefore, until China is willing to agree to a satisfactory delimitation of the Sino-Tibetan boundary line. In the second place, any real solution of the problem will demand the organization of a new form of government for the Tibetan Marches that undoubtedly will remain under the control of China. The past history of this region has fully demonstrated that the best plan for the rule of "Inner Tibet" would be one that would place all of that country, now inhabited chiefly by Tibetans but to be transferred to China, under the direct supervision of the Central Government of the Republic. The provincial officials of Szechwan should no longer be permitted to rule or interfere in the affairs of this region. It should form, rather, a special territory of the Chinese state, whose administrators should be appointed by, and directly responsible to, the Republican régime at Peking. And the Central Chinese Government must furnish all the funds necessary to the successful administration and for the economic development of this district, which are not to be obtained in the region itself, and to keep an intelligent and close watch over the management of affairs.

A third step in the process of reconstruction which will take place on the Chino-Tibetan frontier is the conclusion of a working trade agreement between China and Tibet.

In order that an equitable arrangement may be provided, that will ensure the proper regulation and promotion of all commercial intercourse between the two countries, it is essential that freedom of trade within certain specified limits shall be established and a mutual understanding reached as to trade centers or marts and trade routes; and to make this new commercial arrangement really valuable and workable, it will be necessary for both China and Tibet to conclude similar trade agreements with India.

The whole problem of Tibet and the Tibetan Marches is intimately connected with the general question of the administration of the outlying provinces of China. Since the establishment of the Republic, altogether too little attention has been paid to colonial or provincial affairs. Matters have been handled in a hit or miss manner. And a "laissez-faire" policy has been the rule of conduct except where pressure — as in the case recently of Mongolia and Manchuria — has compelled action of some sort. As soon as all of China is reunited and an efficient administration is worked out for the Central Government, one of the first things that will claim its attention will be the reorganization of the government of Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai, and "Inner Tibet." A commission of experts in government, finance, and economics will have to be appointed to study the situation in these regions and their relationship to the central authorities. And a practical plan will have to be evolved for their efficient administration, control, and development. It would be a wise move if, when this time comes, the Chinese Government would add to this commission a number of well-trained foreign advisers who have had experience in colonial administration and finance.

CHAPTER XI

INDO-CHINA AND SIAM

FROM the southeast corner of Asia there juts out between the Bay of Bengal and the stormy South China Sea a strange and wonderful region known as the "Golden Peninsula." Its area is over 870,000 square miles — more than one fourth the size of the United States; and it is inhabited by a medley of races totaling from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000 people. With an extreme length of about 1800 miles, it varies in breadth from nearly 700 miles to something over sixty miles at the Isthmus of Kra; while its long finger — the Malay Peninsula — stretches southward 750 miles in the tropical seas, till it approaches within one degree of the equator. And it consists of two distinct peninsulas — Indo-China and Malacca — each of which has a widely diversified coast-line with many bays, inlets, islands, and headlands, but which differ greatly in physical composition and in the character of their inhabitants.

Rugged mountain ranges from Tibet and Yunnan run down on each side of the Golden Peninsula — one, known as the Annamite Range, crosses western Tongking to the Annamite coast of Indo-China and down that coast to Cape St. Jacques; and the others, in a number of branches, pass through northern Burma down between Burma proper and Arakan in the Arakan Yoma as far as Cape Negrais, and through eastern Burma and western Siam into the Malay States and through the entire length of the Malay Peninsula. Great rivers — the Song-ka (Red), Mekong, Menam, Salween, and Irrawaddy — rush down through these ranges and their offshoots, and spread out

through rich alluvial valleys into broad, tropical, and low-lying deltas, as they reach the sea.

Moreover, the Golden Peninsula has been the meeting-place of three distinct branches of the human family and of three different civilizations; the Indian, the Chinese or Tartar, and the Malay; and it has been the scene of innumerable racial conflicts and of interstate wars between ambitious monarchs striving to found kingdoms and nations struggling to preserve their national existence. Of the races which survive till the present day, the most important and virile are: the Burmese, the Siamese, the Annamites, the Cambodians, and the Malays. Of the states established by these people, the Empire of Annam was undoubtedly the greatest in the early days. For its emperor ruled over Tongking, Annam, and Cochin-China, was the suzerain of Cambodia, and received intermittently the homage of the Laos States. Yet even this country did not escape the intrigues of foreign powers; and all of the peoples of the Golden Peninsula were forced sooner or later to submit to the dictation of European states. To-day only one of the old kingdoms — Siam — is independent; two — Annam and Cambodia — are French protectorates; Burma became a province of British India in 1886; and the Malay States are all under British protection.

The Dai Nam Quoc, or the Grand Empire of the South, as Annam has been called since the fifth century to distinguish it from China — the Great Empire of the North — has passed through many vicissitudes. It was a vassal of China from 280 B.C. to 114 B.C., a province of the Celestial Empire from 114 B.C. till 931 A.D., again under Chinese control from 1427 to 1428, and for many years under the suzerainty of China to whom it paid tribute to 1884; while the country was considerably influenced by Chinese art, customs, religions, and ideals. Nevertheless, the An-

namite people who now constitute three fourths of the population of the Indo-Chinese peninsula possessed an individuality and a civilization of their own — so virile and progressive that, if the movement had not been arrested by the French invasion, they would have absorbed all of the other races of Indo-China. Cochin-China was already absorbed. So, too, was the greater part of Tongking. Cambodia was rapidly being affiliated; while the Laos States were silently being drawn within the orbit of Annamite influence and control.

Annam enjoyed independence under its own rulers from 968 to 1427, and again from 1428 till the end of the eighteenth century, when the country was thrown into confusion by the outbreak of civil war. However, Gia Long — of the Nguyen family and King of Cochin-China — succeeded in uniting the whole country and in restoring the old Empire of Annam in 1801. Fourteen years earlier, this same Gia Long had been assisted in the recovery of his own crown in Cochin-China by French officers and by that great apostle of French civilization — the Bishop of Adran, Monseigneur Pigneau de Béhaine; and he had signed with Louis XVI, on November 28, 1787, a treaty which opened Cochin-China to trade, and ceded to France the peninsula of Tourané and the island of Bulo-Condore.

After the death of Gia Long in 1820, the power of the Empire of Annam gradually declined. He was succeeded by weak and inefficient rulers who feared and distrusted all foreigners and who were opposed to all intercourse with the outside world. They slowly lost their grip on affairs; while their authority was restricted on every side. By 1850, they had lost Cambodia, had only a slight control over Cochin-China, and their authority in Tongking was threatened by the independent action of local mandarins and by the appearance of Chinese pirates under black, red,

and white flags, who overran the province, pillaging the towns and endangering the missions and trading posts. Persecution of French and other Christians ensued in different parts of the Empire, and foreign traders were abused and driven out. Finally, after the murder of a Spanish Dominican bishop in 1858, the French and Spanish Governments decided to protect their rights and their subjects through a naval demonstration; and a French squadron under Admiral de Genouilly occupied Tourané on September 1, 1858, and Saigon in February, 1859; while Admiral Bonard took Bien-hoa on December 9, 1861. Thus began the intervention of the French in Indo-China. Its pretext was a combination of religious zeal — to protect their missionaries — and of national pride — to take revenge for insults to their nationals and to their country. But its real motives were commercial and political.

After the loss of her Indian possessions in the eighteenth century, France began to seek colonies and new markets elsewhere in the East. "Having only mediocre possessions in India," wrote Jean A. Salèles in 1815 to the Commandant-in-chief of l'Île Bourbon cruising in the vicinity of Cochin-China, "it becomes of great interest to France to establish commercial relations with Sumatra, côte Malaise, Cochin-China, Borneo, Philippine Islands, and China." The location of Indo-China was excellent, since it had for neighbors Siam, China, and the Philippine Islands, and since it would give the French a foothold on the China Sea and a basis from which to conduct commercial enterprises throughout the Far East including the East Indies and the South Seas. Moreover, it was a region where European domination might be set up with comparative ease. For the weakness of the Empire of Annam, with its loose political organization, its inferior military forces, its incapable rulers, and its divided peoples, made it an object

of prey to its neighbors — China and Siam — as well as an attractive country for French intervention.

The maintenance of peace and order and the establishment of favorable trade conditions in the Golden Peninsula were, doubtless, matters of considerable importance in the minds of French statesmen. But no one thought of considering seriously the interests of the people of Annam; nor of investigating their institutions and civilization, which were of a high order and worthy of study. Yet the Annamites are a courageous, high-spirited, and intelligent people. As a race they are patient, capable of great endurance, uncomplaining, small of stature, yet agile as cats; but they are cursed with an incurable strain of idleness and indifference. They cling with uncompromising devotion to their ancient customs, religious ideals, and national institutions; and they still regard all foreigners with suspicion and see no justification for their presence in Indo-China, as they did while the French were seizing control of their country.

Of all this, European powers took little notice, for their eyes were filled with the lust of conquest and their minds with the spirit of profit and adventure. "Whatever may be the principles and whatever may be the occasion," wrote de la Bissachère in 1812, "it is not impossible that great concessions will be made to European commerce. Tongking may be involved in some crisis, as an unhappy war against China, a throne shaken by revolts, a prince expelled from his estates as happened in Cochin-China. And, when a European power, as a price of the aid it has given, has received only a simple commercial concession, it is possible that, in a little time, this concession degenerates into a territorial property and then this property right takes on a character of sovereignty. Such has been the foundation of the greatest commercial establishments in Asia."

The French move to coerce the Emperor of Annam was delayed on account of a joint attack by Great Britain and France upon China during the years 1858 to 1860, which compelled the French to send their Far Eastern fleet and most of their troops to the coast of China. However, by February, 1861, they had secured control over the district surrounding Saigon; and in 1862, they defeated decisively the forces of the Emperor, Quang Dinh, in that vicinity, while Admiral Bonard occupied the district about Bien-hoa. At length, on April 15, 1863, the Emperor was compelled to recognize the French claim to sovereignty over the three provinces of Upper Cochin-China: Mytho, Saigon, and Bien-hoa. Revolts and disturbances continuing, and no coöperation or support being received from the ruler of Annam, the French were moved to take over the direct administration of the three other provinces of Cochin-China: Vinh-Long, Chau-Doc, and Ha-Tien, in 1867. And, finally, by the Treaty of Saigon, signed March 15, 1874, the six provinces of Cochin-China were transferred officially and permanently to France.

Meanwhile, events were moving rapidly to pave the way for the ultimate establishment of a French protectorate over the whole of Indo-China. Cambodia — a little kingdom lying between Siam and Cochin-China in the basin of the lower Mekong, and possessing now an area of 65,000 square miles with a population of 1,500,000 — had been for centuries the unfortunate victim of its more powerful neighbors. For two hundred years previous to the coming of the French, it had been a vassal of both Siam and Annam, which competed for its control. The Annamites had penetrated into the southern provinces where Annamite officials and troops assumed control of affairs; while the Siamese gained an entrance in the north and proceeded to dictate to the royal government. At the end of the

eighteenth century, Siam annexed the provinces of Battambang and Siem-Reap, compelled the King to send his sons to Bangkok for training, and interfered more and more in the internal affairs of Cambodia. Thereupon, its rulers appealed to the Emperor of Annam for aid; and a long struggle ensued, which was ended by a treaty between Siam and Annam in 1847, whereby it was agreed that the Annamites should withdraw from the country, that Ang-Duong — a protégé of Siam — should become King of Cambodia, and that a joint protectorate should be established over the realm.

Ang-Duong, although an intelligent and capable ruler, was unable to free himself and his country from this foreign domination. Upon his death in 1860, a contest for the throne ensued between his sons — Norodom and Sivatha; and the successful candidate — Norodom — owed his triumph to the Siamese who retained his insignia of office and forced on him a Siamese mandarin as an official adviser. Feeling that no aid could be expected from Annam in its weakened condition, and being convinced of the ability of the French by reason of their conquest of Cochin-China, the new King appealed to France for assistance. In September, 1862, Admiral Bonard — Governor of Cochin-China — visited Norodom and learned the real state of affairs; and Commandant Douart de Lagrée, who was sent into the country shortly afterward to offset the Siamese intrigues, made a treaty with the King on August 11, 1863, whereby Cambodia was placed under French protection. The French promised to “maintain peace and order in the realm and to protect it from all attack from outside”; while they were recompensed by certain property and trade rights, consular privileges, and protection for Catholic missionaries. Douart de Lagrée became the first French adviser at the

capital of Cambodia, which was moved to Pnom-Penh in 1866; and a Cambodian representative was sent to live at Saigon — the official residence of the French Governors of Cochin-China.

In 1877, Norodom attempted unsuccessfully to reorganize the government along modern lines; but his efforts were frustrated by the opposition of mandarins and court officials. The quarrels, troubles, unrest, and misrule continuing, and the King showing a strong tendency to ignore his French advisers, the French determined to make their authority supreme. Accordingly, a new treaty was executed in 1884, by which the administration of the country passed into the hands of a French Resident-General; while the French took over the direction of the budget, the collection and disbursement of all revenues, the execution of all reforms, and the supervision of local government in the towns and districts. The King, however, was allowed to retain the seals of office and the right to sign decisions, besides being paid an annual income of three hundred thousand piasters. Nevertheless, so unpopular was this agreement, so great were the demonstrations against it, and so strenuous was the royal opposition, that it was not put into force till 1891, when a royal ordinance fixed the present form of government under the King and a French Resident-General.

"Since the occupation of Cochin-China has placed France in contact with Cambodia," wrote a French Resident of the latter country in 1904, "the national independence [of Cambodia] has ceased to be in danger." In fact, all danger of Siamese intervention was removed by the Franco-Siamese Treaty of July, 1867, in which the latter power renounced all its claims to the country in exchange for the transfer to Siam of the provinces of Siem-Reap, Battambang, and Sisophon, and the assurance that

Cambodia would not be incorporated into Cochin-China. In 1904, Cambodia recovered from Siam the provinces of Melupré and Bassac and the maritime district of Krat, and from Laos the province of Stung-Treng and territory of Siem-Pang. And, in 1907, Siam was induced by France to exchange the provinces of Siem-Reap, Battambang, and Sisophon for Krat and the province of Dansai, on the assurance that the French sphere of influence would be withdrawn to the left bank of the Mekong — which recovery of ancient Cambodian territory was called the “greatest glory of his reign” by Sisovat, the brother and successor of Norodom.

In the meantime, the French were acquiring other possessions in the Golden Peninsula. Tongking — the northern province embracing some 46,000 square miles of territory and composed of a western and northern section of rugged mountains and plateaus cut by the Red River and its tributaries and of an eastern section of fertile plains about the great delta of the Red River — had been a bone of contention between China and Annam till its incorporation into Annam by the Emperor Gia Long in 1801. China was still claiming some portions of it and the Black Flag pirates from the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung were constantly preying upon its northern section, when the French became interested in the country. The great majority of the inhabitants were Annamese who dwelt in the delta and the lowlands, while the Mois, or original people, lived in the hill and mountain section. But everywhere, although the King of Annam was recognized as the legal suzerain of the country, the province was ruled by its own local mandarins and town officials.

Between 1866 and 1868, Douart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier explored the Mekong north to Yunnan; and the indomitable Jean Dupuis, who had recognized the value of

the resources of Yunnan and Szechwan and the importance of opening the Red River to trade as early as 1865, conducted an expedition to Yunnan via the Red River and Lao-hai in 1870-71. But when he returned from a second trip to Yunnan in the spring of 1873 with a cargo of tin and copper, he was stopped at Hanoi by the mandarins of Tongking, who were opposed to foreigners and foreign trade. An appeal to the French authorities brought Francis Garnier to Hanoi on November 5th with a small military force. He supported Dupuis, and tried to induce the mandarins to place Tongking under French protection. Failing to move the local officials, Garnier took matters into his own hands. On November 18th, he proclaimed Tongking and the Red River open to the trade of France, Spain and China through open ports at Hai-Phong and Thai-Binh. On the 20th, he seized control of Hanoi by force; and by the 20th of December the whole of the delta was in his hands through the occupation of Phu-ly, Hai-Doung, Nind-Binh, and Nam-Dinh. But Garnier was slain in a sortie against the Black Flags at Hanoi on December 21st; and with him vanished the dreams of conquest in Tongking; for the French Government, "with its eyes fixed on the Vosges frontier, did not have a centime nor a man to risk at a distance," after the Franco-Prussian War. As Admiral Duprés wrote from Saigon to Garnier on December 4, 1873: "The Ministry approves my project [opening of trade on the Red River and securing control of Tongking by the expulsion of Dupuis], if I am able to realize them pacifically, by diplomatic methods. It forbids me absolutely to attempt the affair, if it can only be carried out by the use of arms."

Accordingly, Admiral Duprés, after the death of Garnier, apologized to the King of Annam for Garnier's activities, sent Lieutenant Philastre to Tongking to arrange for the

evacuation of that province and the withdrawal of Dupuis, and concluded with the King of Annam the weak-kneed Treaty of Saigon on March 15, 1874. This agreement was supposed to set up a French protectorate over Annam, by placing the control of foreign affairs in the hands of the French and admitting a French Resident Minister to Hué, by opening two ports — Hanoi and Hai-Phong — to trade in Tongking, and by entrusting the French with the protection of Annam and Tongking against the pirates and other enemies. However, the withdrawal of the French from Tongking and the abandonment of the occupied cities had a very bad effect on the situation; the Red River was not opened to trade; massacres of Christians ensued; the King of Annam tried to free himself from French control; and within five years the treaty was a dead letter.

At length, after all the notes of the French representative had been disregarded and the policy of conciliation had proved ineffective, Admiral Jauréguiberry wrote the Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 1, 1879: "After an existence of nearly five years, the treaty of March 15, 1874, is in a sort of decadence. One ought not to delay taking action any longer. The time has come, it seems to me, to change front — to settle the situation by definite action." But the French Government was not ready for colonial adventures in the Far East. Colonial expansion was little understood in those days; and it was opposed by many statesmen because it was intimately connected in the minds of all men with expensive wars of conquest. Even those leaders who claimed it was a duty of the Government to seek raw material and markets abroad, and to take part in the "division of new territories and to assure itself of new bodies of consumers," were ignorant of the real conditions in the Orient and acted with timidity and without definite policy. It was, therefore, not until the spring of 1882 that

Captain Henri Rivière was ordered to Tongking to open the Red River to commerce, to see that the treaty was enforced, and to drive out the Black Flags. With a small force he occupied Hanoi on April 25th, but was compelled to wait nearly a year before reinforcements arrived. Even then, the troops at his command were utterly inadequate for the work at hand. Nevertheless, he took Nam-Dinh and other delta towns and established the French control over the whole delta during March and April, 1883. But on May 19th, he was slain and his forces wiped out in the course of a foolhardy attack upon a greatly superior army of Black Flags.

This disaster aroused the French to definite action. M. Jules Ferry — the first French statesman to grasp the advantages of a colonial empire — who became Premier in February, 1883, determined to execute a vigorous policy and secured a vote of five million francs from the French Assembly to revenge Rivière and to acquire Tongking. In the summer of 1883, Dr. Harmand, supported by the French fleet under Admiral Courbet, landed at Tourané and stormed the Annamese capital — Hué — after the Government of Annam had ignored his demands. A temporary agreement with the Annam Ministry placed the country completely under French domination but it was not till June 6, 1884, that the formal Treaty of Hué was definitely executed. By this, Annam placed itself irrevocably under French protection. The direction of its foreign affairs was placed in French hands and it was to receive a French Resident-General and French Resident administrators in Annam and Tongking. The ports of Qui-Nhone, Tourané, and Quang-Ngai were opened to trade and a French garrison admitted to Hué. The customs and finances of the country were put under French control, and the French were to supervise the administration of

Tongking, although an Annamite Viceroy and other local officials were to remain in office in that province.

Meanwhile, an expedition under Generals Brière de l'Isle and Négrier proceeded to Tongking at the end of 1883 and the early months of 1884, and occupied all the delta up to the foothills. When the French attempted to occupy the northern hilly section of the province, they became involved in a serious encounter with the Chinese who claimed this section of the country. The French, however, took Song-tay, defeated the Chinese forces at Chu (near Lang-Kep), and pushed on to Lang-Son by February, 1885. But, although Fournier and Li Hung Chang had negotiated an agreement at Tientsin in May to be worked out in detail in three months, a column under Colonel Dugenne was defeated badly and put to flight by the Chinese¹ at Bac-le in June, 1884, and on March 28, 1885, the French forces were driven back and thrown into a complete rout at Lang-Son. The French people were horrified at the disaster and the Ferry Ministry fell on March 30th. But negotiations were resumed speedily with China, resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin on June 9, 1885. In this agreement, China renounced her rights over Tongking and Annam and recognized the French protectorate over Annam. Trade between Tongking and China was to be carried on through the towns of Lai-Kai and Lang-Son; and the French were to coöperate in restoring order on the frontier. To prevent trouble, French subjects were to have Chinese passports, and Chinese French passports, when the former entered China or the latter Tongking. And the French were to build railways in Tongking and to assist China to do the same in her southern provinces.

¹ The Chinese commanders, having received no word of the agreement, refused to permit the French advance, although willing to delay action till instructions came from Peking.

Notwithstanding this favorable agreement with China and the official recognition of the French protectorate over Annam and Tongking by the young King of Annam, the French adventure in Indo-China, which in three years — 1883 to 1885 — had cost them 344,000,000 francs, was by no means a success. It took them five years — 1886 to 1891 — to complete the military occupation of Tongking; and even then they held the province only by main force, for neither the head men nor the people had any sympathy for French rule, and gave the new administration little support. In Annam they found themselves faced at once with a native uprising. The young Emperor, Ham-Nghi, supported by the Regent and Minister of War, Ton That Thuyet, refused to receive General de Courcy at Hué as Resident-General, and, although exiled from his capital, maintained the rebellion for three years. He was captured at the end of 1888 and banished to Algeria in January, 1889; but the French were forced to select a successor from the Nguyen family, appoint a council of regency from men loyal to France, and to set up a military administration throughout the land, before the country was at peace. Indeed, the French were very pessimistic about this new colonial enterprise. In December, 1885, after a stormy debate, the Chamber voted to stay in Tongking by the narrow majority of six. It was only the enthusiasm of the few far-seeing statesmen and the eloquence of men such as Jules Ferry that carried the country through these early trying days. "It is not a question of the future of tomorrow," exclaimed Ferry on October 30, 1883, "but of the future of fifty or a hundred years, of that which will be the inheritance of our children, the bread of our workers. It is not a question of conquering China. But it is necessary to be at the portal of this rich region in order to undertake the pacific conquest of it."

But for a decade the position of the French was precarious. They had no definite or intelligent colonial policy; and they paid out their money grudgingly and under compulsion for this distant enterprise which they little understood. Neither the expenditure of large sums of money nor the efforts of military and naval experts brought them any security of prosperity in Indo-China. Paul Bert — Resident-General for six months in 1886 — though greatly handicapped by the lack of funds and trained men, reduced *corvées*, subsidized the devastated regions, founded hospitals, repaired dikes, established religious toleration, organized public instruction, and created chambers of commerce at Hanoi and Hai-Phong. Yet even these heroic labors, though costing their originator his life, failed materially to change the situation.

It was not until the administration of J. M. A. de Lanessan — Governor-General from April, 1891, to December, 1894 — who had spent two years — 1886 to 1888 — at the head of the “Mission de Lanessan” studying the situation in Indo-China, that the French took the first step in the creation of a sound colonial policy for their Far Eastern possessions. The first move of de Lanessan was to restore the prestige of the Court of Annam and of the local mandarins in Tongking by giving the former a dignified semblance of authority and the latter a large part of their ancient powers under the supervision of the French Residents and by entrusting them with the direction of local government in all the provinces. With the aid of the mandarins, the delta of Tongking was pacified in three months without the use of force, and the situation speedily transformed throughout the land. In Tongking, the six mountain districts of Lang-Son, Cao-Bang, Thai-Nguyen, Tuyen-Quang, Hung-Hoa, and Quang-Yen were organized as military territories; and, through the coöperation of the

Chinese and a "Mixed Commission of Control," the frontier was pacified and rendered safe for life and trade.

The new Governor-General next succeeded in establishing an international credit for the colony by doubling the annual revenues through increased trade and customs dues. This was accompanied by the starting of many important public works, such as fine roads, railways, quays in port towns, sanitary casernes for troops, pure water and electric light in the cities, a hospital at Hanoi, and facilities for handling trade in the seaports. He completed the work of centralizing the government of the whole colony in the hands of the Governor-General and his superior council, which had been ordered by decrees of 1887 and 1889 and April 21, 1891, and added the finishing touches to the federal customs union formed in 1887 by Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia, and Tongking. The Lieutenant-Governor of Cochin-China, the Residents-Superiors of Annam, Cambodia, and Tongking (advisory), and the military and naval authorities were placed under the Governor-General, who was now given extensive powers, wide liberty of action, and initiative in local affairs. Moreover, the control of Indo-China, which had been transferred from the Ministry of the Marine to the Ministry of Commerce in 1889, was definitely assigned in 1894 to the Ministry of the Colonies. And, finally, this federal administration of the colony was strengthened by the suppression of the "Kinh-Luoc," or Viceroy of Tongking, in 1897, who was replaced by a French Resident-Superior subject to the Governor-General, and completed by the decrees of July and August, 1898, which made effective the financial and political unity of French Indo-China.

Yet no real union of the French possessions in this region was possible till the problem of the territory of Laos had been solved. The Laos country is a vast region of high

valleys and plateaus crossed by numerous mountain ranges. It lies in the center of the great tropical Golden Peninsula, between Siam and Annam proper; and its only communication with the outside world lay for centuries over the Mekong and Menam Rivers. Its inhabitants, who have no affiliation with either the Siamese or the Annamese, are related to the Chinese and pushed their way into this land from the Chinese provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow some two thousand years ago, settling on both sides of the Mekong River and on the upper reaches of the Menam. There were two clans of them: the Lao Pong Dam which occupied Chieng-Mai, Lampun, Tern, Pré, and Nan, and the Lao Pong Kao which penetrated into Luang-Prabang, Chieng Chang, Ubon, and Bassac; and the greater part of them have remained till this day under the rule of their own chieftains who were of the highest rank of mandarins and administered large areas. The soil of the country is poor, but the land is rich in forests, minerals, and elephants. The greater part of it was included in the old Kingdom of Vien-Chang or Lan Sang which reached its height in the fifteenth century. In 1428, the King was deposed and a gradual division of the country into separate states and principalities (muongs) followed, of which the chief were Vien-Tiane, Chieng-Mai, Luang-Prabang, and Vien-Chang. Ultimately, this state of disunity brought disaster upon the country by laying it open to the attacks of its ambitious neighbors: Siam, Annam, and China — all made periodic invasions into the land.

But the Siamese attacks did not become serious until Siam was freed from Burmese encroachments about the middle of the eighteenth century. Although its advance was slow and its people never colonized, the Siamese Government had acquired Chieng-Mai and its dependencies by the end of the eighteenth century. Many principalities,

such as the Muongs of Mahassy, Cam Keut, Cam Mon, and Lakhone in Vien-Chang, became tributary to Annam to escape the domination of the Siamese; while others such as Ban Tong, Phon Sanan, and Ban Na Thot joined the Kingdom of Annam outright. In 1828, Siam took Vien-Tiane, destroyed its capital, and invaded Luang-Prabang and Vien-Chang, while Annam hastened to the rescue of her subjects and her tributaries. For thirty years a fairly equal contest was waged for the possession of Laos; while the Mekong River became the tacitly recognized border between the rival claims. However, between 1858 and 1886, while Annam was occupied with local revolutions, invasions from China, and contests with the French, Siam annexed nearly all of Laos — finally penetrating the mountains forming the boundary between Annam and Laos and occupying Cam Mon and the heights of the Col de Ha Trai in 1886.

As a result, the situation on the whole western frontier of Annam became intolerable. There was constant friction between the different peoples; the political intrigues of the Siamese, as well as their harsh government of the Laotians, kept the region in a state of uproar and unrest; the border muongs became places of refuge for political refugees and criminals; and there was no security for life, property or trade. The French, after establishing a protectorate over Annam, inherited this border problem; and it was perfectly clear that it must be speedily solved in order to establish peace and security on the border, to preserve the Annamese interests in this region, to protect such Laos states as belonged to Annam or which had accepted its suzerainty, and to promote the trade of Annam with Laos and Siam. The chief difficulty lay in deciding on a just and a defensible frontier line. At first the French authorities were inclined to make the mountainous watershed between Laos and An-

nam the boundary; and a French officer was sent to Cam Mon in 1886 to secure an agreement with Siam along this line. But the intrigues of the Siamese Frontier Commissioner, Phra Yot Muong Khang, who distrusted the French, and the appeals of Laotians who came to Vinh and Hué aroused the ambition of the French and convinced them that the safety and future interests of Annam and Cambodia demanded that Annam control Cam Mon and a fair share of the Muongs of Laos.

Accordingly, in 1889, A. Pavie, who had been sent as Vice-Consul to Luang-Prabang in 1885 and who had conducted the "Mission Pavie"¹ through Cambodia and Laos in 1886-88, studying scientifically the land and the people, visited Cam Mon and set up a French post at Na Pé. The French Governor-General of Indo-China decided to insist on the Annamese claims to this region, and ordered a small military force to this post, which was, in a few weeks, moved to Khong. Matters finally came to a crisis in 1893, when a French expedition under Captain Luce, sent to arrange for the evacuation of the district by the Siamese, was besieged at Khong by a Siamese regiment, a French military inspector — M. Groscurin — slain by Phra Yot, and Siamese troops were rushed secretly to the frontier. The French Government promptly took advantage of this situation to force the hand of Siam. A French fleet under Admiral Humann forced the passage of Pak Nam with its forts, and made its way to Bangkok, while French forces from Annam seized several important towns in Laos. The Treaty of Bangkok signed on October 3d of the same year was the result. By the terms of this treaty, Siam recognized the claims of Cambodia and Annam to the

¹ The results of these remarkable studies were embodied in the work entitled *Mission Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879-1895: Géographie et Voyages*, and published by Leroux, Paris, 1901-06.

territory on the left bank of the Mekong River and south of the twenty-third degree of north latitude. All the Siamese forts on the left bank were to be evacuated within one month; and no Siamese armed boats were to patrol the river or military posts to be set up within fifteen miles of it. Siam was to give satisfaction for the murder at Keng Chek, and to pay two million francs war indemnity.

By the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904, some 7800 square miles of territory on the west bank of the Mekong, including Luang-Prabang, Malipré, and Bassac, were transferred to Annam and Cambodia, while France returned the district of Chantabun. On the 23d of March, 1907, a further agreement brought about the final rectification of the Siam-Indo-China frontier, by the cession of four provinces to Cambodia, and the return of Krat and a strip of the gulf coast, together with a tract of the Laos country in the Luang-Prabang region to Siam. In this way the Laos country was divided between Siam and France—the former holding the six states of Chieng-Hai, Chieng-Mai, Lampun, Nan, Tern, and Pré, while the latter obtained the three protected states of Bassac, Muong Sing, and Luang-Prabang with its two kings, and thirteen provinces of which Upper Laos contains six and Lower Laos seven muongs. From 1894 to 1899 Upper and Lower Laos were administered by the French as two distinct districts under Residents living at Luang-Prabang and Khong. But, in 1899, Governor-General Doumer organized all of French Laos into one protectorate administered by a Resident-Superior who lives at Vien-Tiane, and is directly responsible to the Governor-General of Indo-China.

Meanwhile, Great Britain, which had annexed Burma to her Indian possessions in 1885, and which had special trade interests in Siam, Yunnan, and Szechwan, opened negotiations with the French Government with a view of

reaching an agreement concerning their respective "spheres of influence" in the Far East, of protecting her own interests there, and of preserving the integrity of Siam. On January 15, 1896, an agreement was reached, guaranteeing the independence of Siam, defining the spheres of influence of each country with the Mekong River as the western limit of the French sphere, and providing that England and France should use their joint influence with China to secure equal commercial rights and privileges in the provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan. And in 1904 this understanding was completed by a treaty defining their respective positions in detail and advancing the French sphere of influence westward to the Menam River and the Gulf of Siam, while that of Great Britain was to be west of this river and the gulf. This assigned commercially the lion's share of Siam to France. England, however, by the treaty of March 10, 1909, surrendered all British jurisdiction within Siam and made a material modification of extra-territorial rights in that country, on the transference to her of Siam's protectorate over the four Malay States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and Kedah, which embrace a territory of nearly¹ 16,000 square miles with a population of over 800,000. On the other hand, Siam, freed from all danger of foreign invasion since 1895, and reorganizing its government on a modern basis in the same year, with a cabinet and legislative council, has become, with the help of foreign advisers, one of the best-governed and prosperous communities in Asia. Its area is 194,580 square miles — about the size of Spain — and its population over 8,266,000; and, in recent years, great progress has been made in the spread of educational institutions and in economic development and commercial expansion.

It was not till the twentieth century, however, that the

¹ See Chapter IX.

French undertook the same intelligent organization in Indo-China. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, till about 1880, their energies had been devoted to the securing of trading posts and openings for commerce in that country through the aid of their naval forces; and whatever factories and places they succeeded in occupying were under the control of the French admirals and naval officers. Between 1880 and 1890, the French authorities, actuated by the national need for new markets and raw material and by a craving for colonial empire, took over by force the greater part of Indo-China, and placed it under the control of French military authorities. They had little concern for the welfare and interests of the native peoples, but were bent upon extending French trade and in creating a Greater France beyond the seas. It was only with the advent of those two great colonial administrators — J. M. A. de Lanessan (1887-91) and Paul Doumer (1897-1902) — that the French began an intelligent study of the situation and undertook the organization of a civil colonial administration along modern lines.

As we have seen above, de Lanessan restored to the Kings of Annam a dignified, though nominal, royal authority, and reinstated the mandarins and other local officials in their former positions of authority in Tongking; and he began the work of reorganization by introducing the system of French "Residents" and advisers, and by coördinating the work of governing in the different states of Indo-China. Paul Doumer achieved the real union of Annam, Tongking, Cochin-China, and Cambodia into French Indo-China by suppressing the "Kinh-Luoc" or Viceroy of Tongking in 1897, who was replaced by a French Resident-Superior directly responsible to the Governor-General, and by inducing the French Chamber to pass the decrees of July 3d and 31st, and August 8, 1898, increasing the powers

of the Governor-General, creating a Superior Council and a "common budget" for Indo-China. To this union the Protectorate of Laos was added on October 20, 1911, thus bringing all of Indo-China under one central authority; while the whole unity was gradually made more effective through the development of a customs union, financial coöperation, national railways, roads, posts and telegraphs, commercial facilities, and economic improvements.

The Governor-General is now invested with extensive powers, although directly responsible to the French Government, while the unity of French Indo-China centers in his person and authority. He is the supreme administrative and military authority, controls the civil service and the sea and land forces, conducts the foreign relations through the French Government, possesses the initiative in local affairs, supervises the work of the Lieutenant-Governor of Cochin-China and the Residents-General of Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, and Laos, who are his representatives, enjoys the right to approve the common budget of the country and of the different protectorates, and governs, through a civil administrator, the territory of Kwangchow-wan in southeast China. The Superior Council is composed of the Governor-General, the Lieutenant-General of Cochin-China, the Residents-General of Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, and Laos, the Directors-General of the nine departments of state, the director of the School of Medicine at Hanoi, presidents of the chambers of commerce and agriculture of Tongking, Annam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China, president of the Colonial Council of Cochin-China, presidents of the chambers of commerce of Hanoi, Saigon, and Hai-Phong, four high native officials, the chief of the cabinet, and the secretary of the Governor-General. It meets successively at Hanoi, Hué, Saigon, and Pnom-Penh; and a permanent commission of thirteen and the

local authorities of the section where it meets do most of the work, but it holds a grand session once a year to approve the budget, which in 1920 balanced at \$28,500,000.

In reorganizing the local government, the French attempted to popularize the administration by the use of native officials subject to French supervision and control. In Cochin-China, with an area of 20,000 square miles and a population approaching 3,500,000, which is now a French colony with one representative in the French Chamber, there are a few natives on the Colonial Council of eighteen; but the Lieutenant-Governor and his private council of six are French, while justice and education are in the hands of the French. There are French administrators over each of its twenty provinces, and at the head of each subdivision or canton; but natives are employed as administrators in many cantons and large towns, while native elected councils rule in the communes. In Annam and Cambodia, which are protected states with their own kings and councils of regency, embracing respectively 52,000 and 45,000 square miles of territory and populations of nearly 6,000,000 and 2,000,000, the policy is much the same. The control of the entire administration is in the hands of the French Residents-Superior and their subordinates, while there are two native representatives in the councils of the protectorates. But in the eleven provincial districts of Cambodia — each under the supervision of a French official — the old native system of administration, retained in large part since 1863, was broadened by the reform acts of 1897 and 1913, which gave the realm also a national elective assembly and a native inspector of administrative affairs; and, in the twelve provinces of Annam, the old corps of mandarins reorganized and with a regular scale for promotion was reconstituted in 1912, and elected provincial councils of native notables were authorized in 1913 with

power of legislation over the budget, public works, and local affairs.

Tongking, with an area of 46,400 square miles and approximately 6,500,000 inhabitants, is a French territory administered by a French Resident-Superior and a Council of fifteen containing two native nobles. It is composed of twenty-one provinces under resident administrators, and four military territories under French officers. In the former, the old mandarin rule reestablished by de Lanessan was reorganized and simplified in 1912, and is thoroughly native with mandarins of the highest rank, such as governors, prefects, and under-prefects. But French provincial inspectors travel to and fro throughout the land advising the rulers, and hearing and adjusting complaints. Laos, comprising an area of 98,000 square miles with a population of 641,000, with its three protected states and its two large administrative districts of Upper and Lower Laos, divided into ten provinces since 1914, was organized as a French Protectorate in 1899. Its Resident-Superior controls the administrative officials, supervises the government of the protected states, and administers the affairs of the protectorate through three bureaus: personnel, administrative, and native. "Commissaires du Gouvernement" are at the head of each province, who control the work of administration, of levying and collecting taxes, of policing and of maintaining peace and order in the provinces. But everywhere native officials are employed, not only in the political department, but also in the Annamite and Laotian courts of justice. And the native administration in most of the old muongs has been preserved intact, and is carried on by mandarins elected by the nobility of each district.

Moreover, the French Governors-General, beginning with Paul Doumer, have done much to promote medical, professional, and technical education, to provide public

works and to advance the agricultural and commercial interests of the country. French Indo-China has been well provided with good roads and railways, posts and telegraphs, docks and commercial facilities in the harbors, and public works of various sorts such as administrative buildings, hospitals, and technical schools and colleges. Fine cities have been created at Hanoi and Saigon; all the cities and towns cleaned up and sanitation vastly improved; and every effort made to promote by the latest methods and by the division of the land into three economic areas, mining, manufacturing, and agriculture — this last being the great asset of the country. So that now French Indo-China is paying its own way: the five states being self-supporting with the exception of Laos, the cost of whose administration is divided proportionately among Cochin-China, Tongking, Annam, and Cambodia. The country is fairly prosperous with a debt of only 403,000,000 francs (1920), imports of 1,075,930,517 francs and exports of 1,473,124,517 francs in 1921 of which former some fifty-three per cent came from France.

Nevertheless, it can hardly be said that this colonial experiment is an unqualified success; and the future of Indo-China is shrouded in uncertainty. As Marshal Turenne remarked, "It is more difficult to conserve or retain a conquered country than it is to conquer it." Nowhere has this sentiment found a truer application than in Indo-China, where the French have attempted to impose European civilization and French methods of government and customs on an unwilling people who did not understand them, and where the French have failed to grasp the merits of the Annamite civilization and make wise use of it. They have, indeed, constructed a colony by building from the top downward — a very dangerous experiment. "We have misunderstood the genius and the civilization of the Anna-

mites," writes Sombsthay in *Cours de Législation et d'Administration*: "and we have in haste imported into that country institutions that the people were not able to understand or appreciate, and which are contrary to their manners and customs as well as to their social state; also our institutions, indeed, far from regenerating these people, have enslaved them and have, with the same blow, paralyzed their spirit and action. . . . It would have been preferable from the point of view of economics to have perfected the institutions of the country instead of suppressing them. One does not change the customs of a country by substituting for a national tradition a foreign administration having always an oppressive character; and the more one studies the legislation of the country, the more one finds that it was in perfect harmony with the civilization."

Moreover, the French statesmen are only just beginning to realize that the coöperation of native peoples is absolutely essential to the good government and the successful development of Indo-China. "It is imperative," exclaims Captain Charles Gosselin whose many years of service have given him an intimate knowledge of the country, "to acquire the esteem and friendship of these Annamite people who are only commencing to come to us. This is for us all, for the situation and the future of our country in the Far East, a question of life or death."

If the French wish to attain an unparalleled colonial success in Indo-China and to make of the state a progressive and contented community — an enlightened and helpful member of the Pacific family — therefore, they must recognize the rights and talents of the native peoples. "Our first duty consists, then," writes Captain Gosselin, "in rendering the French occupation sympathetic to the Annamites, to bring to us — I do not say the love, but the support of the population, the esteem and appreciation of

the directing and enlightened class of the country." And E. Diguët affirmed with equal truth, as late as 1908, "Either we shall lose Indo-China, or we will give to the Annamites, whose friendship is essential to us at any price, the social rank that belongs to them as individuals, the real exercise of administration and of justice by their fellow citizens, and the tranquillity which our fiscal system has taken away from them."

In addition it is essential to put into force, in its fullest sense, the principle of political association. One should strive for a Franco-Annamite state and not for a "French Indo-China." To quote again from E. Diguët, Indo-China can only be guarded "through the support loyal and unanimous of the Annamite people. . . . For that, it is necessary to enter resolutely and without delay on the path that our late ministers of the colonies have traced for us in conceiving the '*politique d'association*.' It is necessary to make a moral conquest of the Annamite people. It is necessary to fill up the ditch which we have dug with our own hands between the two races. It is necessary to descend from the height of our pride of conquest and to see in the home of our protégés free men and not slaves." In other words, it is imperative that the people should be admitted more and more into the administration of their own affairs, the mandarins and local officials everywhere be restored to their ancient prerogatives with adequate pay to prevent graft and corruption, and the most enlightened citizens admitted to the highest offices of state.

Furthermore, the expenses of the Government should be reduced by eliminating many of the French officials now employed in the customs and in the political administration; while the burden of taxation should be lightened, and modifications made in the mode of levying indirect taxes. The principle that the salvation and the future of the Annamites

and of Indo-China is to be worked out by and for the peoples of that country should be recognized at once. Common school education should be provided as rapidly as possible for the masses, as well as higher schools for the upper classes, for there is as great a need of general education as there is for industrial and agricultural training; and the Annamite civilization should be protected and encouraged, and the native institutions cultivated and developed throughout the land. Only in this way can the French win the confidence and coöperation of the natives, arouse the national spirit to productive activity, and enable the people of Indo-China to establish a self-respecting and self-supporting state which will relieve the French from future worries and expenses, and the world from the danger of unrest and wars in the Far East.

CHAPTER XII

THE OPENING OF CHINA

THE continent of Asia possesses the most remarkable seaboard in the world. The shortest distance traversed by ships from the burning shores of the Red Sea to the frozen headlands of the Arctic Ocean is sixty-seven hundred miles — more than one fourth of the world's circumference. Of this extended seacoast, the Pacific shore, lying mainly within the temperate zone and backed by a rich and widespread hinterland, is well favored with bays, inlets, and harbors. Approximately two thousand miles of the heart of this wonderful seaboard has been inhabited since the earliest times by one of the most virile and distinguished peoples of the world — the Chinese.

In the vast territory of the Chinese Empire, where good roads and railways were unknown, the chief means of communication and transport was the slow-moving junks which traversed the great rivers navigable for thousands of miles, the Grand Canal — one thousand miles in length connecting Hangchow with Tientsin and Peking — and the coastal waters. This unusual combination of bays, good harbors, and inland waterways was commercially a great asset for the Chinese people, and it made both the Chinese mainland and the interior of the country readily accessible to foreign vessels. Nevertheless, the great mountain ranges of the Tianshan and the Kuenlun and the immense Takla-Makan and Gobi Deserts — together with the Great Wall 1145 miles long — served for centuries as an effective barrier to intercourse between China and the rest of Asia. And the mighty waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans with their mysteries, their unknown dangers, and their treacherous

waves, shut off the Celestial Empire from the outer world even more completely during the same era.

The great "Middle Flowery Kingdom" of the Chinese, however, with an area of 4,376,000 square miles, a population of over 300,000,000, and rich natural resources, became at length an object of considerable interest to European merchants. The Arabs were the first traders to reach the Far East, coming at first overland and later by sea. There was a colony of Arabs, Indians, and Persians in Canton as early as 300 A.D.; and by the ninth century the Arabs were trading at Chüanchow (near Amoy), Ningpo, and Hangchow. To these, Shanghai and Wenchow were added in the thirteenth century. But a monopoly of trade with China passed into the hands of the Portuguese, who rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498, reached Canton in 1517, and extended their trade soon after to Ningpo, Foochow, and Chüanchow. Unfortunately, the conduct of these early traders offended and scandalized the Chinese, so that the Chinese Emperor ordered them driven from the country, and closed all the ports to trade.

At length, the Portuguese were permitted to open factories at Macao in 1557, which remained the center of trade and the only place of residence for Europeans for two centuries and a half. In the seventeenth century, the ships of the British East India Company, which by charter enjoyed a monopoly of the British trade with China from 1680 to 1834, appeared in Chinese waters and penetrated as far as Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines. In the eighteenth century, the greater part of the foreign trade with China passed through the agents of this Company, and was carried on through the port of Canton, to which it was officially restricted by an Imperial Edict in 1757. Its operation was skillfully managed by the use of Macao and the island of Lintin — forty miles from Canton at the

mouth of the West River — as bases, from which the ships proceeded in season to the island of Whampoa, just below Canton. From this point the cargoes were taken in small boats to the foreign factories or warehouses on the bank of the river outside the west end of the city.

On the foreign side, the trading was done through resident members of commercial companies or through the supercargo who accompanied the ship. A certain amount of official supervision, however, was maintained through the chairman of the Select Committee of the British East India Company, French consuls, and American merchants appointed intermittently as consuls by the United States, who superintended the trade and affairs of their own nationals. On the Chinese side, a complete monopoly over both trade and relations with foreigners was enjoyed by the "Co-Hong" of Canton — an organization of Hong merchants dating from 1720 and numbering from seven to thirteen members. This "Co-Hong" not only controlled all commercial dealings — even to the loading and unloading of the cargoes, the renting of factories to foreign traders, and the providing of food and servants for foreign subjects — but also it was held responsible by the Chinese Government for the debts, the conduct of aliens, and all the fees and duties levied upon foreign ships and trade. Moreover, all communications concerning matters of trade or intercourse had to be addressed to the Hong merchants in the form of petitions — the Chinese idea being that officials should concern themselves only with the important matters of government, while the "petty affairs of commerce" should be left to the merchants.

"The laws of the Celestial Empire do not permit ministers, or those under authority, to have private intercourse by letter with outside Barbarians,"¹ wrote Loo, Governor

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 22, p. 1259.

of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, to the Hong merchants on August 18, 1834, when Lord Napier tried to open direct communications with the Chinese officials. "If, by chance, any Barbarian merchant should have a petition to make requesting an investigation of any affair, the Tai-pan [chief supercargo] should present the petition in the prescribed form and an answer by proclamation awaited. . . . From the time Canton has admitted outside Barbarians to its open market, all affairs relating to commerce and the control over the Barbarian merchants have been placed under the entire cognizance and responsibility of the said merchants [the Co-Hong]. There never has been such a thing as official correspondence to and fro with a Barbarian Eye [head man]." ¹

In this connection it must be remembered that alien traders were admitted to Canton as a special favor or privilege, and that the Chinese considered trade as a matter of little consequence. "Some hundreds of thousands of commercial duties yearly coming from the said country [Great Britain]," exclaimed the Governor of Kwangtung in the note just referred to, "concern not the Celestial Empire to the extent of a hair or a feather's down. The possession or absence of them is unworthy of one careful thought."

For centuries the Chinese Empire had been the leading power on the Pacific. It had little interest in outside affairs, however, for it was self-centered and occupied with the management of its own affairs and the care of its own people. Moreover, the Chinese considered themselves superior to all the other races of the earth; and with good reason. Their Emperor — the "Son of Heaven" — was the greatest monarch of the East, whose royal decrees were respected throughout the eighteen provinces of China

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 22, p. 1259.

proper and the outlying regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Formosa, Korea, and Indo-China. Their provincial and local government was unequaled, and their civilization as ancient and as remarkable as that attained in any other part of the world. They had an originality and a charm of life all their own; and their achievements in the fine arts, in architecture, in literature, and religious culture were of the highest order. No wonder these self-respecting Chinese regarded the pushing and boisterous European with disfavor and suspicion, and refused to submit to dictation or demean themselves before the foreigner, as some of the Eastern nations had done.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, a lively trade was going on at Canton under the Co-Hong system, which had proved satisfactory to all parties concerned in most respects. In addition to British and Portuguese ships, American, Dutch, French, Danish, and Swedish vessels participated in the trade with China, which was carried on in little sailing sloops or clippers varying in tonnage from seventy to five hundred tons. The Empress of China of three hundred and sixty tons burden was the first ship to reach Canton from the United States. Sailing from New York by way of Cape Town, after a voyage of six months she reached China in the summer of 1784. And, to-day, one marvels at the success of these tiny clippers in negotiating the long and precarious voyages and in bringing home to their owners fortunes in teas and silks.

As time went on, the Co-Hong system began to fall into disfavor with alien traders. The foreigners came to resent the jurisdiction of the Hong merchants and of Chinese courts over their actions and disputes. The Hong merchants, who were, for the most part, honorable, wealthy, and capable men, suffered severely from the heavy duties and exactions of the Peking Government and of local

officials. And they in turn were compelled to squeeze the foreigners to escape bankruptcy and to make some profit from their commercial transactions; and annoying restrictions were laid upon the trading operations and on the freedom of action of alien merchants who were permitted to stop in Canton only during the trading season — without being able to leave the factories, however — and forced to leave their wives at Macao.

At length, the British Government, with a view to improving conditions, protecting its own nationals, and advancing its commercial interests, took an unprecedented step. It refused to renew the charter of the British East India Company giving it a monopoly of the Chinese trade; and it opened Canton to free trade, as far as British ships were concerned, after April 22, 1834. And Parliament passed an act¹ on August 28, 1833, which created three superintendents of trade in the Far East with power to supervise British trade with China and with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction over British subjects and in cases in which British subjects were parties, in China and for one hundred miles from the coast on the high seas. They were to act as arbiters in trade disputes, to protect British nationals, and to observe and promote trade conditions; but they were forbidden to receive any gifts or gratuities, to engage in trade, or to levy tonnage duties to pay their expenses.

Lord William John Napier was appointed the first British superintendent of trade under this scheme, with W. H. C. Plowden² and J. F. Davis as assistant superintendents. Lord Napier belonged to a noted family of English admirals, generals, statesmen, and scholars. He was a man of distinguished personality and ability; but he possessed little knowledge of Oriental customs and politics.

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 20, pp. 256-59.

² Plowden declined to serve; and Sir George Best Robinson was appointed third superintendent upon the arrival of Lord Napier at Macao.

His associates, on the other hand, were men of experience in Eastern trade, having served for years as supercargoes on the ships of the East Indian Company and in its factories at Canton and Macao. The task assigned to the new superintendents was one requiring great tact and caution. Unfortunately, it was begun under unfavorable circumstances; and its promoters met with great difficulties from the start; and, with a curious lack of foresight, the British authorities made no preparation for the introduction of their new method of trade control, not even that of informing the Chinese authorities — both local and imperial — of the proposed change in commercial relations and methods. On the contrary, Lord Napier was expected to open communication directly with the Chinese officials at Canton and through them with the Peking Government, in order to secure official recognition for himself as chief superintendent of British trade and for the new plan of trade supervision. He was given orders, however, not to indulge in “menacing language” or in military or naval demonstrations; but he was instructed to live in or near Canton, to protect the interests of British merchants, and to use his authority to adjust all disputes in which British subjects were parties. Strangely enough, he was strictly forbidden at the same time to go to Peking, to engage in any new “regulations and negotiations” with China except in case of emergency, and to observe the Chinese rules governing trade and shipping at Canton.¹

Lord Napier arrived at Macao on July 15, 1834, and labored strenuously till his death, on October 11th, in a vain effort to execute his orders. He made no impression on the Chinese officials; and he was unable to secure recognition from them in any form — even though he went to

¹ See Palmerston's letters of instructions dated December 31, 1833, and January 25, 1834, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 22, pp. 1229-35.

Canton to arrange interviews with the Governor of Kwangtung and was supported by two British men-of-war. His letters were either returned without being opened, or merely acknowledged through the Hong merchants by requests for a petition in the usual form through the Co-Hong if he wished any modification in the existing system or change in the British trade privileges. And his mission was a complete failure — chiefly because the British did not understand the spirit and the psychology of the Chinese. Napier declined the advice and assistance of the Hong merchants, fearing to weaken his position as superintendent of trade if he dealt with the Chinese authorities through inferior persons; and it was beneath his dignity to petition the Chinese Government for recognition. On the other hand, the Chinese officials could not receive him or recognize his commission with political and judicial powers without acknowledging his official status; and none of them could open official communication with him without violating the laws of the Empire and incurring the disfavor of Peking.

During the three years following the death of Napier, the British did not attempt to force their plan on the Chinese, but followed what Sir George Best Robinson called a "perfectly quiescent line of policy." Lord Napier was succeeded by Sir John Francis Davis¹ and then by Sir George Robinson,² who contented themselves with supervising the British trade and shipping from Macao and the island of Lintin, where Sir George took up his official residence on a seventy-ton vessel in November, 1835. The British trade flourished and the Chinese authorities were apparently satisfied to let the *status quo* stand, as long as no effort was made to force a superintendent

¹ Acting from September 12, 1834, to January 19, 1835.

² From January 19, 1835, to December 14, 1836.

upon them or to compel them to let him take up his residence at Canton. But the British superintendents experienced considerable difficulty in controlling the British mercantile community and in preserving peace among the traders, for the merchants favored a more vigorous policy toward the Chinese, quarreled among themselves over rights and questions of policy, and were restrained with difficulty from using force on their own account to settle their claims. Some even questioned the authority of the superintendents and defied their instructions, claiming that the latter had no control over matters of trade, since they were not recognized by the Chinese officials, and since their powers were supposedly limited to consular duties, observation, and a limited amount of criminal admiralty jurisdiction. The situation was still further complicated by divisions of opinion between the three superintendents, or in the "Commission" as this group of superior officials was called.

Lord Palmerston — then the British Minister of Foreign Affairs — did not favor making Lintin the permanent official residence of the superintendents. For he was anxious that they return to Canton, adopt a more progressive policy, and exercise their authority more effectively. Accordingly, he abolished the office of chief superintendent in December, 1836, and appointed Captain Charles Elliot — then second superintendent — as "Chief of the Commission" with full powers. Elliot was instructed to secure official recognition from the Chinese Government by dealing directly with the Chinese officials as a royal officer of importance without recourse to the suppliant form of "Pin" address or the use of force; and he entered promptly and energetically upon his difficult task.

The diplomatic maneuvers of the new commissioner were more successful than the efforts of his predecessors, for

he not only understood the situation thoroughly, but he grasped clearly the Chinese point of view. As early as January, 1836, he wrote to Palmerston: "The peaceful and conciliatory policy by which the King's Government appear to me to desire to maintain and promote commercial intercourse with this Empire, is not very generally approved by the fifty or sixty residents at Canton; and a determination to give it effect, so far as it depends on me, is the least popular task I could have proposed to myself." With regard to the policy of the Chinese Government, he wrote: "In China to keep things quiet is the best evidence as well as the whole end of a successful administration." And his judgment was confirmed in the remark of the Governor of Kwangtung, when suggesting in his "Memorial" to the Emperor that the difference in name (superintendent in place of supercargo) might be passed over, that "it would be well to relax the unimportant restraints, in order to preserve peace and order."

Elliot entered upon his official duties by forwarding a letter — diplomatically in the form of a petition — requesting permission to visit Canton in pursuit of his official work. His communication was duly forwarded to Peking; and he received permission, on March 27, 1837, to reside in Canton during the trading season. Although he remained there till November 29th, and secured the privilege of sending his notes to the Governor of Kwangtung in a sealed envelope, he failed to obtain official recognition of his position as a royal British official. He could not even get the consent of the Chinese authorities to the omission of the word "Pin"¹ from his communications; and he was

¹ "Pin" was used by all officials below the third rank in addressing a superior; and the communications of the lower officials were always expressed in the form of petitions. "Yu" was placed on communications of superior officers whose instructions took the form of orders.

forced to receive orders, not only from the Governor, but also from the Hoppo (superintendent of customs), the Prefect of Canton, and the head of the police of the city. Indeed, his position differed little from that of the former supercargoes of the British East India Company; and his rank — in the eyes of the Chinese — was lower than the chief of police of Canton.

At this inopportune moment, the opium trade became suddenly a vital political issue and a source of discord in Chinese trade centers; for the Peking authorities decided to enforce the imperial laws against the traffic, and appointed Lin Tse-sü Imperial Commissioner, with authority to proceed to Canton and to stop the importation of the drug. The commerce in opium, however, had been going on for upward of two hundred years — chiefly between India and China. For a hundred and twenty years — 1676 to 1796 — it was a regular article of commerce and subject to an official duty. The importations of opium during this period were not large, but the total amount rose to forty-one hundred chests in the year 1796. In that year, however, the importation was forbidden, and opium taken from the list of dutiable articles. As a consequence, a regular system of smuggling arose, and the importation mounted materially till 1836, when approximately twenty thousand chests were brought to China. The ships of all nations transported the opium to the vicinity of Canton and other places along the coast — such as Amoy and Swatow; and it was taken off in small boats and smuggled into the country. The majority of the Hong merchants and some of the best British and American firms had nothing to do with this traffic; but the foreign merchants who did, although not participating directly in the smuggling and bribery that prevailed, engaged in the business because it was generally practiced by foreigners and

because of the large profit — one hundred dollars a chest commission — accruing from the transportation of opium.

On the other hand, a perfect system of bribery existed among the Chinese officials of all grades, including even the customs officers and mandarins of the highest rank, who obtained a regular and lucrative profit from the smuggling of opium. It was claimed that these profits amounted to approximately \$1,400,000 in 1836. Thus protected, the opium traffic became the most important part of the foreign commerce, for, according to British accounts, it amounted to considerably more than \$10,000,000 a year. Yet the whole system was morally and politically vicious. As Captain Elliot wrote Palmerston: "The fact that such an article should have grown to be by far the most important part of our trade is of itself a source of painful reflection. And the widespread public mischief which the manner of its pursuit has necessarily entailed . . . aggravates the discomfort of the whole subject."

The memorials of leading officials to whom the Imperial Government appealed for advice on this subject in June, 1836, condemned the traffic, both on account of the general rottenness of the whole system and because of the evil effects of the use of the drug upon the physique and character of the Chinese race. Yet, as far as the general mass of the people was concerned, the practice of taking opium does not seem to have been as universal as was claimed. "They [the Chinese] were a healthy, active, hard-working, and industrious people, withal cheerful and frugal," wrote a British merchant who lived many seasons in Canton. "They were intelligent in business, skillful in manufactures and handicrafts. These traits are inconsistent with habitual smoking, while the costliness of the prepared drug was such as to render a dilution of it (to bring it within the means of the masses) utterly harmless. Among the wealthier

classes, no doubt it was more or less common, this we knew; but I myself, and I think I may safely say the entire foreign community, rarely, if ever, saw any one physically or mentally injured by it. No evidences of a general abuse, rarely of the use of the pipe, were apparent. . . . In fact, smoking was a habit, as the use of wine with us, in moderation. As compared with the use of spirituous liquors in the United States and in England, and the evil consequences of it, that of the opium was infinitesimal.”¹

The most convincing reason advanced by the mandarins for the abolition of the opium traffic was, however, its ruinous effect upon the monetary system. Most of the foreign trade was operated on a barter basis: i.e., by an exchange of commodities with balances being adjusted by cash payments in silver or drafts on London. But the opium trade was of necessity on a strict cash basis; and, when the commerce in this drug took on large proportions, the specie of the country disappeared rapidly. For China had no silver coinage of her own, but had acquired quantities of Spanish, Chilean, Peruvian, Mexican, and United States dollars which had been shipped to or found their way into the country in large numbers, before the opium trade reached such proportions; and the fear arose that the Chinese Empire would be denuded of specie and would become a debtor nation, since the balance of trade was continually against them.

Consequently, when the news of Commissioner Lin's appointment and the order for the abolition of the opium traffic reached the Governor of Kwangtung, he promptly announced these instructions to the foreign merchants, forbidding them to bring opium to Whampoa and asking them to pledge their word not to engage in smuggling or to

¹ W. C. Hunter: *The Fan-kwaie at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825-44. By an Old Resident.* (London, 1882.)

assist in taking out silver. This move to stop the opium trade without previous warning started difficulties at once, and worked a special hardship on those merchants who had shipments of opium among their cargoes. Moreover, the situation was further complicated by the fact that many of the Hong merchants had become financially embarrassed because of the heavy and vexatious exactions of the Chinese officials and the unfavorable financial and commercial conditions prevailing at the time. This situation reacted seriously on the foreign merchants, who were unable in their turn to collect large accounts due them in spite of pressure brought to bear on both Chinese officials and Hong merchants.

Commissioner Lin arrived in March, 1839, and at once took vigorous steps to abolish the opium traffic. He sought through the Co-Hong a list of all foreign merchants engaged in transporting the drug; and he ordered all the opium held in ships or warehouses in the vicinity of Canton and Macao delivered to him immediately. Moreover, he demanded the expulsion of nine alien traders from Canton who had participated in the opium trade, and a promise from all foreign merchants, under penalty of death, to abstain from the traffic in the future. Although many of the English and American firms were ready to give a voluntary bond, this proceeding was resented by the British merchants, who naturally desired payment for their opium and objected to the Chinese authorities assuming the right to inflict the death penalty upon them. Captain Elliot, while assuring the Commissioner of his willingness to coöperate in suppressing the opium trade, notified him that the British superintendent had no power to require of his people a bond under penalty of death, or to control the nationals of other states.

Nevertheless, Captain Elliot ordered the British ships

to keep away from Canton, and started a move to collect the opium belonging to British merchants. But the affair was proceeding too slowly for Lin, who distrusted the British superintendent and all foreigners. Accordingly, he stopped all river traffic, blockaded the British merchants in their factories at Canton, cut off their supply of food, and took away their Chinese servants. Meanwhile, by giving the owners British treasury notes for the value of their goods, Elliot succeeded in collecting 20,283 chests of opium from all the traders — the Americans owning 1540 chests. On March 26, 1839, he arrived at Canton at the risk of his life and took in hand the direction of the negotiations. On March 28th, he notified Lin that he would deliver the opium if the blockade of the factories was lifted, the servants returned, the food allowed to come in, the British furnished with passports to leave Canton, and assurances given that payment for the opium would be forthcoming from the Chinese authorities. To all this Lin agreed on April 2d, on the basis that normal conditions would be restored as rapidly as quarterly deliveries of the opium were made; but he was so slow in the execution of his part of the agreement that the final delivery of opium did not take place till May 21st and the British did not leave till May 27th. In this way Commissioner Lin, although he destroyed all of the opium then in Canton or its vicinity, drove out the good and the bad together — some sixteen of the best merchants who had had no connection with the opium trade leaving Canton with the rest; but he failed to suppress the opium traffic. On the contrary, after the 20,283 chests were destroyed, the price of opium mounted sky-high, and the illicit trade under irresponsible traders increased by leaps and bounds; for the Chinese authorities made no sustained effort through their own officials to stop the smuggling.

Commissioner Lin was not satisfied with the temporary success of securing the twenty thousand chests and of driving the British out of Canton. He used his influence with the Portuguese at Macao to compel the British to leave that port also; and he tried to force them to take all of their ships out of Chinese waters. Captain Elliot and the British traders, however, took refuge in Hongkong Harbor toward the end of August, 1839; and by September 7th, there were some thirty-eight ships anchored there representing twenty-eight British firms; yet Americans and other traders were allowed to visit Canton as usual. Elliot spent the next two months in fruitless negotiations in an endeavor to obtain permission for British merchants to return to that port and Macao and to recover their trade privileges at Canton. At length, two British warships — the *Volage* and the *Hyacinth* — went up the river and destroyed the Chinese fleet at the so-called battle of Chuenpi on November 3d, but without result.

Negotiations were resumed by Captain Elliot; but they dragged out until the following spring without any progress being made toward a satisfactory adjustment of the difficulties. At length, in order to force the hand of the Chinese authorities, the British resorted to a naval demonstration in the summer of 1840, blockading the West River, Canton, and neighboring ports and occupying the island of Chusan; and a special despatch was sent to the Emperor via Tientsin stating the British demands. Yet the only outcome of these maneuvers was the appointment of Kishen as Imperial Commissioner with authority to negotiate and with instructions to maintain a conciliatory policy and to wear out the British by procrastination. Finally, Captain Elliot tired of the delay; and the English forces stormed the Bogue forts defending the river route to Canton in the second battle of Chuenpi in January, 1841, approached the

city gradually, and in May took all the forts about it and entered the town itself. These military successes enabled Elliot to conclude with Kishen and the local Chinese officials an agreement at Chuenpi in January, an armistice in March, and a treaty at Canton in May, 1841, by which Canton was saved from military occupation, the island of Chusan evacuated by the British, and Hongkong and a large money indemnity given the English with assurances concerning the speedy reopening of trade at Canton and equality of treatment. In addition, Elliot secured the release of twenty thousand tons of shipping and £30,000,000 of tea and other produce. Hongkong was taken over in January, 1841, the island of Chusan evacuated shortly afterward, and a large sum paid over to the British; but the other terms were not fulfilled. And the British Government, which had permitted Captain Elliot to act for several years on his own initiative and profited by his successes, now repudiated his agreements and recalled him in disgrace.

In August, 1841, Sir Henry Pottinger replaced him as superintendent and British plenipotentiary and took charge of the arrangements of a second and more powerful military expedition already in process of organization. Hongkong with its splendid harbor became the base of operations; and in the summer and fall the British occupied the various ports of China as far north as Ningpo, including Amoy, Chinghai, and the island of Chusan. Finally, reinforcements having been received from India, the operations were resumed with vigor along the Chinese coast in the spring of 1842. The expedition, now under the joint command of Sir Henry Pottinger and General (Sir) J. J. Bremer,¹ occupied Wusung, Shanghai, and proceeded up

¹ Assisted by Major-General Sir Hugh Gough and Admiral William Parker.

the Yangtze-Kiang to Chinkiang, which was taken on July 21st, and to Nanking, which was invested between August 9th and 11th. At that moment, the Imperial Government, which had been building new forts and vessels in feverish haste, berating its commanders for not punishing the British barbarians and offering fanciful rewards for the heads of English officials, begged for an armistice which terminated with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking on August 29, 1842.

Thus ended the so-called "Opium War." By the terms of the treaty the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Foo-chow, and Shanghai were opened to foreign trade and to the residence of British consuls with power of supervision over trade and legal jurisdiction over the subjects of Great Britain. The island of Hongkong was ceded outright to England and opened to the trade of the world.¹ Peace and an equality of intercourse were established between the two countries, and a fair and regular tariff on exports and imports was provided for, which was elaborated in the supplementary treaty of October 8, 1843. In addition, the Chinese agreed to pay \$9,000,000 — \$6,000,000 to cover the opium claims and \$3,000,000 to pay the debts of the Hong merchants to British traders — and to reimburse the English for the \$12,000,000 which the war had cost them. In this way the British Government attained their immediate objectives: the opening of China to trade, the abolition of the Co-Hong system, and the recognition of political equality between Chinese and Europeans. Moreover, the judicial jurisdiction of consuls over the subjects of their own country and the right of foreigners to lease and own property in China were tacitly acknowledged. But not a word appeared in the treaty concerning the opium

¹ A British court of justice was established there on January 4, 1843; and Hongkong became a British Crown Colony on April 5, 1843.

trade; and the smuggling of the drug into the country continued on as large a scale as it did before the beginning of the Chino-British controversy on the subject.

It is, therefore, evident from the facts detailed above that this "Opium War" was not waged primarily over the question of the opium trade. The restriction laid upon British trade by the Chinese officials in an attempt to end the opium traffic was only the pretext for the conflict that ensued. The English authorities were not interested in the continuance of the opium trade—no matter what the wishes of British traders may have been—but they were vitally concerned in securing full recognition of British trade privileges and consular jurisdiction in China, in obtaining reparation for the losses of British subjects and insults to the British flag, and in establishing a position of dignity for their official representatives in the Far East—as well as equality of intercourse between them and the Chinese governmental officers.

Unfortunately, although all of the British demands were recognized on paper, it did not mean much, because the Chinese were induced to sign the treaties under compulsion, and because they interpreted these agreements in the narrowest sense and enforced them only so far as it was absolutely necessary to do so. "The Pottinger Treaties," wrote Dr. (later Sir) John Bowring in 1852, "inflicted a deep wound upon the pride, but by no means altered the policy, of the Chinese Government. They were submitted to as a hard necessity. The motive which influenced our negotiations was the removal of the barriers which prohibited intercourse with the vast Empire of China, and the establishment and gradual expansion of friendly commercial relations with its multitudinous inhabitants. We sought to enable our merchants to avail themselves of the immense resources and the extraordinary producing and consuming

powers of China, and to offer in return to the people of China all the advantages of an honorable and lucrative commerce. But this object never met with the concurrence or found the coöperation of the Chinese authorities. Their purpose is now, as it ever was, not to invite, nor to facilitate, but to impede and resist, the access of foreigners. This policy is impressed upon all the high officials of the Empire, associated, however, with the most stringent commands to avoid conflicts with foreign nations and to take care that the public peace shall not be disturbed.”¹ This policy the Chinese authorities continued strictly to enforce, in spite of the fact that Caleb Cushing negotiated the first American-Chinese treaty at Wanghsia on February 24, 1844, and Lagrenée a Franco-Chinese treaty at Whampoa on October 24, 1844² — both being very similar in content to the Nanking Agreement with the British. Indeed, to give treaties of this nature any substantial value and to place the relations of China with foreign nations on a progressive, workable basis, it was imperative that the Chinese authorities should be converted to the foreign viewpoint and induced to coöperate wholeheartedly in the effort to establish international intercourse between China and the outside world. On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the governments of foreign states whose merchants were engaged in trade with China to compel their nationals to observe scrupulously the treaty regulations, to respect the laws and customs of the Chinese Empire, and to conduct all their operations with honesty and fair-dealing.

Unfortunately, during the sixteen years following the

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1857), ed. 1173, no. 4, pp. 3-4: Correspondence relating to the British entrance into Canton. Dr. Bowring was consul in Canton in the early fifties and Governor of Hongkong from 1854 to 1859.

² Treaties of the same character were signed with Belgium in Canton July 25, 1845, and with Sweden and Norway in Canton March 20, 1847.

signing of the Treaty of Nanking, nothing like this happened. On the contrary, the Chinese, suspicious of foreigners and bitter over the experiences of the late war, evaded their promises at every turn, raised innumerable obstacles to the development of trade and intercourse at Canton, at other treaty ports, and in the interior of the country, quibbled continually over the interpretation of the treaties, and procrastinated interminably over the enforcement of their agreements. On the other hand, many of the foreign merchants, who considered that they were exempt from Chinese jurisdiction by reason of the treaties, and whose conduct and whose business affairs were not supervised by their home governments, indulged in smuggling, evasion, and fraud to escape the duties, interpreted the treaties in their own fashion, broke these agreements and the laws of China at will, and resorted to force, violence, and bribery to advance their interests and promote trade. The foreign powers, which had indulged in 1842 in magnificent dreams of markets for foreign goods in China, failed to make a systematic study of the situation and to evolve an efficient plan for the regulation and development of trade in the Far East. Nor did they try to find out what the Chinese needed, or how these needs could best be met; nor did they make any sustained effort to secure the friendship and coöperation of the Chinese. On the contrary, they tried to induce the Chinese officials to enforce treaty agreements by bluster and threats; and, on more than one occasion, they abetted their own missionaries and traders in the abuse of treaty rights and privileges.

It is not surprising, therefore, that conflicts between Chinese and aliens were frequent, that foreigners were beaten and slain, and that foreign powers should again employ force to protect their rights and insure the enforcement of treaties, before international intercourse between

China and outside nations could be established upon a just and permanent footing. At first, however, and as long as Commissioner Kiyong¹ remained a dominant figure in the Chinese-British relations, the main stipulations of the treaties were observed and the general situation improved. For Kiyong, whom Sir John Davis described as "by far the most elevated in rank, as well as the most estimable in character, of any persons with whom the representatives of European states in China had ever come in contact," and who was a man of high intelligence and breadth of view, desired to maintain peace and to cultivate cordial relations with the British and other foreigners. Normal conditions were restored; trade was resumed through Hongkong, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai; and British consuls were sent out to at least two of these ports.² But British traders and the British superintendent were not admitted to Canton, on the ground that the people were opposed to the presence of foreigners and that the conditions there were unsettled. However, on April 6, 1847, Kiyong signed an agreement at Bocca Tigris with Sir John Davis providing that the British should have free entrance into Canton two years from that date, and recognizing the right of British merchants to rent ground on the island of Honan for warehouses, at Whampoa for graves, and at the five open forts for the erection of churches.

In February, 1848, Commissioner Kiyong was recalled to Peking; and Yeh Ming-chin became Governor of Kwangtung, and filled the combined offices of Viceroy and Imperial Commissioner from 1852 to 1857. This short-sighted and narrow-minded official and Hsü Kwang-tsin, who served as Viceroy from 1848 to 1852, reversed the

¹ Successor of Kishen.

² Shanghai was opened to foreign trade on November 17, 1843; Ningpo in December, 1843; and Foochow and Amoy in June, 1844.

policy of Kiyung. With the complete approval and backing of the Peking Government, Yeh triumphantly defied the British for ten years, resisted all their efforts to enter Canton, raised innumerable obstacles to the development of trade and intercourse with foreigners at that port, and evaded all the Chinese official agreements and promises. This policy of exclusion and procrastination, however, reacted upon China in the end, while the relations between Chinese and British officials were sorely strained and the situation in southern China reached an acute state.

On October 8, 1856, Chinese officials seized the *lorcha Arrow* near Canton, hauled down the British flag, and took off twelve Chinese. Consul Parkes immediately demanded that the Chinese return the men and offer an apology, claiming the vessel was under a British charter and entitled to British protection. Yeh refused, asserting that the ship was a Chinese boat and that the Chinese officers had not pulled down the British flag. After a year of fruitless negotiations, the patience of the British was exhausted; and, in company with the French, a new punitive expedition under the command of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros was prepared. Since the Treaty of Nanking had become a dead letter and foreign trade was hampered and restricted on every hand, the commanders of the Far Eastern forces were ordered to secure reparation for losses and injuries to British and French subjects, enforcement of treaty rights at Canton and other ports, approval of new concessions such as the right of the British envoy to visit or reside in Peking and to communicate in writing with Peking Government officials, compensation for the cost of the expedition, and a revision of treaties to facilitate trade and to open more of China to foreign commerce.

In December, 1857, the combined fleets took Canton; and in 1858, they seized the ports along the China coast and

advanced to Tientsin, from which place forces were sent to capture the Taku forts defending the approach to Peking. After the taking of the forts, the Chinese sued for peace, and the Treaty of Tientsin was signed between June 13 and 26, 1858, by Russia,¹ the United States, Great Britain, and France in the order named. Considerable delay ensued in securing the ratification of the Peking Government. For the imperial authorities did not consider the treaties binding, since they were "forced oaths which the Spirits do not hear." At length, in June, 1859, when the British and French plenipotentiaries and their staff — some four hundred and thirty persons in all — were on their way to Peking to exchange ratifications of the treaties, they were fired upon by the Taku forts and carried off as prisoners to Peking. The troops of the European allies immediately advanced on the capital, but were soon compelled to retire by the superior forces of the Chinese.

In 1860, after large reinforcements had been received, the allied army took the Taku forts and entered Peking on October 13th. The ill-fated emissaries, of whom sixteen had died, were freed; and the imperial summer palace — nine miles out of Peking — with its lovely grounds ("Bright Round Garden") was looted and burned just behind the hasty steps of the Emperor as he fled northward to his summer home at Jehol. Prince Kung, who represented the Imperial Government, assisted in the release of the imprisoned emissaries and opened negotiations with Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. The Treaties of Tientsin and new conventions with some important additions were signed with the British on October 24th and with the French on October 25th. By the agreements of 1858 and 1860,

¹ Russia had just reached — May 16th — an agreement with China at Aigun defining the Chino-Russian boundary along the Amur River and regulating trade on the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari Rivers.

eleven new ports were opened to foreign trade: Niuchwang in Manchuria, Tangchow, for which Chefoo was later substituted, Taiwan, and Tamsui on the island of Formosa, Swatow, Kiungchow on the island of Hainan, Tientsin, and Hankow, Kiukiang, Chinkiang, and Nanking on the Yangtze.¹ In addition, the town of Kowloon — on the mainland opposite Hongkong — was ceded to the British; the Chinese were to pay then a war indemnity of 8,000,000 taels to both Great Britain and France; the Yangtze-Kiang was opened to the trade of all nations; religious toleration was established; alien travelers with passports from their consuls were to be permitted in the interior of China; foreigners were no longer to be called “I” or barbarians; and China, recognizing at last the right of the representatives of outside powers to negotiate with her officials of high rank on a basis of equality, agreed to an exchange of ministers and to the residence of a British representative at Peking.

This second controversy of China with foreign powers, culminating in the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking, was the first real step in the opening of the Chinese Empire to world intercourse. Forced by the pressure of Russia on the north, the allies on the coast and at Peking, and the Taiping rebels in the interior,² to accept agreements laying the foundation of international relations between China and other countries, the imperial authorities, however, accepted the new régime grudgingly and unwillingly; and they were never able to escape from it, or to stop the advance of foreign penetration into their land during the forty years that followed the signing of the treaties. On the contrary, by the force of circumstances and the signing of various agreements, they were induced to open the greater

¹ Hankow was opened in 1861; Chinkiang in 1861; Kiukiang in 1862; but Nanking not till 1899.

² The Taiping Rebellion lasted from 1850 to 1864, causing a great destruction of property and a loss of life estimated at ten to twenty millions.

part of their country to international trade. Yet they were never convinced of the intrinsic value of world commerce — particularly for China — or of the honesty and disinterestedness of European statesmen who, they suspected, were laboring solely in the interest of their respective states with a view of obtaining for their nationals and their governments a large portion of the natural wealth and of the territory of the Chinese Empire.

Nevertheless, Prince Kung and the more liberal imperial officials made an effort to meet the foreign powers halfway in establishing international intercourse on an equitable basis and in stabilizing conditions throughout the country. The Tsungli Yamen, or Board of Foreign Affairs, was created in 1860 to act as an intermediary between foreign governments and the Emperor. A movement was inaugurated to transfer the control of intercourse with foreigners from the local officials to the central authorities. British and French subjects were given permission to enter the Chinese service; and foreign experts were employed in the army, navy, and the customs service — the last-named being organized on a permanent and efficient basis through the genius of Sir Robert Hart in 1863–64 with the aid of some four hundred alien inspectors.¹

One cannot deny, however, that there were abundant grounds for the suspicions of Chinese statesmen. Russia, whose subjects had been trading in Mongolia since the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689,² and at Kuldja, Ili, and Tarbagatai since 1847, was permitted by the Treaty of 1860 to trade at Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, at Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan, and at Kalgan,

¹ Sir Robert Hart, who had served as Deputy Inspector-General and acting head of the service from 1859 to 1863, was Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs from November 30, 1863, till his death on September 21, 1911.

² China's first treaty with a European state.

one hundred and thirty-five miles north of Peking. In addition, she secured by the same agreement the island of Sakhalin and a large accession of territory north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri Rivers (and south to the forty-second degree of north latitude) which was organized into the Amur Province with 154,795 square miles of territory and the Primorskaya or Maritime Province with 266,486.¹ By an agreement with China in 1869, Russian merchants were permitted to go for purposes of trade to all towns in Mongolia where Chinese officers were stationed. In the Treaty of 1881, approval was given for the appointment of Russian consuls to Kobdo and Uliassutai in western Mongolia, Hami in Sinkiang, Urumchi and Kucheng in Zungaria, and Suchow in the province of Kansu. And a section of the province of Kuldja, which had been seized in 1871 and held for ten years by Russia on account of border disturbances and the revolt of Yakoob Beg — put down by the Chinese General Tso-tsung-tang in 1877 — was retained by the Czar and incorporated in the province of Semirechinsk.

Meanwhile, between 1861 and 1869, China was induced to sign treaties with Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, the United States, and Austria-Hungary, granting trade privileges similar to those in the Tientsin Agreements. Then Great Britain, taking advantage of the murder of one of her consular officials — Augustus R. Margary — in the province of Yunnan in February, 1875, secured by the Chefoo Convention in 1876 the establishment of trade relations between Burma and Yunnan, the opening of four new ports to trade — Pakhoi in Kwangtung, Wenchow in Chekiang, and Ichang and Wuhu on the Yangtze — the appointment of a British consul to an important city in Yunnan, and the opening

¹ China claimed only a part of this territory.

of the Yangtze River as an artery of trade as far as it was navigable. And France, after the war of 1884 with China, induced the latter, in the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking of 1885, 1886, and 1887, to give up its claims over Tongking and to open three more ports to trade: Lungchow in Kwangsi, Mengtze and Szemao in Yunnan.

With the opening of the Yangtze ports and others on the seaboard, the commerce of the country made an immediate advance — the imports at Shanghai doubled between 1860 and 1863 — and increased steadily during the next quarter of a century, particularly after the application of steam to navigation. The exports of silk, tea, and sugar rose rapidly, together with large shipments of soya beans, oil seeds, cereals, furs, and hides; while the imports of cotton, woollens, metals, matches, kerosene oil, and foodstuffs rose correspondingly — the importation of opium till it reached \$50,000,000, or forty-four per cent of the imports, after which it was gradually outdistanced by the national imports of cottons, foodstuffs, and other articles.

In spite of all these signs of progress and good-will, neither the trade of China nor the development of intercourse with foreign powers advanced as rapidly or as consistently as was contemplated under the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking. This was due to a combination of causes. In the first place, the foreign merchants caused endless friction and trouble. For many of them had no regard for the interests of others,¹ and persisted in smuggling opium into the country and in violating the treaties. In spite of

¹ "Whatever basis of justice there may be in the complaints of the merchants," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock on April 16, 1868, "they have too plainly shown that they have no regard or consideration for either the rights or the interests of others; and the Chinese have a perfectly clear conception that the country has both sovereign rights and national interests which it is their business to uphold, whatever foreigners may think or say to the contrary."

Chinese protests, they insisted that the agreements of 1858 and 1860 entitled them to the right of residence anywhere in China, free navigation on all inland waters, the shipment of goods inland without transit dues, and the abolition of the "likin" or internal tax laid by the Imperial Government on goods shipped from province to province. Then the missionaries, taking advantage of the protection promised in the Tientsin Treaties, established missions too frequently outside the limits set by the agreements, and demanded privileges not contemplated by the signers of the treaties. This caused considerable unrest and occasional outbursts of violence such as the massacre of Catholics at Tientsin in 1870, and the burning of the French mission at Wuhu in 1890. For the Chinese authorities, owing to unfortunate incidents during the Taiping rebellion, believed that the teaching of the missionaries was revolutionary — unsettling the minds of the people and promoting civil disobedience and the invasion of foreigners.


Unfortunately, the policy pursued by foreign powers did not help matters; for they made little effort to control the conduct and activities of their nationals, and failed to produce an intelligent plan to control the development of international intercourse along sane and conservative lines. In fact, they furthered the discord by using every artifice of diplomacy and intrigue, and resorting to force when these failed, to secure protection for their merchants, travelers, and missionaries in China, the execution of trade rights, the establishment of commercial relations between the Celestial Empire and India, Tongking, and Russia, proper treatment of all foreign ministers and representatives, and full recognition of the principle of extra-territoriality — in excess of the stipulations agreed upon in 1858 and 1860 in many instances. Yet no equivalent advantages or concessions were made to the Chinese Government or its nationals.

And, it is to be noted, all this went on while little was done to secure the coöperation of the Chinese, and while the majority of Chinese statesmen and officials — both imperial and local — still clung to their old policy of exclusion, and were opposed to trade extension, the residence of missionaries and traders in the interior of the country, and the opium trade. To this unfortunate situation a new factor was added. Between 1840 and 1890 the efforts of foreign states acting fairly in accord were directed to securing trade rights in China and protection for the persons and property of their nationals engaged in commerce. But, between 1890 and 1900, European powers inaugurated a movement to mark out spheres of influence for themselves in China, and to abet their nationals who, through concessionnaire companies, were seeking all kinds of concessions for the construction of internal improvements, such as railways, mines, docks, and public utilities. It was a free-for-all contest, in which the competition soon became intense, for the stakes were high, and in which the competitors did not hesitate to make use of bribery, intrigue, intimidation, and force to secure their own ends or to thwart the plans of each other. When this selfish, domineering imperialism showed its hand in directing the policies of foreign powers, it struck the spark which brought a terrific explosion in China. The patient, long-suffering Chinese, already harassed and brow-beaten by their "friends," the foreign traders and diplomats, arose in haste and anger to throw all aliens into the sea.

The first sign of this "forward movement" of European states was noticeable at the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894. At the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, which not only marked the beginning of the modern development of China, but also was the starting-point of Japanese imperial expansion, the island of Formosa and the Pescadores were transferred to Japan, and

the interior of China opened further to the trade and residence of foreigners by the creation of four new treaty ports: Shasi and Chungking on the Yangtze, Soochow in Kiangsu, and Hangchow in Chekiang. In this way Japan secured control of all the important islands off the Chinese coast and the right to participate with the other powers in the commercial exploitation of the Celestial Empire. Her merchants might rent houses and docks and engage in trade and industries; while her ships could sail up the Yangtze to Ichang and Chungking, and penetrate the canals and waterways; and her trade increased rapidly and permanently. In addition, China lost her rights of suzerainty over Korea, which was now declared independent, and paid a large war indemnity. All of this proved of inestimable value to the Nipponese; but it had few advantages for the Chinese. On the contrary, it was a great blow to the prestige of the Manchu monarchy and to Chinese pride; for the Chinese authorities not only had to accept a defeat in arms, but also to submit to dictation and to the commercial invasion of their country by an Oriental power for the first time in modern history.

In the Treaty of Shimonoseki the southern part of the province of Sheng-king (Manchuria) known as Liaotung was ceded to Japan; but Russia, with her eyes on Manchuria and supported by Germany and France, induced the Empire of the Rising Sun to relinquish this claim "in the interest of peace in the Far East." The very next year — 1896 — however, the Russians, in compensation for their good offices, obtained the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok; and, on March 27, 1898, a Russo-Chinese Convention was signed giving Russia the right to construct a railway from Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur, and leasing to Russia for twenty-five years the Kwangtung



Peninsula at the southern extremity of Liaotung with Port Arthur, Dalny, Ta-lien-wan, and the adjacent waters.

Meanwhile, on February 4, 1897, Great Britain had forced China to cede a district sixty miles long and twenty-five miles wide (including the Shan State of Kokang and part of Wanting) to Burma, to open the Si-kiang or West River to trade through the three ports of Wuchow, Shamshui, and Kongmoon, and to recognize the British sphere of interest in Yunnan through the appointment of British consuls to the cities of Teng-yueh¹ and Szemao, and the opening of trade routes between Burma and Yunnan. This was insisted on as a punishment for ceding Kiang-hung to France in 1895. The former was a large district east of the Mekong River and one of two provinces restored to China by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of Tientsin on September 6, 1894, with the proviso that they should never be transferred to any other power. And the next year — 1898 — jealous of Russia and anxious to have a coaling station in northern Chinese waters, the British demanded and obtained the lease of Weihaiwei with its harbor — on the north coast of Shantung and opposite Port Arthur — for as long a time as the Russians held the latter port, as well as an extension by lease for ninety-nine years of the territory held by the British at Kowloon — opposite Hongkong.

Germany, who had entered late in the race for imperial expansion and had had to take a third-rate position in the partition of Africa, was determined to have a real “place in the sun” in the Far East. She examined the coast of China in the summer of 1897, and, after the slaying of two German missionaries in the province of Shantung in November, ordered her fleet to seize Kiaochow Bay with

¹ A choice was permitted between Teng-yueh and Shunning-Fu, and the former was taken.

its forts. On March 5, 1898, China, in addition to paying a monetary compensation for the death of the missionaries and dismissing the Governor of Shantung from office, leased to Germany for ninety-nine years the waters of Kiaochow Bay, the islands in the bay, and some one hundred and seventeen square miles of territory around the bay, including the town of Tsingtao. In addition, Germany was given the right to construct a railway from Tsingtao to the capital of the province, together with the mining rights for eighteen miles on each side of the railway and other economic privileges in the province. As a consequence, Germany was able soon to build a beautiful city at Tsingtao, to dredge out Kiaochow Bay, making of it the best harbor north of the Yangtze, and to furnish the funds and experts for the economic development of the whole province of Shantung.

Meanwhile, France, which had been seeking control over the trade of the province of Kwangsi through northern Tongking and Lungchow since 1887, secured by the treaty of June 20, 1895, the right to have a consular agent at Tongking, the opening of Szemao to trade, mining rights in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, and favorable transit duties across the China-Tongking frontier. Taking advantage of the murder of two French lieutenants, France obtained from China on April 10, 1898, the right to build a railway from the frontier of Tongking to Yunnan-fu,¹ a lease of land about Kwangchow-wan or Kwangchow Bay — two hundred miles south of Canton — for a naval base and a coaling station, and the right to furnish assistants to China whenever the latter should establish a postal service. The lease at Kwangchow-wan was confirmed by treaty the following month;² and the boundaries of the new terri-

¹ The final contract for this railway was signed October 29, 1903.

² May 27, 1898; ratified by the Chinese Government February 19, 1900.

tory — including the islands in the bay and some one hundred and ninety square miles on the mainland — were delimited in the fall of 1898 by Marshal Sou¹ and M. G. Bertrand¹ who had been coöperating for some years in the establishment of peace and security on the Kwangsi-Tongking frontier. And the French, who placed the administration of Kwangchow-wan under the control of the Governor-General of French Indo-China in 1900, expected it would become the base of French colonial and commercial expansion in South China. "We can equally count on a brilliant future for it as a port of commerce," wrote Paul Doumer — Governor-General of Indo-China — in 1902. "With the projected ways of penetration toward the interior of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the basin of the Si-kiang, it will drain the products of an immense region, to which will also enter the goods of the importer."

At the same time that European powers were demanding these cessions and leases, Japan received assurances from the Chinese authorities that the province of Fukien — opposite the island of Formosa — would never be alienated to any other power; but the demand of Italy for a coaling station was indignantly refused. Yet the powers did not long remain content with ports of trade, commercial concessions and leases. They proceeded to mark out in China vast areas for their own exploitation under the name of "spheres of influence or interest," in which they claimed to have special rights and privileges. The legality of this system was speedily recognized by Germany, Russia, France, and Great Britain, although the last-named state was forced into the game in spite of the sentiments of her people, who preferred a policy of equal oppor-

¹ Marshal Sou was military governor of Kwangsi and G. Bertrand spent thirteen years in the service of the French Government of Indo-China and in the Chinese service as adviser to Sou.

tunity for all. And even China was compelled to give a sort of tacit approval. In this way the exploitation of the Celestial Empire advanced with rapid strides. By the middle of 1899, some eight cessions and leases of territory—including Formosa, Macao, and West Kuldja—had been made, forty-two ports opened to trade, and some thirteen provinces out of eighteen marked out as “spheres of influence.” But the movement was leading rapidly, not only to the serious injury of foreign trade under the treaty rights and the possible complete exclusion of all foreign competition in the spheres of influence, but also to violations of the sovereignty and independence of China.

At the same time there occurred an unholy scramble by the nationals of the leading foreign powers for economic and financial concessions to assist the Chinese in the development of their resources and their country. So that during the years 1898 and 1899, the Celestial Empire was “obliged to sign a number of very illiberal contracts with various powers or syndicates strongly backed by diplomatic pressure, for the building of railways, the opening of mines and for other purposes,” wrote W. W. Rockhill, “and many of these concessions frequently violated the favored-nation clause guaranteed the different powers by China. The primitive and unsatisfactory condition of the Chinese fiscal and financial system made the country ill-prepared to embark in these vast schemes of improvement so rapidly without serious apprehension. And the complete ignorance of the people added greatly to the concern of the Chinese Government and to the anxiety of the United States, which had taken no part in the fight for concessions.”¹

Moreover, the great weakness of the Manchu Government furnished another element of danger in the situation,

¹ Address to the Naval War College on August 4, 1904.

for it possessed neither the stability nor the machinery essential to any work of reconstruction. Indeed, the only certain method whereby China could be saved from partition and its future development along sane and broad lines assured was by the establishment of a strong and efficient central government. But, alas! when the Emperor and the influential men about him proposed widespread reforms, the tide of opposition arose to an alarming degree. For, to quote Rockhill again, "soon the reactionary spirit of the great body of officials and literati, supported by the ignorant people, was aroused. Reform in their eyes was identified with revolution, reformers were the tools of foreigners — the destroyers of China, her institutions and her ideals."

Such was the state of affairs in China in the summer of 1899; and the danger of the situation was brought home to the people and the Government of the United States at that time by the publication of Lord Charles Beresford's book entitled *The Breakup of China*, and his speeches in America. John Hay — then American Secretary of State — had early recognized the necessity of stopping further inroads on the sovereignty of China, of reassuring the Chinese people, and of protecting American treaty rights and interests in regions where "spheres of influence" were being set up. Inquiries were made of the leading foreign governments to ascertain the intentions of the powers in China and how they proposed to use the recently acquired privileges. Favorable oral replies were received by the United States; but, since some of the powers continued to press their demands on China and to make preferential arrangements in their so-called "spheres of influence," the fears of the American Government were not allayed.

Fortunately, in the same summer of 1899, W. W. Rock-

hill¹ — formerly Secretary of the American Legation in Peking, and the closest personal adviser of John Hay — and his friend Alfred E. Hoppisley, who had held an important position in the Chinese Customs Service for some thirty years, were in the United States. Through their influence — particularly the urgent insistence of Rockhill — Secretary Hay came to realize the necessity of obtaining immediately categorical pledges from the powers.² On August 7th, he wrote Rockhill as follows: "I am fully awake to the great importance of what you say, and I am more than ready to act. But the same senseless prejudices in certain sections of the 'Senate and people' compel us to move with great caution." Convinced, however, that the time was favorable for securing the consent of the powers to definite principles of international policy, John Hay asked Rockhill on August 24th to make specific recommendations for government action. And on August 28th, Rockhill submitted a "Memorandum" containing a brief summary of the situation in China and a statement in concrete form defining the pledges to be asked of foreign powers. Secretary Hay thereupon embodied these suggestions in a circular note on September 6th to Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and Italy.

In these communications, the United States made the reservation that it did not recognize that any power possessed exclusive rights within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire, but expressed its desire to main-

¹ W. W. Rockhill was Director of the Bureau of American Republics, 1899-1905. He had returned to Washington early in May, 1899, from Athens, where he had served as American Minister to Greece, Roumania, and Servia, from 1897 to 1899.

² See Hoppisley letters to Rockhill dated July 25th; August 16th, 21st, with memorandum of August 17th; August 26th, September 26th, October 26th; Rockhill letters to Hoppisley dated August 3d, 18th, 26th, 28th; September 14th; Rockhill letters to Hay, August 3d, 19th (Adee), and memorandum of August 28th, in Rockhill unpublished manuscripts.

tain open markets, to remove dangerous sources of international irritation, and to promote administrative reforms that would strengthen the Imperial Government and maintain the integrity of China. And the consent of the powers was requested to the following propositions:

"1. No state shall in any wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of interest or leased territory that it may have in China.

"2. The Chinese Treaty Tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed in or shipped to all such ports as are within such spheres, unless they be free ports; duties so levied to be collected by the Chinese Government.

"3. That the power approached shall levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such sphere than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality nor higher railway charges over lines built or controlled or operated in its sphere in merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nations than are levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own citizens."

The principles enunciated in these proposals contain the essence of the "Open Door Policy" or the "Hay Doctrine" of equal opportunity in China and the Far East. Unfortunately, no machinery was provided to enforce obedience to these excellent and just provisions, to regulate competition between the powers, or to establish the trade and economic development of China upon an equitable basis. Nor would it have been possible to secure the consent of the powers at that time to any curtailment of their economic activities in China nor to any supervision of their intercourse with the Celestial Empire. Indeed, not one of the European states ever had any serious intention of keeping strictly to the agreements; and they violated the Hay "declaration" whenever it interfered seriously with their interests or their operations. So this so-called "Open

Door Policy" remained nothing more than a negative, self-denying ordinance foredoomed to failure. The only chance it had of remaining effective was through the constant exercise of a vigilant policy by the United States, such as John Hay maintained during the five strenuous years that followed, insisting upon the enforcement of all treaties and agreements concerning China and the Far East. But after his death in 1905, Congress was too indifferent as well as too ignorant of Far Eastern affairs to support enthusiastically any enlightened policy in the Orient, while Hay's successors lacked the initiative and the backbone essential to the successful maintenance of his program.

Before the end of the year 1899, however, the "fat was in the fire." The anti-foreign movement — erroneously designated as the "Boxer" uprising — originating in certain Chinese secret societies and receiving support from higher quarters, assumed violent proportions.¹ Chinese Christians were persecuted and slain; foreign missions attacked and burned; and the foreign legations in Peking besieged from June 9 to August 15, 1900. Foreign nations bestirred themselves, at length, to protect the lives and properties of their subjects. Russian armies occupied Manchuria; while the allied forces advanced from Tientsin, taking the Taku forts and Peking, and forcing the Chinese authorities to sign the humiliating Treaty of 1901. This agreement compelled the Chinese Government, in addition to sending missions of apology to Germany and Japan for the murder of their representatives, and to putting up expiatory monuments in Peking and in alien cemeteries desecrated by the Chinese, to punish the officials and leaders who partici-

¹ See pages 328-29 for a brief account of the overthrow of the movement for reform and the *coup d'état* of the Empress Dowager who returned to power in 1898.

pated in the rising, to abolish all the secret societies, and to pay an enormous indemnity for losses suffered by foreign nations and individuals. In addition, China agreed to amend her treaties of commerce and navigation to the advantage of the powers, to reconstruct her department of foreign affairs, to introduce immediately important governmental reforms, and to submit to a military occupation of important places and territory till the terms of the treaty were fulfilled.

Thus the nineteenth century passed out with China still in the toils of foreign powers. That country had, indeed, been opened to foreign trade, but only by force; and both China and the powers had reaped large benefits from the increase of international commerce. Yet the situation was still full of danger, and no real progress had been made toward the establishment of a just and equitable relationship between China and the powers or between the powers themselves. The Chinese people, on the other hand, had been humiliated and embittered; while those high ideals of national honor, international justice, and the brotherhood of nations, engendered by a European and a Christian civilization, had been obscured by the dust of an all-absorbing international race for commerce, power, and empire.

CHAPTER XIII

CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE RISE OF THE REPUBLIC

THE progress of a lamb among wolves is always a delicate and dangerous affair, notwithstanding the peaceful and self-denying assurances of the wolves. For ten years after the signing of the Treaty of Peking, the weak Manchu Government was harassed and hindered at every step by the foreign powers, in spite of all their declarations concerning the "open door," the preservation of the independence of China, and the advancement of financial and economic reforms in that country. Front-door diplomacy found itself constantly checkmated by back-door intrigue. And the slightest success of any one state toward securing advantageous contracts for its nationals or the privilege of furnishing aid to China in any form was immediately blocked by the opposition of other powers or offset by demands for similar concessions that frequently nullified honest movements to promote economic reforms. This was particularly serious for the old Manchu régime on account of the intimate connection then existing in China between political reconstruction and economic reform.

The presence of the Russian armies in Manchuria after the signing of the Treaty of 1901 was another source of difficulty and danger for China. Russia declined to evacuate the three provinces of Manchuria on account of the disturbed conditions prevalent in that region — to which she herself had contributed not a little — and the destruction of railway and other property that had occurred there. Meanwhile, she took advantage of her position to strengthen

her hold upon northern China by dictating in local affairs, by seizing Niuchwang and the Niuchwang-Shanhaikwan railway, and by negotiating the Mukden Agreement of January, 1901,¹ which assigned to Russia the control of the railway and a share in the reorganization of the government of Manchuria. Impressed, however, by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance on January 30, 1902, and subjected to the combined diplomatic remonstrances of Great Britain, United States, and Japan, she at length abandoned her plans and signed an evacuation agreement with China on April 8, 1902, that provided for the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Manchuria by October 8, 1903, and for the restoration of the Niuchwang-Shanhaikwan railway to China or to its owners — Russia to be compensated for expenses incurred during its operation and maintenance while under its control.

Nevertheless, the Russian imperial authorities, who had been extending their control over northern China and Mongolia with great rapidity since 1898 through diplomatic pressure, the activities of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, with the accompanying financial and economic concessions, were extremely loath to loosen their grip on the country. Accordingly, the evacuation was not carried out on time, but was allowed to drag along interminably. Instead, Russia tried to force upon the Chinese Government the so-called "Convention of Seven Points" which forbade the opening of new treaty ports, the appointment of foreign consuls or of foreigners in the public service other than Russians, the changing of the Manchurian administration, and the alienation of any part of its territory to any power, while leaving in Russian hands the control of the Port Arthur-Mukden telegraph line and

¹ Signed by General Korostovich and Viceroy Tseng, Governor-General of Manchuria.

the sanitary commission and customs offices at Niuchwang. Yet, at the same time, the Muscovite diplomats were solemnly assuring Great Britain, the United States, and Japan that their country was in no way attempting to force the hand of China or interfering with foreign trade rights in Manchuria; and, when John Hay remonstrated with the Russian Minister at Washington in May, 1903, stating that the inevitable result of the policy of aggression pursued by his government would be the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, Count Cassini shouted in reply: "This is already done. China is dismembered and we are entitled to our share."

By thus violating her agreements and interfering with the treaty rights of other powers, Russia committed one of a series of great blunders that nearly cost her all she had gained in northern China. For, with the success of her enterprises in Mongolia and Manchuria depending in large measure upon her cleverness in avoiding conflicts with other powers and in allaying their suspicions and jealousies, she deliberately aroused the opposition of the European states and the bitter enmity of Japan, whose statesmen became immediately apprehensive for the rights and interests of their country both in Korea and on the mainland.

In the second place, in spite of the remarkable work of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the success of the Manchurian railway enterprise, the Russian commercial and colonial expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria proved a gigantic failure. This was due to a combination of causes. A too rapid commercial and economic expansion, accompanied by wholesale bribery in governmental circles and a vicious system of contract-making in the execution of all enterprises and public works, brought on a depreciation of the rouble, a financial crisis, and the failure of many undertakings which had not yet reached the productive stage.

Too much haste, inflation and speculation, accompanied by poor methods of production and operation, ruined the mining and other industries which had started with great *éclat*. Moreover, the Russian officials, who usually were successful in dealing with Orientals, failed completely to enlist the coöperation of the native Manchus and Chinese in the work of reorganizing, administering, and developing northern China. The Russians, indeed, controlled the railway and the railway zones about the chief towns and cities, and exerted a dominating influence in the general administration of affairs, but they never succeeded in replacing the native administration, in collecting the taxes, or in securing control of local government in the different provinces; while the unscrupulous Chinese robbed and outwitted the incompetent, dishonest Russian officials at every turn. Finally, a divided authority in Russian upper circles, where its financial experts in the Far East reported only to the Ministry of Finance, the three military governors of Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar to the Ministry of War, and the consuls-general and the consuls in Manchuria and Mongolia to the Department of Foreign Affairs, was sufficient in itself — accompanied as it was by constant intrigues for control and conflicts of policy — to defeat any program of expansion in Asiatic fields.

In spite of the loss of prestige by the Russian Empire in the Far East and the breakdown of Russian plans in Manchuria, the radical elements in Russia were determined to force the issue without delay. In the summer of 1903, the imperialist party secured control of the government, forcing out Count Witte and the moderates; and, on August 13th, Admiral Alexeieff — one of its leaders and an ardent advocate of Russian expansion in the East — was appointed "Imperial Lieutenant of the Far East" with supreme power to maintain order and security in the zone

of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to protect the Russian population and interests in the Far East.

Admiral Alexeieff entered vigorously on the work of completing the fortifications, improving the railway system, and strengthening the Russian position in Manchuria; while food, supplies, ammunition, and troops were poured steadily into the country. Meanwhile, conflicts in commercial and economic affairs — particularly in the Yalu lumber district — between Japanese and Russians were frequent, and the friction between the two countries became acute. The Muscovites, who greatly underestimated the ability and genius of the little Nipponese, and who gave little consideration to the position and rights of Japan, were ready to push "the little Japs" into the sea rather than let them interfere in any way with Russian ambitions on the mainland of Asia. Yet Japan had vital interests in Korea and trade privileges in North China; and, as long as an aggressive Russia was dominant in Manchuria, her position was dangerous and difficult. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia," wrote Baron Komura to the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, "would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese Government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire, or at least make Russia the dominant power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defense; and Japan consequently considers its independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are

paramount over those of other powers. These interests and influences, having regard to her own security, Japan cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another power."

The full significance of this statement is apparent when one recalls how both powers had been competing since 1896 for the control of Korea, whose independence had been recognized by the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the close of the Chino-Japanese War. Indeed, both parties had intrigued shamelessly to secure their ends. The Japanese efforts culminated in the assassination of the Korean Queen, the overthrow of the Reform Party, and the securing of concessions for the construction of the Seoul-Fusan railway, the working of mines and the promotion of trade; while Russia contented herself with protecting the King in her legation for a year, supporting her friends — such as the Minister of Finance Yi Yong-ik — in the Korean Cabinet and obtaining economic concessions to promote her own commerce. With the signing of the Waeber-Komura Agreement of May 14, 1896, which guaranteed the independence of Korea and provided that no soldiers from either state be permitted in the country, the competition abated for a time. But, with the arrival of M. Pavlow, Russian Minister, in Seoul in January, 1900, the Muscovite activities were again resumed. Yi Yong-ik was aided in his financial reforms and abetted in the centralization of all power in the hands of the Emperor. And in 1902, Russia obtained a coaling station at Masampo in Korea, and in the following year a concession to cut timber on the Yalu River.

Meanwhile, the Japanese statesmen had come to realize that strategically Japan's future prosperity and security depended on the securing of a foothold on the mainland, preferably in Korea, and that commercially and economically it was a matter of life and death for her to dominate

Korea and to maintain effective protection for her commercial interests in Manchuria and China. Her policy, therefore, resolved itself into an intelligent and determined effort to maintain the integrity and independence (outwardly) of China and Korea, to preserve the open markets for herself, and to have a large share in the reconstruction of the Far East. On the other hand, the Russian policy of national expansion in the Far East involved the disintegration of tribal relations and government in Korea, Manchuria, and China, an exclusive market for Russian goods, the lion's share of participation in the commercial and economic development of northern China and the "Land of the Morning Calm," and a dominant political influence in these lands to hold off other powers and to direct all developments.

To reconcile these conflicting policies was a well-nigh impossible task; yet the Japanese, anxious for peace but determined to establish stable conditions on their western frontier, opened "diplomatic conversations" with Russia on the subject in July, 1903. In spite of prolonged negotiations and the submission of various plans by both parties, no compromise was reached, owing to the steady refusal of the Russians to meet the Nipponese halfway and to recognize any Japanese rights in Manchuria. At length, on February 6, 1904, Japan broke off relations, and two days later declared war on Russia. The Russo-Japanese conflict which ensued was a succession of disasters for the Muscovite Empire. Its fleet was destroyed; Port Arthur captured after a prolonged siege, and the Russian forces driven out of Southern Manchuria; and the Muscovite armies defeated in the great three-day battle of Mukden. Through the mediation of President Roosevelt¹ — acting on the

¹ The Japanese — unable to follow up their successes at Mukden — appealed to Roosevelt on May 31st, four days after the battle of Tsushima

secret intimation of both parties that they were ready for peace — an armistice was arranged and representatives of the contending states signed the Treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire) on September 5, 1905. By this agreement the Russian holdings on the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalny, the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur and to the Korean border, and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) were transferred to Japan. In addition, Russia recognized the "paramount political, military, and commercial interests of Japan in Korea" and agreed to restore the Chinese administration in Manchuria; while the armies of both states were to evacuate Manchuria simultaneously within eighteen months.

The effect of this treaty was far-reaching. What the Russians lost in prestige, the Japanese gained. The latter were instantly recognized throughout Asia as the leading power of the Orient; and their victories over a European state gave a great stimulus to the movement for independence and for native "home rule" in Asiatic countries. Moreover, the treaty freed the Japanese for a quarter of a century from all fear of Russian aggression in the Far East, and it left in the hollow of their hand the domination of Korea and southern Manchuria. A genuine foothold on the mainland of Asia had been gained; and from this treaty dates the remarkable commercial, economic, and political expansion of the Japanese Empire, which during the next fifteen years placed Japan in the forefront of the nations of the world, but brought her to the verge of political and financial collapse and of an international conflict.

The inauguration of the American "open door" program and the Russo-Japanese War had little effect on the race

Straits, and the Russians on June 6th, after Roosevelt had suggested to them that the two powers get together and try to agree on peace terms.

for commercial and economic concessions and control in the Far East. It went on as merrily as ever, except that Russia had a temporary setback, while Japan now stepped to the forefront as a dominating factor in all matters affecting the future life and development of China — particularly her northern provinces. Between 1902 and 1909 — through treaties with China — Great Britain, Japan, and the United States secured the opening of twenty-eight more ports to international trade together with valuable concessions in commercial facilities, railway construction, mining rights, and economic control. At the same time, in the Anglo-Japanese Agreements of 1902 and 1905, the Chino-Japanese Treaty of 1905, the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907, and the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1907, high-sounding assurances were given that the independence and integrity of China would be preserved and the principle of equal opportunity maintained.

Yet Japan, fortified by the agreements with Great Britain, Russia, and France just mentioned, was fast getting a strangle-hold on the three provinces of Manchuria. She secured controlling interests in the railroads, mines, loans, and timber rights. Commercially, she obtained great privileges and advantages; and she dominated the markets of Manchuria and North China. But complaints arose that she was discriminating against the nationals of other nations in regions where her influence was paramount or her troops stationed, and interfering with the trade rights of foreign powers. With a view to clarifying the situation, preserving the integrity of China and maintaining the "open door" policy, the United States became a party to the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908. In this convention Japan and the United States agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the Pacific, and to preserve "by all the pacific means at their disposal the independence and integ-

rity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and in industry of all nations in that Empire.”

The Roosevelt Administration, which at that time had every confidence in the integrity and good intentions of the Japanese Government, acted in good faith and believed that this straightforward agreement taken at its face value would exert a beneficent and steadying influence in the Far East. As a matter of fact, however, since it was a tacit recognition of the position of Japan in Korea and Manchuria, and since it was interpreted by the Japanese authorities as giving them a free hand — so far as America was concerned — as long as they did not actually threaten the real independence and territorial integrity of China, it operated to strengthen the position of Japan. American leaders, political and financial, were anxious to show their friendship for China by assisting that Empire to get on its feet financially and economically. They believed the other powers were equally interested in such a work. As a result, the so-called “dollar diplomacy” policy was inaugurated, particularly during the Taft Administration, to effect the regeneration of China through financial and economic reforms in which all the interested powers should have a part on an equal basis. But Japan quietly checkmated every move. She blocked the Harriman plan for joint participation with Japan in the operation of the South Manchurian railway in 1905 and the Tang Shao-yi-Straight¹ scheme for a Manchurian bank in 1907, resisted unsuccessfully the inclusion of the United States in the “Four Power” loan for the Hukwang railways in 1908, and, with the assistance of Russia, overthrew the Knox Neutralization Plan for the Manchurian railways in 1909,

¹ W. D. Straight was United States Consul-General at Mukden at the time; and Tang Shao-yi was sent on a special financial mission to the United States in 1908.

which proposed the participation of all the powers in the building and operation of the proposed Chinchow-Aigun line and all other new Manchurian lines.

In spite of the great virtues of the Knox plan *per se* and the generous, neutral attitude of the United States, it was preposterous to expect its adoption by the powers without the most careful preparation and the most skillful and sustained diplomatic maneuvers. Instead, with only the nominal consent of Great Britain to the general principles involved, the scheme was laid suddenly before the governments of Japan, China, Germany, France, Russia, and Great Britain. And a great diplomatic blunder was made in supposing that Japan and Russia would lightly yield to other powers a share in the economic development of Manchuria, and in inviting them, in case they were unwilling to abandon their special interests in that region, to assist in the creation of new interests — such as the Chinchow-Aigun line — that would compete even remotely with the existing railway and other enterprises. As a consequence, Japan and Russia used their influence at once with the weak Manchu régime at Peking to prevent the signing of the Chinchow-Aigun agreement and the promotion of the Knox plan. And, on the 4th of July, 1910, Russia and Japan signed a convention, agreeing to coöperate in the improvement of their respective railway lines without competition, and to maintain and respect the *status quo* in Manchuria. Thus the exploitation and development of Manchuria was preëmpted solely for Russians and Japanese.

Meanwhile, outside of the northern provinces, the financial maneuvers of the United States, supported by the Chinese, met with fair success. As a member of the Four Power Group, she used her influence to secure for China a loan of £10,000,000 for currency reform, the preliminary contract for which, including the appointment of a neutral

adviser, was signed on October 27, 1910, and to conclude on reasonable terms the loan for the Hukwang railways in the Yangtze Valley, which was signed in May, 1911. But excellent as these measures were, and the various other financial and economic proposals of the powers to make possible the regeneration of the Chinese Empire and the development of its tremendous resources, the weak, incompetent Manchu régime was unequal to the task and unprepared for reform. Accordingly, the schemes for foreign loans and railway construction, instead of helping the Government, actually precipitated a revolution by contributing fuel to the agitation of the Republicans just then taking on extensive proportions.

The Manchus, or "stinking Tartars" as the Chinese contemptuously called them, had controlled the Government of China and compelled the Chinese men to wear pigtaails as a sign of their subjection, ever since that country was finally conquered in 1644 by the persevering warriors from Manchuria. Uprisings against the Manchu domination — often engineered by powerful secret societies — were frequent during the nineteenth century. The most famous of these revolts was the Taiping Rebellion which lasted from 1852 to 1864, and which was only overcome through the aid of the foreign generals — Ward and Gordon — and their "Ever Victorious Army" after a four years' struggle. Nevertheless, Manchu emperors and princes seemed never to realize the dangerous and critical situation of the Imperial Government — a thoroughly corrupt and inefficient régime superimposed from above upon the Chinese nation. They were neither trained to rule nor educated in the art of government. Nor did they see any necessity for introducing reforms or for reorganizing the administration along modern lines. Fortunately for them, the Chinese were a peace-loving people with little concern for revolutions and

political struggles, who took no special interest in the administration of the great affairs of state. So it was not till the last decade of the nineteenth century that a genuine movement for political reform took place. And it made its appearance, curiously enough, simultaneously in two widely separated spheres, i.e., the Imperial Court and the public arena.

The Emperor Kwang Hsu, although placed on the throne in 1875 when four years of age, was not permitted by his aunt, Tsu Hsi, the Empress Dowager, to assume the reins of power till 1889. Even then he remained under the watchful eye of Prince Kung, the head of the Manchu family, and Tsu Hsi. Impressionable and well-intentioned, he became interested early in the progress and development of modern states — particularly after the defeat of China by Japan in 1894. Encouraged by the counsel of his tutor, Weng Tung Ho, a member of the Grand Council and a believer in republican government, and of such conservative reformers as Kang Yu-wei, one of the greatest Chinese scholars of the day, he became an enthusiastic convert to the new ideas. He found support among leading men of the Empire, such as Chang Yin-huan, a member of the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen, Chin Pao-chen, Governor of Hunan, and Liang Chi-chao, editor of *Chinese Progress*, who were in touch with the reform movement then spreading over the central and southern provinces of the Empire, and to whom he appealed for advice concerning progressive reforms in the government of the country.

Unfortunately, the Empress Dowager had little interest in foreign institutions and ideals; and her residence — the Summer Palace — became the center of the opposition to the new movement. Aroused by rumors of her own deportation into the interior, and fearful of the effect of the reforms upon the position of the Manchu Imperial family,

Tsu Hsi on September 21, 1898, suddenly executed a *coup d'état*. With the aid of Jung Lu — Viceroy of Chihli — whom she appointed commander-in-chief of the army and a member of the Grand Council, the Empress Dowager seized control of the imperial administration, shut Kwang Hsu up on an island within the grounds of the Forbidden City and put to death or imprisoned a large number of the reform leaders. Thus the new movement for the reorganization of the Chinese Government and life came to an abrupt and inglorious end. Two years later, the country was in the throes of that appalling anti-foreign uprising — the Boxer Rebellion. And twelve years passed before a really serious movement was again set on foot to reorganize the national administration.

After the signing of the Treaty of 1901 and the return of the Manchu princes to Peking,¹ the Imperial Government made a pretense of putting into operation the reforms promised in the treaty. Tsu Hsi ordered members of the Grand Council to prepare plans for reforms in dynastic institutions, in administration, in finance, in education, in the army, and in methods of advancing the public welfare. Yuan Shih-kai, who as Viceroy of Chihli had organized the first army modeled on modern lines, became the commander-in-chief of the army, a member of the Grand Council, and the chief adviser of the Empress. The old classical examination system whereby officials were chosen for the public service was abolished in 1904; and the growth and importation of opium were forbidden in 1906. A reform commission was sent abroad in 1905 to study the public institutions of Europe and America; and in the following year its report was officially approved by an im-

¹ The Empress Dowager and the Manchu princes fled to Jehol, the summer residence of the Emperors, when the Allied forces advanced on Peking, and returned in 1902.

perial decree promising immediate reforms. A National Senate was announced in 1906; but it did not meet till 1910. Provincial Councils¹ were also authorized in 1907, but assembled for the first time only in October, 1909. And the organization of a constitutional monarchy on a nine-year program was announced in August, 1908. Nevertheless, in spite of this excellent beginning, the majority of the Manchu leaders were far from being convinced of the utility of the proposed reforms, or willing to commit the Government whole-heartedly to any serious movement for the reorganization of the administration. And the successes achieved were due in the main to the pressure from foreign powers and to the resourceful leadership of a few broad-minded and progressive Manchu and Chinese statesmen.

Upon the death of Tsu Hsi, on November 15, 1908, the control of affairs passed into the hands of a reactionary group of Manchu princes who were opposed to reform, to the surrender of power to the people, and to subserviency to foreign powers. Pu Yi, with the official name of "Hsuan Tung" ("promulgating universally"), infant nephew of Kwang Hsu, was made Emperor; and the government was entrusted to a council of regency at whose head was his father, Prince Chun. Yuan Shih-kai was speedily dismissed from office, and all the measures for constitutional reform indefinitely postponed — in spite of the valiant efforts of the little Empress Dowager Lung Yu, widow of Kwang Hsu, and Prince Tsai Tao, who favored a liberal policy. Concessions were made, however, under pressure from the Senate in 1910, in promises to call a National Assembly in 1913 instead of 1916, and to form immediately a modern cabinet composed of nine Manchus and four

¹ Neither the Senate nor the Provincial Councils were given financial powers; and the making of a budget was postponed till 1915.

Chinese. Meanwhile, strenuous efforts were made by the Government to develop the national resources and to make the imperial régime financially independent. The Peking-Kalgan railway, constructed by Chinese capital, labor, and engineers, was opened in 1909; an attempt was made to take over the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs; and the Government announced an elaborate plan of railway and economic development, on the strength of which it negotiated in 1911 a £10,000,000 loan with foreign powers.

At the same time vital movements were on foot in China the importance of which the imperial authorities failed to gauge properly. A popular desire for Western knowledge, Western ideals, and Western goods and implements had gained a great hold within the country. An equally strong sentiment in favor of democratic constitutional government took possession of the intelligent classes. And accompanying these, curiously enough, was a powerful impulse urging the people to free themselves and their country from foreign intervention and control. It was "China for the Chinese" with a government for and by the people; and these combined sentiments crystallized in the rise of republicanism.

The republican movement which had been in abeyance since 1898, took on new life in 1905 with the organization of the T'ung Meng Hui, or Sworn Brotherhood, including all the different elements of the republican group, and the publication of the *Min Pao*, or *People's Paper*, edited by Sun Chiao Jen. By 1911, the movement was in full swing with a large following in the center and south of the country and a military force of considerable importance under the leadership of two men of marked ability: Generals Li Yuan Hung and Huang Hsing. After an abortive attempt to launch a movement against the Manchus at Canton in April, the republican leaders, taking advantage of the seces-

sion of Szechwan due to a financial quarrel with Peking and of a military revolt at Wuchang in October, 1911, engineered the capture of Hanyang and Hankow on the Yangtze River and the seizure of the southern end of the Peking-Hankow railway, on October 9-10th. These successes, accompanied by separate revolts in other provinces, led to the declaration of a republic on October 11th.

To offset these gains and the threat of an advance on Peking, the Imperial Government quickly recalled Yuan Shih-kai from exile, making him Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan with power to lead the army against the rebels. And on October 27th, it appointed him High Commissioner with full control of all the military and naval forces of the Empire. Within a month, the Imperialist forces had driven back the Republican army and retaken Hankow and Hanyang. Meanwhile, however, uprisings against the Manchus had broken out in many provinces and Shanghai and Nanking had been taken by the insurgents; and the now famous Republican *Manifesto* had been issued to the world from Nanking on November 17th. Finding themselves faced with a widespread and serious revolution, the Manchu leaders attempted to save face and the Empire by issuing, on October 30th, a Manchu renunciation decree announcing full constitutional government with equality between Chinese and Manchus, amnesty to political offenders since 1898, freedom of the press, and the exclusion of princes of the blood from the cabinet and offices of state. On November 1st, Yuan was asked to form a cabinet; on the 2d, a constitution of nineteen articles was proposed; and on the 8th, Yuan was elected Premier by the Senate. Finally, a decree of December 6th removed the Regent from power and transferred the control of affairs to the Prime Minister and Cabinet; and, on December 9th, Yuan and General Li signed an armistice for fifteen days.

The result of these maneuvers was the holding of a peace conference at Shanghai from December 18th to January 2, 1912, at which Tang Shao-yi and four commissioners represented the Imperialists and Dr. Wu Ting-fang and five representatives the Republicans. But no agreement was reached, for the Republicans demanded a republic and the Imperialists asked to have the question submitted to the vote of a national assembly which the Manchu Cabinet on December 28th ordered called under rules to be agreed upon. Meanwhile, the armistice was extended to January 29th; Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived at Shanghai and took an important hand in affairs; Republican delegates from thirteen provinces met at Nanking and organized a Provisional Republic on December 21st, electing Dr. Sun provisional president on December 30th.

During the following month, Peking was filled with intrigues, negotiations went on between Peking and Nanking with feverish haste, and the provisional parliament planned a new government and a new constitution. Memorials, including one signed by forty-six imperial generals, asking the Manchus to resign, poured in from all parts of the country. Yuan steadily refused to take part in the discussion, to give advice, or to accept high honors or special powers from the Manchu princes, who at length found their position no longer tenable. Accordingly, on February 12, 1912, the Manchu ruler and princes abdicated their positions and powers, on the condition that Pu Yi, the last of the Ta Ch'ing Ch'ao, or Great Pure Dynasty, should retain the title of Emperor as long as he lived, and should receive an annuity of \$3,000,000 (Mex.). Thus passed out the great Celestial Empire of China; and, on the same day, there came officially into being the "Ta Chung Hua Min Kuo," or Great Middle Flowery Republic.

Three days later, the Nanking Assembly unanimously

elected Yuan Shih-kai President of the new Republic; and, on March 10th, the new constitution was promulgated placing the government in the hands of a President responsible to the Legislature, a Cabinet, a National Advisory Council of five members from each province, and an elected National Assembly. Tang Shao-yi was made Premier and a goodly number of southern men given cabinet positions; and negotiations were set on foot to secure a large loan from a four-power group of foreign powers composed of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany — the American representative¹ at Paris playing the leading rôle. Unfortunately, although the foreign governments had full confidence in the ability of President Yuan and faith in the success of the new Republic, it was a full year before the loan was signed. Meanwhile, the four-power group, upon the insistence of France and Great Britain, had been forced to admit Russia and Japan to an equal participation in the loan; and, as a consequence, the terms were made much more onerous for China. Moreover, the new Republic soon lost the support of the United States through the latter's withdrawal from the six-power group in March, 1913, on the initiative of President Wilson, who feared international entanglements.

The National Assembly was opened with due ceremony on April 8, 1913, with some 500 out of 596 Assemblymen and 177 out of 274 Senators present, the great majority of whom were members of the Kwo-ming Tang or Nationalist Party led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a number of radical Republicans. Unfortunately, only a small minority of the Senators and Assemblymen had had any experience, either in parliamentary procedure or in the organization and operation of democratic institutions; and they proceeded to talk the convention to death. Millions of dollars were

¹ Myron T. Herrick.

expended before the Assembly settled down to any real business. Twenty days passed before the regular presiding officers were elected; one hundred before rules of procedure were adopted; six months ere Yuan and Li Yuan Hung were chosen President and Vice-President; and seven months without any real progress being made toward the drafting of a permanent constitution — other than the passage of a presidential electoral law. And, although the situation demanded a strong executive and China possessed none better fitted for the position than Yuan Shih-kai, the Republicans opposed him vigorously on the ground that he was conservative and in sympathy with monarchical ideas; and they fought to weaken the powers of the executive in the proposed constitution as much as possible. "Yuan Shih-kai's sole aim is to get rid of Parliament," Dr. Wu Ting-fang complained to Dr. Paul Reinsch. "He has no conception of free government, is entirely a man of personal authority. The air of absolutism surrounds him." But he added, with rare insight concerning the political atmosphere of the Forbidden City, "Beware, when you get behind those high walls of Peking. The atmosphere is stagnant. It seems to overcome men and make them reactionary. Nobody seems able to resist that power."¹

Yuan, however, losing confidence in the ability of the Parliament to perform any creative work and disgusted with the eternal wrangling, expelled the whole Kwo-ming Tang from the assembly rooms on November 5, 1913, and finally dissolved what was left of both legislative bodies on January 10, 1914. "It was not a good Parliament," Yuan told Dr. Reinsch, "for it was made up largely of inexperienced theorists and young politicians. They wished to meddle with government as well as to legislate on all matters. Their real function was to adopt a permanent

¹ Paul S. Reinsch: *An American Diplomat in China* (London, 1922), p. 419.

constitution for the Republic, but they made no headway with that." Thereupon, the whole burden of reconstruction was thrown upon President Yuan, who soon came to feel that the salvation of the state depended mainly upon his own ability and resourcefulness. Aided by an "Administrative Conference" from December, 1913, to June, 1914, and an appointed Council of State thereafter, he finished the new constitution, organized an efficient administration, and prepared the way for a permanent government based on a strong central executive with the minimum of popular participation, that could be counted on to unify the country and secure the coöperation of the provincial administrations.

In the provinces, Yuan replaced the post-revolution governors with his own stanch soldier nominees from the North, on whom he could rely. "He carried out this policy with extraordinary success and tact in province after province," wrote Eric Teichman, "though in most cases it was a case of playing with fire. But for some reason or other he omitted to do so in the case of Yunnan, an omission which was to cost him his throne and his life."¹

The new "Constitutional Compact" was promulgated on May 1, 1914. It extended the presidential term from four to ten years. It gave to the President and his Cabinet the power to convene and dissolve the Assembly, initiate legislation, submit financial estimates, appoint and dismiss ministers, direct foreign affairs, declare war and conclude peace, confer titles, honors, and pardons, and issue orders with the consent of the Senate when the Assembly was not in session. And it provided for a new constitutional assembly consisting of a single chamber of two hundred and seventy-five members chosen through electoral colleges. Moreover, new election laws were formulated materially restricting the electoral franchise and the persons eligible

¹ *Travels in Northwest China* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 10.

to public office; and new elections were promised early in 1915. If this program had been carried out, a powerful central government would have been created — masked under the form of a Republic to be sure, but autocratic, and the only one that could have accomplished the political and economic reconstruction of the Chinese state under the circumstances then existing and while the people were unprepared to govern themselves. Yet even such a government could not hope to succeed unless the new régime was given a fair chance to establish itself and to extend its organization throughout the country, the ambitions and intrigues of Yuan's friends and supporters were curbed, and he was given diplomatic and financial support by the European powers.

Unfortunately, this was not to be. In 1914 came the Great War; and, in the course of the same year, the situation in the Far East was as completely changed as in Europe. European states were too much occupied at home to give serious thought to the affairs of China, and it became impossible for them to help her financially. The United States, which might have given great aid to Yuan by taking a firm stand diplomatically on the enforcement of the "open door" policy and its own treaty rights, obliterated itself and left China to its fate through its Wilsonian policy of "watchful waiting." Japan, which had no desire to see a strong government in China and which considered Yuan a personal enemy from whom no favors were to be expected, since he had proved an able and powerful competitor in Korea twenty years before, was thus given an open field. She acted quickly and resourcefully. Great Britain was easily persuaded, since she needed greatly Japanese services in the Pacific, to refuse the overtures of China for participation in the war against Germany. Thereupon, the combined forces of Japan and Great Britain besieged

Tsingtao, which was surrendered by the Germans on November 7, 1914; and Japan proceeded to take over all the political and economic rights and concessions of the Germans, including the whole railway from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu and many commercial and economic rights not enjoyed by the Imperial German Government.

No sooner were the Japanese firmly seated in Shantung than they presented to President Yuan, on the fateful night of January 18, 1915, the startling and infamous "Twenty-One Demands" for the purpose of securing from the Chinese Government "full recognition of Japan's natural position" in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shantung, which, to quote the instructions of Baron Kato to Hioki, Japanese Minister at Peking, was "absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern Asia," and which the Imperial Government was "determined to obtain by all means within their power." These demands were divided into five groups. In the first, China was asked to give her full consent to the future agreement between Japan and Germany concerning the German rights, interests, and concessions in Shantung, to engage not to cede or lease to any third power any territory within or on the coast of Shantung, to permit Japan to build a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to the Tsinanfu-Kiaochow line, and to open a number of important towns and cities in Shantung to trade. The second group, which concerned South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, recognized the special interest of Japan in those regions, extended the lease of Dalny, Port Arthur, and the South Manchurian Railway to ninety-nine years, transferred to Japan the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun railway for ninety-nine years, and gave Japanese subjects the right to travel, reside, transact business, open mines, and own or lease land and buildings in Manchuria and Mongolia. In addition, concessions for

railways or loans — either for railroad construction or secured by the resources of the regions mentioned — without the consent of Japan were forbidden; and China must apply for aid first to the Japanese Government whenever it decided to employ political, financial, or military advisers in the northern provinces.

The third group provided that the Hanyehping Iron Company, with its steel mills at Hankow and all the mines in the neighborhood, be transformed into a close Chino-Japanese corporation with Japanese control; and the fourth that China should “not cede or lease to a third power any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China.” But the fifth group, which Japan insisted should be kept secret and whose existence was vigorously denied by high Japanese authorities through their diplomatic representatives abroad, was an astounding and preposterous proposal. It demanded that China employ “influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs”; that Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools be allowed to own land in China; that the police departments in important places be placed under a joint Chino-Japanese administration; that China purchase fifty per cent or over of her munitions of war from Japan; that Japan be first consulted whenever China needs capital for mines, railways, or harbor-works in the province of Fukien; that Japan be permitted to build two new railways in Central China; and that Japanese subjects be given the right of missionary propaganda in the Republic.

The Yuan Administration was stunned at first with the enormity of the demands, the recognition of which would not only have ensured the complete domination of Japan in Manchuria, Eastern Mongolia, Shantung, and Fukien, but also would have wrecked the independence of the Republican régime and made China a vassal state of its pom-

pous little neighbor. Such a thing was unthinkable; and, with characteristic Eastern skill, the Chinese played for time, entering early in February on a series of conferences with Japan's representatives that dragged out to the number of twenty-four, and prolonged any real decision till the following May. On the 7th of that month, however, Japan, confident that Yuan would get no support from European powers or from the Wilson Administration, forced the issue by an ultimatum demanding the acceptance within thirty-six hours of the "Twenty-One Demands," with the omission of the fifth group and some minor changes in the other sections. The Chinese Government capitulated on May 9th, and on May 25th the documents were signed. But Chinese statesmen and people have always considered these agreements illegal, since they were signed under compulsion, and have never been approved by a Chinese Parliament, as the constitution of the Republic requires.

The Japanese triumph, however, was not genuine, even though they were able to extend materially their control and their holdings in Manchuria and Shantung, and to set up a civil administration and to dictate in political and economic matters in the latter province. For it was secured through two far-reaching diplomatic blunders. Their secret maneuvering and "disingenuous denials" lost them the respect and confidence of other nations; and the thrusting of the demands down the throat of the Chinese Administration under threat of violence lost them the friendship of the Chinese nation, while arousing instead in Chinese hearts an implacable suspicion and hatred. The reaction upon the Japanese nation through a loss of influence in the higher circles of China and the boycotting of Japanese goods on a large scale that soon ensued throughout the Republic, and through a loss of national prestige in diplomatic and commercial circles in all parts of the world, out-

weighed greatly the advantages of the pact. Moreover, they dealt themselves a bitter body-blow, for a strong and friendly administration in China was more needed by Japan than anything else in the Far East.

On the other hand, however, Japan had dealt a death-blow to the Yuan Administration, for it would have been exceedingly difficult for any government to survive the disgrace of such a national humiliation. Moreover, the Japanese Government followed up its advantage by aiding and abetting the Republican and anti-Yuan movements in many provinces. On top of this disheartening situation, the Anhui Party under the ægis of the Ch'ou An Hui, or Peace-Seeking Society — friendly to Yuan, but monarchistic in tendency — started an ill-fated move to form a monarchy, in the hope of saving the waning powers of the Yuan régime. As a basis for a monarchical agitation, they seized upon an academic dissertation of Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, of Johns Hopkins University, then American constitutional adviser to the President of China, which favored in principle a constitutional monarchy for China. As claimed by Mr. Liang Shih-yi and Mr. Chow Tsu-chi, leaders of the Anhui Party: "There is such a strong demand for this step that we shall have great trouble if it is not taken. There will be military uprisings. Indeed, the people can only understand a personal leadership; and they want it so that the country may be settled."¹ Impressed by these representations, and unable to resist the ambitious demands of his family and of the designing supporters of his régime, President Yuan gave his official sanction to the movement.

On October 12, 1915, a presidential mandate was published announcing the desire of the people for a monarchy and setting a date for a national referendum on the question. In November, an indirect vote through specially

¹ Paul S. Reinsch: *An American Diplomat in China*, p. 175.

selected electors whom the Peking Administration had taken pains to approve, was taken with the result that 2043 cast ballots for a monarchy and only fifty against it. Upon the receipt of these returns, President Yuan, on December 11th, very gracefully and patriotically acceded to the "will of the people," and consented to accept the position of Emperor. The temporary parliament, thereupon, conferred upon Yuan Shih-kai the title of Emperor, which the President accepted, after having exhausted the traditional forms of polite refusal by two rejections of the proposal.

It was expected that the new empire would be officially proclaimed at the opening of the New Year; and preparations, including the making of costly robes for the occasion, were set on foot at once. However, it never came to pass, for the opposition to this movement soon became much more pronounced than the so-called sentiment in favor of it had ever been. Japan, Great Britain, France, and Russia gave "friendly advice" against the establishment of a monarchy to the Chinese Foreign Office. And, late in December, the news arrived in Peking of a rebellion in Yunnan, which proved to be the beginning of a determined and far-reaching uprising against Yuan and the monarchical party, and was engineered by Republican leaders, the chief of whom were Liang Chi-chao, editor of the *Peking Gazette* and former Minister of Education in Yuan's Cabinet, and Tsai Ao, a brilliant soldier and ex-Military Governor of Yunnan.

Between January 1 and March 1, 1916, the opposition grew so pronounced and the successes of the Republican forces so spectacular that, on March 22d, Yuan issued a new mandate taking on himself the blame for all the troubles and for misunderstanding the will of the people, and announcing a return to the Republic. This new action was approved immediately by the Council of State, which

ordered its own dissolution and the calling of a National Assembly. In spite of the creation of a "Responsible Cabinet Government," with General Tuan Chi-jui as Premier, and hasty efforts to secure support by promises of a constitutional reform government, the revolt spread to eight provinces, beginning with Szechwan and Kwangsi; and the military successes of the Republican forces increased till Yuan's supporters, led by Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Chang Hsün, were nearly surrounded in the provinces of Honan, Hupeh, and Anhui. Many southern leaders joined the opposition; and some two hundred members of the original National Assembly dissolved by Yuan met in a convention at Nanking on May 20, 1916. The next day, in spite of a spirited opposition, the convention passed resolutions demanding the restoration of the constitution of 1912 and the retention of the Presidency by Yuan till the end of his term in 1919. It was evident, however, that Yuan Shih-kai's position had become untenable; and it was doubtful whether he could "save his face" and continue in office for the remaining three years. In any event, he was no longer a powerful factor in political circles. Disease had weakened his power of decision and his mental faculties. The man, once so resourceful and determined in action and so skillful in organization, became a hesitant politician without a program or a party. Fortunately for him and his reputation, the dilemma was solved for him in the twinkling of an eye by his sudden demise on June 6, 1916; and the Chinese people recognized his genius in a remarkable national tribute consisting of the greatest funeral of modern times and a monument costing a million dollars.

Thus passed the greatest Chinese statesman of our day, who missed the chance of performing a notable service for his country, and who alone could have saved the new Re-

public and his people from interminable anarchy and sufferings. For with him went all hope of a strong central government and of the immediate organization of an efficient Republican administration.

In spite of the promptness with which the accession of the Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, to the head of the government was engineered through the coöperation of the two political competitors, General Tuan Chi-jui and Liang Shih-yi, and the unanimity with which it was received throughout the provinces, the situation in China was such that the new administration had little chance of success. In fact, from that momentous day in 1916 till the present writing¹ — nine years — no real progress has been made toward the establishment of efficient, representative government in China. No constructive work has been accomplished. The various administrations that have followed one another in rapid succession have been chiefly engaged in the cheerful occupation of making ends meet financially and of holding on to the offices of state. Meanwhile, a steady contest for political power has been in progress between the Tuchuns, or Military Governors, of powerful provinces, or Super-Tuchuns, who, as "High Inspecting Commissioners," have assumed control over several provinces.

General Li made an honest but ineffectual attempt to create an efficient constitutional government. Embarrassed by disputes with the reassembled Parliament, controversies with the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, and the incessant political intrigues of Peking, his position became untenable within a year. Unfortunate episodes in foreign affairs, such as the Cheng Chiatun incident² in Manchuria, and the debate over the entrance of China into the Great War,

¹ September, 1925.

² A heated diplomatic discussion growing out of an insignificant row between a Japanese merchant and some Chinese soldiers.

undermined his power. Finally, he was forced to dissolve Parliament; and, on July 1, 1917, he appealed to General Chang Hsün of Shantung to come to Peking, and to assist him in adjusting his differences with the military group. Unfortunately, General Chang Hsün — an old-fashioned Tuchun — took matters in his own hands, seizing Peking by force and setting up a monarchy for eight days with the deposed Manchu Prince — Pu Yi — as Emperor. General Li retired to Tientsin; while General Tuan Chi-jui with the forces of the military party speedily routed out General Chang, and reinstated himself as Premier and General Feng Kuo-chang as Acting-President.

During the next three years the affairs of the Republic were directed by the so-called Anfu Club — which was dominated by Tuan Chi-jui, Tsao Ju-lin, the inglorious Minister of Finance, General Hsu Shu-tseng,¹ and other mediocre statesmen. Although this group maintained nominally a constitutional régime by calling a new Parliament, electing Hsu Shih-chang President, and taking a parliamentary vote on the question of entering the War, it pursued a dictatorial and high-handed policy. And realizing that Europe could not and that the United States would not furnish them with the funds necessary to establish an efficient government and to maintain themselves in power, the Anfu leaders turned to Japan.

However desirable and justifiable an *approchement* between China and Japan might have been under normal conditions, the moment chosen by the Anfu Club was most unpropitious. The Chinese people, stung to the quick by the humiliation of the "Twenty-One Demands" and incensed by the unwarranted seizure of Kiaochow by the Japanese and by the economic penetration of the Nip-

¹ Commonly known as "Little Hsu" to distinguish him from the President. As commander of the Northwest Frontier defense force, he had reëstablished Chinese authority in Mongolia.

ponese into Manchuria, eastern Mongolia, and Shantung, were in no mood to view with equanimity an "entente" with their little but over-ambitious neighbor. In November, 1917, the situation became even more intense by the publication of the Lansing-Ishii Notes, through the negotiation of which the Japanese diplomats double-crossed their Peking friends and nearly upset their own apple-cart. For, not content with the recognition of Japan's special interests in those sections of the Chinese Republic "contiguous" to her own possessions, on the curious theory that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries," the Japanese representatives created the impression in Peking, through a premature announcement of their own text of the Notes, that the United States recognized Japan's special position in China and was ready to leave that country to its fate.

So, when the Anfu Club under cover of secrecy and at the sacrifice of Chinese resources and independence, negotiated loans with Nipponese bankers, concluded the Chino-Japanese military agreement providing for joint action under Japanese control against the Bolsheviki, and established the War Participation Bureau — an extra-legal body with control over finances, national resources, and police — to obtain from Japan the funds and arms necessary for participation in the Great War, they not only played into the hands of the Nipponese diplomats, but also defeated their own ends. Yet, fortunately for China, their intrigues — followed so closely as they were by the assignment of Shantung to Japan at the Peace Conference of Paris — awoke public suspicion and indignation; and China was soon aroused from end to end by student demonstrations¹ and burning, tense discussions of the Shantung

¹ The Students' Union now has 700,000 members, and is a powerful factor in the national life of China to-day. It acts like clockwork from one end of the country to the other.

question. A general boycott of Japanese merchandise was inaugurated with the support of the merchant guilds and commercial associations; and a nation-wide movement was set on foot to save Shantung and to keep China for the Chinese. As a result a sense of national consciousness was awakened in the Chinese people for the first time, and something like a public opinion¹ created.

The downfall of the Anfu Club was swift and complete. The resignation of Tsao Ju-lin was forced at once by the leaders to "save face." But, before any plans for governmental readjustment could be effected, Tuan Chi-jui and his followers were driven from Peking without fighting a single battle by a military drive, launched in July, 1920, by the forces of the military group led by Chang Tso-lin, Governor-General of the three provinces of Manchuria, and Tsao Kun, Inspector-General of Chihli, Shantung, and Honan, who accused the Anfu Cabinet of disloyalty and dishonesty. Nevertheless, the Anfu Government, by precipitating a division of political parties and forces, had already exerted a sinister effect upon national affairs; for on May 18, 1918, another group of politicians led by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and Tang Shao-yi, who denounced the Peking régime as inefficient, unrepresentative, and subservient to Japan, established a rival government at Canton. Representative institutions were created; and the new administration, which claimed to have the support of the five southern provinces, proclaimed itself the real Republic of China. Indeed, it gained so rapidly in strength that the Peking authorities were shortly compelled to recognize it and to send representatives to a joint con-

¹ The growth of public opinion in China has been remarkable. To-day there are two thousand newspapers, of which eight hundred are dailies and the most important of which has a circulation of fifty thousand. At least twenty per cent of the population read these papers or hear what they contain.

ference at Shanghai to discuss the problem of national unity. This congress lasted from February to May, 1919, but without result — chiefly because neither faction possessed sufficient patriotism or unselfish, broad-minded vision to permit it to accept a compromise. Consequently, the conflict of forces and the disunion of the country were perpetuated.

After the downfall of the Anfu régime, the two great military leaders formed a matrimonial alliance and joined in controlling the Peking administration for twenty months. Then a contest for the ascendancy broke out between the two Super-Tuchuns. In the course of this conflict, known as the Fengtien-Chihli War and lasting through the months of April and May, 1922, Chang Tso-lin, who had come down from Manchuria with eighty-five thousand men, was decisively defeated and driven back to his own provinces by Generals Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang. Meanwhile, General Chen Chiung-ming, Tuchun of Kwangtung, and supporter of Tsao Kun, defeated the forces of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who attempted to come to the aid of Chang from the south. By thus participating in the conflict between the Super-Tuchuns, Dr. Sun wasted the energies and resources of the new Republic in a fruitless struggle. This unpardonable blunder had been preceded by a greater one: i.e., the use of force to compel the neighboring provinces to join the southern Republic, accompanied by political wrangling with Marshal Chen and other prominent southern leaders. Consequently, the young Republican movement, which started so auspiciously and contained the elements of a successful democratic organization, fell flat; while Dr. Sun fled to Shanghai.

Thus, the only peaceful movement for the reorganization of China failed ignominiously, while the triumph of the Chihli military party was complete. Although General Li was permitted to return to the presidency for a year —

upon the urgent solicitation of leading parliamentarians, prominent merchants, and influential citizens — and the old Parliament met on August 5, 1922, with the first legitimate quorum since 1917, the leaders of the triumphant military group had no intention of permitting the organization of any real democratic or representative government in the country, even while they were claiming to be staunch supporters of constitutional government. The leaders of the two most powerful military groups took identical stands. "The problem most necessary to be dealt with," exclaimed Chang Tso-lin in January, 1922, "is the adoption of a constitutional form of government suitable to the needs and character of the Chinese people. . . . The constitution drawn up in the first year of the Republic was unsuited in many respects to the needs of the Chinese people, and because of it the Southerners are on the wrong track in their present agitation. China wants a Chinese constitution, not a copy of a foreign one."

"The supreme legislative power of the Republic is vested in Parliament, and its members should be left free to do their work without military pressure from the many generals and provincial leaders," said General Wu in July, 1923. "Should Parliament continue to do nothing till its term expires in October," he added, "then provincial authorities will be free to do the work Parliament has failed to do. They must call a conference of representatives from all provinces who have been authorized to choose a new Parliament, a new President, and a new Cabinet." And, in speaking of the policy of the Chihli Party, he said: "The Chihli Party is like one large family. Tsao Kun is the father. I am the eldest son. The father has other sons, however, some of whom have the idea of taking the father to Peking and forcibly putting him in the President's chair. This is not Tsao Kun's idea or mine. Despite my deep

personal loyalty to him, I would not recognize him or any one else as President unless Parliament legally elected him."

Unfortunately, the old Parliament did not succeed either in finishing the constitution or in concluding any work of real importance, by the time its term ended in October, 1923; and the pathway was cleared for the Chihli Party. Preparations were at once set on foot to establish this party in power constitutionally. The following June, General Li was forced to resign from the presidency, and a new parliamentary election ordered, which produced a new chamber, the majority of whose members were adherents of the Chihli group. A new constitution was hastily formulated providing for provincial decentralization and elective cabinets and two chambers as formerly; and, on October 5, 1923, Marshal Tsao Kun was elected President by 480 votes out of a total of 588 — although it was whispered about that this success cost him the tidy sum of \$10,000,000. All this did not mean, however, that the new régime was a real representative Chinese Government; nor that the unification of the country has been effected and an efficient central administration established; nor that the great and complicated Chinese problem was about to be solved—even if the powers did rather hastily recognize the new Government or President. Far from it.

The plight of China was never worse. Tsao Kun's Government controlled only nine provinces, was practically bankrupt and harassed by all kinds of difficulties, lacked popular support, and depended on its military power for both support and revenue. Moreover, it was only one of several governments still functioning in China. Chang Tso-lin continued to administer the three provinces of Manchuria. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who returned to Canton in 1923, was still leading a forlorn hope in the South with hardly more than one province in his hands. General Lu Yung-hsiang, the

popular and able Tuchun of Chekiang, controlled a large part of the Yangtze Valley as well as his own province. And a number of other provinces were maintaining their own independent administrations — more or less successfully. But brigandage and civil conflicts were omnipresent; there was little security for life and property; and conditions generally were chaotic and disheartening.

It is true that the Chihli Party made some progress toward strengthening its position and its hold over the country, although financially and politically the situation did not materially improve. In accordance with its policy of putting the strongest men at the head of each province — provided always these leaders were supporters of the Chihli administration — General Wu Pei-fu was appointed High Inspecting Commissioner of Chihli, Shantung,¹ and Honan; Chi Hsieh-yuan, Commissioner over Kiangsu, Anhui, and Kiangsi; Hsiao Yao-nan, Commissioner over Hunan and Hupeh; and Kao Er-hung, Director of the Kiaochow Territorial Government. Overtures were made to Lu Yung-hsiang and other Tuchuns; the province of Szechwan was taken over by force; Fukien, and possibly one or two other provinces, were induced to coöperate with the Chihli Administration; while, in January, 1924, the Chihli candidate, Sun Pao-chi, was elected Premier after a deadlock of three months. Nevertheless, the dream of Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, of unifying China through military force masquerading under the garb of republicanism, was bound to fail ultimately. For it had no fundamental basis or far-reaching principles on which to build; and it failed to enlist the popular interest or support without which no public organizations or institutions can thrive.

¹ Tien Chung-yu was Marshal in Shantung and powerful enough to escape punishment for failure to arrest and punish the bandits who held up the Shanghai-Peking Express in 1923 and carried off the passengers as prisoners.

In the late summer of 1924, the Chihli Party launched a move to overthrow the power of Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang in Central China. Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, Tuchun of Kiangsu, with his capital at Nanking, who had coveted the rich commercial city and district of Shanghai for some time, led the combined Chihli forces in a well-organized attack against Marshal Lu early in September. Lu, with the aid of General Ho Feng-lin, defended Shanghai successfully for a month; but on October 9th, Sungkiang fell, and by the 13th, Generals Lu and Ho had fled to Japan. Meanwhile Marshal Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, taking advantage of this civil conflict which he loudly condemned, set his own troops in motion in a vigorous attack on the forces stationed at Shanhaikwan by Marshal Wu. After a series of brilliant victories in October, near Shanhaikwan and Chingwantao, the army of Wu was driven back in confusion; and General Feng Yu-hsiang¹ deserting his associate, Marshal Wu Pei-fu, and marching with rapidity and secrecy, entered Peking on October 23d. Within a week, President Tsao Kun had abdicated, and Marshal Wu Pei-fu was a fugitive. Thus ended the rule of the Chihli Party.

After a conference with Generals Chang and Feng at Tientsin on November 10th, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui assumed office as the chief executive and proclaimed a provisional government on November 24th. Three days later, a new Cabinet was formed with Tang Shao-yi as Minister of Foreign Affairs, on which all important political groups were represented except the Chihli Party. And on December 24th, some 166 leading personages were summoned to a national reorganization conference to prepare the way for a new government and the calling of a representative citizens' assembly, and the conference opened its first session in

¹ The so-called "Christian General" who two years earlier had so ably assisted Wu Pei-fu in defeating the forces of Chang Tso-lin.

Peking on February 1, 1925. Meanwhile, General Chang returned to govern his Manchurian provinces, and the situation of "Chang and Company" steadily improved. For General Lu Yung-hsiang, who was appointed "Pacification Commissioner of Kiangsu and Anhui" on December 12th, speedily restored order at Nanking and on the Yangtze, and, in January, 1925, defeated the forces of General Chi Hsieh-yuan — the last supporter of the Chihli régime — and entered Shanghai. And, in March, 1925, death removed one of the most fickle and visionary politicians of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who already was causing difficulties to the new régime by his intrigues.

Future developments cannot be predicted. There should be no further conflicts for some time, however, since Chang possesses the only great military force and he disclaims any personal wish to rule the land, now that Generals Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu have been eliminated; and it is certain that Marshal Chang will support Premier Tuan in an effort to unite the country under a strong central government. "Through Wu's failure, it is now apparent to all that it is impossible to unite China by military force," exclaimed Chang in an interview with William Giles on October 29, 1924. "I shall not meddle with politics beyond supporting an honest constitutional government, for no government can exist in China unless it is supported by the military until the governmental machinery is fully established and the people learn by example the duty they owe to the state. It is my intention to unite the country by calling Tuan Chijui to be a semi-dictator pending such time as a conference of representatives from all the independent provinces can be held to draw up a constitution and a constitutional parliament can be elected by the provincial assemblies."¹

To the present there has been too much talking and

¹ Telegram to the *Chicago Daily News*, October 29, 1924.

negotiating in China. What the country needs is action and the master hand of an able dictator to keep the horde of little chieftains in order and to organize a real government. "We have been negotiating ten years," said Governor Chi Hsieh-yuan of Kiangsu recently. "We are still negotiating. No authority is recognized. So-called independent generals establish themselves in positions of authority where they are able to keep the country from unification and to prolong the internal and international difficulties which beset China. Although I am a military man, I am a man of peace. If we could pacify China by peaceful means, I should be in favor of it above all else. But one grows despairing as the years pass and as the state of the country grows worse. The time has come when there must be action." ¹

Yet how are the Chinese people to be stirred to action? Will they submit to the dictation of Marshal Chang or any one who appears as a usurper of public power or popular rights? If Chang Tso-lin is resourceful, tactful, and patriotic, he may succeed ultimately in uniting the country under a strong régime — monarchical in principle, but democratic in form — which will make possible the reorganization and development of the state till such time as the people are able to rule themselves. If, on the other hand, he succumbs to the rôle of an old-fashioned, iron-handed dictator, he may prove to be the savior of the state just the same. "The dictatorship would be, of course, repulsive to the Chinese people, but it might be its greatest service," wrote Nathaniel Peffer at the end of 1924. "Just as Yuan Shih-kai's monarchical pretensions aroused and unified national sentiment for the Republic, just as the Anfu Club's treasonable services to the Japanese military oligarchy stirred the Chinese people out of their lethargy in

¹ Interview for the *North China Daily News*.

1917, so Chang Tso-lin's reformed-brigand czardom might stir them to throw off the feeling of helplessness that now makes them so inert and pessimistic. It appears to be a law of Chinese history that the Chinese people have to be goaded beyond endurance before they will assert themselves. When they finally do, they always leave no doubt that the Chinese people are masters in the Middle Kingdom, whether it be a monarchy in the Tang dynasty or a republic in the twentieth century."¹

In any event, the ship of state has been cleared for action, a new captain is in command, and an open sea lies ahead. As far as the great powers are concerned, no serious obstacles will be raised — for the present at least — to impede the work of reconstruction; for, at the Washington Conference,² called in November, 1921, at the request of President Harding to discuss the reduction of naval armaments, foreign governments made an honest effort to eliminate foreign interference in Chinese affairs and to give the Chinese Government a free hand to create an efficient administration and to institute financial, judicial, and economic reforms.

In the Nine Power Treaty³ signed at Washington, between the United States, Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal on February 6, 1922, the contracting states agreed to "respect

¹ *Asia*, December, 1924, p. 996.

² President Harding extended the invitation on August 11, 1921; and the Conference was in session from November 12, 1921, till February 6, 1922.

³ Including the four Root Resolutions proposed on November 19th and approved by the Conference on December 10, 1921. The international agreements concerning the principles and policy to be followed in Chinese affairs, and the revision of the Chinese customs tariff were signed in Washington on August 5, 1925, by nine of the powers; viz., China, the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, and Italy.

the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." To ensure this freedom of action to China, the powers pledged themselves "to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China," "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges," and not to enter upon any treaty or agreement which would infringe or impair the above mentioned principles, or create spheres of influence. To facilitate the execution of this "open door" program and to assist the Chinese Government in the work of reconstruction, China was permitted to raise her tariff to a uniform five per cent ad valorem, and commissions were established at Shanghai to assist in the tariff revision, in the readjustment of economic and railway concessions and agreements, and in studying a plan to abolish extra-territoriality in China as soon as China had effected the necessary judicial reforms.

Moreover, the powers agreed to remove their armed forces from China as soon as China was in a position to assure protection to the lives and properties of foreigners, and to abandon their postal agencies in the Republic by January 1, 1923. The Four Power Treaty, signed at Washington on December 10, 1921, by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, guaranteed the *status quo* in the Pacific and provided for the calling of future conferences if the position of any power was threatened or serious trouble arose. Thus, China was freed from the danger of attack from without, and the general peace of the Far East was assured for ten years. Finally, the restitution of Shantung

to China was provided for in the Chino-Japanese Treaty signed at Washington on February 4, 1922; and the transfer actually took place on December 10, 1922. Assurances were also given that Weihaiwei and Kwangchow-Wan would be restored by Great Britain and France respectively upon the conclusion of a general agreement between China and the powers which should provide for the restitution of all leased territories and properly safeguard all private rights and properties.

While the conference was in session, the powers urged the Chinese Government to hasten the work of reconstruction. They specially stressed the imperative necessity of taking prompt and effective steps to reduce the standing armies and the military expenditures, and they urged the Chinese authorities to unify all the Chinese railways under governmental control as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the situation in the country has been such that it has not been possible to carry out either of the last-mentioned reforms; nor has anything worthy of the name been attempted in the way of reconstruction. The continued civil strife has headed off all movement or desire for reform both political and economic; and Chinese officials have become more and more unwilling to seek or accept foreign aid.

On the other hand, foreign powers have not carried out all of their promises in good faith. Nor have they preserved an impartial, just, and friendly attitude in all their relations with China. The tariff has been raised uniformly to five per cent, it is true; and the foreign post-offices have been removed or closed; but the foreign troops remain, and little has been done to settle the problem of extra-territoriality, while Great Britain still holds Weihaiwei, France Kwangchow-Wan, and Japan Port Arthur and Dalny. Even the consortium, which was created by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan on October 15,

1920, to secure international coöperation in financial matters by the pooling of all existing and future loans to China, is merely marking time. This is due partly to the unsettled conditions and partly to the disposition of the powers to make the distribution of all loan funds subject to effective foreign supervision, and all loans dependent upon the disbandment of the military forces of the Tuchuns. And finally, Japan and France, although outwardly friendly, have made matters difficult for the Chinese — the former by intrigues to maintain her special privileges and holdings in the north and to support Chang Tso-lin, and the latter by her refusal to ratify any of the agreements (except the Four Power and the Five Power Treaties) till China consents to pay the rest of the Boxer indemnity in gold francs.¹

The strength of the present Peking Government is still unknown. It is not possible to foretell at this writing whether it can secure sufficient support and public confidence to enable it to unite the country, establish an efficient administration, disband the greater part of the standing armies, and start seriously upon the work of reorganization. Nevertheless, the situation is not without hope. The future of China, indeed, lies "on the knees of the gods." The Chinese Republic is like a great leviathan afloat, whose di-

¹ Advantage was taken of strikes in the mills at Shanghai, Tsingtao, and other cities, and of a civil conflict at Canton, to launch anti-foreign demonstrations and riots in May and June, 1925. These led to conflicts between police, students, and rioters, in the course of which some students were killed in Shanghai, to a boycott of foreign goods directed particularly against British and Japanese products, and to a general demand for the abolition of extraterritoriality. The foreign powers immediately took steps to protect the lives and property of their nationals, and pressed the Central Government to restore order and protect aliens. A movement is now on foot to summon another international conference in the near future, at which plans may be perfected for the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality, and for the reorganization of the finances and government of China.

vided and poorly equipped command is trying to direct its course over an unknown sea with the aid of an untrained crew and an old-fashioned mechanical equipment. And in China, as in all ancient states, the legacy of the past is as great a stumbling-block to national reconstruction as are the inherent difficulties of every movement to create modern political, financial, and economic institutions. The inheritance of the Chinese nation included, first of all, an Oriental and religious civilization of a high type with institutions of a first-class order — particularly in municipal and local circles — that suited the ideals and needs of the people and have stood the test of time. But accompanying these institutions, there was a great mass of superstitions, ideals, and customs which were opposed to progress and which controlled the life and thought of the people in a way incomprehensible to Westerners. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the old civilization be preserved and that the national political tree be not torn up by the roots; but, rather, the new state government must be grafted on the old tree and conform to the old institutions, practices, and customs, if it is to succeed.

In the second place, political instability is a condition of long standing. The Celestial Empire was merely a sort of loose imperial confederacy within which the provinces enjoyed a large amount of local autonomy, and the country was held together chiefly through the prestige of the Emperor and the coöperation of the provincial authorities. For centuries, China has suffered from the lack of a strong central government — except on those rare occasions when some dominating personality filled the imperial chair. And, when the Manchus abdicated, the Republican leaders discarded the feeble central control that existed and attempted to put in its place republican institutions which, to this day, have remained in the formative state. No

wonder there is no stable government as yet in China, and that over a dozen years have passed without the drafting of a workable and permanent constitution and the inauguration of regular and efficient representative institutions — particularly when one remembers that there was in 1912 no ancient aristocracy or wealthy class powerful enough, or sufficiently organized, to take the lead and the control long enough to ensure the establishment of national republican institutions.

This unfortunate situation was further aggravated by the lack of national unity or solidarity in the Chinese nation. In addition to the fact that there are five different nationalities in the Republic — Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans, and the Moslems of Chinese Turkestan — the citizens of China proper have been kept apart through speaking dialects so different that residents of one province are often unable to understand the citizens of another, and by a universal lack of communications. Except for one or two great navigable rivers and the grand canal, the residents of the different sections of the country, without railways, roads, telegraphs, or telephones, have been as far apart and have lived as isolated lives as though they were living in widely separated countries. With good reason, therefore, they have taken little interest in the work of the distant, unscrupulous, and inefficient central authorities, and have remained content with their own local government and institutions.

In the third place, the present Government finds itself seriously handicapped by the presence of millions of illiterate citizens without political training or preparation for republican institutions, while the country is woefully lacking in even the most elementary facilities for educating the masses. In addition, there is not only a scarcity of great civil leaders and administrators, but the number of

experienced minor officials is inadequate. Unfortunately, the young men who have been trained abroad are neither sufficiently numerous nor properly qualified to supply this lack. They are, in many instances, either so out of touch with conditions at home or so imbued with abstract and unworkable theories which they are in feverish haste to apply, that they are untrustworthy as leaders in the new Republic.

Again, Republican China, although the country possesses enormous natural resources, is at the greatest disadvantage in inaugurating progressive political reforms because of the lack of a workable fiscal system, of international credit, and of a regular, dependable revenue suitable to the needs of the state. Antiquated and scandalous methods of taxation and collection fail to produce anything approaching the natural revenues from a great land such as China. Provincial authorities withhold much of the income from their districts; military rulers commandeer a large proportion of the taxes and wealth of the regions under their control; large sums disappear through dishonesty and graft in the public service; and European states have controlled the customs and coöperated in preventing any material advance in customs dues. So, those insignificant sums which have reached the public purse have hardly sufficed to keep the ship of state afloat. How it still manages to navigate is a mystery. But the present Government possesses no funds for reconstruction. That is certain.

As a legacy from the disturbed conditions attending the creation of the Republic and the conflict engendered by Yuan's imperialistic plans, there came the military governors, or Tuchuns, who have added fuel to the fire and increased immeasurably the difficulties of national reorganization. Some of them are doubtless honest in their intentions and sincere in their desire to serve their country. But self-interest plays too large a part in their policies and

actions; and no national unity or constructive statesmanship is possible so long as they continue to dominate the political situation.

And, lastly, the weakness of the old Empire, its loose organization with the semi-detached and outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet, and its fabled natural wealth in resources and trade exposed it to the intrigues of foreign states and drew it into the vortex of an unrighteous struggle for economic power and privilege that shook the very foundations of the state. Alien powers did not hesitate to violate the national traditions, force the gates of the country open to trade, compel the Government to accept the system of extraterritoriality like a ban of servitude, demand the lion's share of all economic developments and concessions, and to interfere extensively in the internal affairs of the country with the set purpose of keeping its government divided and impotent. This policy was pursued under the Republic with even greater intensity and success — particularly by Japan — till a forced halt was called by the agreements at the Washington Conference of 1921. And there is still some likelihood of its being resumed if China does not soon succeed in restoring order and establishing an efficient administration.

From this cursory survey of the legacy of modern China and the conditions resulting from a hasty and premature attempt to create democratic institutions without due consideration for the traditions and customs of the past, a carefully prepared and digested program, and the proper facilities and leaders to ensure its success, it is readily seen that China is in desperate straits to-day. The situation presents one of the greatest and most difficult political and economic problems that the world has ever seen. The end is not in sight; nor will it be for years to come. But the remedy is well-known — both to many Chinese leaders

and to the well-informed statesmen of foreign countries. Certain fundamental institutions must be created at the start; and the great question is: How is this to be accomplished, in the face of national disunity, discord, and poverty?

It is clear, first of all, that permanent national political institutions must be constructed which will include a thoroughly representative central government that will function efficiently and that has power enough to enforce its decrees; representative provincial governments which will provide protection for life and property and encouragement for agriculture and industry and trade; a nation-wide educational system suited to the needs and customs of the country that will reach the great mass of the population, make possible a wider franchise, and provide a proper training for public officials; reorganized ministries of finance and communications to make possible the reorganization of the fiscal system, methods of taxation, collection, and distribution, and the construction of railways and good roads throughout the country; a modern civil and criminal code together with the creation of efficient and honest courts; an up-to-date system of national defense to include a small federal army and navy and a country-wide organization of national and provincial police to maintain order and security.

To make these reforms possible, it is imperative that the vicious system of military governors, with their standing armies totaling over 1,300,000 men, should be abolished as speedily as possible; that China should be absolutely free from all foreign interference and intrigues; and that the development of national resources and trade should proceed rapidly through the national ownership and control of railways, mines, and public utilities with the coöperation of Chinese banks, merchants, and commercial associations,

in order that the state may have an adequate income and the masses steady employment.

The reconstruction of China is, however, impossible save by and through the Chinese people themselves. The question is too big, the territory and its resources too vast, and the population too enormous for any plan to succeed that is not based on native institutions and executed by the natives themselves. The day of European exploitation is past. The problem is not one of international concessions and partitions, but rather a vital matter of constructive statesmanship whereby a great nation may save itself from destruction and the world from an international conflict.

Fortunately, the motive power is there, and in sufficient strength to meet the needs of the emergency. The Chinese nation is awake to the dangers of the situation and anxious to work out its own salvation. It only awaits the right leadership. Driven on by the necessity of self-preservation, racial pride in their civilization, institutions, and national powers, and a just ambition to see China a strong state and taking her place among the leading nations, the Chinese people will soon provide the sinews of power to effect the reconstruction of their own state. A new national spirit is being born. The beginnings of a national consciousness were created by the intrigues of the Japanese and of their own political and military leaders, by the Republican movement, and by the agitation over the Shantung question. And it has spread rapidly over the whole country till the desire for national unity, peace, and security has become nation-wide.

It is only a question of time before the great leviathan will right itself, and start on a straightforward course toward its goal. The men, the power, and the elements of machinery are all there. It only remains to unite them so as

to produce continuous motion. In the first place, there is the great asset of the Chinese character. In brain power, the Chinese take high rank among the nations of the world, while in the power of industry they are unequaled. They are by nature as cheerful, patient, persevering, and tenacious as they are productive, peace-loving, and democratic. There is no good reason why a nation of over three hundred million, which has already demonstrated its intelligence and creative ability in many ways, should not in time produce a stable government of a high order, suited to its own needs, ideals, and customs.

In the second place, China is commercially solvent and sound. It could easily have a large income from its foreign trade, which now amounts to only \$2.50 per capita and would double at once if it equaled that of Australia, is developing steadily in spite of the existing chaotic political conditions, and is capable of an enormous expansion; and the undeveloped national resources are tremendous, while its economic development has only just begun. Moreover, when the moment arrives for the permanent establishment of an efficient and representative central administration, the financial and commercial institutions of the country are fully capable of providing the funds necessary to set the government on its feet financially. If further loans are needed for a time to establish the new régime firmly in the saddle, there is the foreign consortium ready to lend China such sums as may be essential to the execution of such a project. Industry is still in its infancy, although coming along apace in several lines, and labor is unlimited.

Again, the existing provincial, local, and municipal political institutions are in every way suited to form the basis for a nation-wide representative political organization. They have been in use for decades, are essentially democratic, are suited to the Chinese character, and under-

stood by the people. In some provinces, such as Shensi, the provincial and local governments are working admirably; and, with some readjustments, including the removal or resignations of military governors, there is no reason why all the provinces could not be efficiently administered. This once accomplished, it would then be possible to organize a full-fledged central government from the bottom up. The great error, heretofore, in the attempt to form a republic has been that the Chinese leaders have started all their plans for national organization from the top down, and — what is even more short-sighted and disastrous — without securing in advance the support and coöperation of all sections of the country. If, however, the provincial governments were all thoroughly reorganized and made efficient, and these units combined in a patriotic and whole-hearted manner to set up a representative, democratic central government on principles acceptable to all, an efficient national administration would soon be forthcoming.

Moreover, in each province, there is already in existence the machinery for a practical and efficient local administration along democratic lines. There are powerful merchant guilds, commercial associations, boards of trade, patriotic organizations, and intelligent bankers and citizens ready to lend a hand, not only to assist in the establishment of such a democratic government, but also to support the movement for a national organization through the work and coöperation of the provincial administrations. And in every province, city, and town, there is a new and genuine movement for popular government. The idea of a Chinese Republic has captured the imagination of the people; and they are determined to have their own government, albeit they do not understand clearly the fundamental principles of self-rule or just how it is to be successfully applied. Yet

their leaders realize fully the mistakes of the first years of the Republic; and they understand clearly that China must build up her own institutions in her own way and to suit her own needs, that these institutions must be democratic, and that the new movement must carry with it the whole Chinese people and interest itself in the social welfare of the laboring, industrial, and agricultural classes, and in the emancipation of women.

Finally, the basis for a great national life and unity is being steadily laid economically, commercially, intellectually, and politically. Several excellent railways have been built; and it would not take long, if peace and good government prevailed, to complete a set of national trunk railroads connecting all parts of the country. The trade of the land is developing rapidly in spite of commercial and political handicaps. Flour mills and factories of various sorts — owned and operated by Chinese — are multiplying on every hand. Ancient cities have been transformed into splendid modern municipalities with paved streets, electric cars, public utilities, and efficient police. Colleges and universities have been opened — in addition to the permits to foreign educational institutions and mission schools. Great progress is being made in medical and social sciences. A literary revolution is in progress to bring about the translation of Chinese classical literature into the vernacular, to effect the use of the vernacular in all modern writings, to standardize the dialects of the country, and to make the study of language easy by means of a simplified phonetic alphabet of thirty-nine letters; and an effort is on foot to create a nation-wide educational system; while, in some provinces, much has been done already toward providing public school education for the masses. To accomplish all this, a tremendous amount of work and organization is essential to success. But the Chinese people, if given time

and a free hand, will prove equal to the emergency. If outside assistance proves necessary, China may call upon the experts of all lands and peoples at a moment's notice. "Watchman! What of the night?" "The Night has been long. But lo! the new day dawns."

CHAPTER XIV

THE RISE OF JAPAN

OFF the eastern shore of Asia, and extending in a great arc from the waters of Kamchatka and the Gulf of Tartary twenty-five hundred miles southward to the Straits of Formosa, lies a remarkable series of islands. There are over four hundred of some importance, and various estimates set the entire number between three thousand and forty-two hundred. All these islands have been united in a great island empire — one of the leading powers of the world — known as the “Empire of the Rising Sun.” This Nipponese Empire — founded by the people of Nippon, or Hondo, the greatest of the islands — hedges off the greater part of the Chinese seaboard from the Pacific Ocean, and occupies the same position relative to Asia that the British Isles do to Europe. As at present constituted, it is composed — in addition to the two mainland dependencies of Korea and the Kwangtung Peninsula — of five island groups: i.e., the Kurile Islands and Karafuto (the Japanese half of the island of Sakhalin), the four principal islands of Hokkaido or Yezo, Nippon or Hondo, Shikoku, and Kiushiu with their numerous island dependencies, the Riukiu or Luchu Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and the Bonin and Sulphur Islands. To these have been added recently by mandate from the League of Nations the Caroline (including Yap), Marshall, and Mariana or Ladrone Islands (except Guam), which formerly belonged to Germany.

The area of the Japanese Empire is about 260,700¹ square miles; but it sustains an enormous population of

¹ Or approximately 261,500 square miles with the mandatory islands; Texas has just under 265,900.

nearly 80,000,000.¹ Its outstanding features, in addition to the number and intelligence of its citizens, include a splendid strategic position, a singular lack of natural resources, and a powerful oligarchic but constitutional government. Its heart lies in the four principal islands of which Nippon or Hondo is the chief, and which contain all of the large cities, one third of the area and more than one half of the population of the Nipponese state. These islands are volcanic in origin and so mountainous in structure that scarcely one sixth of the land surface is suitable for cultivation. Fortunately, where agriculture is possible, the soil is unusually fertile and produces rich crops of rice, wheat, barley, rye, and tea; and fishing is one of the great industries of the country. Yet a steadily increasing percentage of the food of the inhabitants has to be imported.² A fair supply of coal, copper, sulphur, lead, zinc, antimony, and a small amount of iron ore and petroleum are found in the mountains; but the islands are by no means rich in minerals.

Among the island dependencies of the Empire, the largest is Formosa — a long and beautiful island whose mountain districts are still inhabited by wild and warlike native peoples. Its area is 13,911 square miles; and it was ceded, together with the neighboring Pescadores, to Japan by China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. The

¹ Including Kwangtung and mandates it was very close to 78,000,000 in 1920. Now, without them, it is about 79,500,000 according to the estimated population of Japan proper on September 1, 1923.

² "If the average Japanese only ate as much rice to-day as he did in 1910-14, the production of rice in Japan would be sufficient to feed the population without the large imports of foreign rice which have been steadily increasing." (C. C. Batchelder in *Annals of American Academy*, March, 1924, p. 264; article entitled "Economic Pressure as a Cause of the Revolt of Asiatic Peoples against Occidental Exploitation.") The net imports of foods *per capita* in Japan are about seventy-five cents per year; those of the United States (not net) are eight to ten dollars *per capita*; but the Japanese do not import all kinds of luxurious foods from distant lands as do the Americans.

Kurile Islands — some thirty-one in number containing 6068 square miles of territory and annexed by Japan in 1875 — extend northward from the principal islands to the Sea of Okhotsk; and the Riukiu Islands — fifty-five in number with an area of 941 square miles and acquired by Japan in 1876 — form a connecting link between the main islands and Formosa. The small Ogasawarajima or Bonin Islands (including the Sulphur Islands) are an insignificant group of tropical and volcanic islands — twenty in number — lying in the Pacific Ocean about five hundred miles south-east from Yokohama. They were the source of considerable diplomatic discussion, and acquired by Japan when Great Britain relinquished her claims in 1861; but most of them met with a tragic fate in the great earthquake of 1923. The southern half of the island of Sakhalin — called Karafuto by the Japanese and embracing a territory of 13,253 square miles — was ceded to Japan by Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. After the fall of the Romanov dynasty, the other half of the island was occupied by Japan on the ground of the Nicolaievsk massacre and the general unsettled conditions in the north. And the Japanese retained the whole island till 1925, although they withdrew their troops from Siberia after the Washington Conference.¹ The mandatory island groups are chiefly valuable for their strategic position, for altogether they contain only nine hundred and sixty square miles of territory and about sixty thousand inhabitants. The Ladrone Islands lie directly between Hawaii and the Philippines. Through them via Guam passes the submarine cable to Manila; and at the Island of Yap the main submarine cables branch to Shanghai and to the Dutch East Indies. The Marshall and Caroline Islands, lying north of New

¹ In the Russo-Japanese Treaty of January 20, 1925, it was provided that northern Sakhalin was to be evacuated by May, 1925.

Guinea and extending over two thousand miles westward into the Pacific, not only offer opportunities for coaling stations and naval bases, but also make Japan a factor of no mean importance in the affairs of Oceanica.

The chief mainland dependency is Korea or Chosen, which was annexed to the Empire in the year 1910.¹ This district contains 84,738 square miles or about one third of the total area of the Empire. The native population numbers over seventeen million or about one fifth of the population of the Empire. In spite of a decade of Japanese control there were only about 367,600 Japanese in Korea in the year 1920.² Korea is a valuable adjunct of industrial Japan. More than ten million acres are under cultivation, the chief products being rice, wheat, cotton, hemp, and ginseng. Gold, coal, and iron are found in the mountains. The second mainland dependency of the Empire is a leased territory on the Kwangtung Peninsula. It consists of Port Arthur, Ta-lien-wan, and the adjacent territories and waters, which Russia had leased³ from China and transferred to Japan at the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, together with the South Manchurian railway between Port Arthur and Changchun and the coal mines along its right of way. Dairen, formerly called Dalny, the chief port of this region, provides a mainland seaport free from ice throughout the entire year. Technically, the Kwangtung Peninsula is under the sovereignty of China and cannot be classed legally as a part of the Nipponese Empire. But for all practical purposes Dairen and Port Arthur are Japanese possessions, as much as Seoul or Chemulpo, and form strategic outposts in the Nipponese imperial system. The

¹ See Chapter XV.

² *Résumé Statistique de l'Empire du Japon: Bureau de la Statistique Générale* (Tokio: 1923), pp. 164-65.

³ Japan secured an extension of this twenty-five-year lease to ninety-nine years in 1915.

area of the leased territory is 1220 square miles and the population is nearly 700,000, of whom only 82,145 were Japanese in the year 1921.¹

The Japanese Empire possesses both the strength and the weakness of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In each case there is an island state economically dependent upon the resources of other lands. In each country there is a large industrial population dependent upon the importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, and striving to work out its national destiny through foreign markets, colonial expansion, and sea power, both commercial and naval. But the Nipponese sources of economic supply and their colonial, military, and naval outposts are much nearer the homeland than those of the British Empire. The English are dependent on wheat from Canada, beef from Argentina, oil seeds from West Africa and India, wool from Australia, and cotton from Egypt and the United States; but the Japanese have a great storehouse of supplies, within a stone's throw as it were, on the mainland of Asia. And an admirable system of steamships and railways keeps Japan in constant touch with her dependencies, her manifold economic concessions, and the great markets on that continent.

The Elder Statesmen of the Nipponese Empire early grasped the full significance of Japan's dependency upon Asia for her economic and commercial life; and they realized clearly the danger of permitting any European power to dominate any part of the Asiatic mainland in the vicinity of the Nipponese islands. But they went one step farther: to make sure that no other power would use the mainland of Asia as a base of operations against Japan, and to make their hold upon the resources of the mainland doubly

¹ *The Japan Year-Book* (1923, ed. Y. Takenobu), pp. 698-99. These figures do not include Japanese garrisons stationed in the Peninsula. Compare *Résumé Statistique de l'Empire du Japon: Bureau de la Statistique Générale* (Tokio: 1923), pp. 164-65.

secure, the Elder Statesmen inaugurated a policy of economic expansion and annexation. The logical outcomes of this program were the expulsion of China from Korea, the Russo-Japanese War, the annexation of Korea, and the drive for economic concessions and leased territory in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shantung. The greatest factor in the Nipponese successes, and the one that really made possible the execution of this foreign policy, was the establishment of an efficient and powerful administration, accompanied by the transformation of Japan from a weak and isolated feudal community into a strong and well-organized modern state; for, while the population of the principal islands rose from approximately 33,100,000 in 1872 to 56,000,000 in 1921, the little island kingdom of some 140,000 square miles of territory expanded into the great Empire of the Rising Sun with its 260,000 square miles of valuable lands.

To understand the full significance of this transformation and the means whereby it was effected, one must recall to mind something of the early history and development of the Japanese people, the conditions prevalent in their country before 1870, and the salient features both of their racial character and of the political organization of their state. In the first place, it should be noted that nearly all the intellectual culture of Japan came originally from China and Korea. Buddhism reached Nippon in 522 A.D., coming by way of China. Even the Japanese script was borrowed from China; and, under the influence of Chinese scholars and artists, the literature, painting, and sculpture of the Nipponese had their birth and early development. The Japanese people — a sturdy and virile race — although they possess the power of imitation in a very high degree, have produced an art and literature of their own, artists of the first rank and workers the skill of whose fingers is

unsurpassed. Frugal, obedient, strong of body, and alert of mind, they have served their country and their Emperor with an unselfish devotion and an unparalleled enthusiasm. But, in spite of many admirable qualities, their ambition, their love of secrecy and intrigue, their high-strung temperament, their low standard of commercial integrity, and their willingness to descend to any depths to serve country and Emperor, have led them into many political errors and made them unpopular in the world at large. No Oriental race is as little understood to-day.

Nevertheless, throughout the mediæval age, Japan remained politically detached from the life and thought of the Asiatic continent, and knew nothing at all of Europe. It was not till 1542 that the Portuguese — the first Europeans to thread the mighty Pacific — reached the shores of Japan. But, although Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British traders conducted a profitable commerce with the islanders during the latter half of the sixteenth century, and some three hundred thousand natives with several of the local feudal lords were won over to Catholicism,¹ the first experience of the Nipponese in opening intercourse with Occidentals proved most unfortunate and ended suddenly in a most tragic fashion. Incensed at the continued fanaticism of the Jesuits in inciting attacks upon Buddhists bonzes (priests) and temples, the reprehensible conduct of European sailors and traders and the opposition of Christian daimyo to the ruling Tokugawa family, the Shogun Iyeyasu issued an edict suppressing Christianity in 1614. Between 1624 and 1638 all foreign traders were banished from the country; and a terrible massacre of native Christians under the ban of rebels occurred at Shimabara in 1638. And, finally, after conniving at the murder

¹ The basis of this work was laid by that great apostle of Catholic missions to "the Indies," Saint Francis Xavier (1506-52).

of four Portuguese ambassadors who came from Macao to sue for the reopening of intercourse, the Yedo Shogun flung abroad a defiant insult to the Christian world. "So long as the sun warms the earth," read his tablet over the heads of the executed, "let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians or the great Shaka, contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads!"¹

For two hundred years this policy of exclusion was rigidly enforced. Europeans were banished from Japan on pain of death, and Japanese were not only forbidden to leave the coasts of their country, but, if they did succeed in reaching a foreign port, they were liable to be executed on their return. In the nineteenth century, however, the seclusion of the Land of the Rising Sun was broken at last. The whaling industry off the coast of Alaska brought Russian and American vessels within sight of the Japanese islands. Shipwrecked sailors were sometimes cast upon the shore; and Japanese fishermen were occasionally swept along the "Black Current" to the Aleutian Islands, or even to California. In 1837, the American ship Morrison entered Uraga Bay in an attempt to return some of these castaways, but, when fired upon, proceeded to Canton without landing her charges. In 1846, the American Government dispatched Commodore Biddle with a man-of-war to Uraga Bay to ask the Emperor for trading privileges. Upon a refusal, he sailed away. Three years later, the commander of the American brig Preble by a show of firmness compelled the Japanese officials to release fourteen seamen confined in Japanese prisons.² Vessels

¹ James Murdock and Isoh Yamagata: *History of Japan during the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse, 1542-1651*, p. 667.

² *Report on Imprisoned American Seamen* (August 28, 1850). Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, August 15, 1850. House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. no. 84, 31st Congress, 1st session.

from England, France, and Holland touched at various ports for the purpose of rescuing shipwrecked sailors and obtaining supplies; and the King of Holland sent a letter through the Dutch traders at Deshima to the Mikado advising him to abandon the policy of isolation and to open the ports of Japan.

The whaling interests of the United States being thus inconvenienced by the failure of Japan to permit the return of shipwrecked sailors and to offer shelter and supplies to vessels in distress, Daniel Webster, then the American Secretary of State, inaugurated a vigorous policy in 1851 for the purpose of opening Japan to foreign intercourse.¹ As a result, Commodore Perry in command of a squadron of four warships was sent two years later with a letter from the United States to the Emperor of Japan asking for a commercial treaty and the opening of Japanese ports.²

Upon the arrival of Commodore Perry in Uruga Bay, the Shogun was sorely perplexed. A council of feudal lords was called, prayers offered at the shrines and temples, and the Imperial Court ordered the Shogun to drive the Americans away. The warlike daimyo were eager to undertake an assault, but, through the firmness and tact of Commodore Perry, the hesitation of the Shogun, and the curiosity of the Japanese people, who were impressed by the sight of the largest vessels and the first steamship ever seen in Nipponese waters, and the great variety of presents including a miniature locomotive of one fourth size, with tender and passenger cars capable of running at

¹ Compare his instructions to Commodore Aulick on June 10, 1851: Senate, Ex. Doc. no. 59, 32d Congress, 1st session, pp. 80, 81.

² Senate, Ex. Doc. no. 34, 33d Congress, 2d session, p. 9. The official account of this expedition was edited by Francis L. Hawks, as *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry* (House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. no. 97, 33d Congress, 2d session).

great speed on a circular track, as well as a mile of magnetic telegraph, the opposition was overcome and negotiations begun. Thus the barriers of Japanese isolation were let down, and on March 31, 1854, the first treaty with the hermit Nipponese state was signed.¹ This agreement, however, merely opened two Japanese ports, Shimoda and Nagasaki, in order that American ships might obtain there wood, water, provisions, and coal, and permitted shipwrecked sailors to travel through Japan to those ports.

Holland, Russia, and England shared in the fruits of the American success, and speedily negotiated treaties with Japan similar to that of Commodore Perry. But none of these treaties permitted that commercial intercourse with the Nipponese which was the first essential in the development of a lucrative trade with the islands. It remained for another American citizen to open the doors of Japan to the trade of the world. In 1856, Townsend Harris, an able and traveled merchant from New York, was commissioned by the President of the United States as Consul to Japan. He possessed linguistic ability, was courteous, patient, shrewd, and alert, and had gained considerable knowledge of Oriental life as a trader in China. At Shimoda, the Japanese assigned a temple for his residence; and in 1857, he succeeded in negotiating a commercial treaty² which permitted American citizens to reside at Shimoda and Hakodate, and to trade at Nagasaki.

After much importunity, he received permission to deliver a letter from the President of the United States to the Shogun, representative of the Emperor.³ Thereupon,

¹ William M. Malloy, *Treaties* (Senate, Ex. Doc. no. 357, 61st Congress, 2d session), I, pp. 996-998.

² Malloy's *Treaties*, I, pp. 998-1000.

³ An account of these difficult negotiations, based upon Harris's private journals, is given by William E. Griffis: *Townsend Harris, First American Envoy in Japan* (Boston: 1895), chs. VIII-XV.

the American Consul and his suite were conducted along a road, where thousands of Japanese stood by the wayside silently watching the strangers, to the audience chamber of the Shogun in Tokio where Harris won the admiration of the Japanese by his ability to stand upright and look the great Shogun in the eye during the ceremony.

After this diplomatic success, Consul Harris urged upon the Ministers of the Shogun a more comprehensive commercial treaty; and in 1858, a new treaty was signed, which substituted the more suitable port of Kanagawa for Shimoda as a place for American trade, and opened in addition Osaka.¹ American citizens were granted the right to trade and reside in these open ports, and were exempted from the judicial jurisdiction of Japan. Finally, it was agreed that an American Minister might be sent to Tokio and a Japanese Minister to Washington. And this agreement of 1858 marks the formal opening of Japan to international commerce; for in the same year, shortly after the signing of Harris's treaty, Lord Elgin, who had just succeeded in compelling the Chinese to sign the Treaty of Tientsin,² appeared in Japan, and negotiated a similar convention with the Shogun. Soon after France, Holland, and Russia concluded like accords.³ The Japanese commemorated the landing of Commodore Perry by the erection of a granite plinth on the pine-clad shore of Uraga or Mississippi Bay, and the service of Townsend Harris in a graceful monument at Kanagawa.

The establishment of diplomatic and commercial rela-

¹ Malloy's *Treaties*, I, pp. 1000-10; *The Japanese Treaties, Concluded at Jedo in 1858 with the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain, the United States and France* (The Hague: 1862), pt. iv.

² See Chapter XIII.

³ *British and Foreign State Papers* (1857-58), XLVIII, pp. 28-38; *The Japanese Treaties, Concluded at Jedo in 1858 with the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and France* (The Hague: 1862), pt. III.

tions with Japan had been seriously impeded by the existence of a dual system of government in that country. For twelve centuries, beginning with the rise of the Fujiwara family in 670 A.D., the sacred Emperor had been only the nominal ruler of Japan. The real masters were the Shoguns or military governors, who never usurped the imperial throne, but administered the government in the name of the Emperor. Since 1603, the Shogunate had been in the hands of the powerful Tokugawa family; but, at the time of Commodore Perry's visit, the Tokugawa régime was on the decline. The powerful daimyo or military clan leaders chafed under the restraint of the Tokio Government; while the new school of philosophers at Mito urged the abolition of the Shogunate and the restoration of the imperial power. The arrival of the foreigners produced a crisis in Japanese national life, for the question of the treatment of the foreigners who so persistently demanded trade agreements precipitated a contest between the Imperial Court and the Shogunate, the Shogun at Tokio favoring intercourse with foreign states and the Mikado's Court at Kioto bitterly opposing it.

At length, a powerful group of disgruntled daimyo openly backed the Emperor as against the Shogun and bitterly demanded the expulsion of all foreigners. The Shogun was thus in an awkward position. On the one hand, he was importuned by the persistent representatives of the Occidental powers and by those Japanese who desired international trade, and, on the other hand, he was threatened by the feudal lords and high-spirited knights or samurai who appealed to the Imperial Court at Kioto. The "barbarian expelling" party sought to embroil the Shogun with the foreign powers by making murderous assaults upon foreigners. In July, 1861, a band of ruffians attacked the British Legation and nearly made away with

the Minister.¹ Other attacks followed, including the Richardson affair a year later, in which four English citizens, one of them a lady, were set upon by the retinue of the Daimyo of Satsuma, one being killed.²

The Yedo Government made an apology and paid an indemnity, but it was not powerful enough to compel the Daimyo to surrender his vassals for punishment.³ A British squadron thereupon proceeded to Kagoshima, the capital of Satsuma, bombarded the port and soon brought the Daimyo to terms.⁴ In the meantime, the "barbarian expelling" party had extracted a promise from the Emperor, unknown to the Shogun, that in May, 1863, the foreigners should be expelled. Acting on this policy, the Daimyo of Choshu, whose batteries commanded the strait at Shimonoseki, opened fire upon foreign vessels passing through these waters. In reply, the four powers, Great Britain, France, Holland, and America, sent a squadron in September, 1864, which demolished the forts of the Daimyo, destroyed his ships, and drove back his samurai; and eventually the Yedo Government was obliged to assume an indemnity of three million dollars which could not be collected from Choshu.⁵

The disasters at Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, far from alienating the reactionary party in Japan, seemed to reconcile many of the extremists to the presence of the foreigners

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1862), *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Japan*, H. C. 2929.

² They failed to show proper respect by dismounting from their horses and kneeling in the dust. It does not appear, as is frequently asserted, that Richardson's party attempted to cross the road in front of the procession. They had drawn up to one side of the road. (*Brit. Parl. Papers* (1863), *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Japan*, H. C. 3079, pp. 73-81.)

³ *Ibid.*, H. C. 3242.

⁴ *Ibid.*, H. C. 3242, pp. 90-101, 114-17; H. C. 3303.

⁵ *United States Foreign Affairs* (1863), pt. II, pp. 1039-60; (1864), pt. III, pp. 542-88.

and to incite a desire to study and adopt Western methods. At the same time the antagonism toward the Shogunate increased. In 1865, when Sir Harry Parkes took charge of the British Legation in Yedo, he found that the Shogunate was thoroughly discredited throughout the country and that the time was ripe for a direct appeal to the Emperor for the ratification of the treaties.¹ At the same time, the British wished the Japanese Government to reduce the customs duty from fifteen to five per cent ad valorem and to open immediately the ports of Hiogo and Osaka. To impress the Mikado and precipitate the new policy, Sir Harry proposed to the diplomatic corps at Yedo that the combined navies of the powers proceed to Osaka in the vicinity of the Emperor's palace at Kioto.² After a naval display before Osaka, the appeal was successful. The Emperor ratified the treaties, the ports were opened, and the tariff was reduced.³

The humiliation of the Shogun was complete. In 1867, Yoshinobu received a memorial addressed to him by certain powerful daimyo who urged him in the interest of good government to resign. The Shogun acceded to this advice, and his resignation was placed in the hands of the Emperor on October 14, 1867. This action of Yoshinobu, in the words of Captain Frank Brinkley, "deserves to rank among the most memorable incidents of the world's history, for such a sacrifice has seldom been made by any ruler in the interests of his nation."⁴ And this voluntary surrender of autocratic powers cleared the way not only for better

¹ Compare Stanley Lane-Poole: *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes* (London: 1894), II, pp. 168-71.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers* (1866), *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Japan*, 1865-66, H. C. 3615, pp. 63-80.

³ *British and Foreign State Papers* (1867-68), LVII, pp. 317-33.

⁴ Captain Frank Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi: *History of the Japanese People* (London: 1915), p. 678.

diplomatic relations between Japan and the powers, but also for a phenomenal national development.

Immediately the reorganization and centralization of the Japanese Government under the Emperor Mutsuhito was undertaken by a brilliant group of leaders of comparatively humble origin. Only Prince Iwakura, Prince Sanjo, and Prince Tokudaiji were court nobles. The remainder were samurai or feudal retainers of the influential clans: Saigo and Okubo were samurai of Satsuma; Kido, Ito, Inouye, and Yamagata represented the Choshu; Okuma and Sayejima, the Hizen; and Itagaki, the Tosa clan. The first undertaking of the new régime was the appointment of a council modeled somewhat on the ancient council of the seventh century. There was a Jingikan or Minister of Religion and a Danjokan or Prime Minister. Under the latter were six Ministers, charged with the affairs of the Imperial Dynasty, Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Justice, and Home Affairs. The capital was removed from Kyoto to Yedo or Tokio, where the Mikado took up his residence in the palace of the Shogun. The Mikado no longer remained strictly in seclusion, but rode in the streets openly to show his face to his subjects and to receive their reverent homage. Finally, on April 6, 1868, the Mikado issued a proclamation — later called the “Charter Oath of Five Articles”¹ — in which the Emperor, announcing that “We shall abolish old uncivilized customs and walk in the great and just ways of Heaven,” and “we shall seek knowledge in the four quarters of the globe to promote the welfare of the Empire,” promised deliberative assemblies and the representation of all classes in the work of reform.

¹ The text of this document is given in *Japanese Government Documents*, edited by W. W. McLaren, in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (Yokohama: 1914), XLII, pt. 1, p. 8.

"The great clans which took part in bringing about this restoration of the administrative power to the Emperor did not altogether trust one another," writes Captain Frank Brinkley. "Hitherto, all political commotions had been planned for the sake of some prominent family or eminent leader, and had resulted merely in altering the personnel of those occupying the seats of power. It was not unnatural that history should have been expected to repeat itself in 1867, especially since the clan mainly responsible, Satsuma, overshadowed all its associates with one exception. Therefore, to many onlookers it seemed that the Tokugawa Government had been overthrown to make room for the all-powerful southern feudatory. In order to provide a safeguard against such a danger, the young Emperor was asked to make oath that a broadly based deliberative assembly should be convoked for the purpose of conducting state affairs in conformity with public opinion. This 'Coronation Oath,' as it was subsequently called, came to occupy an important place in political appreciation, and to be interpreted as a promise of a national assembly. But most assuredly it was not originally intended to carry any such meaning. Its framers never contemplated a parliament in the Occidental sense of the term. Their sole object was to place a barrier in the path of their own selfish ambitions."¹

The intentions of the Emperor were excellent and the determination of the clan leaders backed by an able and talented aristocracy unshakable; but the difficulties in the pathway of reconstruction were enormous, owing to the ancient and peculiar feudal organization of the Nipponese social system and state. The kuge, or court nobility,

¹ Captain Frank Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi: *History of the Japanese People*, pp. 679-80. Compare G. E. Uyehara: *Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909* (London: 1910), pp. 56-57.

ranking next to the Emperor and with a lineage dating from the earliest times and represented by one hundred and fifty-five families, held by hereditary right all the offices of the Imperial Court at Kioto. Below the kuge came the numerous military aristocracy of the samurai — the sword-carriers. These knights were undoubtedly, as Captain Brinkley claims, the finest type of hereditary soldiers the world has ever produced. They were proud, sensitive people, passionately attached to their “bushido” or ethical code; and many were men of refinement and learning. Their leaders were the holders of the great and small feudal estates under the Tokugawa Shogunate, and the rulers of the great clans or daimyo — powerful feudal lords with independent control over large districts. The third and most numerous class was the heimin or common people, who were farmers, artisans, or traders. All the menial work and the degrading tasks, such as slaughtering animals and burying the dead, were performed by the slaves or serfs, who were divided into two classes: the eta or defiled folks and the hinin or outcasts.

Nothing short of a thoroughgoing revolution could transform a feudal organization such as this into a modern constitutional state. Fortunately, there was a fever of patriotism and loyalty abroad in the land in 1869–71; and the rulers of the great clans were filled with a rare spirit of self-sacrifice. Four of the chief southern clans — Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen — surrendered their fiefs voluntarily to the Emperor, and petitioned him to organize a new state under his own central authority. Out of two hundred and fifty feudatories only seventeen failed to follow their example promptly; and the majority of the samurai showed their loyalty to the sovereign by supporting the reforms and accepting a reduction in their incomes. On August 29, 1871, feudalism was abolished; and on

October 12th of the same year, serfdom was done away with — the status of the eta and hinin being raised to that of the heimin or commoners. The distinction between court and territorial nobility was removed; all officials were henceforth to be appointed and paid by the Imperial Government; and the feudal leaders became governors of the prefectures and districts over which they had previously ruled. The chiefs of the four greatest clans were appointed members of the Emperor's Cabinet, in which each of these clans was given three representatives; and the four hundred thousand samurai were confirmed in their ancient positions and rights under hereditary but reduced pensions — the feudatories to reside in Tokio and to receive one tenth of their original incomes.

As the reforms proceeded, however, the samurai suffered more and more — particularly from the financial difficulties encountered by the new régime. Many voluntarily gave up their privileges and their swords, retiring into private life or various occupations. With the formation of a national army through the bringing of the feudatory forces to Tokio and the conscription of the masses, many others were deprived of their military livelihood. Yet they bore everything with a good grace and high-spirited loyalty — even the commuting of their hereditary pensions to reduced life pensions in 1873. But, when in 1876 the right of sword-wearing was taken from them and the old order abolished, it was too much. The samurai of Satsuma took the lead under the direction of Takamori Saigo in a widespread insurrection against the new order of things, which was only put down in 1877 by the national army after a bitter struggle. But this Satsuma Rebellion was the only serious obstacle encountered by the reformers; and it marks the end of the old system of local autonomy and class supremacy.

The transition from feudal government to bureaucratic rule under the direction of the clan chieftains was but a temporary makeshift at best, and only the first step in the development of a modern constitutional administration. The great problem was how to form a new government suited to the traditions and needs of the Nipponese people which would combine at the same time popular representation with the highest administrative efficiency; and it was highly imperative, for the success of whatever plan was adopted, that it should enlist the sympathy and coöperation of the different political groups, and be worked out gradually through a process of evolution. All were agreed that the position and power of the Emperor must be maintained, although it should be modified into some form of constitutional monarchy. But there the ways parted; and during the next quarter of a century, although there was a fair amount of coöperation in the organization of the administration and in the material development of the nation and its resources, a spirited conflict ensued between the great political leaders — each championing a different form of political organization.

Most of the gifted men who participated in the overthrow of feudalism and the restoration of the imperial power sooner or later traveled overseas to study the political, financial, and military systems of Europe and America. Ito and Inouye went as early as 1863; and Iwakura, Kido, Okubo, Yamagata, and Okuma in the seventies and early eighties; and they all returned, not only to engage vigorously in the work of reorganization and reconstruction, but also to launch patriotic movements in support of their own particular political and economic ideals. Takamori Saigo — the champion of bureaucracy — struggled to preserve the salient features of the old system till his downfall as leader of the Satsuma Insurrection. Toshimitsu Okubo

favoured the oligarchic rule of the intelligentsia of the clans. With his support, an assembly formed of the governors of the prefectures was created in 1874, and a senate nominated by the Emperor in 1875. After his assassination in 1878, elective assemblies were organized in the cities and prefectures. Meanwhile, Itagaki was waging a lively contest for a representative parliamentary system, and organized the first political party in Japan — known as the “Liberal Party.” Shigenobu Okuma — Minister of Finance — seceded from the ranks of the oligarchy in 1881, and formed the “Progressive Party” to secure the establishment of a national assembly and real constitutional government. This move elicited an imperial edict calling a national parliament in 1890; and finally, Marquis Ito came forward with a program advocating a reduction of armaments and taxes, the abolition of the bureaucracy, and the creation of a parliamentary government with cabinet responsibility to the National Diet. And he was the founder of the “Seiyu-kai” or Friends of the Constitution Party.

This long contest between the great leaders had a remarkable effect upon the development of political theories and institutions in Japan; for, it must be remembered, political parties in that country were not organized upon vital principles or platforms of political ideals, but about great personalities. The result has been that the control of affairs drifted into the hands of the so-called “Elder Statesmen,” and the imperial tradition has become a powerful influence in political circles, through the loyal perpetuation of the imperial prerogatives and the development of Emperor worship. On the one hand, the power of appointing or dismissing a Ministry lies in the hands of the Emperor; but he does not exercise it without the advice of the Genro or Elder Statesmen. On the other hand, the

Ministers could not hold office without the approval of the Emperor — even though personal friends and members of the Genro. The Prince-Regent, Hirohito, is advised in all important matters, as his father and grandfather were before him, by this same body, which is an extra-legal authority, but the most powerful force in the Nipponese Government circles. The number of its members has gradually been reduced by death to one; but its influence is still dominant. Prime Ministers are still being appointed by the advice of the remaining statesman; and there is every indication that the institution will be preserved — new members being added from the ranks of the great clans and the military oligarchy on the death of the older men.

It is a remarkable fact that, while dynasties have come and gone in Europe and Asia and the race of kings has nearly disappeared from both continents, the Imperial House of Japan, with an unbroken succession of rulers from 400 B.C.,¹ still retains its deep hold upon the minds and hearts of the Nipponese race. This is due to the conservative and patriotic policy ever maintained by the imperial family and to the religious aspect of the imperial office, so intimately connected with the national religion — Shintoism — and ancestor worship, and so early inculcated into the racial and religious thought and ideals of the nation. In every Japanese house there is a Shinto altar in the form of a plain wooden shelf. "In the center of this sacred shelf," writes a distinguished professor of the Imperial University of Tokio, "is placed a Taima or 'great offering' which is part of the offerings made to the Daijingu of Ise, or temple dedicated to Amerteraru Omi-

¹ Jimmu-Tenno is supposed to have founded the Japanese Empire in 660 B.C., but the chronology of the Imperial House does not become authentic till 440 B.C.

Kami, the First Imperial Ancestor. The Taima is distributed from the Temple of Ise to every house in the Empire at the end of each year, and is worshiped by every loyal Japanese as the representation of the First Imperial Ancestor. On this altar, the offerings of rice, saké, and branches of the sakaki-tree are usually placed; and every morning the members of the household make reverential obeisance before it by clapping hands and bowing, while in the evening lights are also placed on the shelf."¹ And he concludes his discussion of this subject with this remark: "The worship of the Imperial Ancestor is the national worship."

In the Japanese mind, the Emperor not only embodies the Nipponese nation in his sacred person, but also is the source and soul of everything Japanese. He is the "Supreme Being in the Cosmos of Japan, as God is in the Universe to the pantheistic philosopher," writes Dr. G. E. Ueyhara. "From him everything emanates; in him everything subsists; there is nothing on the soil of Japan existent independent of him. He is the sole owner of the Empire, the author of law, justice, privilege, and honor, and the symbol of the unity of the Japanese nation. He has no pope or archbishop to crown him at his accession. He is supreme in all temporal affairs of the State as well as in all spiritual matters; and he is the foundation of Japanese social and civic morality."²

In drafting the constitution of 1889, Prince Ito — its distinguished author — wove skillfully this religious and all-embracing conception of imperial authority into the structure of the new government. "I can speak from personal knowledge," says Dr. N. Hozumi, "that the principal care of Prince Ito in preparing the draft of the Consti-

¹ Nobushige Hozumi: *Ancestor Worship and Japanese Law*, pp. 30-31.

² Ueyhara: *The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*, p. 23.

tution by command of his Sovereign was to reconcile and bring into harmony the traditional character of the government, based on the cult of the Imperial Ancestor, with the most advanced principles of modern constitutionalism.”¹ And we read in the constitution: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”; and again: “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”²

This imperial ideal, combined with the worship of their own ancestors, has inspired in the entire Nipponese nation a kind of mystic nationality and a religious devotion to the Emperor and the state, which is unequaled by any other form of patriotism. It has been a source of great uplift to the Japanese people; and to it, since the Nipponese believe that their ancestors as well as those of the Emperor descended from the gods, has been added the cult of the divine origin of the Japanese race. The natural corollary of this ideal is that the Nipponese imperial family and people must be superior to all other races and rulers on the face of the earth. Even when the Japanese gentleman discards his native dress for European costumes, he is painfully conscious of his claim to superiority. And he wants to impress this claim upon the world — particularly since it seems to be fully justified by the remarkable rapidity with which the young Japanese state rose to a position of first rank among the nations of the earth. Thus there has been created a peculiar national sensitiveness which has dominated the aspirations and the diplomacy of the Nip-

¹ Hozumi: *Ancestor Worship and Japanese Law*, p. 93.

² In his commentaries on the constitution Ito wrote: “The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred. He is preëminent above all His subjects. He must be revered and is inviolable. . . . Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor’s person, but also He shall not be made a topic of derogatory comment or discussion.” (*Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan* (Tokio: 1889), p. 6.)

ponese statesmen, and has made both rulers and people especially susceptible to criticism and over-quick to sense reflection upon their national honor and dignity — such as might be inferred from the recent alien exclusion legislation of the United States.

The constitution of 1889, after affirming the sacredness and inviolability of the Emperor, conferred upon him full sovereign powers with the right to exercise the functions of the chief executive through the advice and assistance of the Cabinet Ministers whom he appoints and who are responsible to him. He can declare war, conclude peace, and make treaties. He exercises legislative powers with the consent of the Imperial Diet; and it is his prerogative to convoke, open, close, and prorogue the Diet, and to dissolve the House of Representatives. All laws must have the sanction of the Diet; and it has also control over the finances. The Diet is composed of the Peers and the House of Representatives. The former is made up of hereditary peers including male members of the imperial family, princes and marquises, counts, viscounts and barons elected by their respective orders, men of education and distinguished service nominated by the Emperor, and representatives of the highest taxpayers elected by their own class — one from each prefecture. The number of members is now 394;¹ and the term of service is seven years for the elected members and life for the hereditary and nominated peers. The House of Representatives, numbering 464, is elected for four years by an indirect system of electoral districts in the incorporated cities and prefectures. Previous to the Manhood Suffrage Bill of 1925, voters had to be twenty-five years old, residents of their electoral districts, and had to pay yearly land or direct taxes of ten yen. As a result only one man in nine actually had a vote.

¹ *The Japan Year-Book*, 1923, p. 20.

The new law increases the electorate from three to fourteen millions and thereby promises an enormous democratization of the Japanese government.

As soon as this new government was safely set in operation — the Diet held its first session in November, 1890 — the Emperor and his advisers and assistants entered energetically upon the work of reconstruction which should place Japan intellectually, physically, politically, economically, financially, and commercially on a par with the other nations of the world. Already, with the creation of a Ministry of Finance and the abolition of the feudal administration and its methods, an admirable system of taxation and national finance had been constructed on a modern basis, a Bank of Japan (modeled upon the Bank of Belgium) founded, and the coinage system revised. As early as 1869, the Government had inaugurated plans for railway construction and a short line from Tokio to Yokohama, which was opened in 1872 to traffic. In 1870, a national postal service was established; and the Department of Public Works commenced the erection of a long series of public utilities — beginning with the telegraph in 1871 — including waterworks, drainage and sanitary systems, street railways, electric light and gas plants, public buildings and charitable institutions, and — in 1890 — telephones. And, since both private capital and private initiative were lacking, the imperial authorities began at an early date to encourage and subsidize corporations so that factories were founded, mines opened, and the work of exploiting the resources of the country begun in earnest. Not the least important of these activities was the subsidizing of a merchant marine with remarkable results. At the opening of the “Meiji era” — i.e., in 1868 — the Japanese ships were all small junks unsuited both in size and construction for ocean service; but by the end of the

nineteenth century, Japan possessed 1441 modern steam vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 610,446 tons.¹

As soon as the work of reconstruction was well launched, commissions were sent abroad to study the educational, military, judicial, and industrial institutions of foreign countries, and the assistance of hundreds of alien experts was eagerly sought by the Imperial Government. Whatever was best and the most suited to Japanese needs — whether American, British, German, or French — was brought to Japan and given a fair trial; and the progress of the whole movement was remarkable, in spite of the many difficulties to be overcome and the mistakes committed. Nowhere were the results more astonishing than in the field of education.² In 1869, a Department of Education was created. Three years later, the Educational Law was promulgated ordering compulsory education with the intent that “all people high and low, and of both sexes, should receive education, so that there should not be found one family in the whole Empire, nor one member of a family, ignorant and illiterate.” It was planned to divide the country into eight educational districts — each to establish one university, thirty-two secondary schools, and 6720 elementary schools;³ normal and technical schools were soon established; and the Imperial University at

¹ In 1860 the imports of Japan were £198,000 sterling, while 103 merchant vessels of 40,905 tons entered the port of Yokohama. In 1923, the imports had increased to £198,706,000 sterling and the exports to £144,774,000, while in the previous year 13,910 merchant ships of 35,626,000 tons burden cleared Japanese ports in one year.

² In his account of the *National Education in the Meiji Era*, the Marquis Saionji pays high tribute to the work of American educators, particularly that of Dr. David Murray, who was employed by the Japanese Government to develop the educational system of the country. See Count Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London: 1909), II, pp. 161-74.

³ This plan was premature and had to be recast; and it is doubtful if all the primary schools, at least, were established. See *Japan Year-Book*, 1923, p. 197.

Tokio opened its doors in 1877. So thoroughly was this system of compulsory education applied that by 1903 over ninety-three per cent of all the children over six years of age were attending the public schools; and this percentage was increased to ninety-seven by 1907.

The reform of the army and navy and the awakening of a military and patriotic spirit in all classes of society was equally remarkable. Aritomo Yamagata — one of the greatest of Nipponese organizers — returning from a tour of Europe in 1870, convinced the Imperial Government that the old samurai military institutions must be abandoned in favor of a system of compulsory universal military service, modeled upon the systems in vogue in Europe. In 1872, the Law of Conscription was promulgated and the Departments of the Army and of the Navy established. With the aid of German instructors and British and French experts, Yamagata got his reforms into operation; and in a comparatively short time a new and admirable army and navy were created. At first it was feared that it would be impossible to develop the bravery and hardihood of the hereditary samurai in the common soldiery recruited from the masses. But ere long Yamagata was able to boast that the bushido spirit prevailed throughout the new organization;¹ and the new army — well-trained and equipped — soon showed its mettle in overwhelming the Chinese forces in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and again in defeating the hosts of Russia in 1904-05. Meanwhile, after purchasing a few warships from Holland and being presented with a modern man-of-war by Queen Victoria,

¹ The fortitude and hardihood of the Japanese troops has been one of the surprises of the century. Europeans were astonished at the endurance and patience of the Nipponese soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War, and at the zeal with which they fought. In no other country is patriotism and loyalty to the ruler more passionately a part of the soldier's life and religion.

the Imperial Government erected drydocks at Nagasaki and Yokosuka, built an iron foundry at Yokohama, and began to construct its own naval vessels; and in a little over fifty years, it had developed the third largest navy in the world, and emerged triumphantly from one of the greatest naval conflicts of history in 1905.

The Japanese people in their contact with the Occident were more impressed by the grandeur of the material prosperity of Western states than by any other single feature of European civilization. Their intense dislike for all things foreign gradually gave way to admiration, if not to envy, and to the determination to acquire for themselves the same signs of wealth and progress; and, by dint of great exertion and skillful management, the great industrial revolution then in progress in the Western World was imitated successfully within the Nipponese Empire. The Imperial Government, as usual, took the lead in industrial matters, and encouraged the use of machinery by establishing workshops and factories. It was not long before machinery came to be used extensively in the production of raw silk, and labor-saving devices employed in a great number of industries, some of which were new to Japan, such as cotton and silk spinning and weaving, shipbuilding, various sorts of iron industries, gas plants, brick kilns, coal mines, breweries, sugar refineries, manufactories of cement, crockery, and glass, matches, paper of foreign style, india-rubber, paint and artificial fertilizers. In addition, the employment of Western methods and utensils, accompanied by the introduction of dyestuffs, pigments, the Western style of kiln and the gypsum mould and copper lithograph, imparted a powerful impulse to other forms of industry. In this way, Japan was gradually transformed into a great industrial state. The "volume of manufactured goods, which did not exceed 10,000,000 yen in 1890,

advanced to over 89,800,000 yen in 1902, an increase of about ninefold," states an official report in 1904.¹ "The total volume of our export goods of all descriptions advanced during the same period from 55,700,000 to 255,600,000 yen in round numbers; that is to say, more than fourfold."

In spite of all this organization and progress, the Japanese statesmen realized clearly that, before they could hope to see their nation on an equal footing with Western states, a system of justice founded upon modern jurisprudence must be established in the Nipponese Empire. A penal code based on that used in China was promulgated, a bureau of the Danjokan created for the study of European law, and a translation of the French codes authorized in 1870, with a view to developing national criminal and civil codes to replace the old feudal legal system. Finally, in 1890 a code of criminal procedure was promulgated (the penal code being revised in 1890 and again in 1908), and a civil code based upon French law was put into force in 1893. These were speedily followed by a code of civil procedure and a commercial code based on German law.

In all of its early treaties the Imperial Government had conceded extraterritorial rights to foreign powers. This was due to the unsettled conditions existing in the Empire at the time, and to the fact that there were no national courts of justice or imperial codes dealing with criminal or civil cases. Feudal law still prevailed; and there was little chance of foreigners getting justice or protection under that system. So the citizens and subjects of American and European states were placed instead under the jurisdiction of the consular courts of their own country, which were set up on Nipponese territory for that purpose. All alien

¹ *Japan in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* (Tokio: 1904), pp. 383-84.

offenders were brought before their own consuls for trial. So, too, were all cases of dispute between officers and crews involving crimes or wages or terms of service, civil suits between foreigners, and suits in which Japanese merchants and foreigners were parties. Moreover, special land concessions were made in the open ports, such as Kobe and Yokohama, whereby certain areas in those cities were transferred to the jurisdiction of foreign governments and on these were erected foreign warehouses, residences, shops, and consular offices and courts. As time went on, this situation became very irritating to the *amour propre* of the Japanese nation; for these extraterritorial rights were restrictions upon the sovereignty and independence of Nippon and were generally considered a mark of inferiority. Accordingly, as soon as the Nipponese statesmen had the organization of their new state well under way, they opened negotiations with foreign governments concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality in their country. European powers were, however, naturally loath to subject their citizens in Japan to Japanese jurisdiction until they were satisfied that an adequate imperial judicial system had been established in Nippon.

In spite of the fact that the United States offered conditionally to relinquish her special consular jurisdiction in 1878, and that the European states were very earnestly importuned in 1883 to do likewise, no agreement with the powers was secured by Japan for eleven years, although various propositions were advanced on both sides. Finally, in 1894, after the Nipponese Government had promulgated all the reform codes enumerated above, Great Britain and the United States concluded conventions with Japan, recognizing the fiscal and judicial autonomy of that country through the agreement that consular jurisdiction should cease in five years — i.e., on July 17, 1899 — and a regular

customs-tariff with rates from five to fifteen per cent ad valorem be established to be effective for twelve years. In 1896, France made a similar treaty to become effective also in 1899; and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and other powers followed suit. On their side the Nipponese authorities promised to abolish all distinctions between natives and foreigners in Japan and to open their entire country to travelers and traders.

Nippon had already signified her intention to obey the rules of international law and to assume the obligations of a regular member of the family of nations. In 1870, she had issued a declaration of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1886, the Emperor gave his approval to the Geneva Convention of 1884 concerning the treatment of wounded in battle, and concluded an extradition treaty with the United States. In 1887, an imperial edict put in force in the Japanese Empire the rules of maritime law embodied in the Declaration of Paris of 1856; and in 1894, a law concerning prize courts was enacted, in order to set up a prize court at Sasebo during the Chino-Japanese War. And the Emperor now prepared the way for the successful introduction of the new régime by the proclamation, in the words of President McKinley, "of comprehensive codes of civil and criminal procedure according to Western methods, public instruction, patents and copyrights, municipal administration including jurisdiction over former foreign settlements, customs tariffs and procedure, public health, and other administrative measures. The working of the new system has given rise to no complaints on the part of American citizens or interests — a circumstance which attests the ripe consideration with which the change had been prepared." ¹

Japan kept the agreements scrupulously, opening twenty-

¹ *Annual Message*, December 5, 1899.

two new ports to trade in 1899, and putting the commercial arrangements and new tariff in operation at once. And the new scheme worked so admirably that, when the stipulated twelve years had elapsed the treaties were all promptly renewed — in 1911 — by the powers for another dozen years — this time with the granting to Japan of a tariff autonomy similar to that of Germany.¹ Thus ended the struggle of Nippon for full national autonomy and recognition as an independent modern state; and at the close of the nineteenth century Japan took her place as an equal in the family of nations. Her people acclaimed the treaties of 1899 as a great national triumph, as well as a striking evidence of the success of their efforts at national reconstruction. Unfortunately, overemphasizing this testimony to the superior qualities of the Nipponese race, they proceeded through the door of national equality down the pathway of national superiority; and, during the first twenty years of the twentieth century, the Imperial Government devoted its energies more to the creation of a great Imperial Empire than to the work of genuine national development and conservation.²

Yet one must not believe that these successes and the imitation of all things Occidental and the adoption of much of Western civilization by the Japanese people changed materially the character and life of the race. Fortunately, although adopting everything that they considered useful and essential for the development of their national resources and life, they retained the best features of their own national customs and institutions. With a rare refinement of taste, a spirit of liberalism, and a nice judgment of essentials, they fitted in the new ideals and methods of

¹ Various countries stipulated that rates on certain articles should not exceed specified amounts; but Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and some others limit their rates by treaties for fixed periods.

² See Chapters XIII and XV.

the age with their ancient habits, usages, and establishments. So successful were they that in the large cities, where the contact with Western life was more intimate, they lived dual lives. During hours of study or business, the Japanese wore a fine uniform or smart Western clothes. "But as soon as he stepped out of office or off parade, he reverted to his own comfortable and picturesque costume. Handsome houses were built and furnished according to Western models. But each had its own annex where alcoves, verandas, matted floors, and paper sliding doors continued to do traditional duty. Beefsteaks, beer, 'grapejuice,' knives and forks came into use on occasion. But rice-bowls and chop-sticks held their everyday place as of old. In a word, though the Japanese adopted every convenient and serviceable attribute of foreign civilization, such as railways, steamships, telegraphs, post-offices, banks, and machinery of all kinds, though they accepted Occidental sciences and to a large extent Occidental philosophies, and though they recognized the superiority of European jurisprudence and set themselves to bring their laws into accord with it, they nevertheless preserved the essentials of their own mode of life and never lost their individuality."

What is of equal importance, the Nipponese passed safely through the period of destruction and revolution, in which every phase of life, of thought, of national activity and production, and of political organization was transformed, without any great shedding of blood, civil upheaval, or the commission of violence to the body politic; and they passed into the period of construction and national expansion with their national resources not only unimpaired, but conserved and organized for the promotion of Japanese life and development, and with the national stamina of the Nipponese race preserved intact and materially

increased in power. This was a remarkable achievement — one that is a high tribute to the genius of the Japanese people and has raised them into the first rank of national organizers and administrators, in spite of the fact that they have made serious mistakes and have still something to learn and some distance to go, before they attain the mature organization and solidarity reached by some of the Anglo-Saxon states.

CHAPTER XV

THE KOREAN TANGLE

ACROSS from the island Empire of Japan, and separated from Kiushiu — the second largest of the principal islands — only by the Strait of Tsushima, a large peninsula stretches down from the mainland of Asia between the Sea of Japan and the Gulf of Chihli. It contains approximately 84,700 square miles of territory, and it has a coast-line of 1740 miles. On the east side there are only a few harbors. The south and west coasts contain, however, excellent ports and bays into which flow navigable rivers; while the neighboring waters are studded with hundreds of picturesque islands. On the north the peninsula is separated from the rest of the Asiatic world by the Tumen and Yalu Rivers and the Chang Pai-Shan or Ever-White Mountains. This seclusion was rendered more secure by the creation, three centuries ago, of the palisades — a neutral region twenty miles in width of unoccupied mountains and forests marking the boundary between China and Korea — which were later replaced by a neutral strip of territory sixty miles wide and three hundred long. So isolated did this peninsula become, and so slow were its inhabitants in opening their land to international intercourse, that the outside world named this people “The Hermit Nation.” The natives, however, called their country picturesquely: “Cho-sen,” or “Land of the Morning Calm.”¹ And in this there is a peculiar sense of fitness, for, if Japan is the “Land of the Rising Sun,” the region lying just behind is naturally that of “Morning Calm” or “Fresh Morning.”

¹ The name “Korea” was of later origin, but used generally by the people till 1910.

The Korean Peninsula is neither large nor rich, except in natural beauty. Only six hundred miles in length and with an extreme width of one hundred and seventy-five miles, it is filled by chains of beautiful mountains, charming canyons, and picturesque valleys. Its natural resources, however, are limited to a few mines (gold, iron, and coal) and a restricted territory suitable for agriculture — its chief asset; and its white-robed population that adds a pleasing and fascinating touch to the landscape has never succeeded in creating any great material wealth out of the resources at hand. On the contrary, through ignorance and slothfulness, they denuded the hills of forests and permitted their lands to decline in productive power year by year. "Five sixths of the country," wrote one who knew it well, in 1905, "is filled up with lovely mountains and scantily clad hills and, in the valleys and plains that go to make up the remaining one sixth, ten or twelve millions of sad-eyed people are gathered together, laboring for the most part as the beasts of the field, and sleeping with them too. . . . There is but one city — Seoul — a bit of what Korea might have been if it had not been ruined in the past."

Yet the Korean people were not wholly to blame for the wretched plight in which they found themselves at the opening of the twentieth century. In spite of their policy of seclusion, the unfortunate geographical location of their country between rival and ambitious nations not only exposed it to the attacks of the neighboring Manchus, Chinese, and Japanese, but also made it, as Griffis prophesied in 1882, "the pivot of the future history of Eastern Asia." For on its soil was decided — temporarily at least — the problem of supremacy between China, Japan, and Russia. In this connection, it is well to remember that the wrecking of Korea began in the sixteenth century at the hands of Japan, when the Imperial Regent Hideyoshi at the head of

an army of the best warriors of the East reduced the country to ruin in six years. It was "one of the most needless, unprovoked, cruel, and desolating wars that ever cursed a country." Over 185,000 Korean heads were assembled for mutilation and 214,000 for an "ear-tomb" mound at Kioto; and, so great was the national humiliation of the Koreans and so complete the devastation of the fairest and most fertile portions of their land, that their hatred for the Japanese has persisted till this day.

Scarcely a half-century later — between 1628 and 1644 — the Manchu Princes, successors of the Mongol conquerors Jenghis and Kublai Khan, who overran Korea and China in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, annexed Korea and established their dominion over the Celestial Empire. From that date till 1895, the Hermit Kingdom remained under the suzerainty of the Manchu Emperors, who, knowing little about Korea and caring less, exercised their overlordship with mildness and justness and refrained from interfering in its political affairs. Nevertheless, two hundred years passed before the Koreans had recovered materially from those early conquests; and it was not till the early eighties of the nineteenth century that the people were induced to open their country to world trade.

Following the failure of French, American, and Japanese naval demonstrations to make any impression on the Korean nation, the Japanese, through pressure from China, secured the Japanese-Korean Treaty of 1876, whereby the independence of Korea was guaranteed and the port of Fusan opened to trade. Wonsan, Gensan, and Chemulpo were opened in 1880. The United States obtained a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea in 1882, Great Britain and Germany in 1883, Italy in 1884, France in 1886, and Russia in 1888. This auspicious beginning of international intercourse, however, heralded only more trouble and sor-

row for the hapless Koreans. In the years that followed, the intrigues of foreign governments and of Korean political leaders kept the affairs of the country in the utmost confusion and retarded all development.

Two parties were contending for control in Korea at the time, one, the progressive or conservative group, led by the clever and courageous Queen Min, and the other known as the "Liberal Party," directed by the unscrupulous yet patriotic Yi Haeung, the Tai-wen Kun, or Prince Parent (father of the Emperor). Japan, taking advantage of this situation, began intriguing for political control with the result that a violent attack on the Japanese Legation and residents in Seoul was launched at the instigation of the Tai-wen Kun in 1882. To keep the peace, he was deported by the Chinese to Tientsin; but on his return in 1885, he went over to the camp of the Japanese.

Queen Min, however, managed to hold her own position in the face of great difficulties. She was ably supported by Yuan Shih-kai in Korea and Li Hung Chang in Peking, who in 1885 negotiated the Li-Ito Convention at Tientsin restraining both countries from sending troops into the country without due notice. Together they frustrated all the Japanese schemes and intrigues for ten years, in spite of the assassination of six of the ablest progressive statesmen and supporters of the Queen. Finally, the Nipponese, taking advantage of the insurrection of the Tong Haks in 1894, against whom the Chinese at the request of the Koreans had sent two thousand troops, invaded the country with twelve thousand soldiers, occupied the open ports and the capital, and demanded reforms. China resented this intrusion; and the Chino-Japanese War followed, resulting in the overwhelming defeat of the Celestial Empire. At the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, the independence of Korea was proclaimed and the suzerainty of China ceased forever.

Japan, which had forced the Korean Cabinet through its Foreign Minister — Kim Yun-sik — to sign a treaty with her on July 25, 1894, agreeing to assist in every way in the movement to drive out the Chinese and establish the independence of Korea, now resorted to intimidation and intrigue to obtain control of the affairs of the Hermit Kingdom. The Government was induced to accept a number of Japanese advisers; many important reforms were instituted; and the finances were reorganized and placed on a flourishing basis through the genius of the British financial adviser, Sir McLeavy Brown. Matters did not move fast enough, however, to suit the Japanese statesmen; while the Korean Court and many leading men refused to support the new régime. Then the Japanese representatives committed the inexcusable and cowardly political blunder of instigating the assassination of brave little Queen Min and the arrest of the King on October 8, 1895. The latter, however, escaped four months later and took refuge in the Russian Legation, remaining there till February, 1897. As a result, a strong retrograde movement set in, and Japanese influence waned. The reforms were dropped and the advisers dismissed. Meanwhile, the Russian economic advance in Manchuria having reached the Yalu, the Muscovite agents in the Far East began to intrigue against the Japanese for economic concessions and political influence.

Consequently, during the next decade a spirited rivalry and competition ensued between the Russians and Japanese for the control of ill-fated Korea. In spite of the agreements between these two states in 1896 and 1898, which guaranteed the independence of Korea and assured to her the joint protection and assistance of both powers in the reorganization of her finances and government, the competition became more and more keen; and, after Russia had obtained coaling stations at Korean ports and special

timber concessions on the Yalu in 1902-03, a very critical situation developed, resulting in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.¹ Once more the soil of Korea resounded to the sound of turmoil and tramping feet; and this much oppressed land became the base of operations in a new conflict which increased the impoverishment of the Korean people still further. So that, by 1905, there was left in Korea absolutely nothing worth having; and its inhabitants had drained the last dregs of humiliation and despair. No wonder tablets appeared by the wayside reading, "If you meet a foreigner, kill him; he who lets him go by is a traitor to his country."

During this long period of domination, strife, suffering, and humiliation, the Korean people maintained an attitude of stoic self-control and sublime patience. Helpless before their enemies, and fleeced and ill-treated by their own rulers, they demanded redress in dignified and impressive silence through an unequalled spirit of passive resistance publicly demonstrated on various occasions, as in 1898 when thousands of citizens sat before the royal palace in solemn, patient conclave day and night for fourteen days. "There is something in the very sadness and silence of this white-robed race of passive resisters," writes J. O. P. Bland, "something in the stoic dignity of their monuments and men, which compels our instinctive sympathy and respect." Although of the Mongol family, the Koreans are, as a race, quite distinct from the Japanese and Chinese. They are an intelligent, trustworthy, kind-hearted people — more emotional and sympathetic than their neighbors — with their own language, customs, institutions, and civilization, which they have preserved in spite of oppression and persecution.

Unfortunately, the political institutions of the old Hermit

¹ See Chapter XIII

Kingdom had become weak and vicious, and its social system not conducive to the highest moral development; while the masses of the people were abetted in their natural inclination to indolence and apathy through the hopeless conditions under which they lived and the total lack of incentive either for personal gain or for progress. Korea was an old-fashioned monarchy ruled in a wasteful, slipshod manner for the benefit of the nobility. The kings, well-meaning but easy-going individuals, for the most part without training or political genius, paid little attention to the affairs of state. The government was in the hands of a Cabinet composed of three "Chong," or High Ministers, one of whom was Premier, and six heads of departments or boards, assisted from time to time by an advisory council. But the whole political machinery, from the King and Council down to the governors of the eight provinces and the mayors of the towns, was controlled by an avaricious and despicable aristocracy which curtailed the royal prerogative, drained the national wealth, oppressed the nation, and usurped all the rights of official patronage. Some of the nobility held office by hereditary right, but the majority secured their positions through bribery or influence under a system where public offices were sold to the highest bidder or passed out to favorites.

The bureaucratic class gradually absorbed a large portion of the inhabitants, till the number of public officials living on the state was almost incredible. An average district mandarin, for instance, had four hundred subordinates who divided their time between eating, loafing, and the leisurely collection of taxes, and whose food alone cost the Government \$342,000 a year. The taxes — farmed out to the highest bidder or to dissolute favorites — were extremely heavy, and extortion was systematically practiced. No one dared to save, to acquire wealth, or make

profits in business or industry openly; for the officials would take away his property on trumped-up charges, or his wealth in taxes. There was no redress in the courts, for governmental officials possessed both executive and judicial powers. Magistrates were lazy, corrupt, and cruel; graft and corruption triumphed on every hand; and individuals were subjected to a constant official espionage. There was no middle class to champion the cause of the people. On the other hand, the large gentry class were too proud to work, unlearned, uncultured, and given over to a life of ease and pleasure. They smoked long pipes, dressed immaculately, and wore glasses to look important. When they went abroad, attendants held up their arms or assisted them to sit in the saddle, while canopies were held over their heads. Yet the masses lived in squalid villages of unsanitary huts under conditions indescribably bad. As a result, there were in Korea only "a rapacious and dissolute governing class, and a shabby, improvident people who lived from hand to mouth and hardly dared call their soul their own."

Such was the situation of the Hermit Kingdom when the Japanese brought forward their first plan of reform in the eighties; and in 1905, when they inaugurated their second reform plan, there had been no material change. The Treaty of Portsmouth had hardly been signed before the organization of the new régime was begun. The Nipponese statesmen conveniently forgot their promises to Korea in the treaties of February 23d and August 22, 1904, guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of that country,¹ but binding the Koreans to accept Japanese assistance and advisers in the reorganization of their state. Fortified by

¹ For other treaties in which Japan had pledged the independence of Korea see S. K. Hornbeck: *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York: 1916), p. 441; René Terriore: *Le Statut International de la Corée* (Paris: 1911), Annexes.

the Russian engagement in the Treaty of 1905 "neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which Japan may find necessary to undertake in Korea," and by article three of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 22, 1905, which read: "Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea, as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard the advance of those interests," the Japanese Government promptly took the control of affairs within the Hermit Kingdom into its own hands.

Nevertheless, several reasons were assigned by the Japanese authorities for the creation of a Residency-General in Korea. It was claimed, not without reason, that the Hermit Nation was a "fruitful and constant source of unrest in the Extreme East." And it was advanced with truth that the Koreans were not only incapable of governing themselves decently, but also that they were unequal to the task of reconstruction so greatly needed. For had not twenty years passed without any material progress being made toward the abolition of graft and political intrigues, the reorganization of the administration, the reconstruction of the finances, the establishment of an efficient police system and of some form of adequate military defense, and the adoption of modern civilized methods in judicial procedure, in education, and in production? Therefore, the supervision and assistance of some great power were essential if the work of reorganization was to succeed in Korea; and an identity of interests demanded that that power should be Japan. "The identity of Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East," said Marquis Ito in 1907, "and the paramount character of Japanese interests in Korea, will not permit Japan to leave Korea to the

care of any other foreign country: she must assume the charge herself." This identity of interests centered on the creation of a strong system of defense to hold off Russia and China, the development of the national resources of the country to the advantage of both Japanese and Koreans, and the maintenance of Korean independence: i.e., independent of all other states save Japan.

To understand this so-called community of interests, it is necessary to digress from the narrative of Korean affairs long enough to explain the foreign policy of Japan which was evolved during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and which controlled all her activities — diplomatic, commercial, and military — during the first two decades of the twentieth century. We have seen above how Japan was transformed from a weak feudal nation into a thoroughly modern state in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.¹ "In forty years," exclaimed Count Okuma, "Japan arose from an insignificant feudal nation to one of the strongest powers." The Nipponese leaders of those days were not satisfied with the establishment of a well-ordered commonwealth, but they looked forward to the time when their country should be the leader of the Orient and a great world power. To accomplish this, it was not only necessary to train their own subjects thoroughly and to develop the natural resources of the country to the highest point; but, since Nippon was a poor land, it was imperative to seek, near at hand and cheaply, supplementary supplies of minerals and raw materials. At the very door of their Empire lay the great continent of Asia which not only possessed an inexhaustible store of natural resources, but would also provide a splendid market for Japanese products. To ensure for Japan the lion's share of the economic wealth and trade of the eastern seaboard

¹ Chapter XIV.

of Asia, it was deemed essential that the Nipponese should have a foothold upon the continent; and, for this purpose no section of the coast was more suitable than Korea — so close to Japan and having behind it the vast areas of Manchuria and Mongolia, and giving an easy approach to the heart of China.

Moreover, the Japanese, who had lived for years in dread lest Russia or China, or both, should shut them out from the continent and threaten the very existence of their Empire by the occupation of Korea, felt impelled to take over that country themselves, in order to erect there a bulwark against the "Bear of the North" and a base of operations for their economic and commercial adventures in North China. Then a home was needed for the excess population of the Nipponese Empire, for the number of its subjects was increasing by leaps and bounds; and the Osaka manufacturers — symbol of the remarkable industrial revolution then taking place in Japan — were clamoring loudly for markets, markets! and ships, ships!

Again, in the course of the transformation of the Japanese state, its leaders had secured a remarkable unity of effort on the part of all classes of subjects, institutions, and organizations. Everything was subordinated to the state and its success. Personalities were obliterated as far as possible. The state became supreme, and the chief end of man, the individual, a mere atom of the whole. "Personality has been wholly suppressed by coercion," wrote Lafcadio Hearn, "the life of every individual being so ordered by the will of the rest as to render free action, free speaking, free thinking out of the question. . . . With implacable minuteness, with ferocity of detail, everything was ordained for him, even to the quality of his footgear, the cost of his wife's hairpin, and the price of his child's doll. . . . The result was to suppress his mental and moral

differentiation, to numb personality, to establish one uniform and unchanging type of character." This situation once attained, it required no great mental effort to reach the conclusion that, since the masses were but the mere slaves of the state, the Japanese people should be treated as such and should be used as simple pawns in war, in peace, and in the great game of world expansion; and this same doctrine was applied to the neighboring peoples — in Formosa and Korea — over whom the Japanese extended their sway. For it was assumed that they would be greatly benefited by the gift of Japanese civilization, and would be glad to become Japanese subjects and to sacrifice their properties and their lives to promote the greatness of the Nipponese Empire.

It was but natural, therefore, that, from the point of view of national preservation and of economic and commercial expansion, the control of the population and resources of Korea appeared indispensable to the Japanese leaders. Not a few, indeed, went a step farther. Imbued with the erroneous conception that Korea was a rich country inhabited by a worthless people, they claimed the peninsula by the right of their national sacrifices in the wars with China and Russia, as a legitimate happy-hunting-ground for Japanese colonists, concession-hunters, and money-makers. And the influence of this group was so great that the Japanese army of occupation was followed by a great crowd of home-seekers, adventurers, and undesirables, who seized property right and left, and were the cause of much trouble and bad feeling. This situation, together with the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption of the old Korean régime, made the introduction of some form of closer political control at once imperative.

Early in November, 1905, Marquis Ito arrived in Seoul; and, with the aid of Gonsuke Hayashi — Japanese official

representative in Korea — and a troop of Japanese soldiers who surrounded the imperial palace, induced Pak Che Soon — the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs — to sign the Japanese-Korean Agreement of November 17, 1905. This convention transferred to Japan the control of all the foreign relations of Korea, together with the execution of all treaties, and gave her the right to station a Resident-General at Seoul to direct diplomatic affairs and supervise the Japanese resident officials. On the 20th of the following December, a Japanese imperial ordinance was issued defining the position and powers of the new Resident-General. He was to represent the Imperial Government of Japan in Korea, with “control of all political affairs which are, in accordance with the treaties and conventions, to be administered by the imperial and public authorities of Japan in Korea.” In other words, he was entrusted with complete control over the military forces, the post, telegraph and telephone services, and with advisory supervision of the general administration through his control over the Japanese advisers to the Government; and he was given right of personal and private audience with the Emperor of Korea, and the power to appoint Residents at the open ports and chief towns.

In addition to the Resident-General, a system of Japanese advisers was forced upon the Korean Government. There were expert counselors in each department of state, legal advisers for each of the chief courts in Seoul and the provinces, political advisers in each province, and a police advisory board in the capital with branches in each province. Moreover, technical experts were furnished for public works, industrial enterprises, and model experimental farms. At first, under this system, “no radical changes were introduced into the old Korean administrative organization”; but the attempt was made simply “to improve the existing

Korean administration by general guidance under the various Japanese advisory bodies" and appointees. The Residency-General thus created lasted four and a half years. It was confronted, at the start, with the most difficult and delicate task of maintaining the "fiction of Korean independence while practically establishing a protectorate, and yet, to avoid assuming the responsibilities of a governing power."

Marquis Ito — a broad-minded statesman with an extensive official experience in Japan — became the first Resident-General in 1906. He was as anxious to promote the welfare of the Koreans as to advance the interests of Japan; and he took vigorous steps to stop the wholesale Japanese immigration into Korea, to control the irresponsible crowd of Nipponese settlers and adventurers already in the country, to establish order, and to assist the Korean Government in creating an efficient administration. "In Korea," wrote W. E. Griffis in 1910, "he ever stood as the enemy of the rascally Japanese, held in check the soldiers, and strove night and day to give the native people justice, education, and uplift. In a word, he tried to do for Korea what he had done for Japan — to help and to protect the evolution of the Korean into a modern man. His one insistence was for a protectorate and not annexation."

Ito soon discovered, however, that, in spite of his extraordinary efforts, the new scheme of advisers was not getting results. In operation, the system proved unsatisfactory and unworkable because "Korean officials paid little respect to the advice given, so long as they were free to adopt or reject it at will." It was, therefore, necessary to vitalize the system by giving to the Resident-General direct participative power in the general administration. On July 24, 1907, a new agreement was accordingly negotiated with the Korean Government, represented by Ye Wan

Yong, to "develop the strength and resources of Korea and to promote the welfare of her people." By this the Resident-General received the power to initiate and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and remove Korean officials, and to appoint Japanese subjects to official positions in conjunction with and through the Government of Korea.¹

Under this new arrangement, the improvement was marked, and immediately progress "by no means of small degree" set in through reforms "in almost every branch of the administration." A separation of the executive and judicial departments was brought about, together with the establishment of a central court of cassation and a number of lower modern courts of law. The management of the Korean imperial household was reorganized to eliminate waste and to introduce efficient methods. The imperial administration was given a new lease of life by the abolition of numerous superfluous offices, the dismissal of inefficient officials, the creation of important new positions, and the appointment of trained Japanese to high offices of state. At the same time, the Residency-General became a regular organized government in itself, by increasing the staff of officials about the Governor or Resident-General, transferring to his control the administration of justice and the prisons, communications, railways, forestry, agriculture, and supervision over the police and local government in the thirteen provinces through the local Japanese Residents.

In this way, since the Korean administration was continued, there were two governments working side by side and nominally together. The native organization consisted of a Central Government composed of a Cabinet of the six departments of Internal Affairs, Finance, Education,

¹ See *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Korea* (1907), compiled by the Residency-General.

Agriculture and Commerce, Justice, and the Army (the last two were speedily transferred to the Resident-General), a Council with administrative supervision, and certain "Decoration Boards" to watch over Korean customs and traditions, and a Provincial Administration with its own officials, urban prefectures, district magistrates, and revenue bureaus. The number of Koreans employed officially decreased, while the number of Japanese taken into the service of the Government steadily increased till there were 7723 serving the state in 1909, of whom 2471 were officials and 5252 police officers. Meanwhile, the old Korean army organization was disbanded, and the new military forces were incorporated in the Japanese military system. Loans approximating 5,000,000 yen a year were made by the Nipponese Government; and a regular budget was created averaging annually from 28,000,000 to 31,000,000 yen. The railroads were taken over by the Imperial Railway Board of Japan in 1909, and the building of trunk-lines across Korea was pushed along rapidly. Other important reforms — administrative, financial (including currency), judicial, economic, educational, and social — were successfully inaugurated; and, finally, peace and order were established throughout the country — the insurgent forces (insignificant in numbers and poorly equipped) opposing Japanese domination being easily suppressed (1229 surrendering in one day), and only bands of brigands in the mountains being left to disturb the land after October, 1908.

Nevertheless, in spite of this progress and the success of the new administration, no material change occurred in the general situation. The Koreans still refused to support the new régime; and the majority of the people failed to become reconciled either to the presence of Japanese residents or to the dictation of Nipponese officials.

Those Koreans who did accept positions under the Resident-General were condemned bitterly and ostracized from the best society. Radical patriots kept up a secret agitation for Korean independence; and the masses were kept in a constant state of agitation and suspicion by an insidious propaganda, such as reports that the Japanese were carrying off to their own country all the tax revenues as well as the remaining wealth of the Hermit Kingdom. In many influential circles, however, the moderation, the good-will, and the efficiency of Marquis Ito's Government were appreciated; and, in spite of the serious handicaps, the new régime had an excellent chance to solve the intricate problems of national reorganization, provided it maintained a patient and just consideration for Korean rights and welfare. Everything depended upon the ability of the Japanese administrators to win the confidence and coöperation of the Koreans. To do this, it was imperative to convince the native people of the sincerity and impartiality of the Nipponese Government. Not only must the immigration from Japan be stopped and the national revenues be used solely for Korean education and public improvements, but Koreans must be given a large share in the economic development of their own country and be admitted to the more important positions in the public service as rapidly as their training would permit; and, finally, the people of Chosen must be given definite assurances that they would receive ultimately complete local autonomy.

Unfortunately, these conditions were not fulfilled. The Japanese authorities were inexperienced in colonial administration; and they permitted their foreign policy to be dictated by the impatient demands of military and industrial leaders for complete domination and for the immediate advancement of Japanese interests in Korea. Instead of persisting in their moderate policy of administrative control

with tact, patience, and conciliation, they let themselves be convinced that the only way to solve this vexing problem was to "take the bull by the horns" and to place Chosen at once under the full sovereignty of the Japanese Empire.

That the military leaders, at least, were determined on a policy of annexation as early as the summer of 1909 is shown by the fact that Marquis Ito — the best friend of Korea and a firm believer in the protectorate — was forced to resign in June of that year. Then the claim was advanced that the protectorate had failed to give "sufficient guarantees of the permanent welfare of the imperial family of Korea and of the prosperity of the people," to afford "sufficient hope of realizing the improvements which they [the Japanese Imperial Government] had in view," and to "ensure the safety and repose of Japanese and foreign residents" by the establishment of order in the country. Upon the last point, General Terauchi remarked, in 1910, "that a spirit of suspicion and misunderstanding still dominated the whole peninsula and the mass of the people were burdened with anxiety." Color was given to this statement by the assassination by Koreans of D. W. Stevens — American adviser to the Korean Government — in San Francisco in March, 1908, and of the Marquis Ito at Harbin in October, 1909.

Yet the real purpose of the annexation policy was something more than to secure stability and peace on the peninsula. Indeed, if the claim of the Japanese authorities was valid, it was a severe indictment of the inefficiency of their own administration under the Residency-General which had had four and a half years with every facility and power — especially after 1907 — if order had not been established, particularly since they had not been forced to contend with any great revolutionary uprising. On the other hand, the actual inspiration for the amalgamation of

Korea with Japan is to be found in the official statements claiming that annexation will "transform a decayed kingdom into a prosperous and rich country," consolidate the Japanese Empire, and assure "lasting peace for the Far East." The move was held to be justified by the fact that the relation of Korea to Japan differed from that of European colonies to the home countries, because of the close geographical relationship, the strategic importance of the peninsula to Japan, and the common racial and social interests of the two countries, and that "no great obstacle lies in the way of the two nations being assimilated and so becoming one."

The short-sightedness and the selfishness of this policy were altogether too evident. The nature of the proposed plan and the methods whereby it was to be enforced made it apparent from the start that such a union could only be a one-sided affair, and that the Koreans would be precluded from any active share in it. For a complete Nipponese administration — an integral part of the Imperial Government of Japan — was to be set up in Korea; and, under the guidance of Japanese officials, the regeneration of the country and its economic development were to be worked out through the assistance and efforts of the Japanese living abroad in the land and coming into daily contact with the natives, while the poor Koreans were to plod along as pupils and followers. Indeed, Governor-General Terauchi in a short time considered it a "matter of great rejoicing" that "many Japanese, possessed with the resolution to live in Chosen permanently, endeavor to assist and guide their Korean neighbors," and that the Japanese population in the country was increasing rapidly.¹

Accordingly, on August 22, 1910, the Japanese authorities forced upon Korea a new agreement known as the "Treaty

¹ It rose from 146,000 in 1910 to 264,000 in 1913.

of Annexation,"¹ which abolished the old Korean Government and set up a new Japanese administration. The Emperor of Korea humbly ceded to Japan "all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea," while Japan gracefully "assumed the entire government and administration" of the country, but promised to employ duly qualified Koreans "who accept the new régime loyally and in good faith," and to treat Chosenese on an equal footing with Japanese. Annexes and proclamations announced the immediate appointment of a Japanese Governor-General with command of the army and navy and complete control of all branches of the administration, the extension of the Japanese treaties to Korea with the exception that the old tariff agreements of Korea should remain in force for ten years, and the changing of the official designation of the country from Korea to "Chosen."

General Viscount Terauchi, Minister of War in the Japanese Cabinet, who had been appointed Resident-General of Korea on May 30th and who had arrived in July to negotiate the new treaty, was nominated Governor-General; and the new administration was officially launched on October 1, 1910. The fundamental policy of the new régime, as defined by Terauchi, was "to maintain peace and order in the peninsula, win the confidence of the people, develop various productive industries and open up the natural wealth of the country, advance the civilization of the people by spreading and promoting education, to make the people well-to-do and increase their happiness."² In the application of this program, he advocated a spirit of sympathy, kindness, and harmony; but, unfortunately, there prevailed instead throughout the entire Japanese

¹ This treaty was dated August 22d, and the formal declaration of annexation August 29, 1910.

² *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen, 1910-11.*

officialdom a spirit of superiority and condescension and selfishness. And, to execute the new policy successfully, the country not only was to be absorbed within the Japanese state, but the Korean people were to be assimilated into the Japanese nation and transformed into Japanese; while the economic development of the land was being exploited very largely by Japanese labor and capital, and all the positions of trust and importance in the public service — the police, the army, the railways, the banks, and the post-offices — were filled by Japanese subjects. Just how the Japanese authorities expected to transform some twelve million Asiatics,¹ with their own language, traditions, and customs, with their hearts filled with hatred, suspicion, and loathing for everything Nipponese, into loyal Japanese subjects by this program, it is difficult to understand. As a matter of fact, they did not succeed. Their efforts merely postponed the solution of the Korean question for ten years.

Nevertheless, from the material and economic point of view, the work of the Terauchi régime was remarkably successful during those ten years. Besides restoring order throughout the peninsula within fifteen months and suppressing the last trace of insurgency, the new administration introduced valuable financial reforms including the creation of a standard currency and the establishment of banks and loaning institutions, devised a judicial system, and improved the schools and methods of education with emphasis on industrial training. Modern public buildings to house public officials, governmental departments, and institutions, schools, and industrial plants were erected, public works constructed to improve sanitation and the public health, and the work of developing the natural resources of the country undertaken with great energy.²

¹ In 1910, when the Japanese annexed the country.

² See *Results of Three Years' Administration of Chosen since Annexation, Report of the Governor-General of Chosen, January, 1914.*

In the years 1910 to 1921, the mileage of good roads was extended from 583 to 4900 miles, and that of the railways from 693.6 to 1398 miles; while the area of cultivated land was increased from 6,039,000 to 10,590,000 acres. The barren hills were reforested with 20,000,000 trees by the government agencies, and with some 140,000,000 by popular effort on Arbor Days; while the area of land devoted to the silk industry rose from a paltry 8193 to 81,225 acres. The number of cattle was doubled, as well as the output of timber. The production of rice, hemp, corn, barley, wheat, rye, beans, millet, and tobacco increased by one half, while the cotton product multiplied four times. And the annual output of the coal and other mines and of the fisheries increased from 6,068,000 to 15,537,000 yen and from 8,000,000 to 44,998,000 yen respectively. The national revenues, including subsidies from Japan, rose from about 24,000,000 to 162,000,000 yen; while the export trade of Korea mounted from approximately 19,914,000 yen to the substantial total of 218,277,000 yen, of which last some 197,392,000 yen worth was to Japan.

Thus material prosperity came to Korea, but not national contentment and happiness. Order and security reigned, and the conditions affecting the general welfare and life of the people were greatly improved; but, politically, the situation remained unchanged — the new Government being sustained by the Japanese army and police, but not through any support or coöperation on the part of the Korean nation. In fact, the Japanese were no nearer the hearts of the Koreans than they had been ten years before. The reason for this is to be found in the inability of the Nipponese to understand the psychology of the Korean nation, in their own lack of humor, and in a national tendency to take themselves too seriously. "Officials in Korea have worked hard," wrote George Gleason — for

fourteen years Y. M. C. A. secretary in Japan — “and in most cases effectively, but their way of doing it has been lacking in tact as well as in friendliness. They have failed to win the people.” And it is evident that the higher officials laid much more emphasis on statistics and on economic and commercial improvements than they did on winning the friendship or advancing the interests of the Koreans.

Moreover, certain serious defects in the Japanese colonial administration not only worked against the creation of confidence between Japanese and Koreans, but ultimately raised a great barrier of distrust and suspicion between the two nationalities. In the first place, there was an official discrimination against Koreans. They were not only paid less than the Japanese in all branches of the public service and in all other fields of labor, but were shut out systematically from all of the higher and more important positions. In the matter of education, Korean children were given only eight years of training in the schools, while the Japanese youth received eleven. This made it difficult later for the Korean boys to compete with Japanese youths; and much more money was expended proportionally for the education of Japanese than on that of the Koreans, so that by 1921 there were 60,000 Japanese children out of a Japanese population of 368,000 attending school, and but approximately 220,000 Korean youngsters out of the Korean population of 17,000,000, not including some 300,000 put down as attending “old-fashioned native schools.” But this was not all. The Koreans were not consulted in any way about the new administration; nor were any of the best and most capable men asked to serve, or offered places in the new Government. Instead, the Japanese created a peerage for seventy-two discredited Korean officials who belonged to the old, corrupt régime,

and pensioned them. Large areas of the best land were taken for governmental purposes and assigned to the Oriental Development Company and other Japanese organizations; while nothing was done to assist the dispossessed owners and tenants. Large sums were spent on economic improvements, agricultural and industrial development, and education, from which the Japanese Government and residents profited proportionately more than did the Koreans.

In the second place, an inflexible military administration was carried over from Japan, without due consideration of its fitness for the situation in Korea. Its chief characteristics were too much red tape and too much official supervision. As a prominent Korean remarked: "If there are forty miles of red tape in official circles in the United States, there are forty thousand miles of it in Korea." Added to this, the presence of the "big stick" was everywhere in evidence — even police and school teachers carried swords. The police, supported by gendarmes and soldiers, not only interfered in every phase of life, inspecting houses — even the women's quarters — without warrants or previous notice, but also instituted an extensive system of espionage which included the hiring of low-class Koreans to spy on their own countrymen. Moreover, they were given "summary judgment power" which placed in their hands the judgment of all petty cases (involving a fine of one hundred yen) of assault, gambling, crime, and violation of administrative ordinances. The punishment — applying to Koreans only — in these cases was flogging, which was applied without discrimination, but with great severity, so that the system soon became notorious for injustice and cruelty. When one recalls that the new administration introduced many irritating innovations in the laws and customs of the land and abolished freedom of

speech and of the press, it is readily seen that the number of these petty crimes would easily be legion if common-sense and discretion were not used by the police in the application of the government ordinances. That this discretion was not exercised is shown by the fact that in 1913-14 only 496 out of 221,000 cases were acquitted, and in 1916-17 only 30 out of 81,139 cases.¹

In the third place, the "assimilation program" of the Japanese Government carried with it the suppression of everything Korean. Individual freedom was interfered with and the joy taken out of life on every hand. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of association were abolished. No public meetings were allowed. The Minister of Home Affairs was given power to suppress or dissolve any association or assembly, and authorized not only to prohibit the sale of any Korean paper injurious to public order, but to confiscate all such journals published in Japan or in other countries, of which some two hundred and fifty-five were suppressed in 1910.

Not a word could be said or written in defense of the Korean people or their rights or liberty. The Korean language was excluded from the schools, the courts, and legal documents, and the teaching of Korean history from the schools. The names of many cities and towns — and even of the country — were changed without consideration for Korean wishes or traditions. It was even impossible to raise contributions for educational, religious, philanthropic, or scientific purposes or institutions — either public or private — without obtaining governmental permission. And the imperial supervision extended to religious and educational institutions — even in minor matters; while, besides frowning on the educational work in the mission schools and limiting the educational facilities in

¹ *Report of the Governor-General, 1918.*

the Korean common schools, the Government shut out of the country all Koreans who succeeded in going abroad for higher education. As if this were not enough, great emphasis was laid upon Nipponese culture, methods, and institutions, and the people of Chosen encouraged to emulate everything Japanese and to follow the teachings and example of Japanese subjects. Only through subservience to their Nipponese masters and the cultivation of Japanese customs, language, and ideals could the Koreans hope to get ahead and rise to positions of influence and wealth. Even on the railways and in hotels and public places, the Japanese were served first and given the best places, while Koreans were compelled to wait and take their turn.

In this way the Japanese authorities threw away an excellent opportunity to create confidence, coöperation, and good-will through the tactful direction of public opinion and the pursuance of a policy of national magnanimity. Instead, their high-handed paternalism, short-sighted selfishness, and egotistical oppressive tactics during a period of nearly nine years alienated the intelligent Koreans and turned public opinion both in Korea and abroad against them. Although many became indifferent to their fate and others went over to the Japanese for personal profit and advancement, the majority of the people of Chosen, "sorrowful at the loss of independence" and embittered over the humiliation of the nation, were transformed into a nation of passive resisters; and the antagonism to the Japanese régime became even greater than it had been in 1905, while the program of assimilation united the whole country in an intense longing for independence and an individual national life. "This very policy of assimilation," wrote Bland, "has breathed a new spirit of life into the passive resistance of the Koreans and aroused in them a

strong, though still non-combatant, ardor of nationalism. They may bow to the presence of the alien invader, they may even admit that his progressive administration has increased the material prosperity of their country, but they firmly decline to admit the superiority of Japan's intellectual and moral culture, they refuse to be assimilated, and their refusal has assumed the force of a conscious national movement."

This quiescent unity was intensified as the years went on by the discrimination against Koreans and by the secret propaganda of the "Provisional Government of Korea" — a patriotic organization with headquarters at Shanghai supported by thousands of Korean exiles. This powerful association, however, although the avowed champion of Korean liberty and independence, was an advocate of passive resistance and opposed any recourse to force. Moreover, there is little doubt that this silent but steadily growing demand for a Korean national life and government was not only materially furthered by the democratic teachings and atmosphere in the Christian schools, but also was given a tremendous impetus by President Wilson's public enunciation of the doctrine of self-determination for all nations.

Finally, in 1919, this incoherent desire for independence found public expression in an "independence movement," or independence demonstration as it should more properly be called. And the world has never seen a more striking or more universal expression of the popular will than was shown in a peaceful yet courageous and dignified manner by the Koreans on that occasion. Their action was as sudden and as simultaneous as it was spirited and consistent. Yet it was not a revolution, or even a violent popular uprising against Japanese authority. It was simply a peaceful popular demonstration in the interests of national freedom;

and no violence was premeditated, either against the Imperial Government or against the homes or persons of Japanese nationals living in Korea. Nevertheless, it took the Japanese authorities, in spite of all their espionage and everlasting investigations, completely by surprise; and it revealed to the world at large the real situation in Korea.

On the first day of March, 1919, the whole country was in mourning for the Korean Emperor recently deceased; and two hundred thousand people had poured into Seoul to witness the grand state funeral of the old ruler, which was to take place in two days. In the morning of that day, thirty-three enthusiastic and courageous young men sat down in a popular restaurant and drafted the "Declaration of Independence of Korea." It contained these sentiments: "We herewith proclaim Korea an independent state and her people free. . . . We do not wish to find fault with Japan. . . . Our one responsibility is to establish ourselves and not to pull down others. Our duty is to break up the fallow ground of our destiny, and not for a moment, through long-smothered resentment or passing anger, to spitefully attack. . . . Our wish is to move the Japanese Government . . . to change to something better and return by a straight road to the place of innocence. The result of unasked-for annexation has been oppression, time-serving partiality, statistics based on false reports intended to show the opposite of the truth in a profit and loss account between the two peoples. . . . Let them make right what is wrong, and, by a just comprehension based on sympathy, open up a new and kindly relationship which shall put an end to trouble and bring blessing to both. . . . Independence for us to-day, while it means an honor due Korea, at the same time means Japan's departure from an unjust way to one in which she may truly assume the great responsibility of the protector of the Far East." And it exhorted the people

for the sake of truth, humanity, life, and honor, to "manifest the spirit of independence only, and not the spirit of strife"; to "express their real opinion"; and to do everything "in order, so that our purpose and attitude, in every circumstance, may commend themselves as right."

Early in the afternoon of the same day, a young man mounted the pavilion in Pagoda Park, Seoul, and read this proclamation to the enormous crowd of people who filled the Park. "After finishing the reading," writes an eye-witness, "the young man lifted his arms high in the air and began a rousing cheer for Korea, which was instantly caught up by the impassioned throng, and in the twinkle of an eye, the surging mass of people in the park and in the main thoroughfare adjoining were giving deafening cheers for the independence of Korea. Soon, from the East Gate to the West Gate and from the Bell Tower in the center of the city to the South Gate, a veritable pandemonium of enthusiasm and joy reigned. Students with books in one hand and uplifted cap in the other; stately white-robed old gentlemen with their hoary beards flowing and their wrinkled hands waving; young girls with their dark skirts streaming and upturned faces shining; elderly ladies with their characteristic green veils on top of the immaculate dress; mechanics with their rolled-up sleeves and some of them with tools still in hand; sons of the rich with their shimmering silk coats flying; rustic farmers with horny fingers and bony arms lifted toward the blue heavens; stocky-limbed cart-pullers with their long white cloth wound tightly round the head and hung loosely behind; staid and substantial-looking merchants and shopkeepers, some with long pipes, and others with pen either in their hands or behind their ears; fat and plump youngsters with their baggy wadded pantaloons, some in wooden shoes, and some in silk slippers; smart-looking young men dressed

in European style and wearing rimless spectacles; and men and women of every and sundry description, age, and rank — one and all — were in a happy delirium, shouting: ‘Mansai! Mansai! Tok-rip Mansai!’”¹

The people then marched in three great throngs to the Tuksoo royal palace, the American and French consulates, and the offices of the Governor-General, where they cheered again for independence. But they were soon dispersed, the demonstration brought to a sudden and inglorious end, and hundreds of men and women beaten and imprisoned, by a scatter-brained crowd of soldiers and gendarmes who were so startled and frightened by such an unheard-of event that they knew not how to meet the emergency. Meanwhile, similar demonstrations were taking place throughout the country in the public squares and buildings, wherever memorial services for the Emperor were being held; and the police and troops were running hither and yon, performing prodigies of valor such as turning fire hose on the people, firing into the helpless crowds, setting fire to churches in which villagers or towns-folk were assembled, and beating, arresting, and torturing the leaders of the so-called mobs and uprisings. Yet there were no leaders or revolutionary promoters. The thirty-three signers of the Declaration of Independence, who promptly informed the police of their own whereabouts and what they had done, and who were as promptly arrested, were not conspirators; nor did they have anything to do with the popular demonstrations in other parts of the country. The movement was a nation-wide affair — spontaneous and without special leaders or concerted plans of operation. “All the people,” said Yi Sang-chi (the Tolstoy of Korea), “from Fusan to the Ever-White Mountains and beyond are running it. They are all in it. They are the committees back of the agitation.”

¹ Cynn, Hugh Heung-Wo, *The Rebirth of Korea* (New York: 1920), pp. 23, 24.

This lack of leaders, however, as well as the absence of any concrete program — other than a demand for independence — was a great handicap to the success of the movement; for there was no committee or representative body with whom the Japanese authorities could deal; and, without organization, it was impossible to utilize the popular agitation to bring any sustained pressure upon the Nipponese Government. On the other hand, the Japanese administrators, who hastily assumed that they had to contend with a widespread national uprising, failed to grasp the real significance of the situation. Instead of calling in a number of prominent Koreans and making a sympathetic yet serious effort to discover what the popular grievances were, and what measures would best meet the situation and restore order and public confidence, the Nipponese officials set in operation precipitately all their police and military forces. Innocent men and women were arrested wholesale on suspicion and thrown into prison, and outrageous attacks were made upon helpless villages by gendarmes and soldiers. Hundreds of persons were persecuted and suffered great indignities at the hands of the police and troops without any trial or being subject to any specific accusations; and in the prisons numbers of Koreans were beaten and tortured to make them reveal the names of the so-called conspirators. Indeed, this persecution became so widespread and terrible that it aroused at length the indignation of the whole world; and the force of public opinion — both in Korea and abroad — compelled the Japanese Government to promise reforms in the administration of Korea, as soon as it had satisfied its own requirements concerning the restoration of order on the peninsula. Meanwhile, considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Nipponese Government to change its imperialistic policy toward Korea, by the Liberal Party in

the home country, which, by the time the Washington Conference met in 1921, had forced out of office the old military crowd and secured a more liberal government for Japan.

Finally, Admiral Baron Saito and Dr. Midzuno were appointed to the offices of Governor-General and Administrative Superintendent of Chosen, respectively, on August 12, 1919, with instructions to reorganize the Korean administration at once. The naïve explanation, given in the Governor-General's first *Report*,¹ that the reforms were "necessitated by the changing times," had little to do with it. The good intentions of the new administration are unquestionable, and its directors are anxious to abolish all abuses and injustice and to establish cordial relations and coöperation with the Koreans. In their first proclamations to the public they expressed a desire "to meet the requirements of the times and lay a solid foundation for a cultural policy," to give fair and impartial treatment to the native population, to promote the development of the national resources and the well-being of the people, to establish local autonomous government, to place the political institutions on a firm, secure basis, and to maintain the "security and welfare of our territory of Korea." Yet it is doubtful if the Japanese authorities have had a real change of heart or that they understand even now the first essentials of a successful and liberal colonial policy; for, in the same breath with which the above principles of reform were enunciated, the worthy reformers expressed their determination to "pursue faithfully the state policy and vindicate the spirit of annexation," to place "the Japanese and Korean people on an equal footing" (this is the Koreans' own country where 17,000,000 Koreans live side by side with 370,000 Japanese intruders), and to adjust the "administrative institutions

¹ Annual Report on *Reforms and Progress in Chosen*, 1918-21.

in conformity with the standard of popular living and the progress of the times.”¹ They promise the abolition of flogging because, in the words of Dr. Midzuno, it is a “punishment at variance with the modern idea aiming at the reformation of erring people”; while the same administrator is reported as saying: “She [Japan] can no more accept the idea of an independent Korea than Great Britain can afford to recognize an independent Irish Republic.”

The reforms instituted since 1919, however, are excellent as far as they go. The Governor-General is now a civil officer, who, although he has assumed direct control over the police department, retains no military or naval authority. The departments of his administration have been reorganized as bureaus with separate ones for education, police, general affairs, engineering, and railways. And the old council of Korean nobles has become a real advisory body, although its powers are confined to recommendations concerning old Korean institutions, customs, and manners. In the local field, all the thirteen provinces have been given provincial advisory councils — partly elective and partly nominative — which held their first meeting in 1921 and contained 87 Japanese and 275 Korean members. Advisory councils were also provided in all the municipalities and villages. In 1920, the first elections were held in 34 selected villages and 12 municipalities, in the former of which 130 Japanese were elected by eighty-eight per cent of the Japanese voters and 126 Koreans by seventy-three per cent of Korean voters, and in the latter 134 Japanese (eighty-eight per cent voting) and 56 Koreans (sixty-six per cent voting). In all the other municipalities and villages the advisory councils were nominated. These advisory councils in the provinces,

¹ Compare *Annual Report*, 1918-21, and *The New Administration in Chosen*, compiled by the Governor-General of Chosen, July, 1921.

municipalities, and villages concern themselves only with financial questions and taxes. They are in no sense self-governing bodies, but are intended as a step forward in training the people in the administration of public affairs. In addition, school councils are to be created in the cities and districts — elected in municipalities and appointed in the districts — to advise on educational policy and the collection of taxes for public schools.

There has been considerable “abatement in officialism” in government circles, including the abolition of much red tape and of the wearing of swords and uniforms except by the police, customs officials, and prison guards. The personal disabilities against Koreans for the greater part have been removed. The salaries of Korean officials have been raised to the level of the Japanese, and they have been made eligible to the ranks and decorations for service since the beginning of the Residency-General. Korean judges and public prosecutors now enjoy jurisdiction over all cases; and the principalships of common schools are open to Koreans. The restrictions on the use of the Korean language have been removed and its study has been made compulsory in the common schools. Yet, curiously enough, two subjects — the Japanese language and morals — were made required studies in all private schools. The disabilities in common-school education were abolished by lengthening the common-school courses in Korean schools and making provision for placing the elementary and secondary education for Koreans and Japanese on the same basis. In addition, a committee was appointed in January, 1920, to standardize Korean education on the same basis as the educational system in Japan, to promote the co-education of Japanese and Koreans, and to perfect plans to satisfy the desire of the Korean people for education. Meanwhile, provision was made by the Government to

increase the number of Korean common schools from 556 (1919) to 870 by 1923.

In the financial and commercial field, the customs system and tariffs of Japan were extended to Korea on August 29, 1920, new tariff regulations laid on goods exchanged between Japan and Chosen, larger imperial loans made to Korea, and the annual budget of Korea for 1921 raised to 162,000,000 yen, or 113,000,000 yen in excess of that for 1911. The old company law favoring corporations in private railway enterprises was abolished. Governmental aids to afforestation and agriculture were much increased; and additional improvements made in the postal and telegraph service, communications, sanitation, harbors, and public works.

To appease the Korean popular demand for more personal freedom and consideration for Korean interests, freedom of the press has been recognized on a limited scale: e.g., three Korean papers appeared in Seoul and several in the provinces in 1919-20, and five Korean secretaries were appointed to the Governor-General, whose duties are "to observe popular conditions, spread moderate views, and enlighten the younger generation in the provinces." Finally, a special "Information Section" was created in the Bureau of General Affairs to "make known the true spirit of the new policy to the general public" and to acquaint Japan and the world with the real conditions existing in Korea, through moving pictures, public lectures, magazine articles, illustrated works, and a general propaganda.

A reform program, such as that just outlined, speaks well for the intelligence, benevolence, and sincerity of its authors; but it is too short-sighted and too narrow to solve successfully and expeditiously the Korean tangle. It is more a panacea for the redress of grievances and a

stop-gap to hold back the tide of the Korean movement for independence than a constructive program of reform which will readjust judicially, fairly, and firmly the political relations between the two countries. More than likely, Japan has not shown her full hand in this new deal with Korea; but it would be folly not to have conceived at this auspicious time a reasonably complete program for the political regeneration of Korea. The only hopeful sign of such a statesmanlike move shown in the list of proposed and inaugurated reforms, however, is the creation of advisory councils in the provinces, the municipalities, and villages. If the Japanese authorities are sincere in this move, and give it an honest and fair trial, they will soon have in their hands the means of creating local autonomy, or self-rule by and for the Koreans, throughout the peninsula; and there is no doubt that the Koreans will measure up to it in time if education and training are provided. If this point is once reached, it will be impossible for the Japanese to turn backward; but they will have to proceed to the establishment of some form of autonomy for the whole province under Japanese suzerainty; and this, if the Japanese authorities will but see it, is the only practical solution of the Korean question.

Indeed, politically and economically, it would be greatly to the advantage of Japan to have an autonomous, self-supporting, and contented nation in Korea, maintaining with her friendly relations and coöperating with her in the protection of their joint interests on the mainland of Asia. It certainly would be far preferable to the present condition where Japan is holding down by main force a restless and hostile race, while she bears the burden, not only of maintaining order in Korea, but also of defending single-handed her rights and interests on the continent. This is already apparent to the most enlightened

political thinkers among the Japanese; for one of the high Japanese officials in Korea is reported to have remarked recently: "Though it is treason to say so now, Korea will get her independence eventually, as soon as she can stand on her own feet and protect herself — and us — from the north."

If this be so, what is the justification for withholding from the Koreans all participation in political or governmental activities for nearly twenty years? There is none; and the most fatal and far-reaching blunder made by the Japanese in handling this situation was their failure to take the Korean people into their confidence in 1905, and to inaugurate, at that time, with the coöperation and support of the Korean nation, the reconstruction of the Korean state. Instead, they have been blundering along trying to solve the problem themselves *for* the Koreans, while keeping a keen eye open for the special interests of Japan. But the tangle will never be solved in this fashion. In approaching a task of such a complicated and difficult nature, it must first be recognized that there are obligations — both political and moral — on the part of both of the nations involved. In this instance, the Koreans must recognize that they owe much to Japan for saving them from Russian or Chinese domination, and for giving them an efficient and orderly administration, together with many economic, commercial, and educational advantages and considerable material prosperity. On the other hand, it is incumbent on the Japanese to realize that, since they have taken over the control of the peninsula and assumed the task of governing seventeen million Koreans, it is their duty, not only to provide good government and material prosperity, but also to see that the Koreans enjoy those intellectual, scientific, moral, and political advantages and opportunities which will enable the nation to find itself.

And both peoples must see the real need they both have of the coöperation and assistance of each other, if an equitable, stable, peaceful, and progressive situation is to be created on the northeast mainland of Asia.

In the second place, the success of any government over dependent peoples is contingent upon the ability of the controlling power to secure the confidence and coöperation of the people over whom it exerts control, to treat them with strict justice, equality, and impartiality, and to furnish them with the education, the training, and the individual freedom whereby they may become reliant, self-supporting, and qualified for self-rule. The native inhabitants should be given a share in their own local government from the start; and this participation should be increased as rapidly as the people are prepared to assume control and can be qualified for the work of self-government. If, for a time, it is necessary and wise to retain the powers of administration almost wholly in the hands of the alien and superior state, the ruling must be carried on for the good of the governed, not for their exploitation or for the advantage of the controlling power.

In the present instance, the Japanese Government will make little real progress toward the solution of the Korean tangle until it arrives at the point where it can lay as much stress on the rights of the Korean nation as it does on the paramount interests of the Nipponese state. It must recognize that the peninsula is Korean territory, and that the Korean nation is as much entitled to its individual life and development as the Japanese nation is. It is putting the cart before the horse, to give the best of everything and the control of affairs to the 370,000 Japanese immigrants, while the 17,000,000 Koreans are permitted to drag along behind. Is it not adding insult to injury to say that the Koreans will be admitted to equality with the Japanese

in the Koreans' own country? Would it not be fairer and more likely to arouse the confidence of the natives, if Japanese immigrants were admitted to the peninsula under special regulations, but on an equality with Koreans?

It is well known that the new reform administration is not receiving the full support of the Korean nation. The people are giving little coöperation in the new efforts and regulations and institutions. The great majority are still holding aloof, waiting to be convinced that the Japanese Government has had a real change of heart. They are not yet certain of the disinterestedness of Japanese statesmen and governors, nor of their genuine regard for the welfare of Korea and her people. The history of the past relations between Japan and Chosen does not inspire them with confidence in the justice and integrity of the Japanese. On the contrary, it makes them timorous about placing much trust in the promises of the Nipponese reforming statesmen. This is a great handicap for Japan. And it cannot be overcome, except by a straightforward, honorable, and just treatment of Korean rights, interests, and problems, and by convincing the Korean people that their country and its natural resources are to be administered and developed by and for the Korean nation.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OUTLYING PROVINCES OF MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA, SINKIANG, AND CHINGHAI

AMONG the manifold problems awaiting solution in the Far East, few are more worthy of study than that of the outlying provinces of China. It derives its importance not only from the intimate relationship of these provinces to the Chinese state, but also because of its vital connection with the economic development of, and the maintenance of peace in, eastern Asia. Politically speaking, the Chinese Republic is composed of the eighteen provinces of China proper and the administrative districts of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), and Tibet. The vast region embraced within these four territories, whose area is approximately 2,745,000 square miles,¹ or about the area of continental United States less the state of Texas, or one and one half times that of China proper, was originally incorporated in the Chinese Empire by the Manchu Emperors. Its population is relatively small — only about 18,500,000 inhabitants out of a total of approximately 330,000,000² within the Chinese Republic in 1912. To-day,³ however, the Chinese authorities are actually administering only one and a part of two others of these

¹ The area of Manchuria is, in round numbers, 363,000 square miles; of Mongolia, 1,367,000; of Sinkiang, 550,000; and of Tibet, 463,000 (Chinghai alone has about 363,000).

² The best estimates vary from 320,650,000 (*Peking Government Gazette*, February 27, 1911) and 331,840,000 (Ministry of the Interior, 1910) to 433,553,000 (Chinese Imperial Customs, 1910). The *China Year-Book* for 1924 gives the population as 331,000,000, and the Chinese Imperial Customs for 1921 estimates the population at 443,382,000.

³ March, 1925.

great districts. Manchuria is under the control of General Chang Tso-lin, and since 1922 has been completely independent of the Peking Government. Outer Mongolia has been from July, 1921, the "Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Government" and under the thumb of the Russian Soviet Government, while Inner Mongolia remains under Chinese control. Tibet since 1912 has been divided roughly into Tibet proper¹—an autonomous state over which China retains only a nominal suzerainty—and the province of Chinghai administered directly by Chinese officials.

Under the Empire, the outlying provinces were not treated as colonies, but as integral parts of the Manchu realm; and the Emperors governed them through a simple system of military governors and assistants under the Board of Dependencies (earlier the Court of Colonial Affairs) at Peking. The administrative divisions were drawn almost exclusively along racial and tribal lines. The three provinces of Manchuria, each with its own governor, were placed in 1907 under the Viceroy, or Governor-General, of Manchuria. The Governor of Shengking, moreover, had supervision over the eastern tribes of Inner Mongolia, while the Viceroy of Chihli enjoyed jurisdiction over the central tribes and the Governor of Kansu over the western group. The Ambans of Urga and Kobdo, and the Tartar-General of Uliassutai controlled Outer Mongolia; and the Viceroy of Kansu and Shensi exercised supervision over Sinkiang through the Tartar-Generals of Ili and Tarbagatai and the Taotais of Urumchi, Kuldja, Kashgar, and Aksu. And the Controller-General, or Amban, of Koko Nor, residing at Sining-fu in Kansu, administered the affairs of Koko Nor and northern Tibet (the region now known as the province of Chinghai), while the two Ambans of Lhasa supervised the government of Tibet proper.

¹ See Chapter X.

In every case, the local and tribal government was preserved intact; and the peoples of the various districts were ruled through their own begs, local princes and chieftains. Local laws, customs, and religions were everywhere respected and maintained, the Manchu and Chinese officials simply acting as supervisors of the local governments and as collectors of the imperial taxes.

The boundaries of these great outer territories have never been surveyed accurately or definitely determined. But they contain the strange deserts of Gobi and Taklamakan, the wind-swept plateaus of Mongolia, the fertile grass lands of Inner Mongolia, the wild mountain regions of the Great Khinghan, the Altai, the Tannu-ola, the Tienshan, and the Kuenlun, and the weird lake and swamp districts of Sinkiang and Koko Nor. Their inhabitants comprise a variety of races including Manchus, Mongols, Turkis or Tartars, Sarts, Tibetans, and Chinese; and they are more or less closely related and held together by ties of blood, custom, historic tradition, and — in some instances such as the Mongols and Tibetans — by religion. They constitute in the main the so-called five races whose union made the old Empire and the new Republic. But the first four — the Manchus, Mongols, Turkis, and Tibetans — can in no sense be considered Chinese; nor have their lands at any time been an integral part of the eighteen provinces of China proper; nor have they been permitted any real representation in the Chinese Government either under the Manchus or under the Republic.

All of these Tartar peoples, although loving freedom of life and action and deeply imbued with a spirit of local independence, recognized the suzerainty of the Emperors for upwards of three hundred years, but they were a constant source of trouble and anxiety to those rulers; and neither those potentates, nor the Republican administrators

who followed them, met with an unqualified success in the administration of these vast regions with their mixed populations. The Republican authorities replaced the Manchu officials with Chinese military governors and assistants, and completed the formation of two new departments — of Colonization and Frontier Defense — created in 1907 by the Manchus, which were to provide troops for the protection of the frontiers in Inner Mongolia and Tibet and to promote colonization and trade in Mongolia and Tibet. But, so far, the Chinese Government has failed to originate a system of territorial government or to set up a colonial administration that will adequately meet the demands of this peculiar and delicate situation. Moreover, it has not only been unable to gain the confidence of these Tartar peoples, but also its methods and attitude of superiority have roused the enmity of the inhabitants of the dependencies and caused serious troubles and complications — particularly in Mongolia and Tibet.


Ever since Marco Polo crossed the Steppes of Turkestan into distant Cathay and the days when the Tartar hordes of Asia burst into Russia and Asia Minor, the names Mongol and Mongolia have had a peculiar fascination for the European or Westerner. So many virile and famous leaders who founded remarkable states or empires in Asia and Europe have come from the wild plains and valleys of Mongolia; and so little is really known of this remarkable region to-day that men are still fascinated with stories from the Great Gobi, Urga, Kobdo, the Altai, and Kashgaria. Any accurate study of these regions, however, should naturally begin with a definition of terms and boundaries. However, in this instance, accuracy is impossible, since neither the terminology of Central Asia nor the political divisions of these interior districts have been marked with scientific precision. The "Mongolia" of modern maps is

the usual designation given to the great northern province of China, but its boundaries have been determined only approximately, and it corresponds neither to the Mongolia of earlier days nor to the region of the same name claimed by the Mongol princes.

Chinese Mongolia is merely an administrative division of the Chinese territories, created purely for governmental purposes without regard to the character of the inhabitants or the nature of the country. The same may be said in the main of Sinkiang and Chinghai; and herein lies one of the chief causes of the failure of the Chinese administrators in dealing with these outlying provinces. Their point of view has been very largely Chinese, and they have very seldom taken into serious consideration the rights and interests of the subject peoples.

Mongolia, as it appears on the latest Chinese maps, has an estimated area of 1,200,000 to 1,367,500 square miles and a population of from 1,800,000 to 3,000,000. For many years it has been roughly divided into *Outer* Mongolia with 1,100,000 square miles of territory and 1,200,000 people (in round numbers) and *Inner* Mongolia possessing approximately 263,500 square miles and 600,000 inhabitants. The division is purely political and artificial, being the result of tribal agreements and the work of Chinese rulers. There are no natural barriers, and the whole region is one unit ethnographically and physically, which embraces in addition some adjacent sections of territory now under other governments, such as Barga in Manchuria, Zungaria in Sinkiang, Koko Nor (now part of the new Chinese province of Chinghai), and certain districts in the province of Chihli lying north of the Great Wall.

Outer Mongolia physically is composed of two well-defined districts: the *Northwestern*, a high terrace of mountains, valleys, and plateaus covering the whole of the



north and west portions of Mongolia (including the Altai and Tarbagatai sections), and *the Shamo or Gobi*, a low terrace of hills and plateaus and the Desert of Gobi as far as the western slopes of the Great Khinghan Mountains. The southern boundary of the Shamo is naturally the foothills of north China along which the Great Wall was built, but the region lying north of the Chinese provinces of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, and Chihli and extending from the Edsin Gol to the Great Khinghan Mountains was designated as *Inner Mongolia*; to which was added the district east of the Great Khinghan, known as the Eastern Shamo or Gobi, the greater part of which lies between the Shara Muren and Nonni Rivers; and down to the latter part of the eighteenth century, at least, it included also the plateaus and pasture lands — the so-called “grass lands” — lying north of the Great Wall in what is now the province of Chihli.

The Mongol princes and chieftains of this enormous region — nearly one half the size of the United States — were independent for several centuries, tracing their positions and rights back to the days of the notorious Temudjin — founder of the first empire of the Mongols, who was made Jenghis or Genghis (“The Invincible”) Khan about 1189 — and of his descendant, Kublai Khan, who became Emperor of China in 1280. These remarkable Tartar warriors and their successors, with their black hair, piercing eyes, swarthy countenances, and stocky, muscular bodies, mounted upon their wonderful horses, and carrying their yak-tailed standards, overran all of northern Asia and eastern Europe. They conquered not only all of Asia proper, but also Russia to the Dnieper River, Turkestan, Asia Minor, Persia, and India. And one of their kinsmen — Baber, sixth descendant of Tamerlane — founded the Empire of the Grand Moghul in India. But

these warriors in turn were overthrown by their own quarrels and the lives of ease and indulgence that followed the years of conquest; and, while they left their impress on the map and development of Asia and Europe, their name has remained a synonym for cruelty, plunder, and devastation — the word “Tartar” being mentioned with fear and trembling in Europe for many a long year.

When the great empire of the Tartars broke up, the Mongol peoples, divided into groups under minor chiefs, were scattered all the way from eastern Russia and Asia Minor to northern China and Manchuria. Some were absorbed into Russia, Turkey, and China. Others, living within the boundaries of old Mongolia (including Zungaria and Koko Nor), but separated by the natural physical divisions of the land and differences in religion, preferred the suzerainty of the Manchus to the domination of the Russian Czars. And they were incorporated in the Chinese Empire by the Manchu Emperors between 1688 and 1756, although the power of the Mongols in China had been successfully broken by the Ming rulers three centuries before. This Chinese group of Tartars, composed mainly of nomadic and picturesque Khalkas, Eleuts, Tumets, Chahars, and Buriats, soon ceased their wanderings and settled down to a prosaic pastoral life — moving their flocks and herds from northern to southern pastures but twice a year. Ultimately, districts were marked out as the “home lands” of the various tribes.

The Mongols are a hardy people, inured to privation and poverty and accustomed to a roving, out-of-door existence. They live in yurts or tents, enclosed by high wooden palisades, and are addicted to hunting, horse-racing, and intemperate drinking. Both sexes are excellent riders, spending most of their lives in the saddle; and their chief occupation is the raising of cattle, sheep, camels,

and horses, and agriculture (in some sections such as the Ordos country), while many make a living driving the camel caravans which transport the imports and exports of the land, in and out and across the country. As farmers, they are inferior to the more industrious Chinese whom they resemble in a general way, having the same black hair and swarthy complexions. Their countenances are broad and flat with small squat noses and prominent cheek-bones, and their bodies are broad and muscular. Curiously enough, these Tartar nomads have a fear of water, and the healthfulness of its use is unknown to them; but they are noted for their good-nature, their easy-going, slovenly habits, the masculinity of their women, and the filthiness of their villages and homes. In virility and intelligence, these Mongols were supposed to have been superior to the Chinese; but to-day, after generations spent amid ignorance, superstition, vice, and indolence, they do not impress the traveler greatly, for, like the American Indian, their day seems to have passed. Yet, in some unaccountable way, these childlike Tartars appeal to the European more than most Asiatic peoples do; and some of the tribes, such as the Ordos Mongols, are superior in appearance and bearing to the Chinese and Japanese, being tall and well-built, and numbers of the women really fine-looking; while many of the Mongol khans and members of the ruling families still retain the culture, the dignity, the energy, and the resourcefulness of their famous ancestors. They are the backbone of the nation to-day, and the hope of all future progress and development.

The Kianghi tribes of the Altai ranges and the majority of the Turkis inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan, or Sinkiang, adopted Mohammedanism; and the Buriat clans living west of Lake Baikal and on the island of Olkhon retained their old pagan religion. But the greater

part of the Mongol people were converted to that form of Buddhism known as Lamaism. Following the lead of the four Aimaks of Khalka, they recognize the headship of the Bogdo of Urga, who is the third of the most sacred reincarnations, or Living Buddhas — the other two being the Dalai and Tashi, or Teshu, Lamas of Tibet. This head of the Lamaistic Church of Mongolia bears the high-sounding title of Cheptsun (Jebtsun) Damba Hutukhtu, which was originally conferred on the Tuchetu Khan, in 1650, by the Lamas of Tibet. Through the influence of the Manchu Government, however, which wished to place a check on the growing power of the Bogdo, while at the same time utilizing the Living Buddhas in controlling the restless Khalka tribal princes, these Urga popes have been brought from Tibet since 1757, and have no family connection or secular influence in Mongolia. Still their religious influence is felt, not only throughout Mongolia, but also in all the adjacent regions inhabited by Mongols; and in the supplementary letters to the Tripartite Agreement of May 25, 1915, it was specially stipulated that no restraint should be placed upon the Mongols to prevent them from making pilgrimages to the Hutukhtu.

With the introduction of Lamaism, the old warlike spirit of conquest and enterprise disappeared. The nomadic and tribal instincts remained, but the people lost their natural energy and ambition; for, by leading the race into lives of indolence and ease and depriving it of much of its man-power and leadership by drafting an enormous portion of its male inhabitants into the monastic life, the lamas have retarded the development of Mongolia for three centuries. They maintained a low standard of morality in a region already suffering from a lack of moral order and a backward state of civilization. They filled the land with temples and monasteries,

laid the heavy hand of superstition upon its inhabitants, and made their religion, with its prayer-wheels, its sacred stones, its devil dances, and its barbaric festivals, an integral part of the life of the people, influencing all their activities from the cradle to the grave. Meanwhile, the onerous demands of this lamaistic system, which required the support of hundreds of monasteries and the maintenance in idleness of thousands of lamas, imposed a tremendous economic burden upon the country. Every other man one meets on the streets of Urga is a yellow-capped lama; and recent statistics show that the lamas constitute about five eighths of the male population. There is hardly a town or city of any description without one or more temples and monasteries. Large sums pour annually into the coffers of the Hutukhtu; and much of the wealth of the land is in the hands of the lamas, while to them alone belongs the right to work the mines or extract treasure from the soil. Coupled with all this moral and spiritual degradation and superstition, there is a disregard for human life, and a colossal ignorance of common hygienic laws, that are causing a high death-rate and numerous epidemics of disease and a loss of national vitality. Is it any wonder, then, that the Mongol race is threatened with extinction? Or that the Mongol state is likely to be engulfed by the advancing waves of the Chinese, Russian, or Japanese civilization?

Meng Ku or Mongolia is divided, for political purposes, roughly into *Outer* or Northern Mongolia and *Inner* or Southern Mongolia; but there is no natural physical boundary between these two sections. The Manchu rulers preserved the old Mongol Government under Khans, Jassaks (head of the Khoshuns or Hoshuns), and head men, permitting a greater degree of independence to the princes of Outer than to the local rulers of Inner Mongolia,

while here and there certain independent communities were placed under the direct supervision of a Manchu military official. Outer Mongolia is made up of the districts of Khalka, Uliassutai, and Kobdo, and the territories of Uriankhai, Durbet, Altai, and Tarbagatai, the first three divisions being under the supervision respectively of the Chinese Ambans of Khalka (Urga) and Kobdo and the Tartar-General of Uliassutai. In these various communities the tribal units — Banners or Hoshuns — were consolidated into Aimaks, or Princedoms, bound together by common ties of race, religion, history, and family leadership or rule, and governed by a prince with the title of Khan. These Khans were in turn subject to the Chinese Ambans and recognized the religious headship of the Hutukhtu. In Khalka and Uliassutai are four Aimaks:¹ Tsetsen (twenty-three Hoshuns), Tuchetu (twenty Hoshuns), Sainnoin (twenty-four Hoshuns), and Sassaktu (nineteen Hoshuns), comprising in all eighty-six Banners, each being controlled by its own Jassak, but all being governed by the senior Jassak or Prince of the Aimak. In Kobdo, the Jassaks are responsible directly to the Chinese Commissioner; and the tribal government was very simple, but effective. The cities of Urga, Kobdo, and Uliassutai were the chief commercial centers of Outer Mongolia — Urga being 1200 miles from Kalgan (in northern Chihli and the point of departure for caravans from China), Uliassutai 950 miles from Urga, and Kobdo 470 miles from Uliassutai, but 280 miles from the Russian frontier — and the stations on the caravan and mail routes across Mongolia from Kansu, Eastern Turkestan, Siberia, and North China. Each of these towns contained a Russian consulate and residence, and the yamen of a

¹ Known as the Khalka Aimaks because inhabited almost exclusively by Khalka tribes.

Chinese provincial or territorial administrator; while its streets were filled with Russian and Chinese shops. Between 1912 and 1920, however, Chinese and Russian trade with these regions ceased, with the exception of Urga; the shops were closed and the towns were dead and uninteresting.

Of the four territories of northern Mongolia whose inhabitants are organized into thirty-eight tribal groups, and whose lands are considered by the Chinese to lie outside of Mongolia proper, *Uriankhai* is the largest and most important. It is a wild, undeveloped mountain region lying between the Siansk and the Tannu-ola mountain ranges, and was administered by the Amban of Kobdo. Since 1860, a Russian commercial penetration into this region has taken place. Their traders pushed into the country — particularly into the valley of the Upper Yenesai — and at Cha-Kul on the Ula-Kem River, establishing trading posts, settlements, ranches, and factories. Soon after 1914, the trade ceased completely, but it was resumed again in 1920; and, after the Russian Soviet took control of Outer Mongolia in 1921, they tried to make their hold on Uriankhai complete and permanent. *Durbet* is a small Mongol community inhabiting a district of some sixteen thousand square miles, which lies between the Ubssa Nor (Lake), Uriankhai, and the Little Altai Mountains, and includes the Turgun and Barmen ranges and the southern side of the Sailugem with the intervening plains and plateaus. It is ruled by two native princes: the Dalai Khan (Great Chief) who controls the eastern section (about two thirds of the territory) and the Wang who administers the western portion. These rulers are assisted by four minor chieftains, but were subject under the Empire to the Chinese Amban at Kobdo.

The *Kirei* — an interesting and capable Mohammedan people of the Kirghiz family — inhabit the western flanks

of the Altai (Mongolian) mountain chain, headwaters of the Black Irtysh River, and the vicinity of Lakes Dolto Nor and Dain Kul, the sources of the Kobdo River, on the eastern side. They are a well-to-do, fine-appearing race living in cleanly, well-equipped yurts and possessing valuable flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. Their chief overlord is the Khan-Kam, who has taken the surname of Jenghis, since he claims, without any historical basis or right, to be a direct descendant from Jenghis Khan, who conquered all the Kirghiz people of Mongolia and Turkestan. The Khan-Kam was under the supervision of the Chinese Altai Resident, or Amban, living at Sherasumé.

Tarbagatai is the district lying between the Tarbagatai and the Shair mountain ranges and including the region between the Uliungur Nor with its tributary the Urungu River and the Telli Nor. It is inhabited by Torgut and Chahar Mongol tribes and some western Kirei tribes under their own chieftains who were controlled by the Imperial Tartar-General of Tarbagatai living at Chuguchak — a walled town of some nine thousand people and the chief trade mart for Tartars, Chinese, and Russians in extreme western Mongolia.

Inner Mongolia possessed originally seven well-defined districts. Of those, five still remain within its boundaries: *Alashan*, reaching westward from the Hwang Ho to the Edsin Gol and Sokho Nor, with a capital at Fumafu in a little oasis; *Ordos*, lying between the Hwang Ho and Shensi; *Ulanchap*, just north of Ordos; *Shiljingol* (Silingol), between the Desert of Gobi, Shansi, and the Great Khinghan Mountains; and *Cherim*, the region east of the Great Khinghan stretching east and north from the province of Chihli to Shengking and Heilungkiang. The other two, *Chosotu* and *Chou Uda*, together with some small regions belonging to Chahars and Tumets, have been incor-

porated under the administration of Chihli. This extensive division of Inner Mongolia is inhabited — in addition to a large number of Chinese and Manchus — by various Mongol tribes, including the six leagues (twenty-four Aimaks) of Inner Mongolia (a part of whom live now in North Chihli), the Chahars, the Kuihuacheng Tumets, the Alashan Eleuts, and the Etsingol Old Torguts. Prior to 1911, their Aimaks were presided over by Chinese officials and possessed elective diets whose acts and decisions were subject to the approval of the Peking authorities. And their Jassaks were elective rather than hereditary chieftains, and shorn of much of their earlier power, when they decided in joint session the judicial, economic, and administrative affairs of the whole league. But, while the old Mongol organization with all its ramifications has been continued as of yore, it is purely a matter of form as far as the important affairs of government are concerned; for the military control of the region is completely in the hands of the Chinese officers under the supervision of the Bureau of Frontier Defense; and the Chinese have divided Inner Mongolia proper into three administrative districts under military governors residing at Sakhar, Jehol, and Suiyuan, while the extreme eastern portion is under the jurisdiction of the governors of the three adjacent provinces of Chihli, Shengking, and Kirin. These superior administrators exercise supervision over the tribal and local affairs of their respective districts through a number of subordinate officials; but, unfortunately, this system has failed not only to furnish good government for Inner Mongolia, but also to provide adequate means for the development of this interesting region and its defense against the encroachment of the Japanese in northern China. This has been due to the ignorance and inefficiency of the majority of the officials employed, and to the prevalence

of dishonesty, bribery, gambling, and corruption in official circles.

The incorporation of some of the Mongol tribes within the administration of the province of Chihli and the intimate relationship existing between the Chinese Government and the people occupying the lands just north of the Chinese Empire led the latter-day Chinese authorities to consider Inner Mongolia as an integral part of the Chinese Republic. They were strengthened in this conviction by the success of their own economic expansion in the north and the apparent indifference of the Mongol leaders to their assumption of authority. The Mongol princes and chieftains of Outer Mongolia — and a goodly number of the Jassaks of Inner Mongolia as well — however, continued to believe that Inner Mongolia belongs with Mongolia proper by reason of the natural unity of the inhabitants of both regions through the intimate ties of race, custom, language, religion, and historic tradition. They would include in this great and homogeneous Mongol community their compatriots: the Buriats of Bargo, the Kerei of the Altai, and the Mongols of Uriankhai, Zungaria, and Koko Nor; and they resented the Chinese efforts to partition the country and to occupy their lands.

Accordingly, a delicate situation arose, which was further complicated by a determined forward movement of Chinese settlers into Mongolia during the last years of the Manchu régime and the first years of the Republic, which received encouragement and assistance from the Chinese Government. Prior to 1758, there were no Chinese beyond the Great Wall; and the Manchu Emperors forbade colonization and discouraged emigration, forbidding, until 1878, the taking of Chinese women into Mongolia. But when the Russian expansion along the entire northern border of China (1860–1900) aroused their sus-

picion, they permitted colonies of Chinese farmers to be established at certain strategic points to offset this advance, and even sent in soldiers and gangs of workmen to start villages where settlements were needed at once; while certain natural causes induced a considerable migration into the fertile but untilled valleys and upland pastures, the "grass lands," of Inner Mongolia. This Chinese colonial movement took place along three or four clearly marked lines. The first proceeded northward through the lands of the Tumets and of the Chosotu and Chou Uda leagues into Cherim, a large part of which has passed into Chinese control and whose government was readjusted at a conference at Changchun in October, 1913, between Chinese officials and Mongol Jassaks. The second took its way from Kalgan and North Shansi along the famous Kalgan-Kiakhta trade route past Urga to the northern valleys of the Tola, Karagol, Iro, and Orkhon Rivers (beginning about 1880), to form a bulwark against Russia. The third pushed out from Kansu and Shensi to the northern slope of the Tienshan Mountains; and the fourth went along the great highways through Sinkiang to Kuldja and Kashgar.

These Chinese settlers were a thrifty and progressive lot — skilled in trade and husbandry and more than a match for the easy-going Mongols. They were permitted to purchase and take up lands right and left; and, through aggressive methods — not always above criticism — and skillful manipulation, their holdings soon took on extensive proportions and they secured the best flocks and herds. The produce and trade of the country began to pass under the control of the Chinese, and, with the exception of that portion which normally passed into Siberia, was directed toward China. No wonder the Mongols became suspicious and were filled with fear that their land and its wealth would pass into the hand of the foreigner!

They, therefore, rallied about the only leaders they knew: the Hutukhtu and the Khalka Princes.

During the critical days of 1910-11 in China, the Chinese Government tried to strengthen its position in the northern and western outlying provinces by the establishment of military posts in the chief centers and the creation of a systematic administration. The Mongols were subjected to taxation, to a two years' military service, to the furnishing of supplies for officials in government service, and to a rigorous political and military supervision in the conduct of their affairs. Santo, the Chinese Amban at Urga, was one of the most progressive and active agents of the new régime. His contempt for the Mongols, whom he considered inferior beings, was notorious. He permitted the Chinese traders to rob and cheat them, and he inflicted on them severe penalties for minor offenses. He erected barracks in Urga and brought a regiment of Chinese soldiers there. The presence of Chinese military establishments in northern Mongolia and the interference of Chinese officials in the political affairs of that region, however, angered the Mongol inhabitants, who considered these acts not only as a direct insult, but also as a violation of their ancient rights; and, under the stimulus of this oppression and the attendant excitement, the Pan-Mongolian movement, whose main issue was the unity of all the Mongol peoples in one state for mutual protection and advancement, became a vital, progressive force. It was fostered both by the lamas and the tribal leaders; and, by the middle of 1911, a secret organization to promote the independence of Mongolia was in full swing in Outer Mongolia.

In July, a mission was sent quietly to St. Petersburg to enlist the support of Russia. It was well known that the Russian Government viewed the Chinese economic ex-

pansion in northern Mongolia with considerable apprehension, because of its own large commercial interests in that region; and, in some influential quarters, the opinion prevailed that the presence of Chinese troops at Urga and other northern points was a menace to the Siberian railway system, and that the Russian political and economic interests would profit materially by the creation of an independent buffer state between China and Siberia. The Russian authorities at St. Petersburg, however, proceeded with caution, being unwilling to recognize precipitately a community that was not yet independent or to arouse the enmity of China by unneutral acts.

In December, 1911, the Chinese Amban at Urga and his troops were forced to leave the city by a successful *coup d'état* of the Mongol leaders; and the four Khalka Aimaks united in declaring the independence of Outer Mongolia under the leadership of the Hutukhtu who organized the new government under a cabinet of five ministers. This new government was controlled by the Da Lama — Minister of the Interior and leader of the national party. Soon the military party, which was first pro-Russian and then pro-Chinese, secured the leadership. It forced the appointment of the Sainnoin Khan as Premier — a new office created in the autumn of 1912 — and took over the control of the Cabinet on the death of the Da Lama in 1915. In January, 1912, the Khalka tribes were joined by the Mongols and Buriats of Kobdo, Uliassutai, and Barga. In the last-named district, the Chinese authorities withdrew peacefully and an Amban representing the Hutukhtu was established at Hailar.

Meanwhile, a second delegation of Mongol statesmen arrived at St. Petersburg during the last week of December, 1911, and on January 10, 1912, the Russian Government declared its position. The official *communiqué* stated

that the Russian State had no aggressive designs on Mongolia or desire to mix in the controversy between that province and China. Its policy was simply one of mediation, accompanied by a wish to assist in the establishment of order in Outer Mongolia, because of its own great commercial interests there and its proximity to Siberia. Russia admitted that an autonomous régime for Mongolia was preferable to direct Chinese rule and that the presence there of Chinese administrators, troops, and colonists was undesirable; but she urged moderation upon the Mongol leaders, advising Mongolia to remain under Chinese suzerainty; and, while offering Russian assistance to the Mongol rulers in introducing those administrative, economic, and cultural reforms necessary for the establishment of good government, she warned them that any action of theirs, which affected the general interest and welfare, must have the approval of China and Russia. In conclusion the Russian Government announced that, in case Outer Mongolia separated from China, it would be compelled to enter into relations with the new Mongolian Government.

Accordingly, when within the next six months it became evident that the Chinese authorities would not be able to regain control over northern Mongolia, either by diplomatic maneuvers or by a resort to force, Russia sent Jean Korostovetz to Urga in the late summer of 1912. This astute statesman and minister plenipotentiary concluded a definite treaty with Outer Mongolia on October 21st (November 3d), the terms of which constituted a recognition of the new government of Outer Mongolia and a guaranty of the support of Russia. Russian subjects, however, were to enjoy only the same rights and privileges in northern Mongolia as before. A protocol attached to the treaty defined the rights of Russian citi-

zens in respect to the following subjects: residence, trade, business relations and banking, lease and purchase of property, working of mines, timber concessions and fisheries, consular protection and consular control of "factories for branches of industry and residence," postal establishment with privilege of the use of the Mongol postal equipment and facilities up to one hundred horses and thirty camels a month, navigation of rivers, and the ancient privilege of local tribes to pasture cattle, to hunt and to fish across the border-line.

In the following January, another Mongol mission reached St. Petersburg with instructions to plead for the establishment of a Russian bank in Urga and for Russian assistance in the organization of the Mongol army and administration; and, in the same month, the old diplomat Dorjiev arrived in Urga on a mission from the Dalai Lama of Tibet. He concluded a treaty between Tibet and Outer Mongolia on January 11, 1913, the terms of which included a reciprocal recognition of the independence of Tibet and Mongolia, a promise of mutual assistance against dangers from without, and in the establishment of Buddhism on a firm basis. In addition, the subjects of both countries were to be given protection and assistance when traveling in the territory of either state, and the promotion of trade and the protection of credit were to be assured through governmental supervision.

Backed by the recognition of Russia and Tibet, the Government of Outer Mongolia continued its resistance to the Chinese overtures and the Mongolian military bands advanced into Inner Mongolia to within one hundred miles of Kalgan. All of President Yuan's diplomatic maneuvers failed, and he was precluded by internal troubles and financial difficulties from undertaking any extensive military campaign against Outer Mongolia. Accordingly, he

was compelled to turn to Russia in order to escape from an embarrassing situation; and, on October 23 (November 5), 1913, an agreement concerning Outer Mongolia was reached with the representative of that power at Peking. Russia recognized Mongolia to be under the suzerainty of China; and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, admitting the right of the Mongols to organize their own internal government. The Chinese Government agreed, moreover, not to send troops or to keep military establishments, or to permit Chinese colonies in Outer Mongolia; but they were to have the right of maintaining an official representative at Urga. The final agreement concerning all Mongolian matters of a political and territorial nature was postponed to a later conference in which the new Mongolian Government should participate; and autonomous Outer Mongolia was defined as comprising those regions that had formerly been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ambans of Urga and Kobdo and the Tartar-General of Uliassutai.¹

These terms were again the subject of a tripartite agreement between Russia, China, and Mongolia at Kiakhtha on May 25 (June 7), 1915; and from that date began the official life of "Autonomous Outer Mongolia" and the rule of the "Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hutukhtu" as the "Khan of Outer Mongolia." The first items in both agreements were the same; but in the second treaty special provisions were added concerning the position of the Chinese representative to reside at Urga and providing for free trade between China and Outer Mongolia — internal taxes on trade being allowed within the new state. Civil or criminal suits in which the subjects of China and Russia were a party were to be tried before the Chinese representative or his assistants or before the Russian consuls. The

¹ Exact boundaries to be determined later.

boundaries of Outer Mongolia were further defined as connecting with "the boundary of China at the limits of the banners of the four Aimaks of Khalka of the district of Kobdo, and bounded by the district of Houlon-Bouirs on the east, by Inner Mongolia on the south, by the province of Sinkiang on the southwest and by the districts of the Altai on the west." The actual boundary lines were to be definitely determined after a careful survey within two years; and, early in February, 1916, Prince Tsetsen Khan, a special envoy of the Hutukhtu, arrived in Peking, accompanied by a large suite. He brought presents and greetings to the President of the Republic from the Living Buddha; and, in a conference with the Peking authorities which ensued, all outstanding differences between China and Outer Mongolia were adjusted. The Mongolian movement for independence was thus crowned with success, but it was only half a triumph; for the work of creating an efficient administration and of organizing the new community into a self-sustaining, progressive state yet remained to be done.

Unfortunately, the new régime was destined to be short-lived. The entrance of Russia into the Great War, which demanded all its energies and resources, deprived the young government at Urga of its chief supporter and friend. When the Bolsheviki obtained control of Russia in 1917-18, and the subsequent conflict between their Red forces and the White armies of Siberia arose, serious border troubles ensued. The new Mongolian State was threatened with invasion by the Whites under General Semenov, the Buriat chieftains of Lake Baikal, and by marauding bands from Siberia and the neighboring provinces of North China.

This was partly a move to obtain supplies and partly the forerunner of the Bolshevik scheme to carry their

doctrines and methods to China and the Far East. Nevertheless, the Urga Government managed to preserve order within its domains and to protect its frontiers fairly well; but, fearing that it might not be able to stem the tide of Bolshevism and resist successfully the increasing movement toward banditry, it decided to appeal to China for aid.

Meanwhile, the Peking Government, aroused by the spread of Bolshevism and the increase of Japanese influence in Manchuria, eastern Mongolia, and Siberia, had materially increased its forces in Inner Mongolia and pushed its advance guards to the border of Outer Mongolia. In 1919, telegrams began to reach Peking from Urga, asking for assistance, notably on March 19th, May 18th, June 15th and 29th. Finding that there was a party in Mongolia favoring China and Chinese assistance, the Chinese Resident Commissioner at Urga, Chen Yi, began a series of intrigues to persuade the Mongolians to return to the Chinese fold and to place their country again under Chinese control. His efforts through a period of six months proved unavailing, although the invasion of the province of Uriankhai by one of the Russian White armies under General Semenov complicated matters and rendered the position of Outer Mongolia precarious. In the fall of 1919, a special mission was sent to Peking from Urga asking for assistance. This was interpreted by the Chinese leaders to mean that the Mongols wished to return to China; while, as a matter of fact, the Hutukhtu, the President of the Council, the majority of the Council and the Legislature, and three out of the four Aimaks of Outer Mongolia were opposed to reunion with the Chinese Republic and Chinese rule in Mongolia. They were not averse to a mild form of Chinese suzerainty, but they preferred their own local independence and autonomy. It was re-

ported that only one half the population of the Aimak of Tuchetu, living near the border of Inner Mongolia, actually favored annexation with China in the hope of getting more trade, financial assistance, and protection through the officials of the Republic; while the population of the other three and one half Aimaks of Khalka tribes and a majority of the princes, chiefs, and lamas of Outer Mongolia opposed it. Undoubtedly, some few Mongolian Khans, who were jealous of the power of the lama priests and who were anxious to secure privileges and influence for themselves, advocated a return to Chinese sovereignty. And others, because of the failure to secure Russian commercial and political assistance, honestly approved of an *approchement* with China to secure adequate protection for property and trade and to obtain certain much-needed commercial and financial advantages.

The Chinese Government had certain perfectly good reasons, both political and strategic, for wishing to recover control over Outer Mongolia. In the first place, the Government of Outer Mongolia was too feeble to give adequate protection to the northern frontier and to resist successfully the encroachments of the Bolsheviki. In the second, the Peking officials were alarmed at the rapid spread of Japanese influence in the northern outlying provinces of the Republic owing to the unsettled conditions in Siberia, Manchuria, and Mongolia; and they were fearful lest the Japanese sphere of influence, since the Japanese were already laying claim to Manchuria and part of Inner Mongolia, would be extended till it included the former Russian sphere in Outer Mongolia. In addition, on account of the popular agitation over the Shantung question and the resentment aroused by its transfer to Japan at the Peace Conference, the Peking authorities thought it would be an excellent popular move to recover Outer

Mongolia. Such a territorial and political triumph would increase the popularity and strengthen the position of the Central Government — then so lamentably weak and inefficient because of the internal strife and confusion and the failures of its foreign policy.

Accordingly, the Peking Cabinet decided to accept the offer of the Mongol authorities at its face value and to make the most of the situation, even if it became necessary to use force to attain their ends. Acting upon the orders of the President of China and the Premier-General Tuan Chi-jui, General Hsu Shu-tseng — popularly known as “Little Hsu” — who commanded the Chinese forces in Inner Mongolia, marched an advance guard of his troops, of whom there were some four thousand already near the border of Outer Mongolia, to the vicinity of Urga and stationed them between that city and the residence of the Living Buddha — across the valley at the base of the Bogdo-ol, “God’s Mountain.” On November 10, 1919, he called upon the Hutukhtu, accompanied by Chen Yi and the assistant commissioners, En Hua and Li Hang, and tried to convince the Living Buddha of the great advantages of a reunion of Outer Mongolia with China. Failing in his efforts to win over either the Hutukhtu or the political leaders in Urga, he delivered an ultimatum on November 14th, demanding a favorable reply to his overtures within twenty-four hours under penalty of a resort to force and the carrying off of the Living Buddha to Kalgan in a motor car.

The answer was promptly forthcoming, and on November 17th, “Little Hsu” received an official petition asking for the reunion of Outer Mongolia with China and signed by five members of the Mongolian Cabinet and eleven government officials. It is noteworthy, however, that this document, which meant the end of the autonomous Mon-

golia, was not signed by the Living Buddha nor by the President of the Council, and that the second Living Buddha was in Peking from November 22d to the 24th — trying to prevent the annexation of Mongolia and appealing to the United States for aid. The successful general was welcomed with acclaim in Peking on November 25th, whither he had repaired with the petition, received at once by the President, and banqueted. On December 1st, he was appointed chief delegate to Urga (since he had proved his efficiency in this affair and successfully laid upon the shoulders of Chen Yi the blame for the earlier failure of all negotiations), and given charge of the work of adjusting the new relations between Outer Mongolia and China. He returned at once to Mongolia, arriving at Urga on December 27th, where, according to his own report, he received the greatest demonstration and celebration ever seen in the Mongol capital. Three miles out of the city, he was met by “an impressive delegation . . . of Mongol officials, princes, lamas, army (officers), gentry, and merchants,” who accompanied him through the city to his official residence amid great throngs of Mongols and Chinese in streets gayly decorated with Chinese and Mongol flags.

The Peking authorities officially abolished the old offices of Resident and Deputy-Residents at Urga on December 1, 1919, and the autonomy of Outer Mongolia came to an end. A new system providing for the government of Outer Mongolia and its future relation to the Chinese Republic was promised officially, but, temporarily, Outer Mongolia was placed under the control of the Bureau of Frontier Defense. General Hsu, as the Frontier Defense Commissioner, was to be assisted in straightening out the affairs of Outer Mongolia by the two former Deputy-Commissioners; and General Chu Chi-hsiang, commander

of the Chinese forces in Inner Mongolia, was ordered with three brigades to Outer Mongolia at the end of the year with instructions to coöperate with "Little Hsu." In addition, the Peking Government planned to establish wireless stations at Urga, Kobdo, and Uliassutai, to extend the Peking-Suiyuan railway from its terminus at Fengchen (near Tatungfu) to Urga, and to promote the trade of Outer Mongolia.¹

"The next step," exclaimed Premier Tuan Chi-jui at a banquet to General Hsu in Peking, "is to cultivate a close friendship between Mongolians and Chinese." Unfortunately, before the Chinese leaders could make good their promises and embark upon this excellent program, the Anfu Club régime in Peking, of which Generals Tuan and Hsu were leaders, was overthrown, in 1920, and the Chinese forces in Outer Mongolia were left to shift for themselves. In October of that year, Baron Ungern von Sternberg — known as the "Mad Baron" — leading a mixed force of Buriats, Mongols, and Russians, laid siege to Urga. He was a bitter opponent of the Bolsheviki, against whom he had fought with General Semenoff; and he accepted the invitation of Prince Djam Bolon — one of the chief Mongol leaders — to assist the Mongols, with the hope of executing a wild plan of uniting all of Mongolia in one state and using it in his contest with the Soviet Government of Russia. Unsuccessful at first, he returned in February with a well-equipped force of two thousand men including five hundred Russians and forty Japanese officers, and drove the Chinese garrison out of the city.

On February 25, 1921, Outer Mongolia was again declared independent, and within two months the whole

¹ Under the Republic, the government of Mongolia and Tibet had been delegated to the "Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs." Its Director-General and Associate Director-General were supposed to be Mongols.

country was again freed from Chinese control. Meanwhile, a new government was set up in Urga with Baron Ungern as commander-in-chief of the army and dictator. Chinese soldiers, Russian "Reds," Jews, and Mongols guilty of looting and acts of violence were promptly shot or hanged, and order was established with a high hand. The city was cleaned and its sanitary arrangements improved; an electric light plant and a telephone system established; newspapers published; bridges built over the Tola and Orkhon Rivers; hospitals and schools opened; and the Mongols encouraged to participate in their own government, while the Living Buddha was crowned King of Mongolia. Nevertheless, this new régime never reached a position of stability and strength, for its half-crazy promoter, who ran hither and thither, displaying great energy, but heartless cruelty mixed with unreasoning caprice in his political and military activities, never secured the whole-hearted support of the Mongol leaders.

After four months of despotic rule, the "Mad Baron," with characteristic impetuosity and without taking those elementary precautions so essential to success, led an attack in May, 1921, against the forces of Soviet Russia advancing into Mongolia from Siberia. His small army was easily defeated near Kiakhta in June and scattered; and, after two months of wanderings and adventures, he was captured and finally executed on September 15th. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces had advanced to Urga and taken over the control of the city and all of Outer Mongolia. The independence of Mongolia was recognized, and the "Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Government" established in Urga, through a council of ministers which, although containing a number of leading Mongols, was managed by its Russian communist members and advisers. As in other Soviet-controlled regions, an attempt was made

to communize the state. All titles were abolished, and every one became a "Tavarish" or "Comrade"; and the title-deeds to all real property were demanded. Heavy taxes were levied, and the Russian silver rouble became legal tender. Stringent reforms in finance, revenues, and trade followed, leading to a cessation of all trade for a time, except to Russia, which enjoyed special rates and favors. Pressure was exerted to convert every one to communism; and a regular reign of terror was instituted with numerous arrests, executions, and orders concerning habits of life, dress, and sanitation, the introduction of Soviet secret police, and efforts to replace the princes and hereditary rulers in the provinces and districts. All were nervous and afraid and no person dared to go out at night.

Finally, a Soviet-Mongol treaty was signed on November 21, 1921, providing for a mutual recognition of independence and protection, an exchange of representatives, and an immediate delimitation of the frontier. Russia agreed to furnish posts and telegraphs in Mongolia free, and customs tariffs and trade regulations were to be fixed by a joint commission; and Mongolia was to recognize right of property and to give ground space to Russia for buildings and railways; and thereafter, although all the Chinese were expelled by the end of 1922, a milder form of administration was instituted. The Tsetsen Khan, who had been Minister of Justice under the old autonomous régime, was restored to his former position, and other important Mongols admitted to the Council of Ministers. Liubarsky, a new Soviet representative, arrived in the autumn of the same year, and modifications were made in the financial and commercial regulations, resulting in a resumption of trade; and, in January, 1924, the Russian Envoy — Alexis Vasilieff — reached Urga, and promised Soviet coöperation in the development of Mongolian trade

and resources, with a scrupulous regard for Mongolian independence and rights.

Meanwhile, the Moscow statesmen signified to China their willingness to negotiate concerning the cancellation of all the treaties made by the Czarist régime with China and the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Early in 1924, Karakhan, the Soviet Commissioner, arrived in Peking; and by March 14th, he had reached a temporary agreement on all fundamentals with C. T. Wang, the Chinese representative. The Chinese Government, however, refused to accept the terms of the arrangement, in spite of all inducements and an ultimatum in the form of a threat by Karakhan to end all negotiations forever. Finally, after protracted negotiations — this time in charge of Wellington Koo — an agreement was reached and signed on May 31, 1924. In this treaty, Soviet Russia recognized that "Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China," and promised to withdraw its troops from that province as soon as a detailed agreement on the subject was reached and the safety of the frontier arranged for.

It is clear, therefore, that Soviet Russia is willing to return Outer Mongolia to the suzerainty and control of China whenever conditions are ripe; but the future of that province is still uncertain, for with the fall of the Chihli régime at the end of 1924, the settlement of the question of Mongolia was postponed once more. No one knows whether or no the new Chang-Tuan combination will approve the Treaty of 1924. Probably Outer Mongolia will be reunited with the Chinese Republic some day, but it is unlikely that the problem will be definitely settled until China has succeeded in establishing a stable government. Meanwhile, Russia is making the most she can of the situation. She has already alienated the large and valuable Uriankhai territory from Outer Mongolia. The Mon-

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gol representatives have been replaced by Soviet envoys, and a considerable Russian immigration has taken place.

The little state of Outer Mongolia is very weak, however, and needs much outside help in these troublesome times, in order to get on its feet politically and to organize its various communities into a self-sustaining state; and no nation is in a better position to give this assistance than China, owing to her geographical proximity, the earlier relations of her rulers with its princes and chiefs, and her special knowledge of the customs, language, and needs of its people.

Yet no one familiar with the situation in the outer provinces of China will admit for a moment that the reincorporation of Outer Mongolia in the Chinese Republic would solve either the Mongolian question or the problem of the outlying provinces; for the taking over of the Urga Government is only a preliminary step in the difficult and vital task of readjusting the relations of the outer provinces, with their various populations, to the Chinese Republic. The Mongolian problem is not simply whether Outer Mongolia shall, or shall not, be a part of the Great Flowery Republic. On the contrary, it is a great, complicated question, far-reaching in its significance and its influence, on whose successful solution hang the future government, happiness, and destiny of all the Mongol peoples of north-eastern Asia. Along with this must be placed the question of the government of the Uriankhai, the Khirghiz, and other Mohammedan peoples of Sinkiang, and the Tibetans of Koko Nor and Chinghai; and, in addition, there is the intricate and delicate problem of reorganizing the Chinese provincial administration throughout the whole of that great region extending from the Yalu River and the borders of Korea to the frontiers of Russian Turkestan and India, so that it will function properly.

The first great step in this work of reorganization and readjustment is the creation of a modern and well-equipped department or bureau of territorial affairs, which shall be empowered to make a thorough study of the whole situation, to map out a well-ordered scheme for the administration of all the outlying provinces, and to put the entire colonial service on an efficient, up-to-date basis. No suspicion of dishonesty or injustice or of graft should be permitted to arise concerning the colonial office either in Peking or in the territorial administration in the provinces. All the officials employed should be men of experience, integrity, and resource, who will provide the people of the dependencies with good government, just treatment, and public security; and, since to-day economic and political conditions are notoriously bad, the administration in the main inefficient and corrupt, and life and property without adequate protection — except in Manchuria, where General Chang Tso-lin is making valiant efforts to improve conditions — it is imperative that the Republic should clean up this “Augean stable” if it is to convince the Manchu, the Mongolian, the Turkis, and the Tibetan peoples, as well as the world at large, of its ability and right to rule these provinces.

Another important question to be determined is the form of government to be given these outlying provinces. It is generally admitted that the present administration has failed to meet the demands of the situation, and it is equally clear that conditions are not yet ripe for an extension to the territories of the system of provincial government used in the eighteen provinces. Shall, then, the old system of military rule be retained or shall it be superseded by some form which combines military and civil authority, as that in vogue in Manchuria to-day? Or shall it be replaced by an entirely new civil administration organized

on a non-partisan and efficient basis and combined with a new alignment of political divisions on just and racial lines? Past experience, however, both in China and in other countries, has demonstrated that, wherever possible, it is best to set up a civil régime, the military authorities being subject to civil officials and their functions limited to matters of national defense and police. In this connection, it is highly important that careful consideration be given to the question of linguistic and racial frontiers in determining the boundary lines and political divisions of the new provinces. It is vital that the interests and rights of the native populations be safeguarded, and that the people of one race, speech, and religion, such as the Mongols or Tibetans or Manchus, be permitted to organize as one political unit and to have a large share of local autonomy. Some provision also must be made whereby such districts as may be given self-government shall be allotted some representation in the Government of China, and a method provided through which other sections may acquire local autonomy and representation in the national legislative bodies.

As an illustration of this new form of organization, one may refer again, for a moment, to the present situation in Mongolia. It is evident that, in order to solve successfully that problem, it will be necessary to organize anew some sort of autonomous Mongol state. This new community should include a majority of the Tartar inhabitants of the present Outer and Inner Mongolia, Uriankhai, Durbet, Tarbagatai, Zungaria, and Barga; and the coöperation and assistance of the local khans and chiefs must be utilized in the reorganization. Just how much of this vast territory ought to be included in the new state will depend on local conditions, the fundamental principles adopted for the political division of the outlying provinces, and on the

result of the conferences between the Chinese Government and the Mongol leaders. The cornerstones of the new edifice should be religious equality, political representation, and racial justice. It is, however, no longer possible or practicable to unite all Mongol peoples in one state; nor is it desirable that this should be done; but the greatest care should be given to safeguarding the interests, welfare, and future of the Mongols of Mongolia, the Eleuts of Koko Nor, and the Eleuts and Chahars of Sinkiang; while an intelligent effort should be made to preserve the local independence and development of the Kirei and other Mohammedan tribes of northwestern Mongolia and Sinkiang, and the Tibetans of Chinghai.

It may prove advisable and prudent to organize Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Chinghai into one unit composed of two parts: a Mongol state and a territorial region — the latter comprising a number of semi-independent communities such as Uriankhai, Durbet, Kirei, Tarbagatai, Zungaria, Kashgaria, and Chinghai, to be admitted on a basis of equal representation as soon as conditions permit, or to be organized later into one or more independent states under proper Chinese supervision. In any event, it is highly desirable that the new Mongol state should not be hampered by unnecessary troubles and burdens, or financially encumbered with the expense of administering undeveloped, disorganized, or non-sympathetic districts. And all the new communities, including Manchuria — no matter what form the future reorganization and relationship with Peking may be — should be safeguarded in the field of economics and trade, so that their people may trade freely with the rest of the world and be assured of a normal economic life and development. They should be permitted to levy low tariffs on imports and exports wherever expedient, and should be assisted to develop the

natural resources of their lands so that their citizens may have opportunities for work and advancement, and their governments may be assured of regular and substantial incomes.

And finally, in the interests of public security, peace, and prosperity, it is essential that the boundaries of the new states, provinces, and communities should be marked with care and with justice to all the various racial claims. And special attention must be given to safeguarding the special commercial rights and interests of foreign states and corporations, guaranteed in the various Chinese treaties, which have already been legally and properly acquired within the territories of the outlying provinces. Yet this last action will require joint action and coöperation on the part of all the leading great powers, if it is to succeed and be a permanent adjustment. And the spirit of conciliation, justice, and fair play must prevail in all the general councils on these matters, where the welfare of China and the general interests of all the states concerned should take precedence over the special rights or the so-called interests of any one country or corporation. Meanwhile, the Mongols and the other native races inhabiting the outlying provinces will have to work out their own salvation; but administrative and financial aid from without is imperative — preferably from China.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEW PACIFIC

"THE Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter," exclaimed William H. Seward,¹ some sixty years ago. To-day, his prophecy is coming true before our very eyes; and the center of the world's civilization and activities, which during ancient and mediæval times was in the Mediterranean Sea and which from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century lay in the Atlantic Ocean, has now moved westward to the open spaces of the great Pacific. This vast ocean, with its islands, its archipelagoes, its coral reefs, and its "steaming equatorial waters," is ten thousand miles wide at the equator — from the Americas to Asia — and approximately ninety-three hundred miles long — from Bering Sea to the Antarctic Ocean. The eastern half, or about five thousand miles from the South American continent, is nearly devoid of islands. But west of the one hundred and fortieth degree of West Longitude, and for over two thousand miles up to the coasts of New Zealand and Australia, its waters are dotted with innumerable islands of all sizes and contours and values. They vary from isolated coral islets — uninhabited and difficult of approach — to large and beautiful tropical islands crossed by mountains and indented with bays and good harbors, while not a few possess considerable agricultural or mineral wealth. Here and there isolated ones, such as Yap, Fanning, Midway, and Guam, serve as cable stations; but the great majority are associated in groups, such as the Marshall, the Hawaiian, the

¹ Secretary of State under Lincoln.

Fiji, the Caroline, the Gilbert, and the Samoan Islands, or are members of the small Paumotu and Bismarck Archipelagoes, or of that group of wonderful islands known as the Malay Archipelago. One long and remarkable chain of islands runs in loops along the whole length of the continent of Asia from the Kuriles and the southern extremity of Kamchatka to Formosa, the Philippines, and Borneo, and marks off a series of miniature oceans known as the Okhotsk, Japan, Yellow, East, and South China Seas.

In area, the Pacific Ocean is larger than the entire land surface of the globe, and one and three quarters times that of the Atlantic; and a great continent, such as Asia, could be dropped into its central basin without touching the mainland in any direction. Its American coasts are mountainous and unbroken save by a few harbors such as those of Valparaiso and San Francisco, and the Gulfs of Guayaquil and California. But the Asiatic shores are lower and more varied, with numerous bays, gulfs, inlets, and harbors into which flow the great navigable waters of the Amur, the Yalu, the Yangtze, the West, and the Red Rivers.

The peoples inhabiting the islands dotting this vast expanse of water are divided into four groups: the Polynesians, the Melanesians, the Micronesians, and the Malays. Fiji is the meeting-place of the Polynesians and Melanesians. The first-named, dwelling in the islands to the east, include the Maori of New Zealand, the Tahitians, Tongans, Marquesans, and Samoans; and the last-mentioned inhabit the islands and groups of islands to the west of Fiji and as far as New Guinea, including the Solomons, Loyalty, New Hebrides, Louisiade, Santa Cruz, the Bismarck Archipelago, and eastern New Guinea. On this last great island the Melanesians come into contact with the Malays, who form the bulk of the population of the Malay Archipelago and

the Malay Peninsula. The Micronesians live on the more isolated groups of islands to the north and northwest of Fiji, such as the Gilbert, Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana islands.

The Polynesians are generally of a higher type and more civilized than the other races. With a reddish-yellow or bronze color, regular features, straight hair, and splendid physique, they are the most impressive and charming of the Pacific peoples. They have a high tribal organization with powerful chieftains or leaders, and they lay considerable stress on noble blood. They live simple yet industrious lives — each one doing his share of the work of the community, and by nature they are kind and hospitable. They are friendly to the white man, good-natured, and fond of oratory and talking — so much so that the Protestant missions and the opportunities they offered for speaking and social service appealed greatly to them. The Micronesians are a branch of the Polynesian family, but they are inferior, both in intelligence and in physique, to the members of the main group, from whom they are distinguished by well-marked differences in language, appearance, and institutions.

The Melanesians are less advanced in civilization and organization. Each group lives more or less to itself, and each tribe preserves its own autonomy and is ruled by a council of its own elders. Dark-brown, muscular and heavily built, with curly hair and flat noses, they resemble the negro races of Africa, yet are more warlike and wild. They possess a mediocre intelligence and a low standard of morality. They are by nature cruel, unfriendly, and treacherous; and they are disappearing more rapidly than the Polynesians before the advance of European civilization.

Yet all the peoples of the Pacific belong to that so-called group of savage races which possesses only the lowest form

of political organization and only a little of art, invention, expert handicraft, social or religious development, and organized labor, and which has suffered severely from wars, civil conflicts, inhuman customs, and lack of control. Not one of their tribal communities or so-called kingdoms ever had any political or military organization sufficiently powerful to enable it to offer any effective resistance to the armed ships and men from the foreign lands over the seas.

It was not the inhabitants of the South Seas, therefore, nor the presence of powerful competitors, that kept the European powers from extending their dominion into the Pacific. It was, rather, the difficulties and dangers of deep-sea navigation encountered by the little sloops and clippers of the early days, combined with the shroud of mystery that hung over the waters of the Pacific Ocean for centuries. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese and Spanish galleons, commanded by such intrepid explorers as Magellan, Mendaña de Neyra, and Quiros, entered the great ocean and visited a number of its more important islands. In the next century, the Dutch explorers appeared in the Pacific and got the upper hand over their Portuguese competitors. They acquired trading stations on Sumatra, Borneo, Java, and Celebes; and, about 1642, their ablest navigator — Abel Tasman — explored the coasts of Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, Tonga, and the northern Fiji Islands.¹ Then the veil dropped again; and for a hundred and twenty-five years the Pacific remained a closed book to Europeans. Finally, in the eighteenth century — between 1764 and 1784 — two groups of navigators — one French and one British — set to work to solve the mystery. The French were very unfortunate. Three of their gifted seamen with noble ships never returned. A fourth, De Bougainville, al-

¹ Tasman set out on his first voyage in 1642, and on his second in 1644.

though forced to turn back by sickness and the reefs, visited the main Samoan Islands, the Solomon, Society, and the New Hebrides groups.

On the other hand, the British voyagers were unusually fortunate. Byron — 1764–66 — visited the Gilbert group; Captain Carteret — 1766–69 — the Solomon Islands, the Santa Cruz group, New Britain, and New Ireland; Wallis — 1766–68 — Tahiti and the Wallis Islands in Low Archipelago; and Captain Cook — 1768–79 — in three voyages, the Cook, Loyalty, Savage, Hawaiian, Fiji, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, New Zealand, and Australia (including the whole circuit of this great island or continent). The result of these labors was that the Pacific was robbed of its terrors and mystery, every major island and cluster of islands was made known to the world, and the first era in the modern history of Oceanica was ushered in. The purpose of this work was ostensibly the improvement of commerce and the increase of knowledge. But secretly both powers were not averse to acquiring treasure or new territories; and their navigators were instructed to take possession, with the consent of the natives, of valuable regions that had not been discovered by any other European state. This did not hinder the commanders from using their own discretion, and Captain Cook, at any rate, did not hesitate to raise the British flag or mark trees as a sign of possession for Great Britain, without the consent of the local inhabitants.

But neither Great Britain nor France was ready to launch great colonial enterprises, or make great additions to its national domains. They simply wished to blaze a pathway for the promotion of their trade and their national interests; and neither state followed up systematically its first successes. Indeed, England considered these island possessions of little value, and Australia, where she estab-

lished a penal colony in Botany Bay in 1788, only fit for criminals. Another hundred years elapsed before, under the impulse of an unscrupulous and ambitious imperialism, an intelligent, determined movement was inaugurated for the partition of Oceanica. During this one hundred years, governments gave reluctant protection to ambitious missionaries and adventurous colonists who had obtained a foothold in various islands; and Great Britain and Germany, at least, were practically driven into the erection of colonial empires abroad through the skillful and intrepid movements of adventurous traders and colonists, the work of trading corporations such as the British East India Company and the German New Guinea Company, and the necessity for some form of control over the main channels of trade and intercourse.

The missionary expansion began in the year 1797 and extended over a period of fifty years.¹ The London, the Church, and the Wesleyan Missionary Societies established successful missions in Tahiti, New Zealand, the Tonga group, and Fiji, between 1797 and 1835, and the American Board of Foreign Missions in Hawaii in 1820. Following these came the Catholic fathers, who, under the direction of Monseigneur Solages at Réunion Island till 1836, and thereafter under Pope Gregory XVI, started missions not only on the islands mentioned above, but also in Gambier, the Marquesas, Wallis Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia. From these centers the gospel was later carried to all the islands of any consequence. Many of these missionaries were men of unusual ability, discretion, and force of character. They became advisers and counselors to the chiefs and head men of different island

¹ The first English mission was established on Tahiti (Samoa Islands) by the London Missionary Society. See Rev. C. S. Horne: *The Story of the London Missionary Society*.

communities, and exerted a remarkable influence over the natives. The first of these was Pritchard, who spent twenty years at Tahiti in the early part of the nineteenth century. He was followed, in the latter half of the century, by James Chalmers — or “Tamate,” as he was called by the natives — in New Guinea, Dr. George Brown in Samoa and New Britain, and Dr. L. Fison in Fiji. The work of these men, supplemented by the discriminating and tactful labors of such resourceful and able administrators as W. T. Pritchard (son of the missionary Pritchard) in Fiji and Sir William MacGregor in Fiji and New Guinea, not only resulted in the wiping-out of cannibalism, human sacrifice, infanticide, and other barbarous customs, and in improving materially the general conditions of life on the islands, but also laid the basis for the new polity established by the powers in the Pacific. They opened up communication with the natives along the coasts and far into the interior of the islands, inspired confidence in the white man, and made possible the establishment of workable relations between the officials of governing powers and native peoples.¹

Unfortunately, this period of missionary effort was accompanied — particularly after the middle of the century and down till the seventies — by a period of indiscriminate trading and colonization and occupation of lands which threatened to overthrow the good work already accomplished. Riff-raff, sailors, and beachcombers from trading and whaling vessels drifted into the tropical harbors and smiling islands, contributing a restless and undesirable element to the situation and vitiating the moral atmosphere of the region. Unscrupulous colonizers seized lands and

¹ Concerning the remarkable influence of the missionaries upon all phases of native life, see John Williams: *A Narrative of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands* (New York, 1837).

forced the natives into service on the plantations; and an extensive trade in "kanakas" or native laborers was inaugurated, in which the ships of various nations participated. Then the consequences of intercourse between the foreigners and the natives proved very serious for the latter. Occasionally, through carelessness, aliens brought diseases with them; and plagues of measles, whooping-cough, and tuberculosis spread over the islands like wildfire, carrying off thousands of the inhabitants.

This situation forced European states to extend their activities to the Pacific Ocean and to exert some form of control there. In addition, some form of protection for foreign subjects and property became imperative with the steady increase of foreign immigration after 1850, the occupation of lands and factories by alien planters and traders, and the extension of European commerce in Oceania. Nevertheless, none of the European powers were ready or anxious to establish empires in the Pacific. Great Britain, especially, was opposed to such a move. Her policy was: to promote trade without annexation or conflict, to maintain peace and friendly relations by policing the seas and stopping the slave-trade and other crimes, and to see that the native rights and needs were given paramount consideration; and for several decades she enforced this program — which included a large philanthropic element — and used her navy efficiently in the interest of the general welfare, without in the least extending British sovereignty in the Pacific.

Finally, it became evident to British statesmen that their policy — so excellent in principle — was not obtaining the desired results, and that peace, security, and protection — both for foreign trade and for the natives and their interests — could be secured only by the extension of British protection to the native tribes and the annexation

of certain strategic islands. Even then, these conservative officials did not change their colonial policy until compelled to do so by force of circumstances. The steady increase of European competition ultimately caused anxiety in governmental circles, for it looked as if the United States, France, and Germany might seize upon important centers of trade or islands, in their own interests.¹ There were more serious considerations, however. The trade in kanakas was getting beyond the control of the British navy — particularly at Fiji, the headquarters of this nefarious trade. Australia and New Zealand — British colonies just then emerging into semi-independence and importance, enjoying considerable trade with the Fijis, where there were over two hundred British subjects and 235,000 acres held under cultivation by them, and creating intercourse with Canada — exerted pressure in London to secure the annexation of Fiji and the opening of a series of commercial and naval posts between North America and Australia.

Thereupon, the English authorities, taking advantage of an appeal from King Thakombau for British protection, inaugurated a new colonial policy in the Pacific by the annexation of the Fiji Islands in 1874, and by the appointment of a High Commissioner of the Western Pacific in 1875, who was to reside at Suva, Fiji, and to have jurisdiction over all independent islands and places of trade in the mid-Pacific. Already, in 1873, Captain John Moresby,

¹ Planters and traders from the United States secured a predominant influence in Hawaii between 1852 and 1864; and in 1878, the American Government was ceded Pago-Pago in Samoa, which Americans had been using as a commercial station since 1872. France established a protectorate over the Marquesas in 1842 and over New Caledonia in 1853, while the competition of British and French subjects in the New Hebrides forced Great Britain and France to declare those islands neutral in 1878; and German trading corporations were energetically pushing their way into the leading trade centers of the Pacific in the early seventies.

of the British Navy, while surveying the deep-water passage of the China Strait, had hoisted the British flag upon the small islands of Basiliak, Hayter, and Moresby lying off the southeastern coast of New Guinea. Australians, who feared a German settlement on the mainland of New Guinea, promptly urged the annexation of Papua or southeastern New Guinea. Indeed, the assembly of Queensland demanded the annexation in 1875, but the Colonial Office refused to act.¹ Nevertheless, a new factor had entered into the situation in the Pacific which was to influence British policy more than all the efforts of British traders, missionaries, and colonizers, or the appeals of native chiefs and peoples. This was the entrance of the German Imperial Government into the field of Oceanica, and its move for territories and colonies.

In 1879, Germany obtained the right to use the harbor of Saluafata in Samoa;² and German trading companies were already preëempting valuable commercial outposts in various regions and setting up factories in the Carolines, the Marshalls, New Britain, and New Ireland. Bismarck was no colony man; but, in the early eighties, he was forced to take a vital interest in colonial affairs by the popular demand for colonies, an excess population continually on the increase, the operations of German commercial organizations and traders demanding protection, and the pressure from German manufacturing, financial, and mercantile interests; and he began to look about in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific for territories suitable for colonization, for markets and for trade, which had not

¹ The New South Wales Ministry urged annexation in 1876. Compare H. E. Egerton: *Short History of British Colonial Policy* (London, 1897), pp. 397-402.

² By the German-Samoan Treaty of January 24, 1879, trading privileges were accorded to Germany, but the independence of Samoa was recognized. On August 28, 1879, Great Britain negotiated a similar agreement with the Samoan chieftains.

been taken over or marked out as "spheres of influence" by other European powers. Lords Derby and Granville, the British Colonial and Foreign Ministers, failed to note this change; but they were convinced by the work and experience of Sir John Thurston in the Fijis and the mid-Pacific that the natives of Polynesia were incapable of forming or maintaining any government worthy of the name, and, therefore, that annexation or the extension of British protection to native states was fully justified; and, when the German Imperial authorities took steps to acquire territory in the South Seas, the British Government correctly recognized the German acquisitions, but immediately took steps to limit the areas of the new German colonies by dividing with Germany some of the most valuable insular lands.

In the latter part of 1884, German warships hoisted the German flag at three points on the north coast of New Guinea, and at ten different places on the islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and Sableland. Authentic news of this maneuver reached the British Foreign Office by December 19th; and Great Britain, anxious to protect the Australian as well as her own interests in those regions, took up the matter at once with the German Government. After a lengthy diplomatic discussion, a complete agreement was reached by the partition of eastern New Guinea between the two powers in an exchange of notes in April, 1885, marking the dividing line,¹ and by the declarations of April 6 and 10, 1886, defining the British and German spheres of influence in the western Pacific.² By these arrangements, Germany acquired about seventy thousand square miles of territory in northeastern New Guinea and the New Britain Archipelago (renamed the Bismarck Archi-

¹ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 76, pp. 66-68, and 778-809.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 77, pp. 42-45.

pelago), and Great Britain some ninety thousand square miles of land in southeastern New Guinea and a recognition of her other holdings in the South Seas; while a "conventional line of demarcation" was drawn between the British and German spheres of activity in the western Pacific, defined as the region lying between 15° North Latitude and 30° South Latitude, and between 165° West and 130° East Longitude. It was understood, moreover, that all regularly established colonies and the islands of Samoa, Tonga, and Niué were not included in this agreement; and that the subjects and ships of both interested nations should enjoy freedom of trade and equal treatment in both spheres of influence.

In 1885, Germany and France reached an agreement concerning their respective rights and interests in the Pacific; and, in 1887, Great Britain and France placed a mixed commission of naval officers in control of affairs in the New Hebrides.¹ In this manner a movement was inaugurated for the occupation of all the islands, which terminated in the complete partition of the ocean territories and the "absorption of all the odds and ends of the Pacific" by one or another of the powers, by the end of the century. In the course of this expansion, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898,² secured part of Samoa through an agreement with Germany and Great Britain in 1899, and took over from Spain at the close of the Spanish-American War, Guam,³ and the Philippines; while Germany,

¹ The administration of the islands was modified and improved by an Order in Council on March 15, 1893, and a French decree on February 28, 1901; and a joint protectorate was established over the Hebrides by the Anglo-French Convention of 1906.

² After the deposition of the Queen in 1893, the establishment of a Republic in 1894, and the approval of union with the United States by a popular vote.

³ Guam was ceded, and the Philippines were retained by the United States, while Spain was given \$20,000,000.

which had annexed the Marshall Islands in 1885, added part of the Solomon Islands by agreement with Great Britain in 1899, the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana (Ladrone) Islands (except Guam) by purchase from Spain, in the same year, and part of Samoa by treaty with the United States and England. Meanwhile, Japan was taking over the Pescadores and Formosa in 1895, part of Sakhalin in 1905, and looking about for further acquisitions in the Pacific; and the rest of the islands and archipelagoes passed, or had already passed, into the hands of Great Britain, Holland, and France. By 1905, the partition of the marvelous Pacific and its islands was complete, and the spheres of influence of all the powers carefully defined, and with the first years of the twentieth century began the new Pacific and its problems.

Great Britain heads the list in the variety and value of its possessions. Besides the great colonies of Australia, including Tasmania and New Zealand, the British control the Fijis, Louisiade Archipelago, Santa Cruz, Solomon (part), America, Ellice or Lagoon, Manihiki, Phoenix, Tokelau or Union, Tonga or the Friendly Islands, and the isolated islands of Gilbert, Niué, Pitcairn, Nauru, and Ducie, or a total area of a little above 22,400 square miles, excluding the New Hebrides held jointly by France and Great Britain. To this must be added the Cook, Antipodes, Auckland, Bounty, Campbell, Chatham, Kermadec Islands, and the territory of western Samoa,¹ which are dependencies of New Zealand and have an area of approximately 2200 square miles, and the territory of Papua in New Guinea and adjacent islands embracing an area of 90,500 square miles, which are now under the control of Australia. This brings the total area to about 115,000

¹ Includes the islands of Savaii and Upola with a combined area of approximately 1200 square miles and a population of about 41,000.

square miles; and, if we add to this the area of the great Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand,¹ the total of the British acquisitions in the whole of the Pacific — not including the 31,000 square miles of North Borneo — reaches the tremendous area of nearly 3,195,000 square miles — a little more than that of continental United States.

The next in order come the Dutch, who possess the Dutch East Indies or nearly the whole of the Malay Archipelago, including the wonderful islands of Java and Madura, Sumatra, Borneo (large part), Celebes, the Moluccas (with a half of New Guinea), and the Timor Archipelago,² with a grand total of over 733,000 square miles of territory and a native population of over 49,000,000. Then comes the United States, which holds Hawaii, Midway Island, Guam, the Philippines, and certain Samoan islands, with an area just above 121,700 square miles and approximately 10,600,000 inhabitants.

Germany had acquired the Bismarck Archipelago, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land or southeastern New Guinea, part of the Solomon Islands, Nauru, the Caroline, Mariana (except Guam), Marshall, and Pelew Islands with a total area of 96,000 square miles and a population of over 400,000; and France assumed control over New Caledonia, the Loyalty, Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, and the Paumotu and Wallis Archipelagoes, with a total area of 10,000 square miles, or over 15,000 with the New Hebrides, whose protectorate she shares with Great Britain, and a

¹ British Australasia comprises the Commonwealth of Australia (area 2,974,581 square miles and population over 5,000,000), Australian Dependencies of Papua and Norfolk Island, Dominion of New Zealand (area 103,658 square miles and population about 1,100,000) with adjacent islands, and the Crown Colony of Fiji.

² Portugal controls the eastern part of the island of Timor, the isle of Pulo Cambing, and the territory of Ambeno — altogether comprising 7330 square miles with a population about 378,000.





population of about 90,000 or, with the New Hebrides, some 150,000. Yet her interest in Pacific affairs is much greater than these small holdings would indicate; for France not only has a large trade with the Pacific and Far Eastern countries, but she has the valuable colony of French Indo-China which borders on the South China Sea and the Pacific.

The final step in the making of the new map of the Pacific came as a result of the Great War. In accordance with the secret treaties of 1917 between Japan and the Allies, the Nipponese Empire, under the Treaty of Versailles, was appointed mandatory to the former German possessions in the Pacific north of the Equator; and three groups of small islands: the Mariana or Ladrone (except Guam), the Caroline (including Yap), and the Marshall Islands were duly transferred to Japan by mandate of the Supreme Council of the Allies on May 6, 1919.¹ The commercial value of these new possessions is small; but their control — together with that of the Pescadores, Formosa, the Bonin Islands, and the island Empire of Japan itself — makes the Nipponese state a predominant factor in Pacific problems. Moreover, the new acquisitions bring Nippon right down to the heart of the South Seas and athwart the connecting lines (known as the "Quadrilateral") between the United States and its Pacific possessions,² and the trade routes used by all the powers, including Australia and New Zealand; and the control of the island of Yap — an important link in the cable connecting North

¹ League of Nations: Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator, approved by the Council of the League of Nations on December 17, 1920.

² This is measured by lines running from San Francisco via Hawaii to Samoa, Samoa to Guam, Guam to Manila, and from the capital of the Philippines back to Honolulu and San Francisco; and its protection is a problem in naval strategy.

America with Japan, China, the Dutch East Indies, and New Guinea (Australia) — and of several good harbors in the mid-Pacific gives her an invaluable strategic position.

Under mandates from the League of Nations, dated December 17, 1920, and May 9, 1921, Australia has assumed control over the territory of New Guinea — formerly Kaiser Wilhelm's Land — the Bismarck Archipelago, and that portion of the Solomon Islands formerly held by Germany; and, by a mandate of December 17, 1920, New Zealand has fulfilled its national aspirations and taken over the territory of western Samoa¹ (formerly the German Samoan Islands); while a mandate for Nauru Island — a valuable phosphate mine twelve miles in circumference with a remarkable wireless station — was assigned to Great Britain on the same date. In this way the British holdings in the western Pacific were rounded out and perfected, Australia and New Zealand given better protection and security as well as increased facilities for trade expansion, while the bridge of British islands from Canada to Australia and New Zealand, which Great Britain had erected with considerable effort, was greatly strengthened. Moreover, the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand, with their great natural resources and their recent growth in organization and power, have had their position greatly improved by the acquisition of the new mandated territories and have become important members of the Pacific family.

This is, in general, the final result of the partition of the Pacific and Oceanica; and this is the *status quo* guaranteed for ten years by the Four Power Treaty (Great Britain, United States, France, and Japan) signed at the Washington Conference on December 13, 1921. It must not be forgotten, however, that, on the eastern side of the Pacific,

¹ New Zealand seized these islands in the first year of the Great War.

Canada, Mexico, the republics of Central America, and the western states of South America — especially Chile and Peru — are all vitally interested in the trade and the future development of the Pacific world. So, also, are China, Soviet Russia, Indo-China, and India, on the western side. Only two of these countries — Canada and China — were represented at the Washington Conference; yet, some day all of their interests will have to be given full consideration in the general administration of Pacific affairs. The powers holding the largest territorial assets in the Pacific — Great Britain, United States, France, Japan, and Holland — are just now dictating the general policy in the affairs of the Pacific; but it does not follow that they will continue to do so forever, or that they will refuse to admit other powers to the charmed and favored circle.

It is evident, however, that the so-called problem of the Pacific is wrapped up in a reconciliation of the interests of all these states bordering on the Pacific or having possessions in its midst, so that international intercourse and trade in the Pacific World will be perpetuated on an equitable, just, and sound basis. This question is to be approached, not in a spirit of selfishness or of conquest, but of coöperation. Nations must strive "to minimize the faults of our international relationships," to use a phrase of President Harding; and their representatives must work together in the spirit manifested by the United States at the Washington Conference. "The United States welcomes you with unselfish hands," exclaimed the President in the opening address. "We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate nor apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have, we seek nothing which is another's. . . . We wish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good-will.

In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer coöperation. The world demands a sober contemplation of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us."

And, first of all, it must be recognized that the new Pacific presents not a single but a manifold problem. For the sake of clearness, the various questions at issue may be grouped under three headings. The first is strategic, and includes all those matters dealing with the problem of defense for the possessions of each of the interested states, the policing of the seas, the preservation of peace, the control of the centers of trade, communication, and commercial and naval supplies. The second is administrative, and has to do with the government or control of the various colonies, native states, and islands or archipelagoes. The third is social or educational, and is concerned with the protection of native institutions, rights, and customs, and with the promotion of the social, political, educational, and spiritual development of the different races of the Pacific — Polynesian, Melanesian, and Malay.

In the first, fortunately, considerable progress was made at the Washington Conference and in the negotiations that followed it. The burden of armaments and the danger of international conflicts were materially reduced through the Five Power Treaty (Great Britain, United States, France, Italy, and Japan) limiting naval armament. The Four Power Treaty recognized the *status quo* in the Pacific, agreed that the rights of the different powers "in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions" should be respected by each other, and provided for the calling of future international conferences to consider and adjust any differences or conflicts that might arise. In later negotiations and agreements, such as the American-Japanese

Treaty concerning Yap, that recognizes the right of all nations to use the island as a cable station and assigns to the United States two cables, Guam-Yap and Yap-Shanghai, and to Holland the Yap-Celebes cable, various difficulties concerning cable and wireless stations were straightened out. It is mutually understood and agreed — and the trade and intercourse of the world greatly improved thereby — that all the nations may use each other's harbors and ports of call, such as Honolulu, Pago-Pago, Tahiti, Suva, Sydney, Singapore, Hongkong, and Manila, for supplies, trade, and protection; and each state maintains order in its own territorial waters and in those of the islands under its control.

Nevertheless, there are some vital questions affecting the national security and the interests of various states or communities that remain unsettled and that are liable to cause friction or difficulties in the future. In this connection, it is important to recognize the special position of the British Dominions beyond the seas in relation to the new Pacific. Australasia has become the leading factor in the South Seas. Australia — an island and a continent all in one — has been called by Lord Rosebery the "Trustee of the Pacific," and its relationship to the United States has been designated by Sir Charles Dilke as "the key to the future of the Pacific." With a population of over 5,000,000, yet capable of sustaining one of 100,000,000, an area equal to that of continental United States, and enormous natural resources, producing annual federal revenues of about \$300,000,000,¹ this marvelous Commonwealth is a coming power in Oceanica. With the rest of Australasia, including New Zealand, one half of the great

¹ The Federal budget for 1922-23 was £64,700,000, and that of 1923-24, £61,900,000; the combined revenue of the States in the last-mentioned year was about £80,000,000.

island of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and various other chains of islands reaching as far as Fiji, Samoa, and the Cook Islands, it forms a group unapproached in location, resources, and unity of race and ideals by any other power in the Pacific.

Although Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain have been relieved considerably of the burden of defense by the Five Power Treaty, England cannot leave to Australasia alone the defense or the development of the South Seas. They are bound together by strong ties in the same empire, in which the Dominions take pride and in which the interests and influence of the Dominions is steadily increasing. The meetings of the Imperial or Colonial Conference at London, in which all the Dominions including India have been represented, and the enthusiastic coöperation of all sections of the Empire during the Great War, have strengthened the imperial unity as never before, and a new imperial organization is taking place in which all of the Dominions and the mother country will be adequately represented. Moreover, these same Dominions have their own representatives in the League of Nations, and coöperate with Great Britain in the furtherance of imperialist interests.

The interests of Australasia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States in the Pacific are nearly identical, and they stand solidly together in a general desire for peace, free and fair competition in trade, protection of the rights of native peoples, promotion of their own special interests, and the advancement of the general welfare. This Anglo-Saxon solidarity is certain to be a great factor in determining the future history of the Pacific. So strong is it that it may well dictate the general lines of policy to be pursued or dominate the whole situation. On the other hand, another combination is likely to arise with different

ideals and an opposite point of view, so that a stern conflict of interests may occur. This combination is an Asiatic one and will be inspired by the unity of Japan and China for the promotion of Asiatic or Oriental interests; and, if Soviet Russia should join forces with this group, it would indeed prove a formidable combination. The recent agitation over the question of Asiatic immigration has shown what difficulties are likely to arise from such a situation. Japan and India are incensed that their people are shut out from residence and labor in foreign countries, but Australia is determined to reserve her own continent for the white race, and Canada and the United States are equally resolved not to admit Asiatic laborers into their territories.¹ At the same time the problem is still further complicated by an imperative demand for labor in all these countries and in many islands of the Pacific. What this controversy may lead to in the future, no one can say. Fortunately, a real safety-valve has been provided in the Four Power Treaty with its provisions for international conferences in case of controversies; and the substitution of this same treaty for the Anglo-Japanese alliance is a great gain for peace and sound international relations in the Pacific. As President Harding remarked, "There is no commitment to armed force [in this treaty], no alliance, no written or moral obligation to join in defense, no ex-

¹ This is at bottom a great racial problem. "History makes it clear," writes Admiral Ballard, "that Europeans and Asiatics are so constituted that they can never inhabit the same country in peace, unless one occupies the position of an inferior race. Racial differences are inborn and constitute a factor in human affairs that cannot be abolished by speech-making around a conference table at Geneva. To ignore their existence is to depart from practical politics in settling international disputes. It is not a question of the superiority of this people or that, but simply a question of fundamental difference of mentality and social instincts." (Quoted by Aston in "Japan and Singapore," in *Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. 94, pp. 177-87.)

pressed or implied commitment to arrive at any agreement except in accordance with our constitutional methods." If this Four Power Treaty is in time replaced by a "Pacific Entente" of all states having interests in the Pacific Ocean on the same basis of international conciliation and coöperation, a very decided step will have been taken toward peace and progress in Oceanica and the settlement of difficulties without recourse to force.

Coming back to the second subdivision of the problem of the Pacific — i.e., the administrative — one is surprised at the number and variety of the questions awaiting solution. In the British self-governing Dominions, and in the Hawaiian Islands which have become voluntarily a part of the American Union, the problem of control and government is permanently solved and in the interest, and to the satisfaction, of the local populations. In all other parts of the Pacific, the administration of the islands and native peoples is still more or less in a state of transition, while the participation of the different peoples in their own government is nowhere complete. In New Caledonia and Fiji, popular participation is permitted through the agency of elected legislative councils, and in the administration of local affairs in the villages and local communities. But in New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, the Society, Tonga, American and British Samoa, Formosa, and the other islands and groups of islands, the government is entirely in the hands of the foreign administrators or governors and their deputies, except here and there where the native chieftains or tribal organizations are allowed to manage the local affairs of their communities.¹

This method of administration is well adapted to the

¹ For a detailed description of this kind of rule see Captain C. A. W. Monckton: *Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident Magistrate* (London, 1921), and *Last Days in New Guinea* (London, 1922).

present situation and for preserving peace in the Pacific, preventing tribal and racial conflicts, and giving adequate protection to trade and to native peoples and their properties; and it works very well for all the smaller islands and groups of islands, where the population is small, the tribal unity imperfect, and the inhabitants not far advanced in civilization or in the art of self-government — so long as justice is done to the interests, the rights, and welfare of the natives. In any case, no serious danger to peace and prosperity in the Pacific is likely to arise under this system.

On the larger islands and in the big archipelagoes, where one has to deal with thousands — yes, millions — of people of different races, of different degrees of intelligence, and in different states of civilization, the problem is quite different and much more complicated; and the various powers have all attempted to solve their own particular problems in their own ways and through different methods. In British Borneo, British North Borneo, with an area of 31,000 square miles and a population of over 200,000, is administered by a British Governor; Brunei, having an area of 4000 square miles and 25,500 inhabitants, is a protected state and administered since 1906 by a British Resident in the name of its raja or sultan; and Sarawak, whose area is 42,000 square miles and population about 600,000, is an independent state ruled by its own raja under British protection, although through a curious incident this raja is a Briton.

In the Dutch East Indies, a thoroughly autocratic régime was early established,¹ which, although some concessions have been made to the popular demands for a more liberal government, still remains autocratic. This wonderful tropical region, with its numerous rich and fertile islands, is ruled by a Governor-General appointed by the

¹ Clive Day: *Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York, 1904), ch. VIII.

Queen of Holland, who is responsible only to the Minister for the Colonies, who in his turn is responsible for the methods employed in the Dutch colonies to the Queen and Parliament. This administrator possesses extensive executive and legislative powers, and lives like a king in a great palace in the midst of a beautiful park. He is assisted by a secretariat of nine departments and an appointive council of five; and to him all the Residents, Assistant Residents, and Deputies, distributed throughout Java and the other provinces of the Dutch East Indies, are responsible. A "Volksraad" came into being in May, 1918, which is considered the first step in the development of self-government, and which is designed to represent the peoples of the Dutch possessions as a unit. It is composed of forty-nine members; and its speaker is nominated by the Queen. One half of its membership is nominated by the Crown; and the other half is elected by local councils, so that its composition will be one half native and one half European and Asiatic (Chinese and Arab). But it has no powers of legislation or action, save to approve the annual budget and the requirements concerning military service, and to advise the Governor-General when asked.

For administrative purposes the islands are divided into two groups: Java and Madura, and the Outposts or Outer Possessions. Java and Madura are divided into seventeen Residencies, and these again into divisions, regencies, districts, and villages; while over these various branches of the administration are Dutch Residents, Assistant Residents, three classes of Controleurs, Regents, District Heads, and two classes of Under-District Heads. The Outposts, embracing Sumatra, Borneo (a large part), Riau-Lingga Archipelago, Celebes, Molucca Archipelago, the small Sunda Islands, and one half of New Guinea, are divided into twenty provinces under Governors who have under them

the same hierarchy of Dutch officials as in Java. But, wherever possible, native rulers and chieftains and tribal organizations have been made use of, till a great bureaucracy of native officials exists in all of the provinces.¹ The keynote of this system is coöperation between the Dutch and the native officials; and the Dutch Residents and lower officials play the part of "Elder Brother" to the sultans, rajas, and minor chieftains.

In some of the provinces there are county and local councils, some of which are elected, but the greater number are appointive; and in some of the towns and villages there are parish councils. "Already some of the regents have been emancipated in their local administration and before long they will preside over a regency council, entrusted with the local government of the smaller districts. Of course, this new departure will be undertaken in regencies where the local government may be expected to be conducted in a modern spirit. A certain more general government control will probably remain, but in time the representative councils, which will be constituted for provinces of a larger type than the now existing ones, will exercise genuine self-governing powers."

In Java, there is a Dutch Supreme Court and a regular European system of lower courts. In the latter, European judges are assisted by native officials, who, it is expected, will supersede the former in course of time. In the Outposts, Governors and Residents hold court in important cases, but the lesser and local cases are left to the native chiefs and are settled in accordance with native law or custom.

On a number of the islands, native rulers still retain control of native states (in some instances reduced in size) and a large part of their ancient power under the super-

¹ Compare J. de Louter: *Handboek van het Staats- en Administratief Recht van Nederlandsch Indië* (The Hague, 1914), p. 28, 1914.

vision of Dutch Governors or Residents. Such potentates are the Sultans of Solo (Surakarta) and Jakjakarta in Java, Achin, Deli, and Jambi in Sumatra, Boni, Minahassa, and Gorontalo in Celebes, and the Sultans of Bali, Lombok, and Ternate. The sultans or rajas, when they move about on their official duties, carry golden umbrellas, as a token of their superior rank; while the governors of provinces and native regents bear green ones edged with gold. And, in some of the larger islands, there are native independent tribal organizations — shut off from the world and not far advanced in civilization, such as the Battacks of Sumatra — which are allowed to manage their own affairs under the vigilant eye of some neighboring government official.

This patriarchal and autocratic system has, however, worked fairly well in the main, in spite of certain serious drawbacks and handicaps. It was particularly bad under the old "culture system" in Java, which was designed to exploit the country and promote the rapid and extensive cultivation of the soil through the forced labor of the inhabitants. Fortunately, this system has passed out; but other vicious practices remain, such as the unjust and heavy land tax, and the methods whereby native officials enforce native labor on the public roads and in their own personal service. Moreover, very little has been done to give the masses primary education. The Dutch officials are highly educated and well-trained, and the native officials are also given an excellent preparation for their duties; but no opportunities are afforded to the great mass of natives for personal improvement or development. Primary education was introduced only about fifteen years ago in Java, and only about one person in five hundred has even the smallest education. In the Outposts, the percentage is much smaller, if one can say that there is any primary education at all.

Just how far this autocratic system ought to be liberalized; just how far the ideals and principles of self-government and local autonomy can be safely and justly introduced; how this transformation is to be accomplished without confusion and conflict and without upsetting the lives and prosperity of the natives; and whether any vital change in the present situation and methods is at all advisable until a much higher degree of civilization has been attained by the natives — are all questions of the highest significance, which the future will have to solve. Meanwhile, great forces are steadily working for the unification and development of the inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago. Greater intercourse, communication, and capitalization are being widely and staunchly supported by steady improvements in education, in legislation, in organization, and in administration.

In the Philippines, on the other hand, there is quite a different system in operation, although the general policy and purpose of the two governing powers are nearly identical at the present time. In taking over these islands, President McKinley followed in the main the policy of European powers in the Pacific; and our so-called "new foreign policy," as defined by Senator Lodge, consisted in "holding possessions on both sides of the Pacific Ocean for the protection and furtherance of our trade interests." Yet this attempt to protect and promote our commercial interests was not inconsistent with an honest desire to further the welfare of the peoples of the Philippines. "The highest claim of William McKinley to the gratitude of his countrymen," exclaimed Secretary Taft in 1907, "is that, in spite of the abuse and contumely heaped on his head for this policy, he placed our country in the forefront of nations as a civilizer and uplifter of unfortunate people." "If we assume power over a people merely from the lust

of power," continued Taft, "then we may be properly denounced as imperialists; but, if we assume control over a people for the benefit of that people and with the purpose of developing them to a self-governing capacity, and with the intention of giving them the right to become independent when they shall show themselves fit, then the charge that we are imperialists is without foundation."

It was in this spirit that the American administration was established; and this policy has been consistently pursued by the United States ever since the creation of civil government in the islands in 1901.¹ There has been no effort, or even the evidence of any attempt, to exploit the islands or its peoples for profit or for empire. On the contrary, millions of dollars have been spent and an intelligent and sustained effort has been made to improve intellectual, moral, and physical conditions, to promote the material welfare of the people, and to prepare them for self-help, self-control, and self-government; and this has been no mean task in the face of great handicaps, the lack of proper facilities, and the carping criticism and opposition of official and non-official personalities and parties both at home and in the islands.

The Philippine Archipelago, with a total land area of over 115,000 square miles and comprising some 3140 islands, ninety-two per cent of which is included in eleven large islands extending from Luzon in the north to Mindanao in the south, is one of the most remarkable outposts in the Pacific Ocean. It lies steaming in the tropical waters but a few degrees north of the Equator and separated from Asia by the great South China Sea, in the form of an isosceles triangle whose two legs are one thousand miles long and whose base is five hundred miles. The

¹ The Commission Government began to operate in September, 1900.

population of the Archipelago is over 10,300,000,¹ of whom about ninety-one per cent are Christian Malays and nine per cent are Moros and pagans. The people are, for the most part, still living in a primitive state; and they are very far from being homogeneous, showing marked differences in race, tribal organization, customs, and language. The Christian Malays are divided into seven chief tribes, i.e., the Tagalogs, Pangasinanians, Pampangans, Ilocanos, Bicol, Visayans, and Cagayans, of whom the Tagalogs, living in Manila and Central Luzon and numbering about 2,000,000 souls, are the leaders and the ones best known to us as Filipinos. The Moros are Mohammedans, are divided into three distinct divisions with different languages, laws, and customs, and are the most warlike and unruly of the various peoples. They have always been piratical in nature, preying on the other inhabitants of the islands and being held in check only by the Americans, whom they respect and like. "We wish to be governed by the Americans," exclaimed Datu Benito — a prominent Moro chieftain — when a Filipino official was presenting the province of Lanao in Mindanao to the Civil Government. "They have done us great good and we like them. By their rule we have become prosperous and we thank them for that condition. But I wish to inquire who is this Filipino who gives our country to the American Government? What right has he to give the country of the Moros to anybody? Did he or any other Filipino ever have a right to say that a single foot of Moro soil was his? For many years before the Americans came, we fought the Spaniards and Filipinos to a standstill. We have had the Filipinos in abject terror for generations; withdraw the

¹ General Wood's *Report* of 1921 gives the number of islands of any importance as about three thousand, and the population as 10,956,000, of whom 9,350,000 are Christians.

American Government from the islands, and within a year the Philippine Islands will be governed by the politicians in Manila. But we — the Moros — will rule the southern islands and will again be the terror of those in the North.”

The number of pagan tribes is considerable, and they include the five groups of Igorrotes: i.e., the Ifugaos, Ilongots, Kalingas, Katanaganes, Tingians, and the six divisions of Negritos or small black aborigines; and it is a tremendous problem to unite all these various peoples into one state and to erect a just and stable government over the whole archipelago. The differences in race, religion, and customs raise great obstacles to any real union; but the most serious impediment to national unity is the Babel of languages that exists. There is no tongue that can easily be made universal. Spanish never came into use extensively, but was confined mainly to an educated minority; and the progress to date in English has been lamentably slow, for the great majority in the interior still understand nothing but their local dialects. Yet for the success of any future Filipino state, it is imperative that the use of some one language should become general. Moreover, it will be necessary for the same Filipino administration to solve the thorny problem of maintaining order and peace among all the different peoples. It has taken the United States twenty years to put down bandits, abolish piracy, and establish order and security throughout all the islands — something the Spaniards were never able to do. And for some years to come it is exceedingly doubtful if any local organization — Filipino or Moro or any other race — or even any other outside power, could maintain so successfully order, security, and prosperity in the Philippine Archipelago.

The United States achieved her success through three agencies: a small standing army and an excellent native or

Filipino constabulary, an admirable administration reaching to all the islands and made as democratic as possible, and education — free, secular, and co-educational.¹ As to the last, it is only necessary to recall here how, when the civil government was inaugurated, the United States brought out eight hundred teachers, used its soldiers not only to maintain order, but also as health officers, teachers, and advisers in many local communities, and executed the remarkable work of organizing elementary education and of founding higher, normal, technical, and industrial institutions of learning and scientific training under the supervision of such men of genius as Drs. David P. Barrows, Fred W. Atkinson, and M. W. Marquart. Millions were expended on public education, including the generous grant of \$15,000,000 in 1918 for extension of elementary schools. By 1921, there were some 7659 public schools with over 350 American and 14,000 Filipino teachers and a million pupils, fifty provincial high schools, twenty trade, thirteen large agricultural, fifteen farm settlement schools, and a number of special governmental institutions such as the Philippine Normal School, School of Arts and Trades, Central Luzon Agricultural School, Philippine Nautical School, School of Commerce, and the University of the Philippines, together with numerous private colleges and schools, maintained by missionary organizations.

The American civil administration was organized under a Governor-General appointed by the President of the United States, a Vice-Governor or Executive-Secretary to supervise the local government, and a Commission of Five — later seven, then nine — acting in a legislative capacity. There were four executive departments: Interior, Commerce and Police, Finance and Justice, and Education — headed by American commissioners; and in 1907 a Philippine

¹See Dean C. Worcester: *The Philippines, Past and Present* (New York, 1921).

elective legislative assembly of eighty-one members was created; while the Philippine representation on the Commission was raised from three to four.

From 1913, after the appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General by President Wilson, a movement toward complete local autonomy set in, which lasted till the election of President Harding and the appointment of General Wood as Governor-General. Simultaneously there was a great lessening of efficiency in all departments of the administration which had been created by such able men as William H. Taft, Generals L. E. Wright and James T. Smith, and W. Cameron Forbes, a general extravagance and wastefulness, a scandalous political competition for the control of the Government led by the Nationalist Party; and the Filipinos were given a majority on the Philippine Commission, while Governor Harrison inaugurated the policy of appointing Filipinos to the higher posts of the administration. So extensively was this Filipinization of the public service carried on that at the end of seven years the number of Americans in office had been reduced from 2674 (in 1913) to 760, while the number of Filipinos rose from 6603 to 12,047. This policy made American officials uncertain of their tenure of office; and a large number of the most capable and experienced Americans—not only in the Government, but also in educational and scientific work—took advantage of the Pension Act of 1916, and resigned. Others followed suit to enlist when the United States entered the Great War. Altogether, changes in the personnel of the chiefs and sub-chiefs of departments resulted in reducing the number of American officials to twenty by July, 1920, and in raising the Filipino administrators to thirty.

Meanwhile, Congress, by the passage of the Jones Act on August 29, 1916, gave to the islands a representative

government with extensive powers. The Philippine Commission was superseded by a Senate of twenty-four members — two elected from each of twelve senatorial districts except the twelfth, which is composed of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, the Mountain Provinces, Baguio, and Nueva Vizcaya, and whose Senators are appointed by the Governor-General. The old Philippine Assembly was replaced by an elective House of Representatives with a membership of ninety-three including nine appointees representing Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Zamboanga, Sulu, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Mountain Provinces. Suffrage was extended to all males over twenty-one who had been legal voters under the law of 1902, who owned real property to the value of two hundred and fifty dollars, who paid yearly taxes amounting to fifteen dollars, and who were able to read and write Spanish, English, or a native language; and, in 1918, a Council of State was created, which is composed of all the heads of the executive departments and the presiding officers of the two Philippine Assemblies. It acts as a link between the executive and legislative departments, and, under Harrison, it superseded the Cabinet and acquired tremendous power in shaping legislation and in the direction of the government.

Moreover, all the departments of State, except that of Education, are headed by Filipinos; and thirty-four of the forty-eight provinces have elective Governors who with two other elective members form the legislative branch of the Provincial Government. In the other or special provinces, the Governors are appointed. The government of the municipalities is in the hands of a President, a Vice-President, and a Municipal Council of from eight to eighteen members, all of whom are elected by popular vote. In the administration of justice the Filipinos fill four out of nine positions on the bench of the Supreme Court (in-

cluding that of Chief Justice), and a very large percentage in all the courts of the first instance in the twenty-seven judicial districts; while a Philippine National Bank was organized under Filipino control with eleven branches and forty-one provincial agencies, and in 1920 claimed assets of over \$118,000,000.

In this way the control of their own affairs was virtually handed over to the Filipino peoples; and Governor Harrison permitted the Nationalist Party, led by Quezon, Osmena, and Company¹ to run the country pretty much as it pleased. And what happened? The cost of administering the government increased threefold — the sum spent on salaries and wages rising from 18,000,000 pesos in 1913 to 60,000,000 in 1920, while the income of the State rose from 30,000,000 pesos to 80,000,000. In five years' time, the national bank was wrecked, the Government bankrupt, every branch of the administration demoralized, while every department of the public service and public works, including the roads and national highways — so efficiently organized and operated under Governor Forbes — was shot through with inefficiency and neglect. At the same time one small group of *politicos* in the saddle were consolidating their cohorts and their control over the country, playing politics to the limit and clamoring unceasingly for independence. So serious did the situation become, however, that the United States was forced in 1921 to send out a commission of inquiry, headed by General Wood and ex-Governor Forbes, to investigate the situation and report what must be done to reëstablish efficiency and stable condition in the islands; and, to-day, Governor Wood, who has restored the constitutional

¹ Manuel L. Quezon was President of the Senate and Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House; while the Nationalists controlled both Houses and the Council of State.

authority of the Governor-General, ex-Governor Forbes, and William T. Nolting are exerting every effort to reorganize the finances, restore efficiency and order in the administration and in the public service, and to give the country economic security and prosperity.

Just what will be the outcome of the labors of the Commission and the new Governor-General, it is too early to state. But it will not be independence — in spite of the popular clamor on the arrival of the Commission: "Judge us, then Independence." For a careful study of the report of the Commission and of all the facts in the case led President Coolidge to state concisely and firmly, in an open letter to Señor Roxas, on February 21, 1924, that "the American Government is convinced that it has the overwhelming support of the American Nation in its conviction that present independence would be a misfortune and might easily become a disaster to the Filipino people." For, the President maintained, "it is to be doubted whether, with the utmost exertion, the most complete solidarity among themselves, the most unqualified and devoted patriotism, it would be possible for the people of the islands to maintain an independent place in the world for an indefinite future." And it is, indeed, generally admitted that the Filipino people are neither ready to assume nor capable of assuming, alone, the great burden of protecting the islands against external foes, of maintaining peace within their own territories, of educating and training the great population, and of promoting the economic and financial prosperity of the archipelago. "Although they have made wonderful advance in the last quarter century," continues President Coolidge, "the Filipino people are by no means equipped, either in wealth or experience, to undertake the heavy burden which would be imposed upon them with political independence." And

he warns them that, "by reason of their assurance against attack by any power; by reason also of that financial and economic strength which inevitably accrues to them; by reason of the expanded and still expanding opportunities for industrial and economic development — because of all these considerations, the Filipino people would do well to consider most carefully the value of their intimate association with the American Nation."

Moreover, after assuring the Filipinos that the American people "have never entertained purposes of exploiting the Filipino people or their country," but that the American Nation had undertaken the responsibility for the Philippine State unsought, as a moral duty, he firmly announces that "the American people will not evade or repudiate the responsibility they have assumed in this matter." In this connection it is important to remember, not only that the majority of the best people in the Philippines neither support the claim of serious grievances against the United States nor desire independence at this time. They realize that it would be a real misfortune for the islands. Even the leading *politicos* do not really want it. What they do earnestly desire is to see the Philippine Islands remain under the control of the United States and under the protection of the American flag, while they are supplied with the money to finance the administration and permitted unhindered to run the show themselves. But to this, the Americans should never consent; for they cannot bear the responsibility for affairs without the power of control.

Yet, in spite of the mistakes of both Americans and Filipinos, the Filipino people are immeasurably better off than before the American occupation of the archipelago, and are enjoying more freedom and greater advantages for educational and material development than any of the other peoples or races of the Pacific. "Twenty years ago

the Filipino people were benighted, superstitious, slow-footed, unkempt, undersized, undernourished, and diseaseridden," wrote Eleanor Franklin Egan in 1921. "To-day you look at the children and realize that a new people, actually, is in process of development. That is the best thing the United States has done in the Philippines. Contact with Americans has resulted for the Filipinos in a physical betterment that is almost miraculous." But this was not all, for America has by no means shirked in its duty. It has, on the contrary, set a new standard for the care of tropical peoples. It has cleaned up the pesthole of Manila and transformed it into a beautiful and sanitary modern city; eradicated epidemic disease all over the islands; established the finest hospitals and hospital service in the East; introduced broadcast a modern system of education; reclaimed thousands of acres of land; "cleaned up barrios and villages and towns; gone out after animal diseases and blights; opened up big stations for agricultural experiment and instruction; started civic movements all over the archipelago to save babies and check the ravages of tuberculosis; harmonized no telling how many peoples of different tongues, traditions, and dispositions under a single language and a single hope; established a splendid colony of lepers and handled all the lepers ourselves, because no Filipino could be induced to do it; got in among the dreaded wild men and induced them to recognize the advantages of baseball over head-hunting as an outdoor sport." — And so on.

Nevertheless, the Filipino people have a long way to go yet to achieve national unity and solidarity, to reach the place where any organized Philippine Government will be really and justly representative of all the different races, and to arrive at the point where their political, financial, and economic training, their acumen as administrators, and

the development of their national resources will justify the American Government in launching the Philippine ship of state alone upon the turbulent waters of the Pacific under its own officers and crew. And it is not yet evident which of the two systems — the conservative one employed in the Dutch East Indies or the liberal one used in the Philippine Archipelago with its rapid evolution of representative government — is the wiser or the one best suited to the peoples and to the conditions of life and thought and belief in the South Seas.

To grasp the full significance of this problem, it is necessary to return for a moment to the third subdivision of this question, as defined above, which deals with the social side of the problem and the promotion of the social, educational, and spiritual development of the different peoples of the Pacific.

During the past hundred years, all the islands, archipelagoes, and lands of the Pacific Ocean have been explored and partitioned among, or placed under the control of, one or other of the great powers. This movement in its inception and execution was largely a selfish undertaking, conceived in a spirit of adventure, a longing for geographical knowledge, and an insatiable ambition for trade and empire. But much was learned through the history, the experience, and the developments of these long and tragic years; and, in the twentieth century, a New Pacific has come into being and the world has come to look upon the peoples and problems of Oceanica in an entirely new light.

The most serious blunders, resulting in enormous financial and economic losses to European states and in terrible suffering on the part of native peoples, have been recognized and intelligent efforts made to correct them. It is now generally admitted that the attempt to acclimate the white man in the tropics is a bungle of the first order; that the

exploitation of native peoples and the natural resources of their countries simply for the gain of foreign powers is not only a ruinous commercial or colonial policy for the home state, but disastrous in its effects on tropical colonies and communities; and that good government and the maintenance of peace are not to be expected from the savage and partially civilized races except under perpetual supervision.

On the other hand, nations have come to recognize the work of administering and developing Oceanica as a trust of civilization. To use the words of President Harding, "The time has come when nations must devote themselves to the common good. No program which seeks to subvert nationality will succeed. . . . We stand at the dawn of a new day in which nations shall be stronger for their contribution to world betterment, because each shall feel an assurance of a common purpose, united aspiration, and security in a common devotion to the ends of peace and civilization." The maintenance of peace and the development of civilization in the Pacific are as important and vital to the happiness and prosperity of the world as in any other portion of the globe. It is equally essential that the best in our European or Western civilization — and not the worst — should be brought to the South Seas, and to all the East. The powers should be as eager to assist the less fortunate peoples of Oceanica as they are to aid the Chinese, the Annamites, or the Indians (Hindoos); while the Western leaders and administrators and workers should be keenly alive to secure the confidence and coöperation of Eastern chieftains, rulers, and people.

Moreover, Western states have recognized the high value of individual and civil liberty, both in the development of civilization and in the cultivation of self-help, self-respect, and self-reliance among dependent races. So the value of human life has risen; and the powers are assiduously culti-

vating communal or local liberty in various forms from the lowest kind of tribal government up to the representative form of autonomy practiced in the Philippines. Care is being taken to develop native customs, languages, industries, and institutions, instead of imposing upon either the dependent races or the civilized states of the East and the Pacific the manners, ideals, methods, and institutions of the West — except where the Western processes are suitable to the situation and really helpful, as in the fields of medicine and sanitation.

Finally, nations have recognized at last that governments do not necessarily represent the will or the wishes of the people, and that, when they fail to operate in accordance with the popular demands and to promote the public welfare, their existence is no longer justified. In determining the form of government in the different regions, considerable stress is placed on the political genius or fitness of each race or people to govern itself, and on its economic ability to develop natural resources and industries and to provide adequately for the needs of its people.

But this is not all. The world stands to-day on the threshold of a new international life; and many vital and tremendous problems remain to be solved before world peace and international relations will be established permanently upon a sane and sound basis. Agreements at the Washington Conference recognized the present *status quo* in the Pacific and provided for the calling of international conferences in case of conflicts or troubles. The Four Power Treaty guarantees this *status quo*, and, through the activities of the League of Nations and the leadership of great powers, every effort is being made to maintain peace through the submission of all international difficulties and disputes to arbitration, to the League Council for settlement, or to the Permanent Court for adjudication. The

problems of the East and of the Pacific, however, will not be solved, nor the permanent peace of the East be achieved, by these means and methods alone — excellent as they are. Alliances and leagues are valuable, but they are too largely negative and cumbersome to serve in this case. The operations and the progress of the future call imperatively for coöperation and responsibility, if real success is to be achieved. The undue predominance of one or of a combination of states, acting in its or their own interests, is no longer the recognized panacea for the troubles of the East and the South Seas. There should be an equality of forces and governments operating along just and fair lines to promote a healthy growth of international competition and life, and to encourage the material and spiritual development of the populations concerned. There should be an identity of conviction and a community of interest to inspire coöperation and a free and fair competition.

It is not sufficient to promote the material development and to improve the external environment of the native peoples of the East and of Oceanica — primitive or civilized. The elevation of the personal character of the inhabitants is even more essential; yet the methods of approach are so circumscribed and the means at hand so limited and sensitive that this problem is the most delicate and difficult with which the Westerner has to deal. The European or American is merely a "papalagi," or outsider, in the Pacific. He can influence the development of native races only through the application of force in various forms or through the medium of a splendid, inspiring character acting sympathetically and tactfully in friendly coöperation with native leaders and in conformity to native customs and ideals. The day when a people could be led into righteousness through force and fear is past; yet, to promote the welfare and moral development of a race or nation,

discipline is the first essential and confidence the second. And it is now universally recognized that discipline may be successfully achieved by the general coöperation of chiefs and people inspired by confidence in the integrity and disinterestedness of the outsider; although some further motive, such as the desire for independence, the love of peace, the wish for gain or gratitude to the "papa-lagi," may prove a helpful incentive to arouse the native to active labor for the common welfare, or to work out his own salvation — both economic and spiritual.

In the old world — now new — which we designate under the caption "Far East and the Pacific," there are now three movements or impulses engaged in a silent conflict — the Teutonic, the Asiatic, and the Slavic; and the future civilization of the East and of Oceanica depends upon the outcome of this conflict. The Teutonic civilization — virile, progressive, democratic, enlightened, yet (alas!) materialistic and tinged with love of power — is at present the most powerful. Its systems, its theories, its ideals, and its platitudes are ably championed by the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australasia, whose brilliant organizers and administrators have carried their language, their inventions, their institutions, and their religions into the very heart of Asia and the Pacific. The ancient civilizations of Japan, China, Siam, Indo-China, and India, although bearing the brunt of the Western onslaught and losing much of what is least valuable, are holding their own under the clever and intelligent leadership of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian scholars and statesmen, and will have much that is worth while to contribute to the new civilization of the future. The Slavic civilization — at present under the domination of the Soviet Russian Government and the ideals of Bolshevism — has some characteristics and impulses of its own that are bound

to be felt in the life and thought of the East; and the Malays and Polynesians have some things to contribute as well. Yet there are many points where these currents cross or meet; and conflicts, troubles, and disaster are inevitable, unless the mighty captains of industry, of trade, of the ships of state, and of intellectual and religious movements are able to steer clear of the rocks. So, then, the great problem of the future is the welding of all these civilizations or impulses, through conciliation, coöperation, and compromise, into one harmonious unity that shall best promote the welfare of the human family while preserving the entity, the national personality, and the institutions of each and every member.

Yet it must be recognized that this new civilization can, and will, be accepted only in different degrees and forms by the various races and peoples; and, in the course of its evolution, some suffering, losses, and hardships will of necessity be imposed upon native communities. Changes do not occur without sorrow and tribulation. Already, alas! the penetration of Western civilization into the East and the Pacific has brought in its train decay, anguish, and death. The Melanesians and Polynesians are disappearing from the Pacific isles, while vice, rum, and disease have played havoc with the light-hearted inhabitants of the South Seas, the slow-minded Annamites, and the more intelligent but game-loving Chinese. So it behooves the leaders of the new movement to act with caution; and an imperative duty is laid upon all the leading states to direct the progress of civilization in the East and the Pacific so that the transformation will fall as lightly as possible on the weaker and more dependent peoples, so that only the best and most helpful influences will reach them, and so that the rights and welfare of each and all shall be safeguarded. On the other hand, peoples of greater intelligence

and capable of a much higher development, such as the Chinese, Koreans, Annamites, and Hindoos, should be encouraged and given every opportunity to achieve a high national destiny and to contribute their share to the new civilization. Finally, a sustained and intelligent effort should be made by a systematic study of the situation and its needs to create a common basis for combining the activities of the different groups, and to enlist all of the states and peoples in a whole-hearted support of the movement.

Everything depends upon the ability of the great powers to "see eye to eye" in world affairs, and to assure complete freedom of action and development to every nation. "We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives," said Sir Edward Grey in 1915, "working out their own form of government for themselves, and their own national development, whether they be great nations or small states, in full liberty." This applies to nations and peoples all around the world. Above all, it is incumbent upon the leaders, the scholars, and the statesmen of all nations to cultivate the power of imagination and of sympathy so that they may enter into and understand the position, problems, and policies of other countries and other statesmen, realize what their aims and aspirations are, and learn how to deal with them sympathetically, fairly, and discreetly. Ignorance, to-day, is a crime in international politics; and lack of vision to comprehend the political, the intellectual, the moral, and the social currents of the times is hardly less culpable.

APPENDIX

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
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